










Eid-Sabbagh, Karim-Philipp (2015) A political economy of water in Lebanon : water resource management, 










Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
A Politial Eonomy of Water in
Lebanon: Water Resoure Management,
Infrastruture Prodution, and the
International Development Complex
Karim-Philipp Eid-Sabbagh
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
2014
Department of Development Studies
SOAS, University of London
Delaration for SOAS PhD thesis
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the SOAS, University
of London onerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is
my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also
undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another




This thesis argues that the interation of the International Development Complex  the network
of international development ators  and the Lebanese water administration generally follows the
patterns of reprodution of existing Lebanese power strutures and relations. This interation
is analysed through its eets on the hydrosoial yle. The soially unjust and eologially
unsustainable watersape whih took form after the ivil war (and as a result of it) is reshaped in
this interation and reprodues the unequal aess to water.
The interation is shaped by the at times opposing logis of the ators. The IDC's involvement
is guided by a neoliberal development ideology. The Lebanese elite ats following a logi of power
reprodution entred on the ontrol of nanial resoures, ontrol over administrative bodies,
and the division of territory. When these logis are at odds the elite's logi generally subverts
water setor development projets and reform attempts to inorporate its own needs. The IDC's
ontinuous eorts to shape the water resoure management proess disregard the strutural roots
of their failure and it is unwilling and inapable to address these. As a result promoted solutions are
inherently inapable of delivering promised progress. Thus the ontribution of the IDC to power
reprodutive dynamis beomes the most signiant outome of this interation. This happens
along four lines at varying sales: 1) the ideology of the IDC reinfores the atually existing
neoliberalism and foreloses alternative forms of water resoure management; 2) IDC funding
for infrastruture supports the reprodution of the existing aumulation regime and inuenes
developmental priorities aording to its own priorities; 3) the administration is inreasingly shaped
aording to neoliberal templates that annot but maintain its strutural shortomings beause
the elite's ontrol over it is not and annot be fundamentally hallenged; 4) the Lebanese water
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Introdution
The study presented here is an investigation of the politial eonomy of water in postivil war
(19751990) Lebanon and the role of international development agenies and related organisations.
I will later dene these as the International Development Complex (IDC). It is an attempt to plae
the politial eonomi proesses related to water resoure management, infrastruture development,
alloation and governane of the resoure into the larger politial eonomy of the ountry. In this
sense it is a study in politial eology, as it must relate politial eonomi proesses to the natural
and environmental onditions and proesses governing the ows of water through the Lebanese
territory. It does this through the appliation of the onept of the hydrosoial yle (Linton &
Budds, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2009).
A spei fous on the politial, and by extension power, in sholarship about water resoure
management is aording to Peter Mollinga (2008) relatively new. He frames the expanding
amount of work on the politial dimensions of water resoures management (Mollinga et al.,
2008, p. 8) under the phrase politial soiology of water resoure management and points to the
importane of analysing the politial aspets of water resoure management.
The entry point to the politis of water resoure management in this study will be a fous on
the proesses of infrastruture development, as it is at the root of all distribution and treatment
of water and waste water. Other resoure management tools  suh as environmental laws,
water rights and other legal mehanisms, demand management by way of prie strutures and/or
other inentives  inuene the infrastruture prodution proess but also depend on the spei
tehnologial arrangement for supply and disharge (aording to a given poliy).
How water resoure management poliy omes to be is the result of a number of intertwining
proesses inuened by numerous ators or atants and not least by nature or soionatural ar-
rangements themselves. In Third World ountries the water authorities and related administrative
bodies are joined by international development agenies, bilateral agenies, donors and NGOs: in
short, the IDC. These have onsiderably more lout with regard to the development proess in
general and the water development proess in spei than is the ase for industrialised ountries.
The literature relating to water and development is extensive, but the role of international
development agenies in it has only reently begun to be addressed. The World Bank and aspets
of its role in water development politis has been ritially analysed. Karen Bakker (2013), for
example, traes the evolution of World Bank poliy on domesti water and interprets it as an
attempt to extend the biopolitial power of the development state (see Bakker, 2013; Goldman,
2005). Franois Molle (2008) interrogates its role in the reation of water resoures management
onepts and approahes. The World Bank is often named as an ator in the water setor and its
spei interventions are analysed; sometimes other ators taking part in spei water resoure
management projets are analysed as well (see Molle, Foran & Käkönen, 2009; Swyngedouw,
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2004b). Molle (2008) mentions a range of bilateral ators and their role in poliy denition,
so does Bakker (Bakker, 2010). The interventions of agenies like the German GTZ (now GIZ) or
USAID are also subjet to investigation (see for example Mishra, 2010; Trottier, 1999).
This already points to the multisalar aspets of the water resoure management proess.
International donors join state administrations, whih in themselves operate at multiple sales, to
produe loal development projets often of an infrastrutural nature. The sholarly debate about
the politis of sale or salar politis is not new but as Bakker (2012) points out this debate and
analyses of water related to power have ourred separately. In order to ll this aademi launae
Emma Norman, Bakker and Cook (2012):
all for loser attention to the interrelationships between governane, water, and soial
networks (power), and an emphasis on the role of institutional framings and salar
onstrutions in these proesses. (Norman et al., 2012, p. 53).
Depending on the ountry more than one bilateral or multilateral ageny is ative. Often there
are numerous agenies ative in the water setor. And while individual interventions are analysed
what remains out of fous is the eet of the sum of the interventions of these ators on the water
resoure management proess in the Third World  or developing  states in whih they are
ative.
The body of aademi work on development has produed analysis of international development
eorts, the agenies, their ation and the eets these produe (see for example Bush 2007; Ferguson
1994; Kiely 2007; Mithell 2002). James Ferguson (1994) has oined the phrase the anti-politis
mahine in his study of international development in Lesotho. He desribes the depolitiisation
of international development interventions when framed in tehnial disourses and so evauated
from the politis and the eets of power these entail. Mithell (2002) in his study of Egypt
analyses the power and eets of international development over a longer time period. His study
does inlude an analysis of the material and disursive eets of a large hydrauli projet  the
Aswan dam  and the related hanging ow regimes, but his fous is on the power of development
knowledge, as well as its onstrution, representation, and eets. Subir Sinha (2008) looks at
transnational development regimes and shows how they are not a unilateral appliation of power
but how they o-artiulate the power strutures that are the result of ommunity development
programs launhed by the Indian state in the early 1950s. The point is preisely that international
development is not external to these dynamis but part of it (Sinha 2008). Pointing to writers
in the Fouauldian tradition suh as Ferguson and Artur Esobar (1995), Sinha questions the
usefulness of their approah to studying transnational development regimes. Aording to Sinha
the oneptions of developmental power that are deployed in these writings tend to underplay the
role of the state in the formation of those omplexes of power (Sinha, 2008, p.85).
Ray Bush (2007) questions international development ageny and donor poliy towards poverty
alleviation and its insistene on resoure led growth. The resoures he investigates are labour,
land minerals, and food, to show how aess to and ontrol over these shape the power hierarhies
within and between states and so reprodue poverty (p. xiv). Bush further writes that among the
aid agenies and donors:
There is little understanding of the ways in whih politis and power are onstruted in
the Global South and how the power of oe holders undermines struggles for poverty
redution and redistribution of resoures, money and wealth. (Bush, 2007, p.xv)
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This analysis also points to the importane of the existing power strutures in the ountries
subjeted to international development eorts. He goes on to highlight the need to strengthen
analyses of the harater of politis by detailing the deision-making proess and how these shape
lass and power (Bush, 2007, p.19).
Water and water resoure management have reeived only sant attention in this ritial
development literature. Similarly, the relationship between international development regimes or
what I all the IDC  power, and water resoure management in a spei loale has also reeived
little attention in the politial soiology of water resoure management (Mollinga, 2008). This
study situates itself in the three aademi disussions desribed above. It is a multisalar analysis
of power reprodution and the spei role of the IDC in the ase of water resoure management
in Lebanon. By analysing the politial eonomy of water resoure management in Lebanon, this
study aims to unearth some of the ontraditions that emerge from the IDC's integration into
urrent mainstream water resoure management and water development praties and disourses
in the ountry.
Lebanon as a ase study
Lebanon is an interesting ase study for this purpose. Depending on the soure, Lebanon is just
below or just above the water sarity threshold of 1000 m³ per apita per year as dened by
the FAO and sholars in the eld (SeeFalkenmark, Lundqvist & Widstrand, 1989; Gleik, 1996).
Parts of the population lak aess to safe drinking water and reasonable sanitation, while farmers
fear and at times suer from droughts. The seasonal variation in rainfall is large. Almost all
the rainfall ours in four to ve winter months, while the summer demand neessarily feeds o
reserves aumulated over the winter.
In spei loations the population suers from water shortages in publi water supply. Twenty
years after the end of the ivil war this is still the ase in Beirut, for example. It is the largest
urban agglomeration in the ountry and home to almost half of the population. But shortages
are experiened in other loations as well. These shortages are met by private initiatives. The
quantities of water are available but the infrastruture to guarantee supply is not. A similar
situation is found in the agriultural setor, as the lak of irrigation infrastruture has led to an
over-exploitation of groundwater. Further, limate hange preditions suggest that temperatures
will rise in the Middle East/Eastern Mediterranean and ause a derease in preipitation in the
region.
There thus exists a tension between urrent availability and onstruted sarity, that further
emphasises the importane of water resoure management to the development proess. The ivil
war whih lasted from 1975 to 1990 aused onsiderable destrution. State institutions were barely
funtional. In the wake of the war they were severely understaed and under-equipped. The
physial destrution of the built environment and infrastruture was immense. Reonstrution
oered a unique opportunity to reshape the ountry's infrastruture, and thus poliy hoies are
partiularly evident in the Lebanese ase. Infrastruture reonstrution has remained a major
development onern over the last 20 years. It has repeatedly been brought bak to the fore as a
result of the destrution from the numerous Israeli attaks (1993, 1996, 2006) on the ountry and
is thus a more prevalent topi than in most Middle Eastern ountries.
But not only the destrution dating from the ivil war or at the hands of Israel is to be blamed
for the state of water infrastruture and water resoure management in the ountry: development
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poliy at large driven by neoliberal ideology, supported by the IDC, and a politial ulture of
lientelism and orruption are equally important fators, as this thesis sets out to show. Another
important fator with regard to infrastruture development is the rippling publi debt. At some
US$ 64 billion in 2013 it is at about 150 perent of GDP. The ountry is, furthermore, the most
neoliberal in the region. As suh, of the ountries in the region, Lebanon omes losest to fullling
(at least theoretially) the presriptions of mainstream development disourse. It is also one of the
few Arab states not under authoritarian rule but governed by a setarian multi-party demorati
system (as limited as it may be). Politial rule is thus openly ontested and struggles for power
beome more visible.
The ountry, starting with the immediate post-ivil war period, has hosted an ever-growing and
evermore ative population of international development ators in various elds of development,
water related development ertainly being among the more attrative elds of ativity. The
development ators are rmly entrenhed in the Lebanese poliy making mehanism. The UN
and the World Bank for example have advised suessive government and naned administrative
personnel sine the end of the war. This study identied some 40 dierent international ators
ative in the setor, not all of them equally important, but all inuene aspets of water resoure
management, or at least attempt to do so more or less suessfully. Bilateral institutions were also
involved in the reonstrution proess as large infrastruture (energy, transportation, and water)
projets promised large prots for international ontrators. The bulk of infrastruture funding
in the water setor, almost 70 perent, was naned through donor nanial support. With the
enormous eorts and funds mobilised by international donors it is perplexing that water resoures
and their management are still in suh a bad state two deades after the ivil war ended and
reonstrution began. The IDC ertainly had an important inuene on the politial eonomy of
water, and it is only by ritially analysing its role that a politial eonomy of water in Lebanon
an fully be elaborated.
Finally, Lebanon is a small ountry and as suh it is suitable for a study on a national sale.
With a surfae area of 10,452 km² and a resident population between 4 and 4.5 million it is
possible to give a desription of the power dynamis at the sale of the ountry, to understand
the eets of IDC intervention on water resoure management in this ontext, and at the same
time investigate water resoure management at a smaller sale, as well as the neessarily loalised
proess of infrastruture prodution.
Researh question
A onsiderable amount of work has been expended to bring about an amelioration of water resoure
management proesses by both the state and the IDC over the last two deades; and yet these
eorts failed to substantially improve this proess and water resoures remain polluted, domesti
supply rationed, and irrigation strongly ontributes to the depletion of groundwater. If this state
of aairs is taken as a starting point for thinking about water resoure management in Lebanon,
a number of questions arise. Despite the lak of substantial improvements of the water setor,
international agenies are still ative in the setor and in Lebanon. Why? More importantly,
if these eorts have not produed the promised developmental gains what other eets did they
generate? Drawing on the literature above the politis and the related power dynamis are seen
as entral to the development proess. Thus, onerned with IDC involvement and issues of power
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and its reprodution in water resoure management proesses, the researh question that framed
this study was artiulated as follows:
Does the interation between the Lebanese Water Setor (ators) and the Inter-
national Development Complex in the dual proesses of water resoure management
and water infrastruture development produe and reprodue soial, politial, and
eonomial power relations and dependenies on dierent sales and, if so, how are
these power geometries reprodued?
This overarhing question an be subdivided into four interrelated ategories that are:
 The material aspets of the hydrosoial yle; that is the quality and quantity of ows through
the landsape and soiety and how all these aet eah other. This means understanding the
hydrologial yle and the geo-hydrologial properties of the terrain; origin, route (inluding
tehnology), and destination of water ows, not neessarily for the whole territory. This
inludes questions regarding distribution and use of water, as well as soures of pollution due
to human ativity. It also means understanding how these are represented as well as soially
and disursively onstruted.
 The Lebanese water administration and the politial eonomi proesses/strutures in whih
it is embedded. A detailed prole of the Lebanese water administration inludes a mapping of
the tasks and responsibilities of the dierent administrative bodies and their atual (versus
the theoretial or legal) mode of operation. Related to this are the politial eonomi
struture or proesses of the Lebanese polity and how these aet the administration of
the water setor.
 The International Development Complex in Lebanon and speially in the water setor. An
assessment of the IDC onsists of the identiation of the ators and their varied interest
and ativities, as well as an understanding of their integration into the Lebanese politial
eonomy, speially in poliy and deision making proesses in the water setor, as well as
the disourses and solutions that are promoted.
 The water resoure management proesses as produt of the interation of the IDC and the
Lebanese water setor administration, with a fous on infrastruture prodution and the water
setor reform proess. This requires an understanding of how the interation takes plae, how
these two proesses and their (always temporary) results are artiulated through sometimes
opposed and other times overlapping interest of the Lebanese deision makers and the IDC,
and how the proess of water resoure management in turn aets power dynamis.
Argument
This thesis will argue that the interation of the IDC and the Lebanese water setor/Lebanese
state generally follows the patterns of reprodution of existing power strutures and relations and
so ontributes to it. Soially and eologially just and sustainable development is substituted for
large sale infrastruture prodution with ambiguous results.
The IDC and Lebanese elites, who drive the water resoure management proess, work aording
to dierent logis. The IDC's logi is guided by a neo-olonial neoliberal development ideology. The
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Lebanese elite ats aording to a logi of power reprodution entred on the ontrol of nanial
resoures, ontrol over administrative bodies, and the division of territory. When these logis are
at odds the elite's logi generally subverts water setor development projets and reform attempts
to inorporate its own needs. The IDC's immense and ontinuous eorts to redress the dilapidated
state of water resoures and their management disregard the strutural roots of the related issues,
and are unwilling and inapable to address these. As a result promoted solutions are inherently
inapable of delivering promised progress. Beause of this failure the ontribution of the IDC to
power reprodutive dynamis beomes the most signiant outome of its involvement in the water
setor. This happens along four lines and at dierent and hanging sales:
1) The neoliberal ideology of the IDC reinfores the elite's own brand of neoliberalism and
foreloses needed alternative venues of water resoure management;
2) IDC funding for infrastruture supports the reprodution of the existing aumulation regime
and inuenes development priorities aording to the IDC's priorities;
3) The administration is inreasingly shaped aording to neoliberal templates that annot
but maintain its strutural shortomings beause the elite's ontrol over it is not fundamentally
hallenged and annot be;
4) The IDC's own power is reprodued by rendering the Lebanese water setor inreasingly
dependent on its involvement.
Struture of this work
Following this introdution ve hapters will build the argument of this thesis. The next hapter
will review the literature that framed the methodology. First, this thesis positions itself in the
broader literature on politial eology. Drawing on the geographial materialism of sholars suh
as David Harvey and Eri Swyngedouw and its ator-network-theoretial ritique (or the new
materialist ritique) the hapter identies the hydrosoial yle as the onept through whih
the interation between international development ators and the Lebanese water setor is best
understood. The hapter then revisits how water and water resoure management has been theo-
rised and debated. Finally it lays the theoretial groundwork for what is alled the International
Development Complex (IDC).
The four empirially grounded hapters of the thesis that follow elaborate dierent aspets of the
hydrosoial yle and its shape, the watersape. The seond hapter fouses on the Lebanese water
setor administration and the strutural roots of its funtioning. It opens with an introdution
to Lebanese water resoures and the disursive onstrution of water as a sare resoure. After
a desription of the water resoure management proess the hapter shows how it is shaped by
Lebanese politial struture and proess.
The third hapter identies the speially Lebanese neoliberalisation proess, the loally
existing variation of neoliberalism, and the main pillar of the aumulation regime that was put
in plae as part of this proess. The IDC's inreasing inuene is rooted in these dynamis.
The hapter then oers a detailed desription of the IDC and its inuene in the water resoure
management proess. It posits the IDC as entral in this proess and by extensions in the shaping
of the hydrosoial yle.
The fourth hapter fouses on the reform proess that was initiated in the early post war
years. It investigates the eorts to implement a reform modelled on market environmentalist
templates. It shows how these eorts did not produe the hoped for produtivity and management
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improvements beause the interests of the Lebanese elites were at odds with the good governane
targets promoted by the IDC. The most obvious result of this intervention is the partial resaling
of water governane.
The fth and last hapter loses the analysis of the hydrosoial yle by investigating the
interation of bio-physial and eologial proesses with the politial eonomi and tehnial
proesses desribed in the earlier hapters. It does so by investigating uneven setoral and
geographial development, espeially with regards to water infrastruture, at the national and
at the subnational sale for the ase study of an area alled Keserwan. As part of this analysis the
water distribution and use patterns in the urban/domesti and the agriultural/irrigation setor
are analysed.
Notes on Method
Data was olleted as follows:
1. I onduted 85 strutured interviews with various Lebanese government and administra-
tive oials, Lebanese and international private setor engineers, Lebanese aademis and
researhers, members of Lebanese assoiations and NGOs, as well as IDC employees and
experts;
2. I attended ten onferenes and workshops about water or related issues;
3. I olleted and analysed government and IDC strategi and tehnial studies;
4. I obtained GIS data from dierent soures. These were used for geographial analysis and
for the maps I produed;
5. I ross-referened my researh through numerous informal meetings/disussions. These were
oasions when partiipants did not wish to be reorded, ited, and did not want their
information to be used;
6. My eld work was done in two regions of the ountry to understand the hydrologial yle
at the loal sale;
7. From mid 20102011 I worked as a researher on a projet analysing transboundary water
issues on the Upper Jordan River Basin of whih Lebanon is an upstream riparian. This
allowed me to make ontats in the water setor and oered the opportunity for eld work in
a seond area of the ountry (see Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, Dajani & Talhami, 2012a; Zeitoun,
Eid-Sabbagh & Loveless, 2014; Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, Talhami & Dajani, 2013).
Limitations of the Study
One limitation of my study is related to the quality of the data. The Lebanese administration
treats data and reports with a lot of serey. These an be extremely diult to obtain when
they are not published. For this reason reent data ould not always be obtained. For example
up-to-date data regarding water supply network onnetions and network volumes ould not be
obtained from the Regional Water Establishments or the Ministry. Data is also often not very
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aurate, espeially water but also soio-eonomi data is of limited quality. The limitations of the
data are explained where neessary throughout the text.
Further, beause I framed my study very broadly it overs a wide range of issues and ators by
design. This has also meant that I had to ompromise on the depth of analysis for some aspets,
but this should not be read as negation of their ausal ageny in the water resoure management
proess. In Chapter 3 for example a more in-depth (miro) soiologial or anthropologial study
of the individual Lebanese and IDC experts ould oer a better understanding of the proess of
knowledge and disourse prodution and reprodution at that level. Similarly, beause the study
interrogated the interation between the IDC and the state administration and infrastruture
development proesses at a national sale, it fouses on elite politis in the neoliberalisation of the
water resoure management proess. It ould not detail the numerous ways in whih individuals
ope with, subvert, or adjust to the the water resoure management proess resulting from the
interation of the IDC and the Lebanese administration. Finally, beause the analysis is so broadly




In what follows I will give an overview of the literature relevant to this study and build from it the
oneptual framework to guide this work. I shall start with issues of a more general theoretial
and politial nature. As I see this study rooted in the eld of Third World politial eology, I
shall rst address the question: What is (Third World) politial eology? How is it useful for this
study? Following, I shall build the theoretial foundation of this study; this draws on historial-
geographial materialism and speially its theorisations of spae and nature, as well as insights
from what is alled Ator-Network-Theory (ANT) (also alled new materialism). I will eluidate
the oneptual tools that will help me make sense of the issues at hand; for example notions of
metabolism and irulation as elaborated in Marxist thought, and dierent ways to think about
the humantehnologyenvironment nexus that takes entre stage in this study.
1.1 Politial Eology
From its ineption, politial eology was never a oherent theoretial position for the
very good reason that the meanings of eology and politial eonomy, and indeed
politis, were often in question. (Watts & Peet, 2004a, p. 9)
As Watts and Peet point out politial eology is not based on one single foundational theory. It is
rather an area of researh onerned with the relationship between soial and environmental hange.
It highlights the soial and eologial proesses through whih ontrol over and aess to natural
resoures  with all their impliations for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods
(Watts & Peet, 2004a, p. 9)  formulate themselves.
Often ited as exemplary are Blaikie and Brookeld's (1985) Politial Eonomy of Soil Erosion,
and this denition from their 1987 work on the soial and politial auses of land degradation:
The phrase politial eology ombines the onerns of eology and a broadly dened
politial eonomy. Together this enompasses the onstantly shifting dialeti between
soiety and land based resoures, and also with lasses and groups within soiety itself.
(Blaikie & Brookeld, 1987, p. 17)
Aording to Bryant and Bailey (1997) Third World politial eology distinguishes itself from
other environmental researh by the radial theoretial (and politial) approahes that are typially
employed, as well as its ommitment to soial justie. The main areas of researh and topis in
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politial eology and speially Third World politial eonomy are land degradation, deforestation,
and soil erosion. A spei fous on water is of a muh younger date, espeially more ritial
approahes (Boelens and Zwarteveen 2005; Budds 2004; Molle 2007; Mollinga 2008).
The term politial eology originates from the early 1970s in the ontext of researh hallenging
the wider held notions that the ausal origins of environmental rises were to be found in the
supposedly apolitial elds of ulture, tehnology, population growth, or poor land use praties.
As a eld of study politial eology emerged from (Neo-) Marxist ritiques  rooted in world
systems theory, dependeny theory, and peasant studies  of the narrow fous of ultural eology
and eologial anthropology on isolated or subsistene ommunities. These new strands of Marxism
sought to understand the dynamis (and their environmental impats) within peasant soieties that
were subjets to the stress of integration into world markets (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Watts and
Peet 2004a).
A major point that politial eologists seem to agree upon, aording to Bryant and Bailey,
are rst that the environmental problems faing the Third World are not simply a reetion of
poliy or market failure (as for example the World Bank would have it), but rather a manifestation
of broader politial and eonomi fores (Bryant & Bailey, 1997, p.3). Capitalist dynamis on
a world sale feature prominently among them. But these problems annot be attributed solely
to the mahinations of global apitalism. Third world states also (sometimes just as importantly)
intervene in soio-eonomi ativity in suh ways that promote environmental degradation within
their territories. Questions about eology were thus never severed from the larger questions of
development in the Third World. Beyond this though numerous methodologial and theoretial
approahes have been deployed to make intelligible various proesses of soio-eologial transfor-
mation questioned (espeially) by third world eologists.
In the last two deades the inorporation of the post-struturalist ritique into politial eology
has produed very interesting innovation and provided new venues of investigation and new ways
to formulate radial politial projets (Forsyth, 2003, 2008; Paulson, Gezon & Watts, 2005; Watts
& Peet, 2004a). Central to these are questions of sale and their interrelation and theorisations of
the relationships between nature and soiety and their oneptions. Sholars of politial eology
and from varied other elds of study sought to rethink enlightenment Nature - Soiety dualisms
in reation to the inreasingly obvious environmental (and related politial) hallenges of the end
of the 20th entury and the beginning of the 21st (Braun and Castree 1998).
Politial eology today mobilises the onept of soial nature or seond nature as a way to
avoid the rude soiety-versus-nature binaries, as well as the related tehnoentri environmental
management approah and the radial eoentri ounterpart. It emphasises the soial onstrution
of nature (and the sienes through whih it is represented) to highlight the politial proesses in
play (Castree 2001; Castree and Braun 2001).
1.2 Historial Materialism and Ator Network Theory
Two theoretial approahes, historial materialism and what Braun terms the new materialists
 Bruno Latour's Ator Network Theory, Donna Harraway's and Timothy Mithell's thinking
 are useful to make sense of the soiety-tehnology-nature nexus that is entral to this study.
Infrastruture is as entral to a politial eonomy of water as the soio-politial arrangements
that govern these relationships. An aademi debate exists about whether these an enter into a
produtive dialogue or not; whether they form an antithesis, or are ommensurable. Noel Castree
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(Castree 2002) for one attempts to split the dierene and sees points in ommon with weaker
interpretation of ANT and relational geographial materialism.
1
Whereas Braun reeting on
Harvey's work suggests that:
the dierene between Harvey and the new materialists is the dierene between im-
manent ausality and external determination. Cruially, we annot simply `split the
dierene' between these, despite the obvious attration of doing so (for an attempt
see Swyngedouw 1999). One annot have a `less exating' philosophy of immanene or
a `modied' transendentalism. (Braun 2006, p. 217)
The point here is not to resolve these dierenes or the disussion, nor to argue their philosophial
intriaies. It would go beyond my abilities and the sope of this work to do so but dierent
politial impliations may follow from the resolution of this debate.
2
1.2.1 Historial Materialism, the Prodution of Nature and
Infrastruture
What is evident then is that all debate about eosarity, natural limits, overpopulation,
and sustainability is a debate about the preservation of a partiular soial order rather
than a debate about the preservation of nature per se. (Harvey 1996, p. 148)
A good starting point to enter the debate about oneptions of nature and soiety are theorisations
of historial geographial materialism. Neil Smith (1984) in his Uneven Development: Nature,
Capital and the Prodution of Spae oined the phrase the prodution of nature. He was
referring to patterns of uneven geographial development that were systematially reated by the
spei soial (lass) relations and spei (prot driven) `value relations' to environment under
onditions of (global) apitalist prodution. What he meant by this was how the ompetitive and
aumulative imperatives of apitalism ombine in a metaboli relationship natural environmental
and onrete labour proesses upon them that produe nature(s) anew (Braun & Castree, 1998
p.7).
Smith's thesis was built on two oneptions of nature drawn from Marx's texts. The rst of
these Smith termed the ideology of nature. This represented the bourgeois oneption of nature
that posits it as external to soiety  as its unalterable other. Aordingly nature is governed
by immutable sienti laws to whih humans must eventually submit, thus denying any soial
relations to the environment and with that any reative possibility to shape and hange it. This
he observes is paradoxial, as the very at of positing nature requires entering a ertain relation
with nature (Braun & Castree, 1998 p.7). The seond, saw the labour proess as entral to the
metabolism of natural matter through soiety. Nature is mediated through soiety and soiety
through nature writes Smith (2008,p. 33).
Labour is, rst of all, a proess between man and nature, a proess by whih man,
through his own ations, mediates, regulates, and ontrols the metabolism between
himself and nature... Through this movement he ats upon external nature and hanges
1
Tim Forsyth (2008) also makes the point that the opposition between the two, ANT and Marxism, is usually
misplaed (p. 762).
2
How an one retain a politial ommitment that hallenges global apitalist dynamis (or the juggernaut of
global apitalism) in one's analysis without giving it undue oherene and explanatory power? And vie versa, how
an one seek loal/event spei politial solutions that remain ommitted to more general `systemi' hange?
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it, and in this way he simultaneously hanges his own nature. (Marx, 1970, pp. 283
and 290 quoted in Swyngedouw, 2006, p. 108)
Swyngedouw builds on Marx's denition. To him:
this soio-natural metabolism is the foundation of and possibility for history, a soio-
environmental history through whih the natures of humans and non-humans alike
are transformed ... To the extent that labour onstitutes the universal premise for
human metaboli interation with nature, the partiular soio-tehnial vehiles and
soial relations through whih this metabolism of nature is enated shape its very form.
(Swyngedouw, 2006,p. 108)
Water is a very good illustration of what is meant. Soiety today is held together by and lives
o the omplex ways in whih water is irulated through it for its various uses in prodution
and reprodution. Canals, pipes, pumps, and dams are the basis for the transformation and use
of water. It is through the metaboli proesses that use values are produed by labour. Farmers
need water to irrigate their rops, eletriity is generated by turbines, water runs from the tap,
tools are made  all of whih is then again used in new metaboli arrangements. In this sense
the produts  or the heterogeneous assemblages  of this soio-natural metabolism enter the
irulation of ommodities (Swyngedouw, 2006). Aording to Foster (1999) these proesses were
intimately bound up with the ows of money/apital.
The eonomi irular ow then was losely bound up, in Marx's analysis, with the
material exhange (eologial irular ow) assoiated with the metaboli interation
between human beings and nature. (Foster, 1999, pp. 157158 quoted in Swyngedouw,
2006)
Both the prevalent view of nature as separate from soiety and the spei forms of the metaboli
relations are historially produed. They are not then immutable fats of life but the objet of
politial struggles, ideas, and the underlying power geometries that shape them. Harvey puts it as
follows:
All eologial projets (and arguments) are simultaneously politial-eonomi projets
(and arguments) and vie versa. Eologial arguments are never soially neutral any
more than soio-politial arguments are eologially neutral. (Harvey 1996, p.182)
The same an be said for the infrastrutural artefats that are so important to the arrangement
of soio-natural metabolisms. Far from being neutral tehnologial/logistial proesses, hanges
in infrastruture systems are neessary elements in the struggle for maintaining, hanging, or
onsolidating soial power (Swyngedouw, 1992, quoted in Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 191).
Aording to Harvey (1996) apitalism as a mode of prodution has neessarily targeted the
breaking down of spatial barriers for ows of people, goods, information, and resoures suh as
water. In its quest for new prots and never-ending apital aumulation, apitalism is prediated
on the extension of its geographi reah, the improvement of produtivity, and the redution of the
ost of soial reprodution. All these depend on the ability to ommand movement of resoures
through spae. Redutions in ost or time of transportation, whih Harvey (Harvey, 2003) alls
the redution of the frition of distane, translate into produtivity gains and oer opportunities
for higher rates of prot.
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The prodution and improvement of infrastruture systems for transportation, teleommuni-
ations, as well as eletriity and water, are entral aspets of development under apitalism.
Their prodution and the nanial, engineering and governane praties that support them, are
therefore neessarily embedded within the broader power relations of global apitalism (Graham
& Marvin, 2001, p. 194).
This happens on multiple sales: international, transnational, national and nally loal onne-
tions are infused with struggles between dierent ators, groups, institutions, rms, and nations.
These power struggles tend to ontribute to the wider reprodution of the apitalist soial rela-
tions (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 190). On all sales, this logi divides into winners and losers,
and as suh, these proesses will tend to reprodue the loal soial relations of power as well.
Infrastruture works in this view beome an exerise in power and geopolitis pitting international
and loal powers against eah other and against loal populations (Graham & Marvin, 2001;
Harvey, 1985). Before turning to the spei onepts and analysis that geographial materialists
deploy to make sense of water and related issues a disussion of the new materialist ritique of the
above approah is in order.
1.2.2 Ator-Networks and the New Materialism
Central to post-struturalist approahes towards nature is an emphasis on the ultural politis
of the onstrution of nature. Simplied, the argument points to the semioti formations and
pregures the new materialism, namely Ator-Network-Theory as advoated by Latour, Callon,
and others, as well as Haraway's thinking. They oer venues by whih to integrate the materiality
of things into theorisations of soiety and nature. Both approahes draw on insights from the
eld of soiology of sienti knowledge that posits that sienti knowledges are also the result of
historially spei and soially situated onstrutions (Braun, 2006).
These approahes ontest ontemporary ategories suh as the eonomi, the politial, or soiety
and nature. These sholars deploy voabulary suh as yborg, quasi-objets or hybrids to desribe
the in-between, the fuzzy middle whih is neither one nor the other and that makes up most of the
world. This, it is laimed, is in ontrast to Marxist theory whih, aording Braun and Castree
following Latour:
has for the most part relied upon realist epidemiologies where `nature' and `ulture',
and `sienti knowledge' and `politis,' are kept separate or regionalized. Nature is
assumed to be something that is unproblematially `ready-at-hand' to human ators;
while its soial transformation may be seen as historial, its `materiality' is not. (Braun
& Castree, 1998, p. 15)
One of the more important observations to be drawn from these approahes is the entrality
of tehnosiene in the making of soiety. Latour (1993) argues that by reating two distint
spheres, the natural and the ultural (or nature and ulture), and in parallel assigning (sienti)
knowledge to the realm of nature and politis to the realm of ulture, modern thinking hides how
soiety and nature are simultaneously built through, or in relation to, things (mirobes, door
losers, mahines and importantly infrastruture) along with the various ways that siene is the
ause rather than the medium of nature's representation (Braun & Castree, 1998, p. 29).
Without the many objets, hybrids, quasi-objets, that mediate soial interation, and in many
ways give materiality and/or durability to soiety, neither the onstitution of soiety nor that of
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the subjet an be made sense of. Soiety is, aording to this view, onstruted materially and
semiotially by both things and soial ators.
Explanation is ahieved by analysing how these heterogeneous assoiations of humans and non-
humans are reated. A brilliant study and a relevant example of this new materialist thinking,
is Timothy Mithell's Rule of Experts (Mithell, 2002) in whih he shows how the damming of
the Nile, new irrigation infrastruture, mosquitoes, statistial analysis, water, weaponry, apital,
and loal elites and so on ame to interat and aet Egyptian development. Aording to this,
an explanation referring only to abstrat apitalist dynamis and entring on the eonomi would
obfusate aspets of rather than explain the expansionary nature of apital that is enabled by
the assoiation of multiple agenies, human and non-human alike. Thus he shows that apital-
ist development overs a series of agenies, logis, hain reations, and ontingent interations
(Mithell, 2002 in Braun, 2006, p. 217).
Ageny is here also assoiated with non-humans. For infrastruture this means that beyond
being a relational artefat, in the very material sense of onneting spae and soiety aross
distane, it atively shapes material and soial reality for far longer and beyond the intentions of
its makers. David Mosse (Mosse, 2003, 2008) illustrates this with the example of the Tamil plains
in India. There he shows how a vast and omplex system of interrelated loally autonomous tanks
and hannels was produed as a funtion of the existing politial systems between the eleventh
and eighteenth enturies. This highly deentralised system has in turn shaped and still shapes
the politial and soial system today, long after its original purpose when the soial reality that
shaped it had disappeared.
3
One an infer from this that infrastruture is a politial artefat or
a soio-tehnologial hybrid that mediates nature in politial ways (not neessarily dependent on
and often beyond the intentions of its produers).
The insights from ANT are rooted in the priniple of (radial) symmetry in explanation that
its adherents stress.
4
Through this emphasis on symmetry proponents of this approah situate
themselves in between dualisms, and so bridge them by giving (or attempting to give) equal
explanatory ausality to both nature and soiety. Aording to Jonathan Murdoh:
by standing in the middle working its way outwards, this approah sees modiations
in both the soial and the material realms. And this applies to all dualisms: by
inorporating materiality into the heart of the analysis, ator-network theory attempts
to link all divided domains in soial theory. Thus terms suh as `ator' and `struture',
`loal' and `global' only make sense in relation to one another; this relationality fores
us to shift our gaze away from the pure forms (that is, the stabilised ategories of
`ator', `struture', `loal' and `global') to the assoiations whih give rise to the puried
outomes (that is, the proesses of ategory making). (Murdoh, 1997, p. 334)
It is in this way that the ouplet ator-network makes sense. The ator depends on the network of
humans and non-humans alike. It is through the spei links between them that s/he gains the
ability to at. What remains are hains of dierent length, time and sope that onnet humans,
mahines, things, resoures, animals, tehnologies and so on. Power and reah, or sale, are not
given ategories but are made with the onnetions. Thus, it is in the understanding of how
3
See also Anita von Shnitzler (von Shnitzler, 2008) for an example on the muh smaller sale of water meters.
4
Castree situates the origins of the priniple of symmetry in explanation to the Edinburgh Shool, aording
to whih  `valid' and `false' knowledges must be explained in the same terms; one annot be explained through
referene to nature and the other through referene to ulture (or ideology). Rather both must be seen as a result
of historially spei soial and sienti praties. (Braun and Castree 1998, p.28)
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networks are made that the possibility for their transformation emerges and politially liberating
potential is found. However, this politis is not lear. Latour for one has been ritiised for failing
to demonstrate or illustrate the politial impliations of his theories. It is also not lear how a
politis that inludes non-humans an be operationalised beyond the legitimate ritiism of politial
views that see humans or non-humans as having politial rights in themselves, that is either pure
anthropoentri or eoentri politis. Similarly problemati, if not more so, seems the suggestion
that no two networks are alike nor shaped by the same or similar set of rules/logis. This seems to
restrit politis to separate issues, while denying all oherene to apitalist dynamis on a global
sale (Castree, 2002).
From this point of view, Marxist approahes fae strong ritiism. Unlike the network ontology
that situates ausal explanations within soio-natural networks, dihotomous thinking is seen as
redutive and evading omplexity by onferring ausal ageny in one or the other pole: nature or
soiety. A seond binarism subjeted to similar ritiism is related to the question of sale and
onerns global versus loal auses and eets. This approah highlights the importane of the
in-between arrangements that onnet loal to global and make a ontinuum rather than disreet
realms. Another set of ritiisms is related to asymmetry and points to the anthropoentrism that
pervades most Marxist thinking, by viewing spae, nature, and matter as being imbued with or a
mere reetion of soial relations, nature an only be seen in human terms, as a mere onstrut
of the soial (and an eet of power), missing the o-onstitutive relationship of nature (and
for that matter tehnology and siene) and soiety. Beause new materialists see ageny as an
immanent eet arising from the relationship between atants or ators (human or not), Marxist
anthropoentrism is understood as produing an impoverished oneption of ators and denying the
ageny of non-humans. Finally, this also results in a oneption of power that is harged as being
overly entred and anthropomorphi, as something held rather than a relational eet/ahievement
that ows towards an ator through the various onnetions (Braun 2006; Castree 2002). This is
not the position taken in this thesis, muh rather the importane of miropolitial dynamis (not
neessarily related to apitalist logis) is taken from this theoretial proposition. Its inuene on
more reent historial materialist thinking whih is elaborated below is how it is onsidered in this
thesis.
1.3 The Hydrosoial Cyle
The new materialist ritiques of historial materialism points to a need for theoretial omplexity
that aims to avoid redutionist interpretations of pereived/studied reality and ausal ageny.
One way this ritique has been integrated into geographial historial materialist thinking about
water is by historiising the onept of hybridity or the ator-networks. Karen Bakker and Gavin
Bridge (2006) engage with dierent aounts of materiality to see how these an enrih and inform
resoure geographies. They point to Swyngedouw's ombination of Latourian notions of networked
reonstrution with Lefebvre's (1991) historial and geographial prodution of spae (Bakker &
Bridge, 2006, p. 17) as one fruitful avenue to inlude post-struturalist ritiques within historial
materialist approahes. He (Swyngedouw, 1999, 2004b) highlights the neessity of analysing the
power dynamis involved in the historial and spatial (or geographial) proess in whih the hybrid
is produed. It is the analysis of the proess of hybridisation rather than the analysis of the
assemblage itself that takes priority (Bakker & Bridge, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2004b). Aording to
him this type of analysis an avoid the depition of simplied binaries when it maintains a view of
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dialetis as internal relations (Swyngedouw, 2004b, p.21) as, for example, Harvey elaborates in his
work on politial eology Justie, Nature, and the Geography of Dierene (Harvey, 1996). What
Swyngedouw proposes is a proess based episteme; a theoretial approah that entres around
the notion of proess and hange. Soio-nature is onstantly produed and reprodued (materially
and disursively), in the interation and reombination of hemial, physial, soial, eonomi,
politial, and ultural proesses, whih are themselves hanged in this proess of perpetual
metabolism (Swyngedouw, 2004b, p.21). In a later work Swyngedouw advanes the onepts
of metabolism and irulation to overome the binary onstrution of `nature' and `soiety'
that haraterised muh of the modern sienti and ultural tradition (Swyngedouw, 2006, p.
113). The dualism is broken with the emphasis on movement and hange that is represented by
metaboli irulation that ombines human and non-human agents in a proess of environmental
and tehnologial transformation (Swyngedouw, 2006, p. 113).
Jamie Linton and Jessia Budds (Linton & Budds, 2013) build on Swyngedouw's analysis and
the work of other ritial geographers (for example Bakker, 2003, 2012; Gandy, 2004; Kaika, 2003;
Loftus, 2009) in their attempt to systematially oneptualise the hydrosoial yle, whih as a
term often used in sholarship, aording to them, laked preision and oherent denition. Their
work starts with the history of the hydrologi yle that is said to embody the separation of nature
and soiety (see also Linton, 2008, 2010).
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The onept of the hydrosoial yle they propose is
dened as a soio-natural proess by whih water and soiety make and remake eah other over
spae and time (Linton & Budds, 2013, p. 6). Soiety depends on the management of water.
This proess aets the physial properties and disursive onstrution of water whih in a irular
fashion hanges older or gives rise to new forms of soial organisation (Linton & Budds, 2013,
p. 6). In this irular o-prodution proess they are internally related and thus spei forms of
soial relations are also shaped by the dierent kinds of water they produe.
The hydrosoial yle fouses analysis on the interrelationship of heterogeneous entities:
water, tehnologies and infrastruture, soial power, knowledge formations, water management
and water governane praties, as well as related regulatory and organisational hanges (Bakker,
2012; Linton & Budds, 2013). These relations are mediated though spei politial projets
(Bakker, 2012, p.618) that an be unearthed through an analysis of the hydrosoial yle as one
faet of the soial metabolism. It is with a view to these dynamis that Swyngedouw (2009) states:
There is an urgent need, therefore, to theorise and empirially substantiate the pro-
esses through whih partiular soio-hydrologial ongurations beome produed that
generate inequitable soio-hydrologial onditions. Interventions in the organisation of
the hydrologial yle are always politial in harater and therefore ontested and
ontestable. This intrinsially soial harater of water resoures management and
organisation needs to be teased out and laried. (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 57)
This thesis aims to exavate the role of the international development ators and their intervention
in the hydrosoial yle (as a onstituent part of it) as well as the resultant eets on soial power
and on water. Before turning to a more detailed review of how sholars have thought about relevant
aspets of water management or elements of hydro-soial metabolisms, I shall introdue what I
refer to as the International Development Complex as the foal point of the investigation.
5
Jeremy Shmidt engages Linton's work (Linton, 2010) and shows that notions of water's ageny were already
present in the work of 19th and 20th entury Amerian water thinkers (Shmidt, 2014).
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1.4 The International Development Complex?
Water resoure development in the Third World is heavily populated by international development
ators and what Tony Allan alls earnest outsiders. The World Bank has been repeatedly noted as
a priniple propagator of the IWRM disourse in water development, and as vehile for neoliberal
poliy and governane reform (Goldman, 2005, 2007; Peet, 2003; Watts & Peet, 2004b). The role
in disourse formation of the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and its institutional bakers, the
UNDP and the World Bank has also been noted (Molle, 2008). Regional development banks as
well as the World Bank are involved in projet nane and implementation (Molle & Berko, 2006;
Mollinga et al., 2008; Saravanan, MDonald & Mollinga, 2009). Bilateral aid and development
agenies, the GIZ, USAID, or DFID, and the various UN agenies are equally impliated in a
range of ativities related to water development. Like international NGOs they are involved in
boring wells, infrastruture provision, livelihood programmes for farmers, and institutional reform
onsultany (see for example Cleaver, 2008; Cleaver, Franks, Boesten & Kiire, 2005; Trottier,
1999). Larry Swatuk (Swatuk, 2008) points to the WWF and others that have been engaged in
onservationist eorts while other allianes further a tehnorati approah. The list ould go on,
the same organisations might be involved in dierent elds in the same ountry or engage in ertain
ativities in one plae of the globe and in another somewhere else.
Inspired by Walden Bello's (2006) oneption of the Relief and Reonstrution Complex, as the
set of ators that deploys in post disaster and post war situations, I group the international ators
briey desribed above under the label The International Development Complex (IDC). This is
not to say that they are a homogeneous group, quite learly they are not. They an subsribe
to dierent ideologies (but they generally do not), they are supported by and represent dierent
interests, they follow dierent agendas, and are organised dierently. Yet they also form a network
whose ations are guided by a ommon disourse and related goals.
Terje Tvedt (1998), in his analysis of development NGOs, talks of an international system. He
points to the loal speiities of eah ountry, donor and reipient. Dierent laws and historial
trajetories shape these setors in a variety of ways, but more importantly, he identies a number
of harateristis that prompt him to see these ators as a distint soial system. This systemness
is highlighted by the shared language and symboli order:
It has been knit together and held together by ommon rhetori. This speial type of
value onsensus an be understood as norms whih also establish boundaries around
the NGO hannel, but a onsensus to whih a variety of dierent and in reality ompet-
ing, value agendas and even manipulative attitudes have been attahed (government
organisations posing as NGOs to attrat funds and legitimay, for-prot rms dressed
up as NGOs to earn money, mission organisations ating with the development aid
hannel while using it as a shield for ahieving their main aims, politial parties and
movements establishing a neutral humanitarian arm to ompete for funds, et.). While
the resoure transfer has made it into a system, one might say that it is this rhetori
and the way it has been handled whih has made it into, and reprodues it as, a soial
system. (Tvedt, 1998, p. 78)
Others have assessed this setor ritially and plae it in the framework of international develop-
ment. They ontend NGOs have beome agents of governments and of a neoliberal global order (see
for example Hardt and Negri 2009; Townsend, Porter and Mawdsley 2004). Mark Dueld talks
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about the role of NGOs as well as donors and aid agenies in governing the borderlands for seurity
purposes (Dueld, 2001). James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer have argued that, what I all the
IDC, has been a vehile for ontemporary imperialism and imposes power from outside onto nation
states (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, 2002). James Ferguson states that from the Marxist point of
view development tends to be seen as an endeavour to extend apitalist relations and to inorporate
new territories into the world system. There is a tendeny in this literature to emphasise the failure
of development projets or to dismiss them as distrations overing imperialist and strategi aims
and proesses (Ferguson, 1994). This is not to say that there is no relationship between imperialist
interest and international development, only that this view disregards a number of proesses and
ators involved therein. As Subir Sinha (2008) rightly points out this does not explain how politis
within national frames interset with these external forms of power (Sinha, 2008, p.60). It is less
this largely unidiretional ow of development's power that is of interest here but rather the
interation of the IDC with the loal ontext.
In his example of Lesotho, Ferguson (1994) shows how what he alls the international develop-
ment apparatus depolitiises the politial proess of development. He shows how the state extends
its reah or power through development interventions that are posited as tehnial managerial
solutions void of politis. His approah is based on a reading of international development that
emphasises its disursive nature. Drawing on Mihel Fouault he emphasises the deentred nature
of power. In his approah he stresses:
that power is not to be embodied in the person of a powerful subjet. A `development'
projet may very well serve power, but in a dierent way than any of the `powerful'
ators imagined; it may only wind up in the end, `turning out' to serve power... the
outomes of planned soial interventions an end up oming together into powerful on-
stellations of ontrol that were never intended and in some ases never even reognised,
but are all the more eetive for being subjetless. (Ferguson, 1994, 18-19)
This approah ould be read as de-emphasising the power assoiated with soial ators too muh.
In a similar but inverted ritique as that levelled against historial materialist approahes this
deentred interpretation of power seems asymmetrial on the other extreme and in that sense
equally totalising. In the ase of water in Lebanon the subjet, the IDC, is very muh related to
the material onditions and the related material wealth derived from it by soial ators. The aim
is not to posit disourse as a mere mystifying ideology and so give ausal primay to the material
and anthropomorphi forms of power. Terming this set of ators the IDC rather than reverting
to Ferguson's onept of the international development apparatus then highlights the networked
nature of disrete soial ators not subsumed in an all-enompassing development disourse, but
separate and yet related. In this way it will allow me to dierentiate between, on the one hand,
international water development disourse and knowledge, and on the other, spei loalised
praties that emerge from the interation of the IDC within the Lebanese soial and material
ontext.
With this introdution of the IDC the theoretial framework of the thesis is ompleted. Through
an analysis of the hydrosoial yle, as the theoretial lens, this study investigates the interation
of the IDC with the Lebanese water setor ators. The next setion will rene this framework,
expanding the disussion of the theory to inlude relevant issues with regard to water. It will
rene the understanding of the soial metaboli relations and how these are organised in terms of
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property and ownership regimes, prodution or assemblaging ativities, distributional arrangements
and onsumption patterns (Swyngedouw, 2006).
1.5 Aspets of Water Resoure Management
That water is the basi stu of life is hardly news. Water is an essential input for bodily
reprodution: and every-body needs water. Water is a resoure in the vast majority of human
ativities or the prodution of tools used therein. It is entral to human-nature metabolism.
Beyond these human ativities, water feeds eosystems and environmental needs. As Molle and
Berkho put it, all water is used (Molle & Berko, 2006). Physially, water is heavy, it is easy to
store but expensive to transport. It requires relatively large amounts of sunk apital and energy
to displae from one plae to another in a ontrolled fashion. This ost of transportation is high
and often a multiple of what is onsidered water's value. The soure of water, with exeption
of relatively few fossil water aquifers, is the hydrologial yle. Preipitation, as snow or rain,
beomes run-o and seeps into the ground. Some of it remains suspended in the soil and more lls
aquifers and replenishes groundwater. From the soil, it will be used by plants. As run o (and
groundwater) it feeds into rivers running their ourse into lakes, seas and oeans. Evaporation
and evapotranspiration loses the yle. Cirulating in temporally varying quantities  depending
on the seasons and the loal geography  water links people, ommunities, soieties, rosses
boundaries to link states, and the multitude of heterogeneous human and non-human ativities
upon it. In many ways it reates its own sales, the river basin being one of the most obvious.
Hydrologial interonnetedness is typied by the well-known upstream-downstream
nexus. Even muh before having oneptualised river basins, humans had reognised
how ations on the upper reah of a river ould aet its downstream part. (Molle,
2007, p. 360)
Inreasing human intervention to divert, abstrat, dam, use, and in other ways modify water's ow
makes this interonnetion inreasingly visible. The type and loation of use aets the quantity
and quality of the water that reahes downstream users. Eets are not neessarily felt immediately,
but an be delayed for long periods of time or even extend to future generations (Molle, 2007).
It is also this interonnetedness that prompts Bakker, in her analysis of institutional hange
of urban water supply in Britain, to write that externalities [are an℄ inevitable by-produt of
prodution of drinking water (Bakker, 2003, p. 28) and to haraterise water as an unooperative
ommodity. This observation an be extended to other water uses. Any type of use an, and is
likely to reate eets on others, the environment, agriultural industries and so on.
The multiple uses an oexist when enough water of suient quality for the respetive ativities
is being replenished into the basin and an be aessed at relatively low ost. When pressure on
water resoures grows beause of limati events, population growth, development, and inreasingly
thirsty ities, eventually renewable soures annot supply for inreased demand, or subside entirely,
and water shortages our. It is in this ontext of losure of a basin that disourses about sarity
are mobilised and ompetition and onits are likely to our (Molle, Wester & Hirsh, 2010). It
is also in the ontext of sarity or shortage that water beomes an issue for development.
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1.5.1 Salar Politis, Sale and Problemsheds
To stik to the spatial sale of the watershed would be to exlude the numerous non-hydrologial
fators that are at play in the distribution of water resoures. Power dierenes between the
various interonneted and thus interating stakeholders bring in a whole range of soio-politial
issues whose spatial sale generally does not overlap with that of the watershed. Dierent ators an
mobilise dierent forms of politial, eonomi, and disursive resoures at dierent sales (Allan,
2001; Mollinga, 2008; Norman et al., 2012).
On an international sale states negotiate over water resoures and ow alloations. In this
ontext the onept of hydro hegemony as developed by Mark Zeitoun and others (Zeitoun, 2008;
Zeitoun & Allan, 2008; ?) desribes the situation where a partiular riparian is in a hegemoni
position and an so seure an unequal alloation of available water. Egypt in the Nile valley or
Israel on the Jordan River basin (of whih Lebanon is an upstream riparian) are examples in the
region (see also Warner, 2008).
In his analysis of the evolution of Spain's soio-hydrologial landsape under Frano, Swyn-
gedouw shows how the reonguration of geopolitial and geo-eonomi networks of funding were
fundamental to the implementation of a new water resoure management strategy largely based
on an extension of infrastruture. A projet that itself was a part of eorts by the regime to
produe a soio-ulturally, politially integrated national territorial sale, (Swyngedouw, 1999,
p. 11) and the onomitant overwriting of regional aspirations depended ruially on naning by
the US and international funders. Similarly, issues of distribution and alloation in basins within
national boundaries are often deided or inuened by politial lout from outside the basin. State
development poliy and investment priorities are often dened for the ountry as a whole but
inuene investment patterns a long a river (Molle, 2007; Warner & Wester, 2002).
Emphasising the role of the politial in water management and the plurality of ators and
disourses Mollinga et al (Mollinga, Meinzen-Dik & Merrey, 2007) suggest the problemshed and
the issue network as a more appropriate oneptual tool:
Mapping of a water management problem from a `problemshed' rather than a watershed
perspetive avoids onning the sope of analysis to a hydrologially dened unit. The
question regarding the boundaries of a given water management issue, in spae, in time
and soially, is treated as an open empirial question in a problemshed perspetive,
while, in a watershed perspetive, boundaries are pre-dened spatially, setorally and
analytially through the primay of water management problems. (Mollinga et al.,
2007, p. 707)
These observations highlight the importane of sale and the assoiated politis in an analysis
of water. Emma Norman, Karen Bakker and Christina Cook (Norman et al., 2012) make this
point drawing on debates between sholars of ritial urban studies (see for example Brenner,
2001; Jessop, Brenner & Jones, 2008; Marston, Jones & Woodward, 2005; Marston & Smith, 2001;
Purell, 2003). As was already alluded to above, this debate is also rooted in the dierenes
between the new materialist theoretial approahes and geographial historial materialism. This
disussion ontrasts horizontally networked relations ... with the vertial hierarhies of sale
theory (Marston et al., 2005, p. 417). On one hand sholars argue for at ontologies that do away
with sale as a soial siene onept altogether (Marston et al., 2005). On the other sholars retain
it as useful tool to render visible the power relations involved in its onstrution. The disussion
of sale is in many ases related to the reregulatory dynamis assoiated with the proesses of
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variegated neoliberalisation (see Brenner, Pek & Theodore, 2010b; Brenner & Theodore, 2002;
Castree, 2008a, 2008b; Jessop et al., 2008; MaLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 1997, 2004a).
Aording to Norman, Bakker and Cook the argument that a salar perspetive is ruial for
understanding water governane (Norman et al., 2012, p.55) is more reent and the omplex
eonomi, politial, and environmental interrelationships that play into this resaling proess are
understudied.
Jessia Budds and Leonith Hinojosa (2012) propose the onept of the watersape as deployed
by ritial geographers (Baviskar, 2007; Loftus, 2006; Loftus & Lumsden, 2008) as a way to avoid
the onnes of onventional spatial sales and administrative strutures (Budds & Hinojosa-
Valenia, 2012, p. 125). Their elaboration of the onept an be summarised as a freeze-frame
of the hydrosoial yle; it represents a snap-shot of institutional, tehnologial, and disursive
assemblages of a partiular point in time. Changes in the watersape are the equivalent of hanges
in the hydrosoial yle. This allows a disussion of resaling proesses without giving priority to
either governane strutures or hydrologial units (Budds & Hinojosa-Valenia, 2012).
With regard to this thesis the proess of resaling of institutions and governane involved in
water resoure management is entral. The IDC forms a network that is international ating
on neessarily loal soio-tehnial assemblages. Its interfae is with the Lebanese state and its
administration produes a bias towards the national sale.
1.5.2 Water Setor Reforms
1.5.2.1 Integrated Water Management
Over the last two deades Integrated Water Resoure Management (IWRM) has entered the
development disourse as the panaea to takle the hallenges of uneven and ineient water
distribution and use, dereasing water quality, and assoiated environmental degradation. The
Global Water Partnership (GWP), founded in 1996 by the World Bank, the UNDP and the Swedish
International Development Ageny to promote IWRM, denes it as follows
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:
[IWRM is℄ a proess whih promotes the oordinated development and management
of water, land and related resoures in order to maximise the resultant eonomi and
soial welfare in an equitable manner without ompromising the sustainability of vital
eo-systems. (GWP, 2010)
It is urrently the hegemoni, or the new santioned disourse (Allan, 2006), with regard to water
development. Though its history an be traed bak further, its entrane into the global arena
an be dated to the Dublin onferene of 1992 (see Biswas, 2004; Butterworth, Warner, Moriarty,
Smits & Bathelor, 2010; Molle, 2008). The four Dublin priniples were a reation to the growing
onern with the pereption of a looming water risis promoted by the `pessimists', as Allan (2006)
alls them (see Gleik, 1996; Postel, 1992). Importantly, it enshrined the onept of water as an




This denition an be found in numerous text with Biswas (2004) and Molle (2008) alling it the most ited
denition.
7
The other priniples are: 1 - Fresh water is a nite and vulnerable resoure, essential to sustain life, development
and the environment; 2 - Water development and management should be based on a partiipatory approah, involving
users, planners and poliy-makers at all levels; 3 - Women play a entral part in the provision, management and
safeguarding of water.
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The eorts of the onferene also sprang from the realisation that water management had
previously been a disjointed exerise in most ountries around the world. Dierent ministries were
responsible for dierent aspets of water poliy and ated without oordination; interventions did
not suiently take the upstream-downstream nexus into aount; hydrologial interonnetedness
was often overlooked and so on (2008). IWRM emerged as the response to this state of aairs and
the pereived global water risis. It is not lear though that IWRM approahes have indeed
ontributed to an improvement of the situation. Biswas (2004) goes so far as to say that its
impat to improve water management has at best been marginal (ited in Butterworth et al.,
2010, p. 69). At the same time, others see it as having led to positive reforms towards integrated
management. The onept remains amorphous, it is so broadly and widely dened that most
ators will nd an interpretation to suit their needs. Today most water setor reform projets will
prolaim their adherene to these priniples and similarly most or all the ators involved in suh
projets (2004; 2008). IWRM also does not neessarily replae previous hydrauli paradigms. The
hydrauli mission being the most noteworthy in the ontext of this thesis. Wester (2009) denes
the hydrauli mission as the strong onvition that every drop of water owing to the oean is
a waste and that the state should develop hydrauli infrastruture to apture as muh water as
possible for human use  a notion that is reprodued in Lebanon. Larry Swatuk (2008) shows
how IWRM and the hydrauli mission oexist and inuene deision making for a ase in South
Afria.
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Molle alls it a Nirvana onept beause it remains an elusive goal. It is by denition a
proess, ongoing, never nal. Lak of suess an always be explained by wrongful appliation, by
this or that missing ingredient. He further explains:
By its very nature, it is an attrative yet woolly onsensual onept (nobody is against
Nirvana). Suh onepts typially: a) obsure the politial nature of natural resoures
management; and b) are easily hijaked by groups seeking to legitimise their own
agendas ... The above denition emphasises the three desired `E' (Eieny, Equity
and Environmental sustainability) but implies that they an be ahieved onomitantly
if  as the word `maximise' suggests  problem-solving an be informed by neutral
and rational approahes, good siene and expert knowledge, reeting these three
dimensions rather than being informed by one of them only. (Molle, 2008, p. 133)
This is not to laim that water problems should not be approahed holistially and that integrated
management is undesirable  they should and it might be desirable. But as Molle goes on to show
IWRM has beome a buzzword (like governane, partiipation, or sustainability) with very little
preise ontent. Its appliation produes as many dierent results as the ontexts in whih it is
deployed are loally spei and varied from one another (Molle, 2008), so that it annot be treated
as an indiator of the atual management praties in any given ontext.
8
Tony Allan (2003) denes ve paradigms on an evolutionary sale. The hydrauli mission in his oneption is
the seond and follows the pre-modern paradigm and IWRM is the last. He sees the developing world still stuk
at that seond stage. Larry Swatuk (Swatuk, 2008) ritiised this perspetive. Aording to him today's water
disourses reet an on-going intra-paradigm debate among approahes that range along a tehnoentri-eoentri
ontinuum(Swatuk, 2008, p. 27). He goes on to show, for the ase of South Afria, how positive or negative (less
positive) outomes or IWRM eorts are the result of partiular ongurations of soial power being assoiated
with ertain perspetives and approahes. Ators, he suggests, do not line up along one spei paradigm, but
oalese around issues.
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1.5.2.2 Institutional Reform
In its urrent guise the emphasis of IWRM projets is on poliy and institutional reform at the
national and river basin level with a spei fous on managing demand, i.e. better management
and sharing of water resoures between users (Butterworth et al., 2010); in other words alloative
and setoral eieny. At the entre of this learly are water authorities or what Molle, Mollinga
and Wester (2009) all hydroraies.
Douglas Merrey et al. (2007) see that the state will remain the main driver of reform for
the foreseeable future but is also the institution most in need of reform (Merrey et al., 2007,
p.195). The role of the state has been redened through the neoliberal state restruturing disourse
over the last few deades. The water setor reforms of the past deades have mainly followed
this neoliberal mantra of less state and formal property rights/water rights (Boelens & Wegerih,
2008; Boelens & Zwarteveen, 2005; Budds, 2004) to support a self-regulating market. As ritial
theorists (Brenner et al., 2010b; Castree, 2010a; Pek, 2002; Pek, Theodore & Brenner, 2009)
have pointed out the translation of neoliberal governane templates does not follow the same
uniform path. The reregulatory proess happens in an uneven fashion and depends on loal ontext
produing variegated forms of atually existing neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). This
neoliberalisation proess does not ome to an end point or reah ompletion, muh rather it happens
in a wave like dynami, intensifying and ebbing over time (Brenner et al., 2010b).
Aording to Bakker (2007) a new philosophy of development  framed in the 2001 Kyoto
agreement  whih she terms market environmentalism, aims at:
a virtuous fusion of eonomi growth, eieny and environmental onservation: through
establishing private property rights, employing markets as alloation mehanisms, and
inorporating environmental externalities through priing, proponents of market en-
vironmentalism assert that environmental goods will be more eiently alloated if
treated as eonomi goods  thereby simultaneously addressing onerns over envi-
ronmental degradation and ineient use of resoures. (Bakker, 2007, p. 432)
The neolassial eonomi argument underlying this logi suggests that only by alloating the
proper value to a resoure, water in this ase, an eient use and best alloation be guaranteed.
Only by getting the prie right would water ow where it ould produe the greatest value/returns.
The pereived failure of alloation is assoiated to the state beause water is usually alloated by
way of entralised management, with subsidies seen as distorting pries. The market is seen as
the one mehanism able to solve these issues. The state was asribed the role of guaranteeing
the proper funtioning of markets by formalising property rights and providing the neessary
legal framework. The wider appliation of ommerial priniples to servie providers, the broad
use of ompetition, and the inreased involvement of users where ommerial and ompetitive
behaviour is onstrained (World Bank 1994, ited in Robbins, 2003) were the means by whih this
would be ahieved. In a funtioning market it would be the private setor that would provide the
neessary investments in all setors related to water. In addition developing ountries are under
tremendous pressure by donor onditionalities and strutural adjustment programmes to redue
state expenditures (see Bakker, 2007; Hall & Lobina, 2007; Hall, Lobina & De La Motte, 2005;
Robbins, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2005).
With this disussion of the neoliberal institutional and administrative reform disourse and the
importane of understanding its hybridised appliation in varying loal ontexts this brief overview
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of the theoretial elements informing this thesis has been ompleted. I now turn to an elaboration
of how these have strutured the following argument.
1.6 A Framework Combining Theoretial Elements: The Hy-
drosoial Cyle, Sale, the IDC, and Neoliberalisation
Understanding IDC interation with the Lebanese water setor and its administration and the
resultant eets on power will be ahieved through an analysis of the hydrosoial yle. This
perspetive allows like no other to draw a omprehensive (as muh as possible) aount of water
resoure management and its eets on soiety and nature and vie versa, and as suh to rystallise
IDC inuene in the proess. The argument is further strutured by its fous on the IDC.
The aggregation of international development ators under the label IDC requires its empirial
substantiation. It also, by denition, sets it apart from speially Lebanese strutures. As will be
shown the water resoure management proess exists, in its urrent form, only in their interation,
and it is impossible to always preisely attribute ausal primay or establish lear and unidiretional
ausal hains. The proess is (an be seen as being) dialetial, it is artiulated in the interation
of the two sets of ators.
Another impliation of studying the IDC is an analyti primay of the national sale, the eets
of IDC intervention on Lebanese development, and by extension Lebanese power strutures and
politial eonomy an only be understood fully at this sale  having posed the problem in terms of
the IDC. (For the ase of Lebanon in part also beause of the important hydrologial interonnetion
between surfae and groundwater due to the spei hydro-geologial onguration.) Furthermore
fousing on the question of politial and eonomi power from a historial materialist perspetive
requires an understanding of the lass dynamis of the proess; how politial and eonomi elites
and/or the most disenfranhised setion of the population prot or not from the proess, whih
setions of the population have aess to suient aordable water of good quality and whih do
not?
The goal in analysing the hydrosoial yle is to unearth the role of the IDC in the onstrution
of disursive/knowledge, material, soial, tehnologial, eonomi, politial aspets of the speif-
ially Lebanese hydrosoial onstellations and dynamis; most importantly for the argument, to
dierentiate it from the ontributions of the speially Lebanese soial dynamis, and from the
multiple and often ontingent inuenes that nd their origin in the material, suh as meteorologial
and hydro-geologial proesses as well as the tehnosoial dynamis that shape the ows of water
and their distribution and quality.
This basi separation is reeted in the following two hapters (Chapter 2 and 3). The argument
is strutured to rst identify the speially Lebanese ontext and dynamis: existing water
resoures and their representation, the water setor administration, and the related denition
of the water management problems by both Lebanese and IDC experts. This problem denition
is then juxtaposed to a desription of how the Lebanese politial system aets water resoure
management (and by extension the hydrosoial yle). The third hapter fouses on the IDC. The
rst part details its emergene and growing importane in the Lebanese development proess and
situates this rmly in the hybridised neoliberalisation of the ountry. The seond part fouses on
IDC inuenes and interventions in the water setor. It details various ways in whih it intervenes
in infrastruture prodution, management, and the onstrution of water resoure management
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spei knowledge. With this separation the presentation of the politial eonomy is also divided
over the two hapters, whereby the eonomi base of the power struture of Lebanese elites is
explained in Chapter 3 as it is also the soure of Lebanese dependene on international apital
and development aid and as suh the growing inuene of the IDC. These two hapters together
explain the larger politial eonomi struture of the ountry and also sketh the disursive and
knowledge related aspets of the hydrosoial yle.
Where the rst two substantive hapters fous on one and then the other set of ators,
the fourth and fth hapter elaborate on the interation between the two, whereby the fourth
looks at the results of this interation on the water setor administration and the fth on the
planning and prodution of infrastruture and its artiulation within the Lebanese geographial
and hydrogeologial ontext. Chapter four explores the hanges of the administrative struture
while juxtaposing this proess to the resiliene of the Lebanese strutures of soial power. Chapter
5 explains geographial and setoral uneven development and related deteriorating eologial
resoures and resulting uneven aess to water resoures.
Finally, notwithstanding the analyti primay of the national sale, partly in reation to the
new materialist ritique of historial materialist approahes and its insistene on desriptive detail,
and the importane of miro sale politial analysis the study is substantiated by numerous smaller
ase studies. This approah is also a inherent in the idea of the hydrosoial yle, whereby here
the miro level politis are more relevant in view of their strutural harateristis. The always
loal harater of water ows and aordingly infrastruture projets  by way of being material
proesses  also neessitates analysis at this sale. These small sale ase studies serve to illustrate
how the soial metabolism of water materialises and is shaped also by bio- and geophysial proesses
and other often ontingent dynamis. Water and its management serve as the binding element in
this ritial analysis of international development and also serve to illustrate the spei pathways
of its (and by extension nature's) neoliberalisation.
Chapter 2
Lebanese Water Resoures and their
Administration
This hapter begins the analysis of the hydrosoial yle in Lebanon with three important elements
that shape it. First the sienti representation of the hydrologi yle as well as the demand and
supply senarios built on it whih serve to render the resoure alulable and manageable. In this
ontext I will show how water is onstruted as a sare resoure and how this inuenes water
resoure management poliy.
The next setion moves to a desription of the water setor administration and its funtioning.
As an introdution to this setion I will show how the administration and its problems are
represented by the IDC in a depolitiised manner. Following, the water resoure management
proess within the Lebanese administration will be detailed. This desription shows that the
proess is invariably tied to the parliamentary and governmental proess and so inherently politial.
The last part of this hapter fouses on the soio-politial power strutures to begin to show
how these aet the water resoure management proess, the water setor administration, and the
deision making proess.
The water resoure management proess is tightly intertwined with the Lebanese politial
proess and reets its six harateristi features: 1) the prevalene of setarian lientelist networks
and related patron-lient dynamis in the administration and the private setor; 2) a need for
onsensus between the dierent elites also rooted in the onstitution; 3) a frequently reurring
deadlok of the politial proess; 4) whih is often resolved through a distribution of resoures
among politial elites and/or 5) through attempts to bypass the politial and legal proess. Finally,
6) diret Syrian dominane over the politial proess until 2005 whih has dereased sine.
2.1 Hydrology, Water Balanes, Climate Change, and Sarity
The national sale is the largest at whih water resoure management takes plae, WRM remains
a state endeavour. In the Lebanese ase the national sale remains small in size, its surfae area




With the Syrian revolution um ivil war going into its fourth year and the related inux of refugees that number
has swollen drastially to somewhere between 5 and 6 million residents.
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Figure 2.1: Topography of Lebanon with rivers and major urban entres
For omparison, metropolitan London has an area of 8,382 km² and a population of about 15
million, the Berlin metropolitan area extends over 30,370 km² and houses 4.5 million inhabitants,
and Mumbai metropolitan area is the home of some 1820 million residents in an area of 4,300
km².
2
That is to say that not only is Lebanon small, but what is the national sale in this study,
in terms of absolute size, is the sale of a metropolitan area in a dierent loation.
The Lebanese geography is marked by two mountain ranges running north to south. The
2
Data on the metropolitan areas was obtained from Wikipedia and serves only for omparison.
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Mount Lebanon range rises steeply from the oast and reahes heights of 3,084 meters in the
north. The rest slopes towards the south at altitudes between 2,000 and 2,600 m and falls o
towards the southern border. In the west the Anti-Lebanon range runs parallel. Its highest peak
is Mount Hermon with 2,814 meters and marks the border with Syria and the Israeli oupied
Golan. Between the two lies the Bekaa Valley with altitudes ranging from 1,400 m in the north to
about 900 m in the south where the terrain falls of towards the Hula plain in oupied Palestine
(see Fig.2.1). Due to the geographial variations the dierent areas reeives widely varied amounts
of rain. The all year round lush green oastal strip and western slope are ontrasted by the muh
drier Bekaa area.
Lebanon has about 2,000 springs and 40 surfae watersheds of whih 16 sustain perennial rivers,
the remainder feed seasonal streams. Of these 13 run from the western mountain ranges towards
the oast and three originate inland. The Litani runs from the Bekaa towards the south along the
Mount Lebanon range and uts towards the sea in its foothills. The Assi river ows north from
the Bekaa into Syria and the Hasbani ows south from the slopes of Mount Hermon towards the
Houla plain into oupied Palestine. Figure 2.1 depits the topography and rivers and provides a
omparative measure of the river ows. The ows are not exatly quantied beause of the poor
quality of the data and the widely diering estimates. Finally, not indiated on the map are the
main groundwater aquifers whih also form an important soure of water for both irrigation and
the domesti water supply. Two geologial layers at as reservoirs for groundwater and all perennial
rivers are sustained mainly by spring disharge from groundwater and only to a very small degree
by surfae water run o.
2.1.1 Water Masses and Measurements
Most of the rainfall or about 70 perent ours on the western slope of the Mount Lebanon range.
The oastal area reeives around 880 mm to 1,000 mm. This inreases with altitude to estimated
highs of 1,6002,000 mm in the high mountains above 1,500 m. Beause the western mountain
range forms a weather barrier, the Bekaa plain reeives only between 200600 mm. Nearly all
rainfall ours in the months from mid November to the end of April.
An assessment of the total water masses the ountry reeives through preipitation is more
diult. In 2010 the government published a national water balane in the National Water Setor
Strategy (NWSS) (see Figure 2.2). Aording to this doument the ountry reeives 8,600 MCM
(million ubi meters) as rainfall and snow, total evapo-transpiration is estimated at 4,500 MCM
leaving about 4,100 MCM total renewable water resoures.
These numbers stem from the mid to late 1990s and have been reprodued sine.
3
They are the
numbers that form the basis for Lebanese water resoure planning. But as will be seen shortly these
numbers annot be onsidered aurate representations of the water volumes of an average rainfall
year (disregarding the fat that an average rainfall year seldom happens). There is a onsiderable
margin of error in these numbers and their usefulness for planning needs to be questioned. Where
their usefulness is more obvious is as justiation for a apital expenditure plan of US$ 7.74 billion
from 2011 to 2020 (MEW, 2010b, p.79), an expression of the Lebanese hydrauli mission
4
and
onrms their politial value.
3
Hussein Amery (2000) ites a presentation from 1998 by Fadi Comair, President of the Board of the Litani River
Authority (LRA) at the time, that presents similar numbers.
4
See Ghiotti and Riahi (2014); Riahi (2013) for a historial view of Lebanese hydrauli mission.
CHAPTER 2. LEBANESE WATER RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION 44
Figure 2.2: National Water Setor Strategy  Water balane in Lebanon
Soure: National Water Setor Strategy 2010, p. 46.
They form the basis for the delaration that Lebanon falls below the ommonly used water
sarity threshold of 1000m³/apita/year and gives just the right sense of urgeny to the investment
program. This indiator has been widely ritiised for its aggregation of regionally varying situation
and the data problems from whih it suers.
5
In the ase of Lebanon the unertainty onerning
the water volumes and the population numbers is onsiderable.
6
A more sensible analysis of the hydrologi yle (at the sale of the ountry) is presented by
Mihel Bakalowiz (Bakalowiz, 2009). In his analysis he reviews a number of previous reports and
ompares the varying estimates for average rainfall, evapo-transpiration and surfae water run-o
(see Catafago & Jaber, 2001a; Comair, 2007; World Bank, 2003; ?). He establishes a range of 8,300
MCM and 10,400 MCM for a year with average rainfall. For a dry year with 10-year reurrene
interval total rainfall is estimated at about 60 perent of the average year.
The values for evapo-transpiration Bakalowiz produes also diverge onsiderably from those
presented by other authors. Based on a statistial approah he estimates the value between 5,200
6,200 MCM, whereas others estimate the values at 4,0004,300MCM.
7
Finally he estimates surfae
water run-o between 3,6704,800 MCM. Following an analysis of resoures at a subnational sale,
using spring and river data, as well as information regarding the prinipal aquifers, he onludes
that the known exploitable resoures are in the order of 2,600 MCM or about 60 perent of the total
resoures of 4,500 MCM remaining in the ountry after subtrating surfae ows to neighbouring
5
See Molle and Mollinga (2003) for a disussion a detailed disussion.
6
The population is alulated from the Central Administration of Statistis (CAS) estimation of residents living
outside of Palestinian amps in 2007. 3,759,135 residents in 2007 with a growth rate of 1.75 perent for three
years until 2010 proving an estimate of 3,975,000 residents outside the amps in addition to 450,000 Palestinian
refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Ageny (UNRWA) responsible for servie provision
to Palestinian amps. A joint Amerian University of Beirut and UNRWA study published in late 2010 estimates
the number of refugees atually living in Lebanon ranges between 250,000280,000 less than the 425,000 registered
refugees (Chaaban et al. 2010, p. x). This is mainly due to the massive emigration of Palestinians. (p.x) But even
the population data from the CAS must be treated with are as they are based solely on small sale households
surveys and extrapolated from there (CAS, 2010).
7
He notes that no explanation for these numbers are given. Two dierent interviewees pointed out the same to
me suggesting that the roughly 50 perent that is urrently used as referene number has no sienti basis.
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ountries. Table 2.1 summarises his analysis of the national water resoures (for the in-depth
disussion see Bakalowiz, 2009).
Table 2.1: Comparison of water balanes
Elements of the Balane (in MCM) Values from the Literature Retained Values
preipitation 8 320 - 10 400 10 000
evapo-transpiration 4 300 - 6 200* 5 000
ows from the 40 major rivers and streams 3 673 - 4 800 4 500
surfae water ows to neighb. ountries 300 - 670 500
groundwater ows to neighb. ountries 310 ?
submarine springs 385 - 1000 < 200
Total resoures
avg. year 2 600 - 4 800 4 500
dry year 1 400 - 2 600 2 600
Exploitable resoures
surfae water 1 500
groundwater 700 - 1 165
Total 1 400 - 2 200 2600**
Soure: Balakowiz 2009, p. 15.
* The unpublished report of the Japanese International Cooperation Ageny estimates evapo-transpiration at 2 700 MCM.
** this number presents his very rough estimate of exploitable resoures. It has to be highlighted that
exploitability is also a funtion of tehnologial ost (energy ost being an important variable).
This summary shows that onsiderable dierenes exist in the assessment of water resoures.
At the root of these dierenes is the quality and inompleteness of preipitation series, and river
ow data, as well as the lak of knowledge about groundwater ows and volumes. The dierent
authors aknowledge the gaps in the data (Amery, 2000; Catafago & Jaber, 2001a; Sene, Marsh &
Hahahe, 1999; World Bank, 2003). The measurement infrastruture was largely destroyed during
the war and has not been rehabilitated to prewar levels. As Amery (2000) observes:
Lebanon's infrastruture for gathering water data is very weak to nonexistent, and this
reets negatively on the quality and auray of urrently available data.
This had not hanged by 2012 as the diretor of a UNDP implemented projet to assess groundwater
onrms (Interview Khayat 2012). Most importantly in terms of preipitation the amount of
snowfall was never measured.
8
Aording to Bakalowiz:
It seems that this inertitude is due to the absene of viable data about the snowpak
over beause no measurements are done at altitudes that would allow to reonstitute
the preipitation above 1,500 m in a valid form. The few proposed estimates suggest a
probable underestimation of preipitation at high altitude. Yet altitudes above 1,500
m over about 3,000 km², or lose to 30 perent of the Lebanese territory. (Bakalowiz,
2009, p. 6)
The ase is similar for the measurements of river ows. The measurements that are taken have been
questioned by numerous experts (Interview Margane 2012, Renk 2011, Khayat 2012, Abdallah
2011) and personal observation of a ouple of stations onrms that many are in poor shape.
The need to improve the data gathering infrastruture is understood by Lebanese water setor
oials but to-date very little has been ahieved in this realm. Data is produed on a pieemeal
basis usually in the framework of infrastruture projet designs or implementation. This omes
with the drawbak that data, projet neessities, and the eonomi feasibility assessments have a
8
Only by 2012 have very limited eorts in this diretion begun (Interview Khayyat).
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tendeny to onrm eah other. The view expressed by oials and international experts is that it
is better to have some data rather than none (Interview Klingbeil 2013, Interview Jaber 2010). The
fat that the existing data is nevertheless presented in absolute terms and that possibly signiant
variations
9
in the volumes at dierent stages of the hydrauli yle are rarely explained point to
the purposeful onstrution of the oial model and the interest behind its retention over the last
two deades.
That the eorts to improve the situation are at best halfhearted highlights the priority given
to other aspets of resoure management, espeially infrastruture development. It further stands
in ontrast to notions that emphasises sarity and aim at a ommodiation of the resoures to
produe an eient alloation through pries determined in a free market (whih in theory would
require a thorough understanding and knowledge of the quantities involved).
2.1.2 Climate Change
This unertainty is exaggerated by the prospets of limate hange. The predited rise of average
temperatures is widely seen as leading to a derease in total renewable water resoures. Treaties
on limate hange often invoke the spetre of shortages or sarity (see Bou-Zeid & El-Fadel,
2002 for example). Experts agree that limate hange dynamis will lead to a rise in annual
average temperature aross the region (see for example Assaf, 2009; Pahauri & Reisinger, 2007;
United Nations Development Programme, 2011). A general derease in preipitation throughout
the Middle East and North Afria is a related senario whih is onsidered very probable by
experts (see also Assaf, 2009, 2010). Yet, given the range of dierent miro limates, Lebanon's
geographial speiity, and the margins of error in general irulation models for limate hange
preditions, the overall eets of limate hange on preipitation in Lebanon remain unertain.
10
Amin Shaban (Shaban, 2009) shows a dereasing trend in preipitation volumes, a derease of
the snow-over area, as well as a dereasing snow-over period based on analysis of satellite imagery
from 19892007. Yet given the quality of the existing data experts have voied their reservations
with regard to his ndings (Interview Khayat 2012, Klingbeil 2012, Margane 2012).
Bakalowiz reviews the preditions of general irulation models and nds that the preipitation
data generated does not math observed data aurately enough, i.e. onsiderable error margins
exist that make the models unsuitable to make preditions for Lebanon (Bakalowiz 2009, p.2829).
Based on evapo-transpiration alulations he goes on to predit inreases of water losses through
the evapo-transpiration proess onditional on dereases in both preipitation and inreases in
temperature. He models for 10 perent and 20 perent dereases in total preipitation and average
temperature rises of 1°C and 2 °C. He onludes that in these onditions water resoures would
derease between 68 perent and 1216 perent respetively. Translated to total volumes this
yields hanges from the urrently estimated 2,8004,700 MCM (see above) to 2,5504,400 MCM
and 2,3504,100 MCM for the two senarios respetively (Bakalowiz, 2009, p.3032).
Climate hange eets on snow-over and related water masses seem to eliit easier onsensus
among experts. With temperature inreases the snow-rain limit is expeted to rise in altitude
reduing the snowpak over. Higher temperatures will also lead to earlier snow melt aeting
ow patterns of rivers. A researh projet onduted by a Lebanese and Frenh team of sientists
9
2,700 MCM remaining in the ountry aording to the NWSS all of whih are onsidered exploitable and
4,500 MCM aording to Bakalowiz whih remain in the ountry but only 60 perent of whih he estimates to be
exploitable.
10
Mohamed el-Raey (2009) points out that: Development of a regional model simulation for the Mediterranean
is presently missing and one needs to be made in the future. (p.61)
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modelled run-o senarios for temperature and preipitation hanges for the Ibrahim river (Nahr
Ibrahim). Based on the model they show that peak ow of rivers is likely to be shifted to earlier
months without neessarily aeting overall volumes dramatially (see g. 2.3). The impliations
are that river ows will peak and start dereasing 15 days to a month earlier, thus prolonging
the draught period (Hreihe, Najem & Boquillon, 2007, p.1132).
Figure 2.3: Modelled streamow of Nahr Ibrahim
Soure: Hreihe et al. (2007), p.1131
2.1.3 Demand and Supply
Compared to neighbouring ountries Lebanon reeives relatively abundant amounts of rain. The
shortage that is experiened in the urban ontext, as well as for agriultural purposes, has two
aspets. One is the geographial aspet, some areas and groups have water for multiple purposes
others do not, this is a funtion of available infrastruture and loal water resoures (this will be
elaborated further in Chapter 5). The seond aspet is seasonal, water demand is highest in the
summer months when it does not rain. When reserves run low by the end of the summer the period
when publi water supply operation dereases drastially and irrigation beomes more expensive.
The sarity disussion is usually linked to water demand, related population growth rates and
limate hange.
An often ited study from Elie Bou Zeid and Mutasem el-Fadel (2002) estimates 15 perent
derease in available water resoures and oupled to this a 6 perent inrease in demand by 2025.
11
A summary of preditions presents per apita estimates for future senarios (See Fig 2.4).
With the benet of hindsight it an be observed that the population estimates are very high.
By 2010 the population was more likely loser to 4 million or even to the 4.5 million estimated
in the NWSS than the 5.5 million that Bou Zeid and el-Fadel produe. Demand projetions are
equally muh higher than the those produed by the NWSS. The latter produes three demand
projetions until 2035. In the high demand senario demand is modelled to reah 2,518 MCM/year,
moderate demand 1,802 MCM/year (see gure 2.5), and low demand 1,410 MCM/year (NWSS
2010 p. 39). The dierenes to Bou Zeid and el-Fadel (2002) are striking and for the year 2030
their preditions are 42 perent, 92 perent, and 134 perent higher than the respetive NWSS
11
Among others it is ited in a World Bank report titled Making the Most of Sarity: Aountability for Better
Water management Results in the Middle East and North Afria(World Bank, 2007) to emphasise the potential
ost of sarity in terms of GDP.
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senarios. The variations originate from the dierent assumptions whih are explained in both
ases.
Figure 2.4: Water resoure preditions per apita by Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel
Soure: reprodued from Bou-Zeid and El-Fadel (2002).
With the benet of hindsight it an be observed that the population estimates are very high.
By 2010 the population was more likely loser to 4 million or even to the 4.5 million estimated
in the NWSS than the 5.5 million that Bou Zeid and el-Fadel produe. Demand projetions are
equally muh higher than the those produed by the NWSS. The latter produes three demand
projetions until 2035. In the high demand senario demand is modelled to reah 2,518 MCM/year,
moderate demand 1,802 MCM/year (see gure 2.5), and low demand 1,410 MCM/year (NWSS
2010 p. 39). The dierenes to Bou Zeid and el-Fadel (2002) are striking and for the year 2030
their preditions are 42 perent, 92 perent, and 134 perent higher than the respetive NWSS
senarios. The variations originate from the dierent assumptions whih are explained in both
ases.
The NWSS was produed 10 years later and benets from a omparable improvement in
availability of data, due to the progression of time and experiene in the water setor. Nevertheless
in both ases the hoie of data is not without meaning. Bou Zeid and el-Fadel hose to extrapolate
from then urrent high onsumption praties. They estimated that water used per hetare for
irrigation will remain at the very high value of 10,000 m³ for the projeted period and total
irrigation areas will reah 150,000 ha. Similarly, they hose to represent per apita domesti water
onsumption to reah 300 l//d by 2030, whih is very high by most standards but espeially for
the Middle East. The estimates by Bou Zeid and el-Fadel (2002) were learly aimed to produe
a worst ase senario, do arry an alarmist tone and produe senarios of onsiderable sarity.
They make the ase that water demand will quikly outstrip available supplies of 2,000 MCM/year
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(based on the same oial water balane reprodued in the NWSS) leading to water shortages by
20102015.
In ontrast the NWSS takes 7,000 and 8,000 m³/ha as values for irrigation and projets two
target senarios for expansion of irrigated area, 130,000 ha and 180,000 ha. It estimates domesti
demand to inrease to 169 l//d, 195 l//d, and 220 l//d for the respetive senarios. The NWSS
produed by the Ministry of Energy and Water has an obvious interest in presenting a senario
aording to whih it an ahieve a situation where demand and supply math in the time frame
of its ambitious investment programme for the water setor.
Figure 2.5: Supply- demand balane for a dry year in the NWSS
Soure: Ministry of Energy and Water, National Water Setor Strategy (2010), p.46.
Another study worth mentioning here is presented in the book of Fadi Comair, General Diretor
of the Department of Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures (GDHER) at the ministry and responsible
for water resoure planning. He predits a total demand of 3,400 MCM/year and a deit of 1,700
MCM/year for 2040 if the deennial plan he devised is not put into ation.
12
Others go even
further. Bassam Hamdar, Chairman of the Faulty of Eonomis at the Amerian University of
Siene and Tehnology is ited in the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar :
All sienti institutions and researhes onrm that water demand in Lebanon ur-
rently exeeds the 3 billion m³ level, and will exeed 44.5 billion m³ in the future.
Meanwhile, those who believe that Lebanon will have a surplus are basing their onlu-
sions on researh suggesting that the urrent demand is less than 2 billion m³, whih
is not the ase.(Abou-Mosleh, 2014)
12
The book was published while the NWSS was studied and produed. The studies it ontains are a ompilation
of work he presented on numerous oasions sine his promotion to the ministry. It was not disussed here in detail
beause of inonsistenies in the presentation of the data and unertainties (mistakes) in the demand-supply senario
(see Comair 2010b, p. 148 -149).
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To say that demand will be as high or higher than estimated exploitable resoures or even renewable
resoures is in eet presenting the resoure as sare resoure. In the ase of Lebanon, a ountry
that was onsidered to be rih in water resoures, these preditions serve to reate a sense of sarity
 projeted into the future but nevertheless emphasising the eonomi notion of limited resoures
faed with quasi unlimited demand (even if managed). The sarity threshold is mentioned and
predited to worsen in the NWSS as well as the World Bank Lebanon Country Water Setor
Assistane Strategy for 20112016 (MEW, 2010b; World Bank, 2012b). This disourse has found
its way into the Lebanese publi sphere. In an interview from 2013 the head of the Health and
Environment Department at the Lebanese University Dr. Jalal Halawani stated the issues with
water is not as muh about mismanagement, bad distribution, and pollution inasmuh as it is
about sarity and shortages (Berberi, 2013) (see Changpertitum, 2008; Dokery, 2012; Galey,
2011 for other examples disussing the looming risis).
This drive to frame the water problem in terms of sarity is not new. In the 1990s it was
framed in terms of population growth (see The Daily Star, 1998b for example). The threat of
limate hange reinfores this notion. For Lebanon this means that the reputation of being the
Chateau d'eau  the water tower  of the region is being replaed. A ountry where suessive
ministers entertained the idea of selling water to neighbouring ountries is thus represented as
being in a situation of shortage and by extension sarity.
This is not to say that there is no limit to the resoure. The NWSS demand supply senario
is represented in Figure 2.5 for a dry year with a 10 year reurrene interval and shows that a
water shortage already exists. Figures 2.2 and 2.5 indiate that at least 200 MCM/year more
groundwater is exploited than replenishes naturally aording to the numbers in the NWSS. Given
the unertainty in the data of both water and the number of wells, this ould be muh more as it
ould be less. The falling water tables in many areas of the ountry indiate that groundwater is
being overextrated (see also Chapter 5). But the demand supply models go beyond this simple
assertion; they frame a vision of the future and how it should be or how the designers of the model
want it to be.
As suh they are loaded with assumptions, many of whih arry a politial meaning. Between
the unertainty resulting from the bad quality of the existing data and the unertainty of limate
hange models, preditions on future water availability an only be highly impreise. The use of
this data and its representation as absolute truth (as the unertainties are never mentioned by
state or IDC ators
13
) as well as the laims regarding availability and development made on this
shaky sienti basis further highlights that the preditions are not guided solely by sienti and
rational planning priniples.
In all ases the senarios that are developed are based on extrapolation from existing onditions
in a more or less linear fashion. The numerial assumptions are expliated but other assumptions
remain impliit. The most obvious is the population growth rate, in its linearity all soiohistori
dynamis are evauated from the preditions. Emigration for its various reasons, war, or sine 2011
the inux of Syrian refugees, do not happen in these senarios. These tehniques might produe
reasonable preditions in a more stable soio-politial ontext, but in a volatile ontext suh as
the Middle East and espeially Lebanon, their preditive value needs to be questioned; the more
13
The National Master Physial Master Plan for the Lebanese Territory is the only exeption that ould be found
showing the dierent estimates of the water balane (Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners)  IAURIF, 2005) but
this plans has never been ratied by parliament.
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so when the last population ensus dates from 1932 and all the more reent gures are based on
muh smaller household or buildings surveys.
Embedded in the preditions are also visions of ontinuous eonomi growth under urrent
prodution systems (soial metaboli assemblages). For demand to inrease as predited not only
the population needs to grow but eonomi ativity needs to follow suit. Why would industrial
water demand inrease if not due to equivalent growth in the setor? The same is true for
agriultural ativity and irrigation demand; agriultural prodution systems are assumed to remain
the same and at the very least the irrigation infrastruture needs to be produed for the real demand
to exist and then to be met.
14
It is a irular proess in whih growth is predited, and so posited
as inevitable, to justify the interventions that are designed to make this growth possible.
15
In
that sense the underlying assumption hides an ideology of maximum eonomi growth and related
maximum exploitation of the resoure, a marriage of the hydrauli mission and a apitalist's
wet dream of innite growth. It illustrates Harvey's (1996) point that eologial arguments are
simultaneously politial eonomi arguments.
Further, positing the water problem in terms of sarity makes the resoure amenable to being
valued in eonomi terms. The solution is thus redued to one of assigning water the orret value
whih will then be alloated through the operation of a free market. This in turn requires the
ommodiation of water, the ommerialisation of state utility bodies and the involvement of the
private setor through privatisation and publi-private partnerships (PPP) in its various guises. In
Lebanon this argument is supported by the extremely limited nanial apaity of the state. This
need for the private setor partiipation is reiterated at every possibility by the Lebanese deision
makers and international water experts. Fadi Comair, the Diretor General of the Department of
Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures, expresses this learly:
We annot implement infrastruture projets if the private setor does not intervene,
...Without the private setor we an do nothing. (Halawi, 2010)
Similarly, the governor of the Central Bank Riad Salame presents the problem highlighting the
importane of PPPs by mobilising sarity:
From a perspetive of an era of desertiation and drought, water is not only a natural
resoure but beomes an eonomi and nanial resoure that is not less important
than oil if it is well managed. (Author's translation, L'Orient le Jour, 2010)
2.2 The Lebanese Water Setor Administration
Another observation an be made about the water-balane senarios desribed above. The senarios
built to predit supply and demand balanes are attempts to render the resoure, in eet the whole
hydrauli yle, preditable. In their abstration they attempt to produe a manageable resoure.
They are representations of aspets of the hydrosoial yle, present and future, at the sale of the
Lebanese territories. They model both demand and supply, existing onditions and future growth,
in abstrat quantities on the basis of a variety of inputs.
16
What is eetively modelled is the water
14
The water sarity threshold of 1,000m³//y for example alulates the water food requirements for one person.
Trade in ereals and other foodstu balanes, or an balane, these water requirements. The real demand for water
is thus a dierent issue, it depends on agriultural prodution systems and markets.
15
This not to say that dierent soial metaboli arrangements or a dierent mode of prodution would not grow
or would not need to exhibit some growth in a more limited fashion.
16
On the demand side they inlude dierent rates of domesti onsumption per apita, industrial, tourism and
irrigation onsumption, population and irrigation growth, impat of eonomi development, tari hange, water
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resoure management proess for the time period, this inludes its administrative and operational
aspets, as well as the infrastruture prodution proess.
The water resoure management proess is reognised as suering from serious defets by all
ators involved. Its improvement and the realisation of the vision expressed by the experts rests
on two main omponents. One is the prodution of the neessary infrastruture (see Chapter 5)
and the seond the reform of the water setor (Chapter 4). The implementation of these strategies
is guided by the analysis of the shortomings of the Lebanese water administration, the problem
analysis, that these ators produe.
2.2.1 The Problems of the Water Setor: a View from the Mainstream
The ators in the water setor and their responsibilities are desribed in a number of publiations
by Lebanese and international agenies and experts. Water setor oials like Selim Catafago,
President of the Board of Diretors of the Litani River Authority, and Bassam Jaber, former
Diretor General of Exploitation at the ministry (Catafago, 2005; Catafago & Jaber, 2001a), as
well as Fadi Comair, urrent diretor of the resoure department (Comair, 2005, 2007, 2010b), are
the most important representatives of the Lebanese experts and their writings. The World Bank
is the international institution whih has produed the most expansive literature on the Lebanese
water setor (Akkaya, Junge & Mansour, 2009; World Bank, 1998, 2010d, 2012b), UN organisations
suh as ESCWA, UNDP and UNICEF have also produed signiant volumes of reports on the
state of water resoures and the water setor administration (see for example Abdulrazzak &
Kobeissi, 2002; Litevout, 2010), as have the EU and bilateral development organisations (Freiha,
2009; Gedeon, 2008; SOGESID, 2005; Tidiere, 2009) (represented in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4).
In these reports the struture of the Lebanese water setor is often desribed in an idealised
and/or shemati fashion built largely on a reading of the laws and regulations that dene the
responsibilities of the dierent administrative bodies. This is usually oupled with observations
stating the overlapping responsibilities and the fragmentation of the setor that are an important
aspet of the dysfuntions haraterising the setor.
The World Bank Water Setor Assistane Strategy for 20122016 elaborates the problem
statement as follows:
The institutional and legal framework envisaged has not been eetively implemented,
reating institutional unertainty over setor responsibilities. Coordination within
government remains poor, in partiular between MEW and the CDR, with ontinued
fragmentation of responsibilities for investment planning and exeution, and onsequent
low eieny of publi expenditures. The (partial) implementation of a delegated model
of servie provision has not been omplemented by a parallel eort to strengthen entral
government oversight over the water setor. Reiproal aountability between Water
Establishments and lients remains weak, as WEs are not adequately empowered to
improve servie levels. (World Bank, 2012b, p.vii)
The reform law of 2000 and the following amendments hanged some of this and aording to
the new legal setup the fragmentation and overlapping responsibilities have been redued  at
least legally (see Chapter 4). The reality of the relationship between the dierent ators is seldom
depited (or not at all) and then very benevolently. How deision making happens, the politis
onservation, and redution in unaounted-for-water (UfW). On the supply side: urrent prodution rates of
ground and surfae water as well as storage apaity.
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that inuene the water management proess, is usually summed up in shallow desriptions of
institutional and nanial weakness of administrative bodies. The atual politial mehanisms
that shape the institutions and their funtioning are a fundamental aspet of this weakness, but
are usually left out of the problem analysis, being redued to soial polarisation (2010d) but
not systematially analysed.
17
This represents a disembedding of the water resoure management
proess from the politial ontext that reates it and of whih it is a onstituent part. The water
resoure administration is analysed is if it operated in a benign vauum.
In part this an be explained by the intended audiene and the aims with whih these reports
are formulated, but also by the ideologial positions of the writers. There are ertainly limits to
how ritial of the Lebanese state the development ators an be in publi before it beomes diplo-
matially untenable. Yet, a report by OMSAR (Oe of the Minister of State for Administrative
Reform) dating from 2001, signed by the minister of state, is very frank about the importane of
politial interferene, lientelist relationships, and orruption as hindering the funtioning of the
state as well as the failure to reform (Oe of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, 2001,
p. 36). The exlusion of these fators in analysis of the water setor administration is thus not
an entirely innoent or diplomati oversight. They are removed from disussions regarding water
resoure management and relegated into a separate realm, the politial sphere. The disourse
about the water setor and its shortomings is thus depolitiised.
The following analysis suggests that the depolitiisation of water resoure management issues
is at the root of the failure to improve these proesses substantially. The depolitiisation happens
with the relegation of the proposed solutions into the managerial and tehnial sphere  even
good governane disourses are by nature formulai and as suh tehnial. The solutions beome
a question of assemblage of governane tehniques. Citizen empowerment is transformed into user
feedbak (via the prie mehanism) for example. Yet the failure of infrastruture projets, of poliy
elaboration (or rather the absene thereof), the disjointed planning eorts and the shortomings
of the administration are all intimately linked to the Lebanese politial eonomi strutures. The
problems are not only managerial and tehnial issues but also (if not more so) politial issues
requiring politial solutions.
2.2.2 The Lebanese Water Setor Ators
It will rst be neessary to desribe the dierent ators and their responsibilities aording to
the law to make this argument. Table 2.2 provides a list of ministries and the aronyms used
throughout this thesis. The ators (see Figure 2.6 for a sketh of the setor organisation) an be
divided into four ategories.
17
The World Bank expenditure report ites an analysis by Philip Keefer and Stuti Khemani (2005) that analyses
the eets of three imperfetions of politial markets on the provision of publi servies. The imperfetions they
assess are inomplete information for voters, the lak of redibility of politial promises, and soial polarisation
(p.1). They reommend that: Where polarisation is in response to grave imperfetions in politial and eonomi
markets, however, ausing people to retreat into groups with whih they have the strongest personal links and
the greatest hope of aessing resoures, the appropriate response is to remove those imperfetions (p.23). The
language and analysis depolitiise the issue as if soial polarisation did not have omplex soio-historial roots that
are ertainly not easily removed.
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Table 2.2: List of Water setor administrative bodies and their mandate
Name
Aronym Category
Ministry of Energy and Water





General Diretorate of Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures
GDHER Water Administration
Proper
General Diretorate of Exploitation GDE
Water Administration
Proper






Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment
North Lebanon Water Establishment
































Counil for Development and Reonstrution CDR
Reonstrution
Ageny
Counil of the South COS
Reonstrution
Ageny
Central Fund of the Displaed CFD
Reonstrution
Ageny














Counil of Minsters COM
Legislative and
Budgetary Body
Ministry of Finane MOF
Legislative and
Budgetary Body
Publi Reruitment Counil PRC
Legislative and
Budgetary Body
Publi Aounting Board PAB
Legislative and
Budgetary Body
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The most obvious is the water setor administration proper, the administrative bodies expliitly
harged with aspets of water resoure management (WRM). The Ministry of Energy and Water
(MEW) has two departments harged with WRM, the Diretorate of Hydrauli and Eletrial
Resoures (GDHER) and the Diretorate of Exploitation (GDE). The GDE now oversees the
four Regional Water Establishments (RWE) that replaed the 21 Water oes (and 200 plus
ommittees) only harged with water supply management and in some ases irrigation management
before the administrative reform of 2000. The RWEs are responsible for water supply, waste water
management and irrigation exept in the areas where the Litani River Authority (LRA) is harged
with irrigation management.
The seond ategory onsists of the ministries and administrative bodies with mandates that
touh on WRM. The most important ministry in this ategory is the Ministry of Agriulture
(MOA). Agriultural poliy, for example touhing on prie levels, inuenes water use and allo-
ation, but more diretly it has responsibilities to improve on-farm irrigation tehniques. The
Ministry of Publi Health (MPH) and the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) are two more. The
MPH sets water quality standards and is tasked with ontrolling water quality in the potable water
market. The MOE sets environmental standards in ooperation with the MEW and is tasked to
ontrol and penalise pollution violations. Neither the MPH nor the MOE have the apaity to
oherently and fully enfore their regulations. The Ministry of Publi Works (MPW) is responsible
for road onstrution and the management of storm water drainage for all major highways.
The muniipalities (and with that the Ministry of the Interior responsible for muniipal aairs)
also fall into this seond ategory. Until the reform they were responsible for waste water manage-
ment, whereas after the reform they still own the urban waste water networks. In a onsiderable
number of ases muniipal ounils still manage and have to manage water supply (ad ho and
improvised) though they have no input on poliy.
The third ategory is made up of the government agenies tasked with reonstrution. They
are not tasked with water resoure management speially but have a broad mandate to restore
destroyed infrastruture and to develop. These are the Counil for Development and Reonstru-
tion (CDR), the Counil of the South (COS), and the Central Fund for the Displaed (CFD)
ombined these have funded most of the infrastruture investments in the setor. Figure 2.7 shows
that apital investment by the MEW is almost negligible ompared to the investments of the three
reonstrution agenies.
The CFD and the COS are regionally bound. The mandate of the COS is for the reonstrution
of the South. The CFD in ombination with the Ministry of the Displaed is tasked with mitigating
the eets of fored displaement during the ivil war. Its main area of intervention is in the
southern Mount Lebanon region where intense ghting aused the most displaement. Both the
CFD and the COS have seen their budgets shrink dramatially. The CDR remains the most
important infrastruture produing administrative body aross all setors: transportation, power,
teleommuniations, soial infrastruture and the water setor with its dierent sub-setors.
The fourth ategory of ators are those that are at the entre of the legislative and government
proess. These inlude the Cabinet or Counil of Ministers (COM), the prime minister's oe
(PMO), parliament, the parliamentary subommittee for publi works, energy and water (and the
subommittee for the environment), the High Counil for Privatisation (HCP) whih is a permanent
ministerial ommittee, the Ministry of Finane (MOF), the Ministry of Foreign Aairs (MFA), and
beause it has inuene over the employment proess, even the Publi Reruitment Counil ould
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be inluded. Of these the MOF and the HCP are often mentioned and sometimes the PMO, the
others are not usually mentioned.
Emmanuel Kugnik (1999) for example, in her disussion of reform eorts and related stakeholder
analysis omits the parliament and the government. Stephan Ghiotti (2005) inludes the latter but
fails to mention parliament. These two authors are examples of aademi writing. Reports or
analysis by Lebanese experts on the water setor and the reform (see Catafago & Jaber, 2001b;
Comair, 2010b) mention the role of parliament and the various parliamentary subommittees in the
reform but present them as an ator external to the water resoure management proess. Reports
by international development agenies tend to exlude both government and parliament from their
stakeholder analysis. All these administrative bodies, importantly the latter two, and organisations
make up the Lebanese omponent of the water management ators. Water management poliy is
artiulated by them and in their interation, as well as their interation with the IDC.
2.2.3 The Water Resoure Management Administration
Whih administrative body inuenes whih aspet of the WRM proess and how they inuene
these is the subjet of this setion. Their legal mandate and their atual operation do not neessarily
overlap, in fat they diverge on a number of issues.
The WRM proess, as an undertaking realised and direted by the Lebanese state, an be
divided into dierent interrelated sub-proesses for the purpose of this study. These are: legislation,
regulation, poliy making and planning, infrastruture prodution, operation and maintenane,
and enforement. They an be pitured on a sale of temporality and dynamism, with the law
making proess and regulation on the one end and the daily grind of operation, maintenane and
enforement on the other end. These elements are uidly interrelated, feeding bak into eah other.
Law, poliy, and regulation build the theoretial, legal, and ideologial framework of WRM, while
infrastruture prodution, operation and maintenane, and enforement are the WRM proess's
exeutive and ative realisation.
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The administrative bodies listed above are assigned some of these funtions in one or more of
the three sub-setors, water supply, waste water and irrigation management. As should be already
apparent from the setion above the responsibilities are not unambiguously dened and often
overlapping. As will beome lear later in this hapter, this institutional fuzziness is a produt of
the struture of the Lebanese politial system and the ways in whih politial power is negotiated.
The institutional arhiteture, and the deision making and implementation proesses provide a
multitude of avenues for politial interferene in the WRM proess. To point this out is not to
strengthen arguments that aim to insulate WRM proesses from the dirty day-to-day of politial
negotiation into the purely tehnial, muh rather it is to show that the proess is mired in politis,
whih need to be taken into aount. Figure 2.6 skethes the Lebanese water setor administration.
2.2.3.1 The Legislative Proess
The legislative proess is a politial proess by denition. The water setor administrative reform,
whih was launhed in the early 1990s and has been ongoing sine, is at the root a legislative
18
It is worth noting here that infrastruture one produed takes on a dierent temporality. Some of the pipes that
bring water to Beirut from the north are older than the law establishing the Ministry of Hydrauli and Eletrial
Resoures in 1966. It is the infrastruture prodution, the atual building of the infrastruture, its implementation
that is situated here as being generally shorter than the administrative reform proess, whih hanges the institutions


















































Figure 2.6: Sketh of the Lebanese water resoure management administration
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undertaking. So are the attempts at reforming and unifying water related laws in a new water
law. The reform proess took o in earnest with the passing of Law 221 of the year 2000 and the
following amendments. It reorganised the water administration, integrated the 21 water oes
into four RWEs, harged them with the management of all three sub-setors, and altered the
responsibilities of the ministry.
Another example of the importane of these institutions in the water resoure management
proess is the ratiation of international onventions whih require the approval of the politi-
al leaders and legislative bodies. The Barelona onvention, UN Convention for international
water ourses, free trade agreements, water sharing agreements with Syria and the EU-Lebanon
assoiation agreement are the more important ones.
At the entre of the legislative proess are the Counil of Ministers, the parliament, its subom-
mittees, as well as the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament. Depending on
the law, its ontent and the ministries onerned, dierent parliamentary ommittees are onerned.
These legislative ators are important also beyond the fundamental reforms and laws. The
COM approves poliy, parliament disusses investment plans and approves a national budget, whih
alloates funds for investment. Foreign funding needs approval from the COM and parliament; in
the ase of grants from the COM only, and in the ase of loans from both. This means that most
of the infrastruture projets neessitate disussion and approval in the parliamentary ommittees
and parliament sine the dramati deterioration of publi nanes in the mid 1990s.
The CDR is tasked with drawing up and negotiating projet agreements with donors whih are
then forwarded to the COM and then to parliament. The government is then by law authorised
by parliament (and the president) to onlude suh a loan agreement. During this proess an
infrastruture projet and its naning are subjeted to srutiny by six parliamentary ommittees.
These are: 1) the environmental ommittee, 2) nanial ommittee, 3) publi works water and
energy ommittee, 4) inter-ommittee ommittee, 5) legal and administrative ommittee, and
(usually) 6) the ommittee responsible for muniipal aairs and the interior (Interview Charfeddine
2011). A projet an be held up in any of the ommittees. The infrastruture prodution proess
is thus intimately wed to the dynamis of parliamentary ativity and politis. Also related to
infrastruture are assoiated land expropriations, as these also need parliamentary approval and
are then implemented by the ministry or ageny onerned (see Fig.2.6).
2.2.3.2 Infrastruture Planning, Prodution and Operation
The proess of infrastruture prodution is implemented by numerous ators. The proess is also
shaped by the geographial loation of the individual projet, the spei soial, eonomi and
politial onditions in that loality, its topography, as well as its hydro-geologial properties. All
of these an and tend to vary; they will be disussed in a later hapters (Chapter 3 and 5). The
theory would hold that infrastruture prodution hoies are based on larger sale master plans
and development hoies made in a poliy ontext. At least in theory apital investments tends to
be prioritised and phased, and later implemented aordingly. In Lebanon, espeially in the post
ivil war period sine 1992, this has not often been the ase. The World Bank in an unpublished




The rationality is one of eonomi ost benet analysis.
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2.2.3.3 Infrastruture Planning
The theoretial aspet that the World Bank report mentions are the numerous plans for the
reonstrution and for the water setor that have been produed over the years. These plans were
produed by the CDR, the MEW, and the engineering onsultany rms they hired. Aordingly,
the methodologies t the World Bank report's understanding of rationality.
The Horizon 2000 plan was the blue print for the reonstrution of the ountry, it was based
on a preliminary assessment of damages and urgent repairs to be arried out quikly. The Horizon
2000 plan envisioned massive infrastruture investments for the rst post-war deade. In the mid
1990s Lyonnaise des Eaux produed a master plan at the behest of the MHER. In 1999 parliament
approved the Deennial plan produed by the GDHER, under the leadership of Fadi Comair.
Following this the Lebanese National Master Plan was published in 2004, but never ratied. In
parallel the EU funded Investment Planning Programme (IPP) produed an investment shedule
for dierent setors, among them the water and waste water setor. Only a ouple of years later an
investment plan for the CDR was produed and published for 20062009. In 2008 the Deennial
plan was relaunhed for the period 20082018 beause its rst iteration had produed virtually no
results. Finally, in 2010 the National Water Setor Strategy was published and adapted by the
COM in early 2012.
The suessive plans have never been fully implemented as planned beause implementation
seldom followed the envisioned suession of phases and projets. The numerous plans provide a
rih pool of projets. The primary onsideration aording to whih they are implemented is the
availability of funds, while politial, soial and tehnial aspets are subsequent onsiderations.
The plans, the ideas they represent, the poliies they enshrined, and the ideology that underlies
them will be disussed in later hapters after introduing the WRM proess and Lebanese and IDC
roles in it. For now it sues to say that reonstrution was foused on physial infrastruture to
the detriment of immaterial poliy omponents and the reonstrution of the state administration.
Aordingly, for the water setor fous was put on the possibility of private setor partiipation,
whih has not materialised in a meaningful way, and infrastruture prodution, whih has beome
the entral aspet of water resoure management.
2.2.3.4 The Reonstrution Agenies: Only Infrastruture Prodution
The Counil for Development and Reonstrution
The CDR is the entral reonstrution ageny and tasked with the management of foreign funds
and the projets related thereto. Its hannelling of funds into the dierent water sub-setors is one
of the main drivers of water resoure management.
The mandate of the CDR made it the most important reonstrution ageny in all setors. It
is subordinated to the prime minister, who ustomarily appoints its president. It ats on demand
of the ounil of ministers and initiates projets aordingly. In pratie the proess is not as
unidiretional beause the CDR also works to math projets to donor funds. To do this it has a
portfolio of preliminary and nal studies and designs (funded both by international funds and by
government funds) for infrastruture projets. These are derived from the suessive master plans
for development and spei to the water setor that were done over the years. One a loan or
grant agreement is reahed and signed the CDR takes harge of projet implementation, aording
to its mandate in ooperation or oordination with the ministry onerned.
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CDR works in onjuntion with the various ministries onerned by implementing
investment projets and providing them with tehnial assistane. Operation and
maintenane of ompleted infrastruture projets remains the responsibility of the rel-
evant ministries. However, CDR manages and implements operation and maintenane
servies that may be requested by the Government. (CDR, 2012 p.4)
The opinions on this diverge though, while CDR engineers view this ooperation and oordination
as funtional and eient (Interview Youssef Karam 2011). The diretor general of the GDHER,
Fadi Comair, omplains that ommuniation is very weak and that he doesn't know what the CDR
does or plans (Interview Comair 2011). This is onrmed by a World Bank report stating that
there is little oordination between the CDR and the MEW in the planning of the investment
(World Bank, 2010d, p.40). This lak of oordinated planning of an infrastruture programme
reinfores the importane of the CDR in the WRM proess. Given its mandate to soliit and
manage foreign funds and projets, the CDR has great inuene over when and where projets are
built.
The CDR has hannelled funds to and implemented the bulk of water setor projets (see
Fig.2.7). Almost 60 perent of investments sine 1992 until 2008 and most of the investments sine
have been implemented via the CDR.
Figure 2.7: Annual CAPEX Expenditure (2008 pries) by Ageny and Setor
Soure: World Bank 2010, p.37
Table 2.4 shows CDR expenditures in the water setor sine the beginning of the reonstrution.
Most of this is spent on infrastruture prodution, inluding the preliminary studies and projet
design ost and very little is spent on operation and maintenane. One delegated water supply
management projet for the ity of Tripoli worth about ¿ 8 million stands out. In the agriultural
setor the bulk of investment was in the rehabilitation of irrigation networks but ompared to the
other setors the investment into other-than water infrastruture and projets was relatively higher
and represents about 30 perent of expenditure, if not more (CDR, 2012).
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832.63 233.43 599.20 603.95
Waste water
688.34 385.43 302.91 402.85
Agriulture
and Irrigation
114.73 18.46 96.27 87.08
Total
1635.7 637.32 998.38 1093.88
Soure: CDR progress report 2012.
The CDR does not usually take responsibility for operation and maintenane of projets. In
the water supply setor projets were usually handed over to the MEW and after 2000 to the RWE
onerned. In the irrigation setor, depending on the projet, it is either the LRA, a ommittee,
or muniipality that should take over operation and maintenane.
In the waste water setor projets are handed over to the MEW whih takes responsibility for
operation and maintenane by outsouring the work to private operators (or muniipalities in the
ase of small plants) beause the RWEs do not have any ompetenies in this setor. If and for
how long this will remain so is not lear. In 2014 only three waste water treatment plants were in
operation.
The Counil of the South and the Central Fund of the Displaed
As mentioned above the CFD and the COS have both built infrastruture and did so in spei
regions. The COS and CFD started their operations in earnest in the mid 1990s and invested
heavily until the early 2000s.
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Figure 2.7 shows their ontribution to investment in the water
supply setor amount to almost 40 perent. Both institutions were reinvigorated after the war in
2006 and reeived higher budgets than in the years immediately before the war.
There is no indiation that the work these two entities did was oordinated with the CDR or
the MEW or after 2002 with the RWEs. The authors of the 20062009 CDR investment plan note
that:
In some ases, there is an overlap of duties and lak of oordination among them. For
instane, the Counil of the South and the LRA are onstruting a domesti water
supply sheme for the West Bekaa and Rahaya that the Water and Waste water
Establishment for the South may not be willing to operate due to its high operation
ost. (Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners) CNBureau s.a.r.l. - IAURIF (2006),
p.11)
Both institutions are known to be used as vehiles for distribution of favours by their patrons.
Investment deisions are in all likelihood governed by the patron-lient dynamis that will be
desribed in detail below.
20
See Alles (2007) for more details on COS ativity in the formerly Israeli-oupied areas of the south.
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2.2.3.5 The Water Setor Administration: Infrastruture Prodution, Operation and
Maintenane
Water Oes and Water Establishments
The 21 water oes whih operated during the 1990s were severely limited in their ability to invest.
They did not have the funds, with the notable exeption of the Beirut water oe whih was able
to draw on a large subsriber base, and in addition all investments exeeding the equivalent of US$
67US$ 1,000 depending on the oe required approval from the ministry's GDE. The approval
proess did not make it impossible for infrastruture to be produed but it ertainly added an
extra layer of bureauray and thus interferene.
The suessors to the water oes were the regional water establishments (RWE). Under law 221
after 2000 the RWEs were reated and harged with apital investment, infrastruture development,
planning, as well as operation and maintenane in all three sub-setors and under supervision of the
MEW. The reform laws and the by-laws of the RWEs stipulate an a posteriori ontrol of expenses
and an annual approval of the budget. But aording to interviewees the reality is dierent and
all expenses over about US$ 100,000 require pre-approval by the GDE (Interview Majdelani 2012,
Giantris 2013). The ability of the RWEs to invest in infrastruture remains almost non-existent
for three of the four RWEs.
The Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMTLWE) has a ertain apaity to invest
and aording to interviewees it is funding the onstrution of the Jannah Dam or at least the
initial work of this estimated US$ 200300 million projet. It started doing so on behest of the
Minister of Energy and Water Gebran Bassil (Interviews Abd el Al 2013, Margane 2013). This
also illustrates how legal independene fails to translate into pratie.
The RWEs were appointed diretors in 2002 and reeived their by-laws in 2005, ve years after
the administrative reform was passed. Legal text and reality, or legal theory and pratial WRM
were not ongruent for a onsiderable period of time. The water oes and ommittees ontinued
to operate in a legal limbo. Water setor ompetenies were still not learly dened in 2013. For
example, ownership of water supply and waste water networks remains opaque as the business plan
for 20092013 of the South Lebanon Water Establishment indiates:
The SLWE must work losely with the Ministry of Energy and Water, as well as the
Ministry of Interior, and the loal muniipalities and villages, to learly dene the
ownership and operational responsibility for the existing and future water supply and
waste water systems within the geographi servie area of the establishment. At this
time, exept for some minimal osts for the waste water preliminary treatment plant
in Saida, the SLWE has not reeted any further osts of waste water management
servies in the Business Plan as an operations and maintenane expense. Over the last
several years, with the assistane of foreign donors, both water supply systems and
waste water treatment plants have been built in a number of villages in the servie
area of the SLWE. These systems are serving villages with populations of 30 to 1,000
families. The nal determination of ownership of these systems, as well as operations
and maintenane responsibility, has not been made. These systems are not reeted
as systems in the urrent SLWE asset base for purposes of this Business Plan. (DAI -
Development Alternatives, In. 2008, p. 7)
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In 2013 the issue of ownership of existing infrastruture networks remains and did not show any
promise of being resolved in the near future.
The Ministry of Energy and Water
The proess based upon whih the MEW (and before the MHER) launh infrastruture projets is
desribed in the unpublished 1998 WB report. It presents a very brief disussion of the approval
proess:
The naning of water and waste water investments is approved in a four-step proess
and an then be implemented via three entities. First, the investment program of the
WO must be approved by its Board Of Diretors. It must be then approved by MHER
(under law no. 20/66). MHER then asks for Parliament to approve the investment
program, and nally provisions for the investment must be inluded in the budget
prepared by the Ministry of Finane, whih is in turn passed by Parliament. The
approved budget does not normally list spei projets, only lump sums for investment
for eah ministry. Thus, there may or may not be a lose orrelation between the
approved MHER investment plan and its approved budget. (World Bank, 1998, p. 9)
By 2014 the proess remains essentially the same with regard to investment. Very little investment
has been realised by the MEW. The MEW draws from the supposedly annual governmental budget
for its investments and aordingly its investment apaity has remained rather low. As Figure 2.7
shows the MEW's ontribution to apital expenditure in the water setor does not amount to 10
perent of water setor expenditure.
The development of large infrastruture projets, suh as dams, remained the responsibility
of the MEW and speially the GDHER after the reform. The only notable ompleted projet
that qualies as suh is the Chabrouh Dam in the Keserwan area. New projets were launhed
after Gebran Bassil beame Minister of Energy and Water in 2009 and developed an ambitious
investment programme presented in the National Water Setor Strategy. As mentioned above the
minister has pushed some investment with the funds of the BMTLWE.
The MEW still takes over a onsiderable part of operation and maintenane responsibilities 14
years after the reform and seven years after the by-laws of the RWEs were ratied. These still
are not in a position to full all the operations they were tasked with and remain dependent on
support by the MEW. They have neither the apaity to take over waste water operations nor
manage irrigation. As mentioned above the waste water treatment plant management is organised
by the MEW and ontrated out to the private setor.
Initially the RWEs reeived MEW support for all their operations, but after 2004 the MEW
stopped supporting salary expenditures. RWEs are expeted to over these from their own
revenues (World Bank, 2010d). The ministry further subsidises the RWEs by overing their power
expenditures and the prourement of servie ontrats for supply networks. These are managed
diretly without the funds being diverted through the RWEs. Aording to the World Bank:
In 2009, US$ 2.5 million was disbursed to proure nine servie ontrats for pumping
stations in three RWEs. It is diult to assess the extent to whih maintenane is
adequate to [or℄ whether the ex O&M budget of the MEW is likely to be small ompared
to the needs of the setor, given the low maintenane expenditure inurred by the
RWEs. (World Bank, 2010d, p.43)
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It is not lear whether the GDHER is also responsible for operation and maintenane of large
projets. In 2007 Comair's, the diretor of the GDHER, interpretation is that the ministry is
responsible for operation and maintenane of large infrastruture (Comair, 2007). The NWSS
published in 2010 lists only design and implementation of large sale projets and does not mention
operation and maintenane as the GDHER's responsibility. Indeed operation and management of
the Chabrouh Dam was transferred from the GDHER to the BMTLWE around 2010 (Interview
Salame 2011).
The MEW is also harged with exeuting all expropriations required by water projets imple-
mented by RWEs and itself. The CDR does so for the projets it takes harge of. Expropriation, the
ost assoiated with it and the politial inuene of those being expropriated plays an important
role in the politis of infrastruture prodution. It an be a deisive fator over the suessful
implementation of a projet, its alteration, or nulliation  often after planning and investments
deisions are made, loan agreements signed, and other preparatory ativities launhed.
21
The MEW also has a small department responsible for maintenane of irrigation networks. It
is extremely understaed with just one engineer, a seretary and one tehniian. The department
proesses requests by muniipalities and irrigation ommittees to nane repairs and extensions
where plans exists and the state has rights-of-way (i.e. expropriation is ompleted). These are
usually very small sale projets (Interview Kanj 2011).
The Litani River Authority
The LRA is the most important government body with regard to irrigation. It is already harged
with management of two large shemes and will be responsible for the South Lebanon Irrigation
projet (also alled the Canal 800). This projet was rst oneived in the 1950s; it will serve to
irrigate 14,500 ha in south Lebanon. An agreement was signed with the Kuwait Fund for funding
at the turn of the millennium but work started only in 2013. This US$ 300 million projet is jointly
managed between the LRA and the CDR.
The Ministry of Agriulture
The MOA also has an irrigation department whih onsists of two engineers (Interview Roukos
2011). They work through the extension servies and have a mandate to improve on-farm irrigation.
More importantly in terms of infrastruture, the Green Plan is a government ageny under the
tutelage of the MOA. It provides loans and grants to farmers for agriultural improvements. This
inludes roads, terraing of lands, and reservoirs. It is also the ageny responsible for the reation
of hill lakes (with a apaity below 1 MCM).
2.3 Where are the Politis?
2.3.1 The Post War Elites  Class and Patron in Lebanon
The protagonists of the eonomi and politial proesses and the water resoure management and
infrastruture prodution proesses are the Lebanese politial and eonomi elites, the government
oials and tehnorats, and the various ators of the IDC. The spei ators of the IDC and
21
This is true for all infrastruture in Lebanon.
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its water resoure management arm in Lebanon, how they relate to eah other and how they
onnet to the Lebanese state (and soiety) will be shown in in the next hapter. The water setor
institutions, the administrative bodies with their overlapping responsibilities as presented above
are also vehiles through whih the dierent Lebanese elites projet and gain their power. As will
be shown below, as muh as they are water resoure management tools they are used by the elites
in order to reprodue their own status as leaders. Before then turning to the politial dynamis
that make the administration suh a ontested eld, an understanding of the elites is required and
will be presented here.
The Lebanese elite or oligarhy is not homogeneous (ompetition and opposition between them
originates not solely from the eonomi realm and is not solely inter-apitalist ompetition, but
stems also from setarian and geopolitial aliations). This ruling lass is made up of a omplex
web of ators whose roles are not desribed neatly in one ategory. They are apitalists, as members
of the nanial or ommerial bourgeoisie or both, and at the same time hold politial oe or
take a politially relevant role without having been eleted or appointed. They may be the heads
of a lan or family, or of politial parties or all at the same time. Their interests meet and/or
diverge on numerous and sometimes seemingly unexpeted issues; setarian allianes an and do
overwrite inter-apitalist ompetition and vie versa.
Often politial leadership is dynasti. A prominent example is the Hariri family. Rak Hariri
as the son of a poor peasant from Saida (South of Beirut) built up a onstrution ompany,
endeared himself to the Saudi king and with this support and his own wealth, started establishing
a power base in Lebanon during the 1980s. His asendany to Prime Minister was preeded by the
displaement of Sunni notables as the most important representatives of their set. After Hariri's
assassination in 2005 his seond son Saad el Hariri took over the leadership of his father's politial
party and eventually beame Prime Minister in 2009.
The Gemayel family is another politial dynasty; Amin Gemayel  who has banking, real
estate and numerous other interests - took over the presideny from his brother after the latter
was assassinated only weeks after beoming president in 1982. In 2005 Amin Gemayel, his son
Pierre, and his nephew were eleted to parliament. His son beame Minister of Commere and
Industry for the rst time but was assassinated at the end of 2006. The leader of the Free Patrioti
Movement (FPM) Mihel Aoun made his son-in-law Gebran Bassil his seond in ommand and in
2009 negotiated the Ministry of Energy and Water for him.
22
Many more suh examples exist (see
El-Husseini & Perthes, 2004; Hudson, 1997).
An investigation of power strutures and their reprodution, hange and strengthening through
Lebanese and IDC interation warrants a more detailed understanding of the elites and the
foundation of their power. Their power is derived from their eonomi lass, their ownership
and ontrol of apital, and/or their patronage positions in the mostly setarian patron-lient
relationships that organise soio-politial life. These two soures of power are o-onstitutive.
Aess to resoures is an important, though not exlusive, aspet of ones ability to at as patron
and vie versa. One's position as lan, party or religious leader gives privileged aess to proesses
of aumulation and prot generation.
22
This quote from an artile about hanges in a proposed eletoral law in the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar illustrates
the point further: Among the biggest losers in this regard must be MP Nayla Toueini, who will have hardly anyone
in her family voting for her if she deides to run. Not her television presenter husband Malek Maktabi, a Shi`a, nor
her Maronite grandmother, or her Druze unle MP Marwan Hamadeh. Her maternal grandfather MP Mihel Murr
also loses his Maronite wife's vote (Qassem, 2013).
CHAPTER 2. LEBANESE WATER RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION 66
As Paul Kingston writes although formally a onsoiational demoray with a onstitution, a
parliament and regular eletions, real politial power derives from the informal networks that are
governed by the various setarian elites (Kingston, 2001, p. 57). This might be underestimating
the value of politial oe for a patron or leader, espeially after the ivil war, but does point to
the varying types of lientpatron relationships that exist. They are far from new soial formations
and have been doumented by numerous sholars (Johnson, 1986; Khalaf, 1977 for example). They
nd their origins in feudal-like relations of the past. Ahmad Hamzeh (2001) looking at modern
Lebanon identies four dierent forms of lientelism: the Zu'ama (Arabi: Leaders) lientelism
being the most important or most prevalent, party lientelism, religious lientelism, and militia
lientelism. These still exist and matter, in the varying permutations that they take (Hamzeh,
2001, p.172). His main point is that they are not pre-modern forms of soial organisation that
are dying, but rather that they have hanged and adapted to the histori periods and remain a
fundamental aspet of the Lebanese soio-politial entity.
The dyadi relationship between the Za'im (Arabi: Leader) and his lient base is likened by
Mihael Johnson (1986, p.49) to a maa, with the Za'im as the Godfather, and the qabadays
(Lebanese equivalent of an enforer or lieutenant) as the ones organising his lientele. The loyalty
was maintained by a mixture of manipulation and oerion(Johnson, 1986, p.49). Consent plays
an equally important role and is reahed or gained through ommunal representation by the
za'im of the lientbase (or rather what the latter pereives as suh and what the former laims to
be in the ommunal interest) and a limited redistribution of resoures.
This type of lient-patron relationship evolved over time and broadened beyond the family
and lan. Charbel Nahas (2009) identies three ategories of ators. At the top of the hierarhy
are the ommunitarian emblems, whih inlude the most important setarian leaders: Rak and
later Saad Hariri, Nabih Berri, Walid Joumblat; after their return from exile Mihel Aoun, Amin
Gemayel; and Samir Geagea after his release from prison in 2005; the Maronite patriarh and the
president, as well as Hassan Nasrallah the leader of the resistane um politial party Hezbollah.
Underneath, he lists
the professionals who are in harge of the regulation of the whole system and who
therefore hold deisive powers, but who have to stay away from the politial sene: the
governor of the Central Bank, the ommanders of the key seurity orps and, of ourse,
until reently, the Syrian seurity oer in harge of the Lebanese le. (Nahas, 2009,
p. 143)
The nal ategory: the lieutenants who inlude politiians and members of parliament and senior
or high administrative personnel (the loal zu'ama an also be ounted in this ategory) form
the base of the oligarhi strutures.
The hierarhies are steeply vertial, both in terms of setarian lient-patron networks and in
terms of inome and wealth. The politial elite also formed and forms the eonomi elite. That
Hariri was prime minister, billionaire, owner of one of the most important banks (BankMed) and
owner of stakes in others as well as a onstrution and engineering onglomerate just illustrates
the uidity of these ategories. A similar listing ould be done for later billionaire Prime Minister
Najib Mikati. If the parliamentarians are not millionaires then for most, with very few exeption,
their families are.
Aording to Nahas 0.6 perent of bank aounts held more than 40 perent of total deposits
towards the end of the 1990s (Nahas, 2000, p. 8), in 2007 some 800 aounts belonging to no more
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than 200 families held 20 perent of total deposits adding up to US$ 14 billion (Nahas, 2009). To
further illustrate the onentration, at the end of 2010 US$ 30 billion or 77 perent of total utilised
redit was held by only 2.6 perent of beneiaries (inluding businesses et.), and 0.2 perent
of beneiaries held 48 perent or US$ 19 billion of redit (Banque du Liban 2012). The Credit
Suisse's Global Wealth Databook (2013) estimates that at least 48 perent of Lebanon's privately
held wealth is onentrated in the hands of some 8,900 itizens  just 0.3 perent of the adult
population (Exeutive Magazine, 2013). The artile presenting the report goes on to say that
the rihest Lebanese are its six billionaires, all from the Mikati and Hariri families. Aording to
Forbes, their ombined worth is $14 billion  some 15 perent of all private wealth in the ountry
(Exeutive Magazine, 2013).
Adib Nehmeh points to a Central Administration of Statistis study from 1997 that shows that
14 perent of households reeived 43 perent of national inome ompared to 39 perent of the
population reeiving only 13.4 perent (Nehmeh, 2001). Aording to a household expenditure
survey published by the CAS for the years 20042005 inome distribution was still highly unequal.
49.5 perent of households (or 45 perent of the population) delared an annual inome of less than
9,599,000 LL or 6,400 US$ while only 7.2 perent of households (7.6 perent of the population)
delared that they earned more than 19,200 US$ (CAS, 2005). While indiative of high levels of
inequality these numbers hide the numerous soures of support and revenue households may have.
The 1997 Living Conditions of Household in Lebanon survey indiates that 38 perent of Lebanese
families ould not make ends meet. Only 13 perent of Lebanese families indiated their living
standard to be satisfatory (UNDP, 1997).
A later report published in 2008 by UNDP analysing Poverty, Growth, Distribution and the
Cost of Poverty Redution in Lebanon establishes money-metri poverty lines based on an analysis
of expenditure and onsumption aggregates. Aording to this report the (onsumption based) Gini
oeient was 0.361 in 20042005. 43.5 perent of all onsumption in Lebanon was onsumed by
the rihest fth of the population while the poorest fth aounted only for 7.1 perent of all
onsumption. Eight perent of Lebanese were onsidered to be living in extreme poverty under
a poverty line of US$ 2.4 per apita per day. The upper poverty line is dened as the value of
the basket of goods and servies atually onsumed by households whose food and energy intake
is equal to the minimum requirement of 2200 alories per person per day (Laithy, Abu-Ismail &
Hamdan, 2008, p. 45) equivalent to US$ 4 at exhange rate (and onsumer pries) in 20042005.
28.5 perent of the population were estimated to live below this line and were not in a position
to aord a onsumption level whih satised minimum food requirements and what is deemed as
normal for non-food expenditures at that level of food onsumption. (Laithy et al., 2008, p. 45).
Aording to the authors of the UNDP study, poverty beomes more pronouned when inluding
those parts of the population living just above this US$ 4 line, who remain vulnerable to eonomi
and environmental shoks. Given the dearth of good and omprehensive statistial data it is
diult even to aess the auray of these numbers but they ertainly indiate that the wealth
of the elites stands in stark ontrast to the poverty, prearity, and inseurity of a large part of the
population. This growing inequality, the distribution of wealth and the related setarian patron-
lient strutures are one important aspet of the Lebanese power system.
During the war armed onit was an important aspet of the redistribution of power, though
shifts in eonomi power were also an important if not the most important fator that brought an
end to armed onfrontation. In the post-war era elite ompetition over power was muh less violent.
Nevertheless, numerous bombings and assassination attempts, failed and suessful, ourred. The
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post-war period also saw armed onfrontations over longer periods of time. In May 2008 militias of
the two main politial blos lashed in dierent areas of the ountry, and sine 2011 an area in the
north in Tripoli has seen a more or less intense onfrontation between two adjaent areas. For the
purpose of understanding water resoure management poliy the most important arena in whih
struggles over power were played out, within the boundaries set by the Syrian oupiers, was the
politial proess to whih I will turn next.
2.3.2 Strutural Elements of a Politial Settlement
After introduing the water setor and explaining the IDC analysis of it, I will show in this setion
how water resoure management proesses are linked to the general politial strutures and the
ups and downs of politial life. While this might seem self-evident, the strutural links between the
general politial proess and the resoure management proess are analytially important. They
are often ignored aspets of the water resoure management proess and they are not addressed
by IDC onsultants and the poliy, reform ideas, and templates they promote. They annot be
addressed beause this would require diret and ative state restruturing by the IDC that would
border on diret (olonial) administration, the formal reognition of Lebanese sovereignty by the
IDC and its rulers, as watered down as it might be, makes this impossible.
The following setion will fous on the most important aspets of the politial proess starting
with the war-ending Taef agreement. This study is not the plae to provide a full retelling of the
politial dynamis of the post ivil war era, but where neessary politial ators and their aliation
will be explained.
2.3.2.1 Taef and after
After 15 years of onits
23
between dierent fations and shifting allianes the Taef
24
agreements
of 1989 would set a path towards an end of the war. Negotiations between the warring fations
were enouraged by the US, SaudiSyrian rapprohement and produed a Doument of National
Reoniliation. Tait US aeptane of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, due to its support for and
partiipation in the rst Gulf war in 1990, would form the bakground for a stabilisation of the
Lebanese situation in the following years. New leaders, warlords, and entrepreneurs emerged from
the ivil war and joined the remaining traditional notables to take over the running of the state
under Syrian ustodial are.
The Taef Agreement of 1989 and, based thereupon, the onstitutional amendments of September
1990 reeted the outome of the ivil war. The war had hanged the balane of power, the
Christian elites had lost their dominant position while both the main Muslim sets had gained
power. The Sunni elites led by Hariri had solidied their eonomi predominane and Shi`a politial
parties had entered the politial arena. Under the slogan no vitor no vanquished the aord
reongured the politial system so as to aount for the new balane of power that the war
produed. It aimed at politial inlusiveness and was designed to prevent the monopolisation of
politial deision making by a politial party or a setarian group. It formed the basis for the
emerging Seond Republi and is olourfully desribed by Georges Corm as:
23
The war is better understood as sequential onits between dierent (or a reombination of the same) ators
for dierent auses rather than one long war.
24
Named so after the Saudi ity that hosted the onferene where most of the remaining Lebanese parliamentarians
and the leaders were gathered to negotiate an end to the war.
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far from reestablishing the national understanding and the funtioning of demoray,
the Seond Republi will resemble a veritable banana-republi, put in a greenhouse
by its powerful neighbour and protetor, Syria, with full onsent of the new soial
fores that emerged vitorious from the war and federated around the overwhelming
omnipresene of Rak Hariri. (Author's translation, Corm, 2005, p. 230)
Corm points to the most important harateristis of the post war state: the two governing fores,
the Syrian oupiers and their allies, the Saudi-baked agent of neoliberalisation Hariri and his
allies, and to the weak state institutions and administrative bodies, as well as deeply embedded
praties that are ommonly labelled orruption, but whih are related to lient-patron networks
and praties. This is not to say that these are immutable ultural traits, rather to the ontrary.
Reinoud Leenders in his analysis of politial orruption in post-ivil war Lebanon makes an
argument that the Taef politial settlement left the door wide open for these praties to enter
into the politial proess (Leenders, 2004b).
The onstitutional amendments born out of the Taef agreement form one starting point for an
understanding of the post war Lebanese state - the Lebanese politial eonomy and its funtioning.
The formulation, interpretation and implementation of the agreement has importantly shaped the
strutures of Lebanese politial eonomi life. Based on Leenders (2004) and Piard (2002) six
important features of the Lebanese politial proess an be identied. These are: 1) a need
for politial onsensus, 2) related and reurring institutional and politial gridlok, 3) politis of
division of the spoils by the elites (allotment state), 4) attempts at bypassing the politial proess
by reating extralegal or temporary arrangements with related overlap of responsibilities, 5) wide
ranging lientelist networks and related patron lient dynamis, and 6) the Syrian presene and
inuene until 2005 when Syrian fores were expelled under international pressure and it lost some
of its ontrol. (Beause Syrian inuene on the water setor is limited to transboundary water
issues this last aspet will not be further disussed here).
The setarian system dating from independene days was kept in plae and even reinfored,
but the setarian distribution of power therein was altered. To adapt to the new balane of
power and related hanging demography and politial representation of onfessional groups (with a
demographi inrease of Muslims as well as the assent of politial representation of Shi`a onstituen-
ies/ommunities) the division of seats in parliament was hanged so that Christian representatives
would be alloated only 50 perent of seats (versus 55 perent before) and Muslims equally
50 perent.
25
Within these two religions the division of parliamentary seats would be further
subdivided aording to sets. Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholis, Armenian Orthodox
and other Christian sets, as well as Sunni, Shi`a, Alawite, and Druze sets were assigned a
number of parliamentary seats eah; yet the system is less rigid than one would expet. While
these numbers remained xed their geographial alloation is periodially renegotiated with the
redrawing of voting distrit boundaries as part of the regular gerrymandering preguring eletions




The two major Islami sets, Sunni and Shi`a, had gained in politial power while the Christian sets had lost
inuene. The alloation of politial oes and parliamentary seats was based on a 1932 ensus, the last oial
ensus to date. But even after the adjustments of Taef politial representation and atual demographi weight of
the Christian sets don't math. Though no reliable data on the demographi weights of dierent sets exists it is
generally aepted that Christians represent well under 50 perent of the population.
26
Eletion results were for the longest time predetermined and even in the last eletion of 2009 some 100 seats
were seured through negotiations in dierent distrits. Numerous distrits saw only one andidate running for the
respetive parliamentary seat.
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In the same spirit of politial inlusiveness and re-balaning of power the responsibilities and
privileges of the three main publi oes, that of the president of the republi, the prime minister,
and the speaker of parliament, ommonly named the troika, were also reongured. Aordingly the
president's (always a Maronite Christian) powers were urtailed while those of the prime minister
(Sunni) and the speaker ( Shi`a) were enhaned to math. Eetively eah one gained veto power
over the politial proess.
Exeutive power was reloated from the president to the Counil of Ministers, normally presided
by the Prime Minister, or oasionally, if he so wishes, by the President. The abinet is formed
upon binding onsultation of the Prime Minister designate and the President, guaranteeing the
president an important say in the formation of the COM. Like parliament, the COM has to
reet the setarian division and so will inlude members from all major sets and politial amps.
Parliament in turn gained more legislative power, with the speaker of parliament a entral ator
in this proess. His powers were inreased as well, a two-year term was extended to four years
and he has sole disretion over the agenda of parliamentary sessions and with that the power to
blok legislative projets for as long as he requires or wishes. It is in this ontext of horizontal
redistribution of politial power among the elites that negotiations and onit over poliy would
take plae.
27
2.3.2.2 Consensus and Gridlok
The most notable outome of these new arrangements was that onsensus, or rather the need
therefore, beame hardwired into the politial proess. In turn lak of onsensus would lead to
politial gridlok. Politial risis beame a reurrent phenomenon of post-ivil war politis. Three
government were in plae between 1991 and 1992. But even with the eletion of Hariri in 1992
onsensus would only hold for short periods. Out of suh situations he threatened to resign from
oe towards the end of 1993 and in late 1996, and atually resigned on two oasions in 1998 and
August 2004. The government that took over from him, headed by Salim el Hoss, in 1998 lasted
just under two years. In September of 2000 Hariri won eletions by a onsiderable margin and took
over government until 2004 when he resigned over disagreements with President Emile Lahoud.
28
After Hariri's assassination in early 2005 politial risis an be said to have beome the norm.
Two opposing blos formed, on the one hand the Marh 14 alliane supported by western powers
and Saudi Arabia, and on the other the Marh 8 alliane supported by Syria and Iran.
29
Marh 14
is dominated by the Hariri's Mustaqbal party representing (or laiming to) the majority of Sunnis,
the major Christian parties are the Lebanese Fores led by Samir Geagea and the Phalangist
Party led by the Gemayel lan, as well as a number of minor Christian parties and Zu'ama.
Marh 8 onsists of the two Shi`a parties Amal and Hezbollah, and Mihel Aoun's Free Patrioti
Movement (FPM), a large Maronite dominated party, and smaller Christian and Muslim parties.
The opposition between these two blos inreased quikly. Consensus broke down ompletely after
the Israeli attak on Lebanon in July 2006 and opposition turned into open hostilities in early May
27
For an in depth disussion of the politial proess, ommentary on Taef see (Leenders, 2004b; Maila, 1992).
28
Under Syrian pressure Lahoud's term was to be extended beyond the onstitutional limit. Supported by Frane,
the US and via the UN Hariri hoped to ounter Syrian eorts to hold on to his most voal rival.
29
Foreign involvement in Lebanon is no new phenomenon. The ountry as a geographi entity was shaped by the
olonial powers Frane and to a lesser degree Britain. Sine its independene foreign powers intervened on behalf
of or supported one or the other elite fation.
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of 2008.
30
A new president was eleted with the help of Qatari mediation in late May. Eletions
marked the rst time parliament had onvened in 18 months.
31
Stability lasted only for a ouple
of years and governments would hange repeatedly. In the four and half years sine the eletion in
the summer of 2009 Lebanon was without a government for a total of almost two years (Muhanna,
2014).
The eets of the reurrent politial risis on the government and governane are substantial.
Institutional deadlok and government breakdown beomes the modus operandi and entails serious
onsequenes for the legislative proess skethed above and aets all aspets of water resoure
management. Law making omes to a standstill or is severely hampered and delayed.
One major eet of these dynamis was that until late 2012 no new government budget law had
been passed by parliament sine 2005. The impliations of this for development and reonstrution
poliy are onsiderable as the Ministry of Finane has to abide by the latest budget law and an
only alloate funds aordingly. Theoretially at least the MEW was operating with a budget
alloation based on 2005 government deision for seven years.
Yet it is anything but lear how money was atually distributed, a fat that was the sub-
jet of viseral publi debate for some time. FPM leader Mihel Aoun publily aused Fouad
Saniora (prime minister from 20052008) of orruption and attempted to initiate legal ation to




Not only was the budget not adjusted to meet needs, even the development projets proting
from international donor support (whih inludes most of the large infrastruture projets) were
often severely delayed as most require either abinet or both parliamentary and abinet approval.
Aording to one CDR employee infrastruture projets are aeted by:
politial problems, absene of government, and politial disputes. One example is the
blokage of the expropriation law relating to a number of projets beause of the tension
in the government between the President and the Prime Minister [between 2003 and
2005℄. (Interview Charfeddine 2011)
On the issue of the expropriation law, Lahoud's blo questioned the Beirut-entri investment
distribution and the ost of expropriation. Hariri's blo pointed to the proedural diulties suh
a delay would entail:
Finane Minister Fouad Saniora warned Wednesday that further delays in the expropri-
ation of land may prompt nanial institutions to stop all funding for projets aross the
ountry ... Saniora said land expropriation is ruial to starting projets. The minister
was alluding to the ongoing debate between Cabinet members about the expropriation
of land in Beirut, whih some ritis laim is overly expensive. (Habib, 2003)
The delays pointed to by the nane minister were real, as muh as they were a funtion of Hariri's
leverage in an attempt to fore his vision of the shool projet at the entre of the debate, as well
30
Starting on May 7 onfrontations between the two blos led to intense street alterations and ghting throughout
the ountry, after ve days Saad Hariri's militias were defeated by Amal and Hezbollah ghters. The ghting stopped
but only after having laimed more than 100 lives.
31
The Marh 8 oalition ministers had resigned from oe shortly after the 2006 war to protest Fouad Saniora's
reonstrution poliies and Nabih Berri as speaker of the house refused to all for a parliamentary session without
onessions from the Marh 14 blo.
32
Not muh ame of his advanes and parliament and government (with Aoun's party being part of the ruling
oalition at the time) retroatively legalised these and later government expenses as lump-sum 2010, saving
themselves the embarrassment of disaggregating and justifying expenditures.
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as his vision of development more generally. One month before Saniora's omments, Hariri was
observed leaving a abinet session and threatening:
If shools are not built in Beirut, no shools will be built in Lebanon. And if devel-
opment projets are not arried out in Beirut, no development projets will be arried
out in Lebanon. (Kawas, 2003)
The main ause was the politial rivalry between Lahoud and Hariri, the entral issue of ontention
was the expropriation law and also the loations of shools in Beirut and assoiated real estate
pries.
33
The law was nally passed during Fouad Saniora's tenure as prime minister in late 2005.
The debate and onfrontation though aeted projets more generally and beyond the two years
that it took for the law to be passed. With the passage of time pries for raw materials and oil
inreased,
34
prompting ontrators to ask for adjustments and re-negotiations of ontrats often
leading to stoppage of work, (Interview Charfeddine 2011) ausing further delays.
This rst example showed how infrastruture projets an be inuened by onsensus breaking
down. The example of the National Water Setor Strategy (NWSS) whih was published by the
MEW in 2010 will show how poliy formulation is also aeted by these dynamis. The NWSS,
the most omprehensive attempt at water resoure planning until 2014, was not presented nor
approved by the abinet or the parliament for almost a year. In Deember 2010 during a publi-
relations media event, the Minister of Energy and Water Gebran Bassil (a member of the Marh 8
oalition) presented this doument to the publi. But faing strong headwinds from the politial
opposition Marh 14 parties it wasn't adopted by the ounil of ministers until Marh 2012.
In a meeting of the parliamentary ommittee on water, with the onsultants to the minister
answering inquiries regarding the NWSS, the debate between opposing politial parties was muh
less about the ontent and orientation of the strategy than about proedural issues. This ould
arguably be read as an attempt by the Marh 14 opposition to prevent the minister (Marh 8)
from gaining politial apital from his eorts.
35
The debates regarding the NWSS saw on one
side the minister (and his party) who had been using every opportunity to present himself as anti-
orruption reformer, eient, as well as working for development and the ommon good
36
, and on
the other side his politial opponents, the Marh 14 opposition, trying to prevent or ontain his
politial asendany with attempts to urtail his politial suesses.
The tehnial and strategi divergene between the two amps is essentially non-existent. Both
embrae the mainstream Integrate Water Resoure Management ideology and disourse, as well as
the master plan onsisting of a network of dams. The NWSS is a reprodution of the 10-year plan
ratied in 1999 and renewed in 2008, notwithstanding the fat that Mohammad Qabbani (Marh
14), who has been the presiding the parliamentary ommittee, approved the renewed 10-year plan,
he and his politial allies used every opportunity to onfront and oppose urrent eorts.
33
Hariri resigned in 2002 in protest to what he pereived as Lahoud's obstrutionism but was onvined by the
Syrian president to head the next government. The new government though was distributed in favour of Lahoud who
had been able to negotiate ministerial positions for a larger number of his allies than in the previous government.
34
These dynamis were espeially pronouned after the war in 2006 when ement, aggregate for onrete, and
steel, as well as other onstrution materials were in high demand beause of the massive reonstrution eorts.
35
A soure relates disputes between member of the minister's politial amp and opponents during a losed door
parliamentary ommittee meeting. (Interview Anonymous 2012; see also The Daily Star, 2011)
36
That this is more harade than atual substane ould be observed in the debate about minimum wages that
saw the Minister of Labour Charbel Nahas, oially allied to the FPM, being left deserted by his politial allies for
a proposal more suitable to the business ommunity and the politial interest of the FPM, espeially Aoun and his
son in law. See Al-Akhbar, 2012a, 2012b; Dakroub, 2012; Ghandour, 2012; Kanaan, 2012 for more details about the
story of the wage sale and Charbel Nahas' resignation.
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The debate is governed more by politial arithmetis than by substantial developmental dier-
enes. The NWSS was eventually endorsed by the abinet, but this example ertainly illustrates
the politial dynamis in general and how these play into the water resoure management poliy
making.
The reurrent standstill of the politial proess also shifts the attentions of the politial elites
towards the issues ausing the gridlok, and other issues are pushed down the list of priorities.
Publi and politial debate in early 2013 foused on the formulation of a new eletion law with
everything else taking a bak seat. That a proposal for a new water law was forwarded to the
Counil of Ministers and rejeted by the Minister of Finane does not enter the publi debate,
foused on the more immediate issues related to the distribution of power (Interview Abd el Al
2013). Aided by the serey that the Minister of Energy and Water ultivates by not making publi
the law proposal, the importane and potential impat of this new ordering of water rights and
water-related regulations is ompletely elipsed. The seemingly more urgent issue of eletoral law
and the general onfrontation between the two opposing amps overshadows developmental issues.
These few examples are only a small seletion of inidents of politial gridlok and its eets
but throughout the last two deades projets and planning eorts were often subjet to similar
dynamis and so were negatively aeted in a many ways. It is also this state of aairs  onsistent
politial gridlok and need for onsensus  that leads to permanent
bargaining that leaves little room for the publi formulation of poliies and alternatives,
the eletoral proess no longer being onerned with testing the popularity of poliy
options, but with asserting and weighting the ohesion and strength of ommunitarian
politial parties. (Nahas, 2009, p. 142)
Crisis and gridlok are onstant and pronouned harateristis (strutural features) of the Lebanese
politial system, but one that is never taken into aount in planning and development eorts, be
they by the Lebanese administration or by the individual members of the IDC.
2.3.2.3 Resolution by Division of State Resoures
Probably the most important mehanism to resolve these politial stalemates was what ame to be
known as the politis of Muhassassa (allotment politis), that would see the three highest ranking
representatives of government, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament
(the troika) negotiate between themselves on aeptable resolutions to politial disagreement.
These types of negotiations are still ommon and usually require an aeptable division of resoures,
privileges, and benets related to and derived from aess to state power. This extends to the
abinet and parliament as suh a division was meant to satisfy the troika and their respetive
lients. The rst three abinets of the post war period were not able to produe meaningful results
in terms of formulating reonstrution and development poliy. Only in 1992 with the nomination
of Rak Hariri as Prime Minister and Nabih Berri as Speaker of Parliament (a post he has held
sine) did this beome a onstant and often suessful feature of Lebanese politis. Enouraged by
Hariri's largess and his eonomi poliies (see Chapters 3 and 5) ways were found to alloate state
resoures to the relative satisfation of the politial elites (see Leenders, 2004b).
One aspet of this was an aumulation regime, following the neoliberal trends and logis of
the time, that allowed a majority of the elites to prot. How this was reated will be disussed
in the following hapter, but division of state resoures, the spoils of publi oe, went beyond
the diretly material. Negotiations for ministerial positions, high ranking publi servant positions
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among others are a regular feature of Lebanese politial ommentary and are seldom easily re-
solved. With every new eletion the distribution of ministries is a point of intense ontention and
negotiations; most abinets were made up of 30 ministerial positions with a number of them being
ministers of state, only to full setarian quotas.
For the reonstrution in general and for the WRM proess the three reonstrution agenies
were immensely important and have remained in the same hands for most of the time sine. In line
with his neoliberal vision for the ountry Hariri reserved the state institutions most important to
the eonomy for himself. These would inlude the Ministry of Finane, the CDR, and the Central
Bank.
37
With the revamping of the CDR in 1991, and with the instalment of Fadl Chalak, Hariri's
former Oger
38
employee and right hand man, one foundation stone was already laid. With the
passing of Law 117 of Deember 1991 Hariri had defeated his opposition and alls for reform
of the CDR, as well as plans for a ministry of planning that would have limited the CDRs
apaity of ation.
39
The law provided the legal basis for the private real estate ompany that
was to be responsible for rebuilding the downtown and granted the CDR sweeping powers to
singlehandedly soliit, negotiate and seure funding for reonstrution from foreign soures, issue
treasury bonds, and nane infrastrutural projets for real estate ompanies with a fous on
Solidere
40
and infrastruture in general (Leenders, 2004b, p. 138). This administrative body is
relatively shielded from interferene by politial opponents beause its budget is not inluded in
the general government budget and it answers to the prime minister only. It would beome one of
the vehiles through whih Hariri would implement his eonomi vision for the ountry.
The Central Fund for the Displaed was also assoiated to the new prime minister. Walid
Joumblat, feudal leader in the Shouf and of a large part of the Druze ommunity, reeived the
Ministry of the Displaed that drew funds from the CFD.
41
Syrian ally Nabih Berri, leader of
Amal, would have trusted underlings in the Ministry of Health, the Counil of the South, and the
Litani River Authority, while remaining the speaker of the parliament. The Ministry of Energy
and Water (MEW) was given to Georges Frem from 19921993, a politial opponent of Hariri,
followed by Elie Hobeika, a Syrian ally. The basi struture of the water setor was established
then and hasn't hanged muh sine. As mentioned above the CDR remains at the entre of the
infrastruture prodution mehanisms.
The MEW is an important ministry in this distribution of the administration (probably on par
with the Ministry of Publi Works and the Ministry of Teleommuniations and unlike the Ministry
of Culture, Youth and Sport that have rather little value). As was seen above its ability to fund
infrastruture was limited, but it entails disretionary powers over the eletriity setor as well.
With the integration of the petrol authority under its responsibilities and the subsequent disovery
of natural gas elds o the Lebanese oast it has beome one of the major prizes of ministerial
positions (see Dakroub, 2014; Fattouh & el Katiri, 2013; Halabi, 2011a; The Daily Star, 2014).
42
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The governors of the Central Bank were Hariri allies, rst Mihel Khoury in 1992, and afterwards Riad Salame
who has retained the post sine 1993. Hariri further kept the Ministry of Finane for himself but had Minister of
State and hildhood friend Fouad Saniora run the day to day operation of this ministry.
38
A Frenh onstrution ompany that was aquired by Hariri.
39
Leenders retells stories of bribery and manipulation related to the parliamentary vote regarding law 117 that
saw Hariri reompense votes in favour of the nal proposal (Leenders 2004, p.112).
40
Solidere is the real estate ompany that was and still is in harge of the reonstrution of the downtown area.
In an expropriation proess that has been widely ritiised and that an be viewed as an at of aumulation by
dispossession, the ompany beame the owner of most of the real estate and lands in this area.
41
Depending in part on Hariri to release funds from the CFD for the operations of the ministry.
42
The formation of a new government in early 2014 was held among other issues beause the Free Patrioti
Movement refused to give up its hold on the MEW. A ompromise was reahed when the party agreed to rotate its
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The ministries provided aess to patronage resoures and would allow the distribution of work
ontrats (speially physial infrastruture) and importantly also employment for partisans and
lients. The Counil of the South (COS) and the Ministry of the Displaed (MOD) through the
CFD were, next to the MEW and the CDR, two ministries that did spend onsiderable amounts
on rehabilitation of water supply networks and the drilling of wells. They were vehiles for the
patrons to dispense lientelist favours. The Ministry of Publi Works (MPW), the COS and MOD
were renown for their rampant orruption, whih is well doumented in Leenders (2004, 2004a)
analysis of orruption. Regarding the MEW journalist Rene Naba has the following to say:
Reruited outside of the proper proedures, without the advie of the Publi Reruit-
ment Counil, deorated with varying titles and missions, the plethora of employees and
onsultants attained a level so alarming that the publi Reruitment Counil had to
publily remind [politiians℄ of the regulations of publi employment. Certainly out of
atavisti survival instint, Hobeika and his alter ego levied a personal tithe representing
20 perent of the market, a uniform rate that he applied to all transations under the
ministry. Mohsen Dalloul broke the silene on Deember 11, 1997, to denoune the
ministry's mismanagement, assessing the amount of waste at US$ 600 million in three
years, or 50 perent of the loans alloated to the setor for its renovation.
(Author's translation Naba, 1999 in Debié, Pieter & Verdeil, 2003, p.86)
The ase of the US$ 4465 million onstrution of the Chabrouh Dam from 20012007 has also
gained a ertain reputation in the ountry for having been an oasion for onsiderable kikbaks.
On this oasion, aording to the rumours, president Lahoud ame into possession of his roof
top apartment in a downtown building owned and built by the ontrator (estimated at US$ 3
million). The ontrator supposedly made up for this from an illegal quarry that was to provide
stone only for the dam, but was eventually used to inrease prot margins by selling rok aggregate
for onrete on the market.
43
Aording to Comair these laims are baseless.
44
The details of these dealings are diult and
even impossible to disern in both examples, the ausation ited by Naba or the rumours about
the Chabrouh Dam projet. In the ase of the dam projet, pries for inputs suh as onrete,
steel, et. did rise onsiderably between the time of the tender proess whih started in 2001 and
the ompletion of works in 2007, as did the euro to dollar exhange rate. An engineer in the projet
explained that the Frenh ompany involved made losses beause of the utuation in the exhange
rate (Interview Faysal 2012).
The dealings and agreements between dierent parties involved, as well as their legality will
remain obsure. Nevertheless, the persistene of these rumours and the fats whih gave birth to
them, as well as the plethora of examples of orruption and pork-barrelling in other setors should
sue to illustrate the wide-ranging prevalene of these praties. Corruption or what Leenders
alls high politial orruption (2004) is an integral part of the power sharing arrangement, and
it is more than just a lubriant to the wheels of power; it is strutural.
minister Gebran Bassil to the Ministry of Foreign Aairs and appoint the head of the allied Armenian Tshnaq party
to the MEW. The MEW thus remained under the ontrol of Aoun's parliamentary blo. In this deal the advisers
of the former ministers retained their positions.
43
An engineering onsultant estimated the volume of stones exavated from the quarry via satellite images, on
the request of the union of the muniipalities of Keserwan (Interview Salame 2011).
44
Every thing that you have heard about Chabrouh is not true he said on the oasion of a onferene  The
Lebanon Water Resoures: Challenges and Opportunities  on Otober 14 2011 at the Amerian University of
Beirut.
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Ministries and other administrative bodies serve not only to distribute ontrats for infrastru-
ture. They oer opportunities for employment and give the ability to dispense numerous other
favours within the apaities and responsibilities of the respetive ageny. The ontrating out of
the operation and maintenane of infrastruture is an example that still entails onsiderable sums.
At a muh smaller sale, in the ase of the MEW and the water oe or water establishment this
ould also entail leniene with late fees on water or eletriity bills for individual users.
Further, it is not only ministerial positions that give aess to resoures. Senior administrative
positions are highly oveted beause they grant ontrol and aess to some of an administration's
resoures. In some ases also beyond the ability of a minister to reign in a senior oial under his
legal authority.
45
Senior positions in one ministry are not easily staed or exhanged as this usually entails
negotiations aross ministries and administrative bodies and needs to onsider both religious and
politial aliation. To nd a satisfatory andidate for the post of diretor of the Bekaa Water
Establishment, for example, took until June 2011, while the equivalent appointments for the other
three RWEs were suessful muh early, by the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002.
Geographial distribution of development and reonstrution investment and projets also
follows a politial logi, at least in part, not for eah setor, but rather aross setors as will
be shown in a later hapter. Parliament and the various parliamentary ommittees are some of
the plaes where these negotiations to balane the regional distribution of projets take plae
(Interview Charfeddine 2011). This proess of geographial distribution is equally linked to
setarian onsiderations, and while all regions are onfessionally mixed eah one  with the
exeption of Beirut  has one pronouned setarian majority.
2.3.2.4 Resolution by Avoidane
In general, when negotiations failed or ould not lead to suess, other ways to ahieve politial
or eonomi aims had to be found. These usually were attempts to bypass the politial proess
 another reurrent feature of the Lebanese politial landsape. These types of arrangements
would be adapted to the urrent problem at hand. Leenders (2004b) desribes the ase of the
reestablishment and strengthening of muniipalities after the war, or rather the failure to do so.
Parliamentarians and espeially the troika of president, prime minister and speaker of parliament
were fearful of a growing loal independene whih a revival of war-defunt muniipalities ould
bring. Fighting to keep ontrol over the proess, the politial stalemate over muniipal eletions
was onvenient for the elites, and the dispute would not be resolved for some time so that the rst
eletions would only take plae in 1998.
More importantly, in order to keep ontrol over the funds due to muniipalities Hariri managed
to pass responsibility for muniipal aairs from the Ministry of Interior to the newly reated
45
An inident over teleommuniations equipment illustrates this very well. Minister of Information
and Teleommuniations Charbel Nahas ordered equipment removed from the state owned (autonomous)
teleommuniations ompany. The diretor Abdel-Monem Youssef (an ally of Rak Hariri and later his son) of
the ompany refused to onform. When Nahas himself attempted to enfore his orders, he was hindered by Internal
Seurity Fores general Ashraf Ri (a staunh ally of the Hariri lan) who had sent a group of ISF oers to bar
entry to the building where said equipment was housed.
Nahas, a politial ally of (Aoun) asked Minister of the Interior Ziad Baroud (politially aligned to the president
Mihel Sleiman) to order Ri to withdraw his fores. Baroud's order were refused by Ri. In turn Nahas managed
to draw on a dierent ISF branh to provide a seurity detail for his mission. One ommentator well versed in
Lebanese politis summed up the results as follows: Ri's men prevailed, but not before the entire sad spetale
was aught on television: two branhes of the same polie fore staring eah other down, with one minister prevented
from aessing a building onneted with his own ministry and another minister issuing orders to his subordinates
to no avail (Muhanna, 2011). Finally the Minister of the Interior resigned over the issue.
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Ministry of Rural and Muniipal Aairs, headed by one of his allies. In the same vein the newly
reated independent muniipal fund's budget would be managed by Fouad Saniora and Hagob
Demerjian and shielded from publi srutiny and aountability (Leenders, 2004b, p. 205206) in
a set up not dissimilar to that between the the MOD and the CFD.
The rational given to justify this ourse of ation was the poor state of the muniipalities'
administrative apaity. The empowerment of the CDR as superministry followed a similar
argumentative line and pointed to the state of disarray in the various ministries.
Eventually the administrative responsibility for muniipal aairs was reintegrated in the Min-
istry of Interior, yet the Muniipal Fund remained as opaque as before, and disbursement to the
muniipalities depends on government derees. To this day many, if not most, muniipalities remain
underfunded and inapable of dealing with all of their administrative responsibilities, among them
being the management of loal waste water networks (Attallah 2012).
The same ould be said for other ministries. Initial funding and support was direted mostly
to the CDR while line ministries reeived support by what was alled setor implementation units
(SIUs) enabled by foreign funding. The CDR hired numerous professionals and has a robust
struture of expertise at its disposal while the SIUs were only temporary, leaving numerous
ministries seriously understaed. The weakness of the MEW and other ministries is thus at least
partially rooted in the preferential treatment the CDR reeived at Hariri's behest. Hariri managed
to reate a bypass of the politial proess that enabled him to at and spend more independently,
to the detriment of the other state administrative bodies.
In terms of administrative tasks and reforms, denitions of responsibilities would often be
kept vague to avoid onfrontations. This lead to administrative rivalries and in some ases to
overlapping responsibilities down the line. The most obvious example is the CDR's ontrol over
the reonstrution and infrastruture prodution proess. Until today the responsibility for waste
water management eetively rests with the CDR, while, by law, the four RWE, the muniipalities,
and the MEW share this responsibility but are in reality unable to full it.
For ivil servant positions this propensity to nd quik xes or temporary solutions meant
that they were staed via interim appointments to nd temporary solutions for vaant senior
ivil servant positions. The diretor of the Litani River Authority, Ali Aboud, or the Diretor of
the General Diretorate of Exploitation, Mahmoud Baroud, until 2012 are just two examples. The
diretors of the four RWE are equally just ating diretors and do not hold a permanent and legally
seured position. Being appointed as interim diretors makes them more easily exhangeable as
the proess does not require legislative ation.
Regarding legislative issues, possible legal loopholes would be exploited or legal provisions
simply ignored. To pik up on the earlier example of the budget law, suessive governments
have atually spent an estimated US$ 11 billion above the legally set limit sine 2005. Another
example is related to privatisation eorts, the omplete transfer of ownership of state-owned assets,
for example, would require parliamentary approval. Certain types of Publi Private Partnerships,
or Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) arrangements would serve as a way to irumvent politial
obstales. The publi phone ompany Ogero or the ellular teleommuniations networks are a
ase in point (see Nahas, 2009). Asked about the failure to reate independent regulators for the
privatisation of the teleommuniations, energy and ivil aviation setor, the Seretary General of
the High Counil of Privatisation had the following to say:
Under Law 431 for teleommuniations a regulator for the setor was reated, the TRA
[Teleommuniation Regulatory Authority℄, yet no regulator was reated for the energy
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setor or ivil aviation. The reason this has not been done in the last two ases and
has been done poorly in the rst is that a onit of interest exists between having
an independent body and the person of the minister in eah one of these ministries.
(Brophy, 2013)
Though required by law, these entities were not reated beause no solution ould be found to
satisfy the ministers. Suh a regulatory body would mean a redution of the powers of the ministers
and ministries and so redue the value of said position. As will be shown in Chapter 4, similar
dynamis are at work in the water setor regarding the national water ounil. In all ases the
easier solution to what in the past promised or urrently promises to be intratable negotiations is
simply ignoring or bypassing the issue. A similar argument will be made for the so-far inomplete
reform where delays in produing law texts organising the ministry, for example, are one way of
retaining privileges of an administrative body.
The water setor administration was also expeted to undergo large sale privatisation eorts
under the guidane and pressure of the IDC though so far not very suessfully. Law 221/2000
was to form the basis for later privatisation eorts, one aspet of the law was the regrouping of 21
water oes (and 200 water ommittees) into four regional water establishments, yet it took ve
years until the water establishments reeived bylaws. They operated in a legal limbo and some of
the water oes kept operating independently in reality, but under the auspies of a larger water
establishment aording to the law. Even today some of these water ommittees are still ative.
Later hapters will illustrate this dynami for the water setor administration in more detail.
2.3.2.5 Patronage Networks and the State
Leenders (2004) suggests that these lientelist dynamis and the politial elite's need to reate
or strengthen patronage networks were reinfored in the post Taef period. He points to the
weak politial legitimay of the post war politial ators as the main reason they resorted to
patronage networks to buy (and render dependent) their politial onstituenies. Hannes Baumann
(Baumann, 2012) desribes Hariri's asent to power and his politial fortunes during his time in
and out of government. He shows how this politial leader inreasingly fell bak on mobilising
setarian networks to regain and keep his hold on power. His assent during the 1980s and early
1990s was setarian in so far as it proted from Saudi largess and support, but his reputation
was that of a suessful business man and his redentials ame from his eonomi suess. Only
after his ouster from government in 1998 did he have to out his setarian redentials and present
himself as setarian leader to return to government in 2000 (see Baumann, 2012).
Kingston's (Kingston, 2001) analysis of the apture and penetration of environmental pro-
tetion/onservation forums by patron-lient networks is also diretly relevant for the ase of
water resoure management. In the post war years, in part due to the greening of development
aid, Lebanon saw the rise of a real urry of environmental NGOs. Following global and loal
environmentalist trends the Ministry of the Environment was established in 1993. Yet it was
severely restrited in its ability to monitor and enfore environmental protetion or breahes of laws
regarding pollution. Previously, environmental ativists established the Lebanese Environmental
Forum as a oordination ommittee for Environmental NGOs and with the goal to hallenge
environmental destrution stemming from the aumulation strategies of the elites. The LEF was
also the venue for distribution of funds earmarked for the establishment of three environmental
protetion areas and distributed by the United Nations-run Global Environmental Fund. Politial
CHAPTER 2. LEBANESE WATER RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION 79
elites quikly penetrated the LEF, most notably an NGO, alled Amwaj el-Bi'a, established by
Randa Berri, wife of the speaker of parliament, who held the post of seretary general until at least
2000. As result of this, members of the LEF, in return for aess to international funding, turned
a blind eye to the environmentally degrading ativities of Lebanon's entrepreneurial elites, be they
industrial pollution or the privatisation of the publi shoreline (Kingston, 2001, p. 67). Attempts
to open other venues for environmental ativism and organisations on the national level to replae
the LEF were obstruted by Interior Minister Mihel Murr, who himself is heavily involved in the
quarrying business and also maintains inuene in the LEF.
The ase of the Beirut River turning red from industrial waste is only one example of the
blatant environmental pollution that plagues the ountry beause of the lak of enforement of
regulations (Meguerdithian, 2012). The initial media outry though was never followed up with
serious ation. It was laimed that the substane that oloured the water was not harmful to
humans or the environment and within a few days the issue disappeared from the publi eye.
As has beome already lear above, the state administrative bodies and institutions are an
important onduit of these patron-lient dynamis, the same is the ase for NGOs and nonprot
assoiations. The amplitude of these strutures is best desribed by the retelling of one onsultant
working for a USAID-funded tehnial assistane projet for the water establishments. He desribes
his experiene of the dynamis related to the announement of job advertisements for 80 positions at
the BekaaWater Establishment. One the diretor of the reeived approval to start the employment
proess every single politiian and prominent person and all the religious institutions, Christian
and Muslim, every regional government and national government politiian beame involved in
order to seure a position for their lients.
So if they announe that the RWE is going to hire 80 people, even before they say it,
there is about 800 people being assigned, and lists of CVs being sent. Unbelievable
pressure is being put on these diretors. For example, the same parliamentarian would
be alling all day. A young person, about 20, would be standing in front of the oe.
He would yell at the diretor for making him wait: Don't you know that I was sent by
this bishop, or this parliamentarian, or this sheikh?
This pressure would ontinue to relieve the person of some or all of his workload:
The diretor is then being told that this guy has two kids and that he an't show up
to work. He doesn't make enough inome, so it is unaeptable for him to be asked to
show up at the water station every day at 8:00 am. The Water Establishment should
let this guy show up when he an.
This is not an exeptional ase:
All the sta that were aepted were from one denomination loated in one area in the
Bekaa, and all the positions are on the opposite side of the Bekaa. So none of the people
who got a job atually have any intention to show up to work. One ase I witnessed,
it was a Christian priest from north Bekaa that seured a job for somebody else.
We are seeing this now in the Bekaa beause it is happening now. In the other
establishments it has already happened before. (Interview Jimmy Zazaar 2012)
The high rate of absenteeism and the problems with produtivity  the many or onstant oee
breaks as it was most often desribed  repeatedly eliited omments by a number of experts
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and oials that were interviewed. These jobs are important to those who get them, espeially in
areas where jobs are few and inomes are low. And often, also beause of the drain these dynamis
put on the nanial resoures of the administration, these ontrat worker positions demand no
qualiations and aordingly pay no more than minimum wage.
The patronage dynamis apply not only to employment. On three oasions I witnessed
muniipal delegations from some village ome to either the MEW or the CDR to further their
ause. Introdution would usually start with a referene to the person who reommended the
persons present (sometimes baked up by a phone all). The drilling or repair of a well, maintenane
on a transmission pipeline, or xing the leakage of a reservoir, but also the onstrution of new
infrastruture (at a relatively small sale), are the goals of suh interations.
The patron-lient relationship also gives protetion or negotiating power to ontrators with
regards to work on infrastruture for example. The pries of material or work, or the substitution
of materials, the quality of work, all these an be subjet to renegotiation if neessary or possible,
and probably more often than not to the disadvantage of the ontrating authority.
The ineieny of the Water Establishments, and the Water Oes before, are, as the examples
shows, not a funtion of the ineieny of the state but rather a funtion of how pervasive patron-
lient relationships are, and as suh are related to the power dynamis in Lebanon.
This setion has shown that the post-war politial order has tremendous impat on water
resoure management, and does so in many and important ways. The post-war politial proess
serves as framework for the rivalries and elite ompetition. It lays out one arena of onfrontation
and the means by whih these struggles were and are fought. The post-war reonguration of
the politial proess endowed it with hroni features that in turn aet water resoures and their
management. The shortomings of the water resoure management proess are intimately linked
to the politial strutures and the power distribution dynamis. They are, as the last setion has




Figure 3.1 is a opy of the rst page of the National Water Setor Strategy published in late 2010
by the Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) and ratied by the Counil of Ministers
in 2012. The illustration, though not a omplete enumeration of the ators involved, gives a good
indiation of the large number of ators inuening or aeting water resoure management in
Lebanon. It is an idealised depition, like so many produed by water setor ators in Lebanon,
both Lebanese and international (see Litevout, 2010; SOGESID, 2005;World Bank, 2010d, 2012b).
Where the gure suggests ooperation and oherene between Lebanese institutions only very little
is present (see Chapter 2). Where it suggests symmetry between Lebanese and international ators,
a stark imbalane exists. In its presentation of the numerous ators the weight of the international
donors and related development agenies already beomes apparent. This hapter analyses the
interation between these two blos: the two distint sets of Lebanese and international ators.
Building on the explanation of the Lebanese omponent of the water setor, the omposition and
funtion of what will be referred to as the International Development Complex (IDC) will be
explained.
Before going into the details of the IDC (its water setor omponent) this hapter will eluidate
the neoliberalisation proess in Lebanon that is one of the important ausal dynamis of the
inreasing involvement of the IDC. As Neil Brenner, Jamie Pek, and Nik Theodore suggest the
neoliberalisation proess is best under stood as an historially spei, unevenly developed, hybrid,
patterned tendeny of market-disiplinary regulatory restruturing (Brenner, Pek & Theodore,
2010a, p. 330). From this point of view neoliberalism is a proess of market driven soial and
spatial transformation (Brenner & Theodore, 2005, p. 102) that takes a path dependent traje-
tory. Its main harateristis are summarised by Noel Castree: State roll bak or deregulation,
privatisation, marketisation, market friendly reregulation, use of market proxies in the residual
governmental setor, the strong enouragement of `anking mehanisms' in ivil soiety, and the
reation of `self-suient' individuals and ommunities (Castree, 2010a, p. 100; see Annex B for
Castree's more detailed summary). These templates never materialise in their pure form, but
partially and inompletely depending on the loal ontext of their appliation. The rst setion
will show how the inreasing neoliberalisation of Lebanon gave rise to the IDC and a spei














































Figure 3.1: National Water Setor Strategy Aknowledgements
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The presene and involvement of the IDC in the water setor is quasi-ubiquitous. The presene
and disourse of the IDC insribe themselves in and reprodue neoliberal ideology loally, aross
eonomi setors, and in the water setor speially. IWRM, the related need for private setor
partiipation, justiations derived from the threats of limate hange, and sarity are the dis-
ourses that guide interventions in the water setor. The general agreement of IDC and Lebanese
oials on and the few marginal dierenes in the disourse regarding problems and solutions to
the ills of the water setor in Lebanon suggest a onuene of interests. Yet this unied disourse
obfusates underlying dynamis of interation. Cooperation, or rather the haraterisation of the
interation between the IDC and the Lebanese administration as suh, hides the tension that
denes the relationship between these two sets of ators.
3.1 Lebanese Neoliberalism
Having presented the politial proess and harateristis of the mehanism of power distri-
bution in the last hapter, this setion will analyse the strutures of the eonomi basis of the
power of the elites. Guided by neoliberal poliy templates, suessive governments have solidied
four rent reation mehanisms that benet the elites. These have importantly ontributed to the
drasti rise of government debt, whih in turn has given the IDC inreasing leverage and inuene
in development poliy formulation and hoie. This is true for eonomi poliy, as well as WRM
poliy. The large publi debt is also one of the main reasons for the sad state of infrastruture
in general and water infrastruture in partiular. This setion lays the foundation to show the
links of proesses of apital aumulation with laking infrastruture, institutional apaity, and
administrative manpower.
It further shows the form that atually existing neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002)
takes in Lebanon. It sets the basis for a ritique of the neoliberal poliy templates that are
promoted to solve the sal woes of the state and the weakness water setor administration. The
appliation of Washington Consensus ideas in the ontext of Lebanon helped reate problems whih
newer iterations of neoliberal poliy and ideology laim an be solved by this same ideology. The
disussion in this setion will show this to be the ase for eonomi poliy and state restruturing
in general. This will form the basis and bakground of a ritique of neoliberal IWRM poliies that
promise to right the shortomings of the water setor, whih are in no small part linked to the larger
politial eonomi strutures built through the hybridised adaption of these poliy templates.
3.1.1 A Vision for Reonstrution
The rst post-Taef governments managed to improve the seurity situation in the ountry but
were not able to produe muh in terms of reonstrution eorts. Administrative and institutional
paralysis, high levels of orruption, the ballooning deit that produed very little ounter-value in
the form of investment in infrastruture, were important auses for the eonomi risis that set in.
The Central Bank withdrew its support for the Lebanese lira (LL).
1
The ensuing ollapse of the
lira and the resulting hyper-inationary period fored the government of Rahid Karami to step
down in May 1992. A new government was formed to oversee the eletions in September of that
1
Charbel Nahas (2000), Samir Makdisi (2004) and others argued that the risis originated from a onerted
speulative eort and was aimed at bringing down the government. Similarly the World Bank: The root ause of
this ination was monetary expansion neessitated to nane the large government budget deit and its interation
with highly sensitive expetations and speulative apital movements, inluding urreny substitution. ... The large
retroative ivil servant salary inrease granted in late 1991 preipitated a speulative risis and a subsequent attak
on the domesti urreny. Author's emphasis (Van Eeghan, 1993b, p. 12).
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year.
2
Rak Hariri was nominate Prime Minister  without having been eleted to parliament
before  and within days of his formation of a Government of Eonomi Salvation the Lebanese
lira appreiated about 20 perent to the dollar; supposedly as result of the ondene he inspired
on international markets.
In fat his peasant to billionaire history, his asent from small ontrator to owner of an
impressive business empire is the stu of neoliberal legends (see Baumann, 2012 for detailed
analysis). Buoyed by his reputation, lever politial manoeuvring, international baking and his
wealth, he would very quikly beome the dominant fore in the formulation of the eonomi and
physial reonstrution of the ountry. Hariri spearheaded the reonstrution, but large parts of
the elite and the population shared and supported his vision for the ountry. Inspired by pre-
war nostalgia for the Switzerland of the Middle East, Lebanon was to regain its position as the
gateway to the Middle East. It was to retake its plae as the ommerial and nanial hub to the
Arab world. The World Bank ommented:
Although presumably Lebanon's omparative advantage still lies in international ser-
vies, tourism, and high valueadded light manufaturing industry and agriulture, the
Government is aware that regional ompetition for nanial servies and transit trade
has inreased, the high regional growth assoiated with the petroleum boom is no longer
present, and other irumstanes that had ontributed to the rapid growth that in the
period prior to the mid-1970s are unlikely to be repliated. (World Bank, 1994, p.6)
A reprodution of the pre-war eonomy led by a servie industry and tourism was promulgated
as the way towards the future.
3
Opinions that questioned pre-war suess and the new strategy
were marginal, and even most of those opposed to Hariri's vision were not questioning Lebanon's
traditional liberal order. Divergene in opinion was about the priorities of rebuilding the eonomy
versus the rebuilding and strengthening of state institutions and the administration, but remained
in the framework of an open-market eonomy and the santity of private property.
4
There were those that advoated that institution building would be a rst and neessary step to
eonomi reovery (on the longer term) while the Hariri amp saw this as subsidiary to eonomi
reovery. In a post war situation where state institutions were in tatters, and the notion of a
state was hardly present in the daily operations of the populations suh a line of argument seems
absurd. But even the statists saw a mostly regulatory role for the state  in the liberal (or even
ultra-liberal) tradition of the pre-war  and nothing like a welfarist and interventionist role in the
reonstrution of the ountry.
In Hariri's vision it was the vigorous and dynami private setor traditionally the ountry's
main asset that was to provide the bulk of investment and lead the reonstrution. Early CDR
2
The timing of the eletions was orhestrated by Syria to oinide with the withdrawal of its troops to the Bekaa
and against the wishes of numerous Lebanese leaders who preferred to postpone them to a later date. The all
for boyott by the more popular Maronite politial gures exluded them from the new government and instead
numerous Syrian lients entered parliament. Elie Hobeika, the Minister of Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures, was
one suh Lebanese politiian. The proess drew heavy ritiism from Europe and the US but nevertheless earned
international reognition in return for the Syrian leadership's aeptane of Saudi-baked tyoon Rak Hariri for
premiership.
3
Touk Gaspard (2004) analysing the performane of this servie and ommere eonomy before the war onludes
that it was already not very impressive. This seems even less so when put in the regional ontext, where Lebanon
in fat had a omparative advantage beause of it openness Gaspard (2004).
4
See Debié et al. (2003), for an argument that divides the politial spetrum into two amps. The rst propagating
a statist vision and the seond vision that saw state building as subsidiary to eonomi reonstrution.
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reports point to the importane of a private setor that was expeted to invest twie as muh as
the oial reonstrution plan projeted for government apital expenditures. The CDR progress
reports sine 2002 reiterated the same mantra:
The ativities of CDR over various eonomi setors. However, the extent of these
ativities varies from setor to setor in aordane with the Government's diretives
and Lebanon's free enterprise eonomi system. The role of the State is limited to the
support and promotion of the private setor. (Author's highlight, CDR, 2003, p.4)
This statement ehos Castree's denition of the purpose of market friendly reregulation where
the state intervenes for the eonomy not, as it were, in it (Castree, 2010a, p. 1729). The
government was to provide the neessary ontext and infrastruture (with an emphasis on physial
infrastruture). Where possible it would be with the involvement of the private setor in the form
of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangements, publi-private partnerships, and other strategies.
To quote the World Bank assistane strategy again:
Regardless of the omposition of growth, the Government plans to support private
setor initiatives in order to realise the ountry's potential. The Government is of
the view that with adequate infrastruture, the traditional strengths of Lebanon's
entrepreneurs, and its human resoure base in general, Lebanon ould exploit new
opportunities that will arise in the region as the peae-proess evolves. (World Bank,
1994, p. 7)
Armed with a hybrid ideology ombining neoliberal ideas with the Lebanese ultra-liberal tradition,
applauded by multilateral and bilateral development agenies (the IDC), and a misplaed believe
in the Arab-Israeli peae proess
5
whih was hoped would solve the region's problems, the task at
hand was to attrat private and international investment to Lebanon. Two elements were entral
for the plan to turn Lebanon into the Singapore of the Middle East to be viable: Internal stability
had to be maintained and a business friendly environment had to be reated.
3.1.2 Hariri's Reonstrution
A lot of work had already been done by Hariri's predeessors with regards to stability. But
beyond the disarming of militias, for this vision to beome reality internal opposition to his plans
had to be redued. This was done by nding an appropriate way to inlude ompeting elites into
the prot-making bonanza that would be sponsored and direted by Hariri's government. Hannes
Baumann (Baumann, 2012) identies four rent reation mehanisms  partially ontraditory
to neoliberal poliy presriptions  that served this purpose: 1) the distribution of servie min-
istries, 2) the regulation of markets by keeping ommerial monopolies and oligopolies proteted,
5
The Lebanese-Israeli onit was simmering throughout the 1990s; parts of the south of the ountry were still
oupied by the Israeli army. Violent episodes ourred regularly. In 1992 Hezbollah leader Abbas Moussawi was
killed in an Israeli heliopter strike. In the summer of 1993 Israel launhed Operation Aountability in reation
to Hezbollah operations in the oupied areas. By 1996 with Operation Grapes of Wrath it must have been lear
that peae would remain elusive when Israel returned for a viious air ampaign against Lebanon.
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3) government borrowing and over-borrowing mainly from Lebanese ommerial banks, and 4)
the physial reonstrution, fousing on large-sale real estate projets. The protetion of the
ommerial monopolies and the distribution of the servie ministries are the opposite of what
neoliberal theory is designed to ahieve. By eliminating or reduing ompetition the monopolies
ripple the market fores rather than eet their liberation that is to produe an eient alloation
of apital. Further, the importane of the servie ministries in the distribution of politial power
signies not a roll bak of the state but a redenition of its role and enshrines the ineienies
of the state in the form of patron-lient relationships.
The rst hurdle to be overome was the distribution of ministries and administrative bodies
among the the politial elites and their lients. Aess to the ministries involved in the reon-
strution of infrastruture made for good prots and is part of the muhassassa dealings desribed
earlier. Hariri seured for himself those institutions important for the eonomy and leading the
reonstrution. The other ministries with WRM responsibilities were distributed among allies
and opponents. For Hariri the CDR was a deep well for dispensing favours, that ould be used as
bargaining hips in his quest to realise his vision for the ountry. Virtually all major reonstrution
ontrats were managed through this ageny and so awarding ontrats to politial opponents or
their lients was a useful way of gaining onessions on politial issues. Between 1992 and 1999 the
CDR spent in total nearly US$ 5.4 billion on ontrats  around 80 perent of total publi apital
investments (Leenders, 2004b, p. 138) illustrating the entrality of the CDR in the reonstrution
proess. With his hold on the MOF, the Central Bank, and the CDR, Hariri held the agenies
that were strategially important in the artiulation of the reonstrution, and that allowed him
to shape the eonomy and aumulation regime of the ountry like no other.
3.1.3 Finaning the Reonstrution
The vision of a business friendly environment that was at the heart of Hariri's reonstrution
strategy rested on two ingredients. One was a high end business hub, a servies and tourism entre
for the Middle East, that would, at least in theory, attrat globalised business elites and luxury
tourism from the Gulf. The seond was a nanial infrastruture able to handle the related apital
ows in the form of loal and foreign investment.
In addition, this strategy also ongured WRM in very spei ways. For one, it foused
the reonstrution on the servies and real estate setors with a geographial entre of gravity
in Beirut and speially its soon-to-be-rebuilt downtown. As a orollary, it reated a less-than-
friendly environment for produtive setors suh as industry and, important for water resoures,
agriulture. The strategy as a whole was one of lass warfare. The bias against produtive setors
and espeially against agriulture and a neglet of the geographial peripheries were also part of
this larger lass warfare programme (see Chapter 5).
After having gained ontrol over the strategi administrative bodies, Hariri was faed with the
hallenge of naning his reonstrution strategy. For this he turned to Lebanese ommerial banks
rather than foreign funding. The Lebanese government started to aution Lebanese lira-denoted
treasury bills via the entral bank, justifying its ations by arguing that the government had only
little aess to foreign funding.
Lebanese government debt at the end of the war was low and Lebanese denoted debt dereased
in dollar terms due to rapid urreny depreiation between 1987 and 1992. In ve years the pound
fell from about 200 LL to 2,500 LL to the dollar. The government was in a relatively good sal
position but these inationary dynamis aused onsiderable pain to loal banks. The banking
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setor was thus in no shape to at as intermediary for the wished-for apital ows. Hariri's strategy
for bankrolling the reonstrution would hange this at a high ost to taxpayers and government
nanes (see Baumann, 2012; Najem, 2000).
When Hariri ame to power government debt was under ontrol, yet within ve years govern-
ment debt would rise from 50.7 perent of GDP in 1993 to 109.1 perent in 1998 when Hariri's rst
term as premier ended. Faed with the monumental task of rebuilding the ountry, an inrease in
expenditures and deits was to be expeted, yet the rate and magnitude were stunning. These
drasti developments led the World Bank to plae Lebanon on its shortlist of states that were at
high risk of bankrupty by the end of 1995 (Najem, 2000, p.142).
Debt would ontinue to grow and though attempts at reigning in budgetary deits were made,
it has remained substantial ever sine. By the end of 2013 total gross publi debt was around
US$ 64 billion. Spiralling debt and the onstantly high budgetary deits had beome a strutural
feature of the Lebanese eonomy.
Figure 3.2: Development of debt and GDP
Soure: Ministry of Finane: general debt overview 2014
3.1.4 The Origins of Lebanese Debt
Three reasons an be given for the high debt. One is the low tax base and the low government
revenues;
6
another is the ost of reonstrution ativity, related a perentage of waste or orruption
6
Years of war had left the tax administration in a bad shape. Tax olletion was ineient due to a lak of
information on tax payers, outdated methods of olletion, weak tax enforement laws, and means of enforement
and tax evasion was high (not really a surprise after 15 years of war and the ongruent soial hanges). Again
following the neoliberal play book the tax system was reformed and the new tax system adopted at the end of 1993
introdued major tax uts on prots to enourage investment and voluntary ompliane (Dah, Dibeh & Shahin,
1999, p. 9). An IMF mission and the Lebanese tax reform ommittee basially agreed on the way forward (Dah
et al., 1999). The tax rate was kept at very low levels owning to the vision of a tax haven that would attrat
vast amounts of FDI. Corporate tax was held at 10 perent and a speial disounted rate of 5 perent applied to
nanial ompanies that build and sell residential buildings. Tax on apital aounts was also apped at 5%, taxes
on salaries were braketed with the highest braket at 10 perent. Tax revenues inreased but remained narrow and
ertainly ould not keep up with the inreasing deit.
Government revenues, utuated between 12 perent of GDP in 1992 and 16.3 perent in 1997. Share of diret
taxes rose from 29,4% to 35 perent of revenue. Customs duties inreased from 35.7 perent to 46.2% between
1993 and 1996 (or 5.05 perent to 8 perent of GDP)beause of an inrease in imports. Relative share of revenues
from indiret taxes delined from 30.76 perent to 24.88 perent of revenues (or 4.93 to 3.26 as perentage of GDP).
These hanges must not be misunderstood. They reet mostly the improvement in revenue olletion and eonomi
growth (as ompared to war levels. At the same time, the budget deit inreased from 11.4 perent of GDP to
23.48 perent of GDP.
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on the spei investment ativities and government expenditures in general (and exepting debt
interest); a third reason an be found in the overly high interest rates on Lebanese liradenominated
treasury bills (LLTBs), as well as government over-borrowing to support an exhange-rate stability
and appreiation poliy.
Gaspard (2004) estimates that half of the average 18 perent weighted annual yield on LLTBs
was payed in exess until the end of 2002, or about US$ 8.5 billion. He adds to this about US$
1 billion stemming from high interest paid by the entral bank as a result of urreny support
operations. Finally he adds another US$ 7 billion representing the 20 perent waste (above normal
waste) on all other government expenditures to get a total wasteful spending of US$ 16 billion
in the time period between 19932002. Publi debt stood at US$ 32 billion in 2002, half of whih,
aording to Gaspard's alulations, was in exess of what ould have reasonably be expeted and
served only to enrih elites and owed into the pokets of Lebanese and international investors.
While debt ballooned, Lebanese banks were thriving and they and their major depositors were
raking in impressive prots. Tom Najem writes that:
The amount deposited into Lebanese banks during the Hariri period was staggering ...
Some 15 months into Hariri's administration, net transfers from abroad totalled US$
6.5 billion. At the end of 1993 total deposits in Lebanon's ommerial banks were US$
8.5 billion, by May 1996 deposits had grown to US$ 16.3 billion. (Najem, 2000,p.182)
Most of whih were denoted in US dollars and only a fration in Lebanese lira. Bank prots
exploded. For example by 1996 BankMed (ontrolled and owned by the Hariri family) beame the
largest Lebanese bank. The bank reorded a prot of US$ 19.2 millions in 1995
ompared with a prot of only US$ 1.6 million in 1993. Its assets grew from US$
21 million in 1992 to an impressive US$ 2 billion in 1995. (Najem, 2000, p.182)
All of the major Lebanese banks reorded similar results. The ve to six dominant banks held
78 perent of total deposits and 74 perent of loans in the system. Average annual growth of the
onsolidated balane sheet of the banking setor in the 1990s was estimated at 22 perent (Nahas,
2000).
The mehanism that links the two, growing bank balane sheets and prots and national debt,
deserves a little more attention. The naning of the reonstrution via the Lebanese ommerial
banking setor served to inluded the ompeting elites in the prots of the reonstrution and to
reapitalise the banking setor to ready it for its assigned task as a regional nanial hub.
In order to entie Lebanese banks to buy T-bills and at as reditors to the Lebanese state the
Central Bank and the government deployed a two-pronged strategy. Hariri's government ommitted
to a poliy of urreny appreiation of the Lebanese lira to the dollar (relatively stable and almost
preditable annual average of 3.4 perent between 19931998 (Gaspard, 2004, p. 218)), and
the Central Bank managed T-bill autions so that interest rates would promise good returns to
lenders. Coupled with interest rates that were very high, touhing 38 perent for two year T-bills
and around 20 perent for T-bills with shorter maturity, averaging about 18 perent for 10 year
period (Gaspard, 2004, p. 219). The exhange ratebased stability poliy essentially gave the
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guarantee for prot as the dierenes in interest rates on dollar-denominated loans and LLTBs
provided returns of up to 25 perent over three months (see Hakim & Andary, 1997).
As a number of observers point out the interest rate was, in all likelihood, only seemingly set in
the free play of market fores. They aount for this development by pointing to a home bias eet
or speially Lebanese soio-politial onditions (see Helbling & Eken, 1999; Shimmelpfennig &
Gardner, 2008). The high interest rate was essential to draw in funds whih in turn were needed to
prop up the urreny. And in irular fashion the attrativeness of the high interest rates depended
on the appreiation and later stability of the Lebanese lira. Baumann (2012) explains  and it is
worth mentioning here beause the lass politial aspet of the naning strategy has had a long-
term eet on the eonomy as whole  that the key to maintaining ondene in this mehanism
is found in the depositor struture. The depositor base that proted from the mouthwatering
interest rates was and still is highly onentrated (see Chapter 2). An IMF report of 2008 shows
that 36 perent of total deposits are held in aounts smaller than US$ 150,000 while 31 perent
are held in aounts of more than US$ 1 million (Shimmelpfennig & Gardner, 2008).
The mehanism through whih LLTBs were autioned and whih guaranteed foreign investors
their bids without having to partake in ompetitive autions, as well as the onentration in the
banking setor formed a good environment for a very ontrolled management of interest rates.
This debt nane mehanism represented a massive transfer of taxpayer money to the Lebanese
elites (and diaspora) as bank owners and major depositors.
Table 3.1: Table Cumulative government expenditure by eonomi ategory 1993 - 2002
Eonomi Category $ Billions % of Total
Interest on Publi Debt 21.0 38
Wages and Salaries 16.3 29





Debt serviing quikly beame the one major government expenditure surpassing salaries and
investment by far (see Table 3.1). A stunning 38 perent of expenditures went on debt serviing
between 19932002 while less than half of this, only 16 perent or US$ 9.2 billion, was spent
on investment. Debt serviing has sine remained the largest share of government expenditure,
hovering around 40 perent.
3.2 Desent into Dependeny
The dramati sal situation would beome lear to all.
7
Tax inreases were onsidered, taris
on imports were inreased but some of these measures had to be resinded due to strong popular
and politial opposition. The government also turned to inrease foreign borrowing by issuing
dollar denominated Eurobonds, inreasing foreign reserves and lowering the ost of debt serviing
7
Sami Baroudi writes that by 1996, Hariri and ating Minster of Finane Fouad Saniora were beginning to
show signs of onern, even alarm, at the mounting publi debt and the failure to bring down the budget deit.
(Baroudi, 2002, p. 68)
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beause of the lower interest rates these bonds fethed. More importantly for infrastruture, the
1996 budget already saw strongly redued apital expenditures.
Hariri had set the path and his suessor would follow as if there was no alternative. By 1998
when Hariri was fored to resign after the eletion of President Lahoud, the government of Salim el
Hoss essentially followed the same poliies, even if with less enthusiasm and onvition (see Corm,
2005; S. A. Makdisi, 2004). It prepared the introdution of a value-added-tax, but that had to wait
until 2002 when Hariri after two years in oe had to show his ommitment to sal onsolidation
to attrat bilateral and multilateral loans. Under Hoss foreign urreny borrowing inreased even
more than during the later years of Hariri's rst reign. The new government was anxious to point
out that it remained ommitted to attrating foreign diret investment and keep the trust of its
reditors.
The poliies of the Hoss government did manage to slow down the run-away deit but sal
health was far from attained. Under the pressure of a oerive debt the government also launhed
the preparations for an ambitious privatisation programme (by far outdoing what Hariri had done
or was able to do). The postal servies, the teleommuniations setor, the eletriity setor, the
water setor, the national air arrier, as well as the asino were to be tendered for sale aording
to these plans. The law regulating privatisation passed in April 2000 and Law 221 reorganising
the water setor with a view to initiate privatisation passed in May 2000 were born out of this
ontext.
8
Yet not muh ame of these privatisation plans with the exeption of the involvement of the
private setor in the teleommuniations setor and the privatisation of the national air arrier.
In the summer of 2000 Hariri's list managed to gain a majority in the parliamentary eletions and
he returned to government in the latter half of the year. Baroudi (Baroudi, 2002) is right to point
out that there was more ontinuity and similarity than dierene in the suessive governments.
The Hoss government was not able to rein in orruption or produe a more balaned eletoral law
as promised on the oasion of Hariri's exit from government in 1998; as vested interests had a
lot of lout with Syria but also within the elites. Similarly, unable and/or unwilling to depart
meaningfully from eonomi orthodoxy, alls for and promises of more soial justie remained just
that. Thus the transfer of wealth from taxpayers to the elites via the banks ontinued even if at a
lower rate. As was mentioned earlier poliy dierenes and developmental strategy were and are
not eletoral issues. The banks and depositors on one side, and the government on the other were
already loked in a relationship where one needed the other. Government default would ome at
huge ost to the banks and as suh was to be avoided.
3.2.1 Donor Dependeny
With his return Hariri ould not evade this problem. After two years of reession and notwith-
standing the eorts of the previous government the Lebanese state was still teetering on the edge
of a nanial ollapse. In the years that followed 2001 and 2002 the Central Bank had to buy up an
inreasing share of LLTBs as banks were beoming more autious.
9
Foreign urreny denominated
debt rose from 25 perent in May 2000 to almost 41 perent by Otober 2002 (Baumann, 2012,
p.185). As an IMF analysis wonders in 2008, the piture of the nanial health of the Lebanese
state that emerges is baing as it is one of the most indebted ountries in the world relative to the
8
Corm remembers this with pride, though he highlights that all eorts were made to guarantee a transparent
proess (Corm 2005, p.285).
9
It eventually held 25 perent of all LLTBs by June 2002 (Baumann, 2012, p.184).
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size of its eonomy and should have undergone a debt risis a long time ago (Shimmelpfennig &
Gardner, 2008, p.4). Aording to this report Lebanon's nanial survival ould only be explained
by fatoring in its international support, Saudi Arabia and Frane at the forefront.
In order to salvage the situation and keep investors in T-bills buying, Hariri turned to his
international allies  his good friend Frenh President Jaques Chira leading the harge  for a
nanial x. At a rst onferene in Paris in February 2001 he obtained just under US$ 500 million
dollar in onessionary loans and grants. Not a nanial suess, the onferene nevertheless laid
the foundation for a more suessful donor onferene in 2002. The partiipants
10
laid out their
expetations for reforms before more substantial ommitments ould be made to the Lebanese
government. By the time of the Paris II onferene (2002) a VAT was implemented, the EU
assoiation agreement was initialised and uts in ustoms duties were put in plae (all initiatives
that were already started in the previous government).
The onferene was a suess for Hariri, overall some US$ 4.2 billion were pledged by donors.
Of these US$ 1.2 billion were linked to projet naning and US$ 3 billion were pledged in the form
of onessionary loans. Frane and Saudi Arabia were the major funders and the guarantors for
suess. Not having any stakes in the future of the ountry neither the US nor the IMF ommitted
funds, though they partiipated as observers to the onferene (Baumann, 2012). The majority
of loan pledges ame from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia while Western ountries and institutions
pledged about US$ 1 billion in loans or about one-third of the total loan amount. Of the funds
linked to projets about half ame from the European Investment Bank, the EU diretly, and the
World Bank.
Figure 3.3: Pledges at Paris II by ountry/ageny (US$ million)
Note: AMF (Arab Monetary Fund) AFSED (Arab Fund for Soial and Eonomi Development). EU inludes presideny and
ommission. Columns in blue denote onessionary loans as sal support, olumns in red denote projet naning. Soure:
Eonomist Intelligene Unit, Country Report: Lebanon, January 2003 (eletroni version) reprodued from Baumann
(2012).
Aording to Corm (2005, p.291) the partiipants bought US$ 2.5 billion worth of treasury bills
(Eurobonds) at 5 perent with 15 year maturity bringing down average interest on the debt. Saudi
Arabia had already provided support to the Central Bank in 1998 with deposit of US$ 600 million
at a lenient interest rate but it was only after Paris II that the dependeny of the Lebanese
10
The EU represented by Romano Prodi and the World Bank president James Wolfensohn who had joined the
Frenh president among others.
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eonomy on bilateral and multilateral support beame obvious. Saudi Arabia with its Gulf allies
in tow is the most import guarantor of Lebanese nanial stability.
11
But European and World Bank support were also substantial, espeially regarding their funding
of projets. Most of these funds were earmarked for infrastruture projets and in fat replaed
Lebanese government apital expenditures that were redued in attempts at sal onsolidation.
By the end of 2002, as a result of Paris II and the international show of support, interest rates
on all types of government bonds fell and thus also for ommerial loans and bank deposits. In
this way, a still miserable (in absolute terms) sal situation was given a silver lining. The debt
ontinued inreasing but the relative weight of debt serviing (as ompared to revenues and GDP)
fell at least until 2005.
It was in response to the Israeli onslaught in July 2006 that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had to
demonstrate their support for the Lebanese eonomy again by depositing lose to US$ 2 billion with
the entral bank to bolster its foreign urreny reserves. The end of the war and the destrution it
wrought also formed the oasion for the next donor onferene. In September 2006 a onferene
in Stokholm aimed at addressing immediate reonstrution needs produed some US$ 3.6 billion
in pledges, with more than US$ 1 billion linked to projets. Fouad Saniora, prime minister after
Hariri's assassination, took the opportunity to mobilise for a more lurative onferene whih was
dubbed Paris III. This time the government boasted that it reeived pledges for US$ 7.6 billion
of whih some US$ 4 billion were earmarked for projets. The total inluded the pledges made in
Stokholm.
These repeated international interventions to save the Lebanese sal situation from going over
the edge  via default and/or urreny devaluation  did not turn around the debt problem.
Sine 2007 the debt inreased from US$ 45 billion to lose to US$ 64 billion by the end of 2013.
Even though the ountry was mired in an ongoing politial risis, inluding various violent internal
onits and numerous hanges of government, ondene in the government's ability to maintain
nanial stability remained relatively solid. This should be attributed to the fat that the two
opposing politial fations (inidentally led by billionaires) essentially endorse the same eonomi
ideologies.
International nanial support kept the basi wealth transfer mehanism going, even if at a
lower rate. This is true for all foreign funding and so for all loans and grants that ow to the water
setor. While the debt to GDP ratio atually improved sine 2007 the government still pays some
US$ 4 billion a year to servie its debt in 2013 (see Figure 3.2). This nominal improvement 
likely to turn out to be a mirage  is further related to strutural imbalanes and dynamis that
have sustained a real estate boom/bubble (see Chapter 5).
3.2.2 The Rise of the IDC and Eonomi Poliy
From the onset, and more so with Hariri's arrival, international development agenies were
involved in the reonstrution proess. The World Bank and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) were the two most ative agenies. The depth of their inuene on eonomi
and nanial poliy is diult to pinpoint at least for the initial stages of the reonstrution.
Clearly, the Bank aompanied the reonstrution proess from the start; a look at the publily
11
Saudi Arabia was among the most important bakers and as Baumann writes: viewed from the perspetive of
international politial eonomy, the Eurobond purhase of April 2002 and the `impliit guarantee' that ame with
it represented the end of a journey for Lebanon's politial eonomy  a journey into nanial dependeny on Saudi
Arabia. Only the kingdom's impliit guarantee ensured that the merry-go-round of government borrowing would
not stop (Baum an 2012 p. 196).
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available ountry database onrms this. The UNDP programme that was to support the ad-
ministrative reforms by providing sta and expertise to ministries was born in 1992. Initially
an agreement was made between the Government of Lebanon and the UNDP to begin a joint
partnership at the nane ministry, aimed at reforming the institution (Halabi, 2010). Over the
last 20 years this has morphed into a large struture managing 67 projets that has been desribed
by Hassan Krayem, manager of the programme, as a dierent exeutive arm that ould provide
poliy formulation, as well as poliy implementation in key ministries (quoted in Halabi, 2010).
The World Bank in its ompletion report for the tehnial assistane for revenue enhanement
and sal management projet dating from 1994 until 2006 mentions that:
The programme original projet [si℄ diretor was also the prinipal advisor to the
Minister of Finane. This opened diret and open links of ommuniation between the
government and the projet implementation unit. (World Bank, 2006, p. 11)
The programme was aimed at improving ustoms administration, adastral and land registration
proedures, as well as eonomi management. Its atual input on sal poliy isn't lear but the
dual responsibilities of the programme manager ertainly suggests agreement and/or ideologial
loseness. Beyond this almost physial interonnetion IMF and World Bank support were onsid-
ered as ruial displays of ondene for the Lebanese eonomy and suessive governments. Corm
 nane minister between 1998 and 2000  desribes his experiene as follows:
The prinipal reform measures that were advoated, partiularly the adaption of the
VAT and other sal measures, were disussed extensively between the minister of
nane and the World Bank, as well as the European union. It was indeed vital to
obtain the endorsement of these organisations to assure the international redibility of
the eonomi poliy of the government. (Corm, 2005, p. 282, Author's translation and
highlight)
In this ontext the World Bank oered loans to nane a strutural adjustment programme
onditioned on progress in administrative reforms and privatisation eorts. Corm also realls
World Bank pressure to enter a stand-by agreement with the IMF that prompted him to break
o said negotiations (Corm, 2005, p.282). The inuene on eonomi poliy-making resulting from
the Paris I and Paris II onferenes were already mentioned before. In this ontext Baumann
quotes eonomi advisor to Hariri, Mazin Hanna:
And while no serious pledges were done at the time [of Paris I℄, at least there was an
outline being provided at the time by the ountries and institutions that will end up
putting money into Lebanon. By drawing a [...℄ road-map for us, saying that: `If you
wanted this money, this is what you should do.' And this is when, going bak, Rak
Hariri deided: `OK, we're going to put in a value added tax, we're going to go into
the Euromed agreement, we're going to lower ustoms rates, we're going to prepare for
privatisation, et. et.' And by the time Paris II ourred, all those prior ations, if
you want, were already fullled. (Hanna in Baumann 2012, p.191)
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As will be seen later Lebanon's partiipation in the Barelona proess and entry into the Euromed
agreement would importantly shape water management poliy and the water setor. Beyond that
the quote illustrates how development organisations inreasingly set the poliy agenda, espeially
regarding eonomi poliy. Four years later for the Stokholm onferene and Paris III onferene
after the July War in 2006 things were not dissimilar and the le prepared by the government
reeted donor expetations.
This setion has in some detail desribed how suessive Lebanese governments approahed the
question of naning the reonstrution. They have shown a onsiderable amount of ontinuity 
even if in the ase of Hoss's government with some relutane and unable or unwilling to formulate
alternatives, this uniformity is reeted in the water setor.
Lebanese banks and their depositors proted greatly from the government's naning strategy.
This mehanism beame an essential aspet of the aumulation regime of the Lebanese elites
and has beome a strutural omponent of the Lebanese eonomy. International funding and
the impliit guarantee that omes with it was ruial for the survival of this wealth-transfer
mehanism and the reprodution and strengthening of lass power that it represents. It is also at
the root of the explosion of publi debt in the 1990s and its oerive fore today.
Inversely, this publi debt guarantees the ever growing importane of the IDC. It in fat weds
the elites to international apital, importantly to Saudi Arabia and to the IDC. Saudi Arabia and
the GCC ountries on one hand, and Iran on the other provide overtly politial funding to their
respetive allies, as well as loans and grants to the government. The IDC operates through the
state and the government only. This inrease of IDC inuene, whih is also a produt of the
the neoliberalisation proess, represents a resaling of governane. Inreasingly eonomi poliy is
inuened by supra national regulatory inuenes.
The rst part of this hapter aimed at illustrating that it was not abstrat market fores that
produed this situation but rather the ageny of elites, government ators, and international donors
in spei histori regional and international ontext  marred with violene and destrution 
that are responsible for the growing debt. In that sense this analysis serves to undermine pro-
privatisation arguments that will be enountered in the disussion of administrative reform of the
water setor and that posit the inertia and ineieny of state administration as obstales to
growth.
The weight of the debt itself, as well as the high interest rates that this borrowing mehanism
entailed had important eets on the water setor. After 1996 government investment in infras-
truture had to give way to sal onsolidation neessitated by the spiralling debt. It was replaed
by IDC intervention that is the subjet of the next setion.
3.3 The IDC in the Lebanese Water Setor
The hoie to group international development ators under the label of the International
Development Complex was explained in Chapter 1. The oming setions will illustrate this set of
networked ators and justify this hoie. The aim is to show that IDC ators are quasi-omnipresent
in the setor and that they touh on all aspets of water resoure management. In the proess it will
be shown that, notwithstanding the dierent interest of the individual ators, there is onsiderable
ross-over, interrelation, at times ooperation, as well as varying degrees of oordination between
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them, both loally and internationally. I will then show how, despite the IWRM disourse being
shared, ooperation between the Lebanese and the IDC omponents is onditional on the pereption
of potential gains from spei projets. Infrastruture projets generally nd approval at the
level of the water setor administration, that is, the CDR and the MEW, but poliy and tehnial
assistane projet tend to depend muh more on the pereived gains and priorities.
There is a large number of ators that an be onsidered part of the IDC in the water
setor. This does not inlude the numerous NGOs that implement smaller sale projets for the
bilateral and multilateral organisations or of their own aord. This number also does not inlude
the international ompanies that onsult on and implement projets. All these dierent ators
subsribe to the same disourse and forward the same very narrowly bound views with regards to
development. The disourse at its highest level is one of demoray promotion, onit resolution,
and the reation of peae and prosperity. It reappears regularly in the disourse of IDC ators (see
below) but it only partially explains their ations and deisions.
The neo-olonial aspets of the disourse and the ivilising mission that is embedded therein
has been ritiised in the Post-development literature (The Development Ditionary edited by
Wolfgang Sahs (2010) has a number of ontribution that make observations in this sense). In
his analysis of the World Bank's role in reating and disseminating green neoliberal approahes
to water management in order to support its pro-privatisation position Mihael Goldman (2005)
points to similar notions. He writes that the third world state is typially portrayed by the Bank
and its partners as stuk in `arrested development,' often depited as orrupt, inept, and politiised
(Goldman, 2005, p. 267). The now hegemoni IWRM disourse is rooted in this meta-disourse.
It an be interpreted as one of its newer tehnial inantations, with this one foused on the water
setor. The tehniques it advoates for sustainable and thus (supposedly) suessful development
are based on neoliberal poliy models. Though ouhed in tehnial language, it is deeply politial.
In Lebanon the neoliberal disourse with regard to the water setor gained a hegemoni status
early on among Lebanese water setor experts and government oials. It evolved from early
alls for outright privatisation of assets to the later alls for private setor partiipation as a more
nuaned inarnation of the former. This disourse manifested in 2013, with the launhing of the
Blue Gold initiative, as also solidly rooted in the irles of the elites. They are represented by
the Civil Inuene Hub (CIH), an assoiation of inuential business people, that stand behind
the initiative.
12
The report (CIH, 2013) suggests that all the ills of the water setor ould be
ountered in only ve years. A newspaper artile reporting on the initiative's opening presentation
at a prestigious hotel sums it up as follows:
The Blue Gold national water plan is to be funded by international institutions and
publi-private partnerships to ease the burden on the indebted state Treasury and
generate prots for the government from publi-private partnership projets, aording
to CIH.
12
A report in the English version of the newspaper al-Akhbar desribes them as follows: During the Blue Gold
projet launh event, prominent business people gave testimonials in support of the projet, inluding Samir Hanna,
group hief exeutive oer of Audi Saradar Group (among the ve largest banks), who expressed his faith in
the projet. Other business leaders also took the podium to praise the projet: Walid Raphael, general manager of
Banque Libano-Franaise (among the ve largest banks); Nehme Frem, head of industrial INDEVCO Group; Walid
Assaf, general manager of Pepsi Cola Lebanon; Mazen Salha, manager of the Phoeniia Hotel; Mar Tabourian,
from the Sannine Bottled Water Company; Dana Nakad, diretor of Wardiyeh petroleum produts ompany; and
Gilbert Ghostine, president of Asia Pai, the Diageo spirits ompany (Abou-Mosleh, 2013).
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The private setor would be able to earn an annual prot of 12 perent from servie-
provider ontrats, aording to the proposal that allows Lebanese itizens to invest
in the water setor through rowdfunding and reeive a minimum annual return of 12
perent after taxes.
Leveraging the onept of PPP in all setors that takle daily needs of itizens should be
distaned from politial tendenies and monopoly and should be inuened by siene,
qualiation and eieny, with the onept of involving itizens, CIH CEO Ziad
Sayegh said. (Sakr, 2013)
The naning mehanisms are not lear, but seem to propose that private investment and donor
money would provide the neessary apital through some variation on the idea of a trust fund
(CIH, 2013). The book that is used to promote this plan is more show than ontent. No details
are given for projets besides quik overviews of envisioned initiatives, at their most generalised
and unspei. Yet it was announed during the publi presentation that 2014 would see a massive
advertising ampaign rolled out to onvine the publi at large to aept and support the initiative
whih aims to:
transform water from a ommodity into wealth and raise awareness ... and ... reate
the proper platform for the private setor and entire Lebanese population to partiipate
in the development of the water setor (CIH, 2013, p.37).
This projet an be read as an attempt to deepen the neoliberalisation of the setor and the
onentrated endeavour to inuene publi sentiment as an attempt to strengthen the market
environmentalist disourse.
13
This happens in a ontext where the IDC has played a onsiderable
role in the promotion of the entral tenets of the IWRM disourse, fousing on Water as an
eonomi good and the need for Private Setor Partiipation and Publi Private Partnerships.
The inuene of the IDC goes beyond its inspirational role in this projet to reate ideologial
hegemony. Through its engagement at the level of infrastruture prodution and its inuene on
poliy making and planning it has played an important part in shaping the hydrosoial yle. The
next setion will explain how the IDC is interlinked into the water resoure management proess
at the level of infrastruture prodution and the establishment of management paradigms.
The IDC ators an be divided into two ategories. The rst is the ore; it groups the most
important in terms of nanial ommitments, diret poliy inuene, and tehnial assistane. The
seond an be seen as the ideologial support network. Its nanial ontribution is small ompared
to the ore of the IDC. Its main funtions are the spread, prodution and reprodution of the
tehnial disourse, as well as being a platform for the networking of water setor experts. These
networks serve the integration of Lebanese experts into transnational poliy networks. Table 3.2
lists a seletion of the ators, those that have been inluded in this analysis, and ategorises them
into a ore group and as part of an expanded group.
13
The Blue Gold group runs regular advertisement on TV and in newspapers, by May 2014 only one newspaper
had presented ritial opinion on the projet, the remainder had thus far only advertised for the projet. CIH also
spent April 2014 lobbying at universities throughout the ountry.
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Figure 3.4: Diagram skething IDC interation with the Lebanese Water Setor
Consult diagram 1 inserted at bak
Table 3.2: IDC Ator by ategory (ore, expanded)
Organisation Ativities Poliy inuene
Category
World Bank (WB) Funder, Projet design, poliy
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3.3.1 The Core of the IDC
The ore of the IDC is made up of the most important bilateral and numerous multilateral
agenies that are ative in the setor. They are the ators whose inuene is unmediated and has
an important impat on the water setor. Figure 3.5 shows who these are. The bilateral agenies
are grouped with the states they represent and on behalf of whom they at, as well as the agenies
they subontrat to do their work.
They are the the Frenh Development Ageny (Agene Française de Développement - AFD),
the Italian Development Cooperation, the three German agenies (KfW, GIZ and BGR), the
Amerian USAID, the Japanese JICA, and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Eonomi Development
(KFAED). The multilateral agenies are represented by the World Bank, European Union agenies
and programmes, and the numerous UN agenies, notably UNDP, ESCWA, the FAO and IFAD.
Two multilateral agenies dominated by Arab states and espeially the Gulf Cooperation Counil
(GCC) ountries led by Saudi Arabia, are also part of the IDC. These are the Arab Fund for
Eonomi and Soial Development (AFESD) and the Islami Development Bank Group (IDBG).
Their involvement is limited to the provision of funding for projets and they do not inuene
poliy unlike the KFAED they do not have loal oes. They are inluded here beause of the
substantial amounts of funding they provide to the setor (see 3.7).
Other UN agenies suh as WHO, UNICEF, UNEP and even UNRWA are set apart. Their
inuene on the water setor is muh more limited. WHO and UNEP promote standards and
poliy thinking in elds that relate to the water setor but do not immediately interat with the
setor. In this way they resemble the organisations presented in the seond ategory. UNWRA
is responsible for the support of Palestinian refugee amps and builds infrastruture therein. Its
work in the amps, however, has no bearing on the funtioning of the water setor. UNICEF has
also not been lassied as being part of the ore beause its programme in the water setor is very
foused and does not aet the strutural aspets of the setor.
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Figure 3.5: Diagram of the ore of IDC in the water setor
IFAD has been inluded even though its involvement is restrited to two relatively small loans
of around US$ 12 million over the last two deades. The projet has an impat on on-farm
infrastruture and is also designed to produe a number of hill lakes as reservoirs for irrigation
water
14
and is thus interpreted as having an eet on the hydrosoial yle. Other ators have
been exluded ompletely, even though their ontributions are about equal. The Saudi Fund
for Development, for example, provided loans and grants worth US $ 24 million early on in the
reonstrution but has sine 1994 not injeted another dollar into the water setor through the
CDR (CDR, 1994CDR, 2013).
The bilateral agenies are not all strutured in the same way, they are the produt of proesses
in their home ountries and subjet to hange. In most ases the development agenies manage
all aspets of development aid. Germany is the exeption with three dierent agenies addressing
dierent aspets of its involvement in the water setor. The GIZ, its development arm (Ageny
for International Cooperation) was born out of the merger of three dierent development agenies,
for the water setor the most notable was the GTZ (Ageny for Tehnial Cooperation). The
KfW is the government's development naning bank, and the BGR is the Federal Institute for
Geosienes and Natural Resoures subordinate to the German Federal Ministry of Eonomis and
Tehnology. The BGR is sometimes tasked with speialised tehnial development missions.
AFD, JICA, or the Italian Development Cooperation ombine all the aspets of development
aid in one ageny. USAID operates slightly dierently, whereby it ommissions speialised private
14
The projet funds the terraing of agriultural lands, paving of agriultural roads, building of on-farm reservoirs,
above mentioned hill lakes, and even implementation of on-farm irrigation systems.
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onsultany ompanies with the management of the projets it nanes, DAI and IRG are two
suh speialised private ompanies.
The ativities of all these ators vary. Some are responsible only for the naning of projets,
others inuene poliy through publiation of reports and analysis or through diret intervention
at the government and ministerial level, and some are impliated in the diret implementation of
projets. Table 3.2 skethes the ativities. The ativities of the ators have been divided into three
main ategories. These are: 1) funding of projets through loans and grants inluding the projet
seletion proess, 2) projet implementation of either infrastruture projets or tehnial assistane
projets, and 3) poliy inuene at the dierent levels of the water setor administration.
The following setions will show how the water resoure management proess is a produt of
the interation between the IDC and the Lebanese water setor administration at all levels. The
fous in this hapter will be on projet funding and projet implementation proesses. The IDC's
inuene on poliy and related administrative and legal reform will be disussed in Chapter 4.
3.3.1.1 IDC Interest and Projet Funding
Projet funding is the most obvious aspet of IDC ativity and learly shows the Lebanese
water setor's dependene. Compared to loal funding and in absolute terms the ontribution of
the IDC is large. The World Bank expenditure (World Bank, 2010d) review from 2010 states that
between 1992 and 2008, 73 perent of CDR investments in the water supply setor, 56 perent of
CDR investments in waste water setor, and 80 perent of CDR investment in the irrigation setor
were funded through international donors. Table 3.3 shows the share of foreign funding relative
to the ontrats awarded by the CDR starting 1992, for years where this data was available in
disaggregated form. The table also lists the foreign funding available and the value of projets
under preparation.
A number of observations an be made. Foreign involvement in the setor started early. Figure
3.7 shows this learly. The perentage of total foreign funding inreased onstantly until 2011 (the
time period for whih data was available). Even though funding in the water supply setor is
already substantial ompared to CDR funding in the 1990s, the COS and the CFD still invested
substantially in the setor during the 1990s. As suh the share of foreign funding to overall
investment in the setor was substantially lower than shown in the table. With the redued
involvement of these two administrative bodies, the relative weight of CDR investment and with
that of foreign funding inreased until 2011.
The derease of the perentage of foreign funding in 2012 is due to the start of a US$ 17.1
million projet naned through a treasury loan. Table 3.3 shows an inrease in foreign funds of
only US$ 12.5 million whih is not ongruent with the detailed listings of the ontrats awarded
presented in the same report.
15
A similar situation is found for the waste water setor data, where
the report lists only US$ 5 million worth of ontrats signed, all of whih are foreign funded. It
is not lear where the US$ 21 million inrease in ontrats awarded omes from. In the irrigation
setor the whole projet value for the South Lebanon Irrigation Projet (or Canal 800 Projet)
15
The report lists major projets started in 2012. Among these are: one projet in the North funded by Saudi
Arabia and the AFSED worth US$ 13 million; another projet worth US$ 16.3 million is funded by the IDB and
loal funding, but the relative shares of eah are not detailed. Finally, one projet worth about US$ 17 million to
rehabilitate the water networks in the southeast (Chebaa, Hbariyeh and other loations in the viinity) is funded
through treasury loans.
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worth approximately US$ 330 million has been listed under the rst olumn but only US$ 180
million of foreign funding has been seured for the projet thus far.














1992 - 1997 (31 De.)
water supply 276.4 205.4 74% 52.5 223.9 349.2 343.0
waste water 121.2 22.4 18% 3.4 117.8 244.0 417.0
irrigation* 17.1 11.11 65% 3.6 13.5 25.7 55.4
1992 - 2007 (31 De.)
water supply 667.5 495.7 74% 404.9 262.6 377.8 761.6
waste water 497.2 267.3 54% 288.5 208.7 1,000.1 745.1
Agriulture &
irrigation
110.2 84.4 77% 91.6 18.6 302.0 210.7
1992 - 2009 (31 De.)
water supply 788.2 573.0 73% 450.6 337.6 441.0 863.8
waste water 596.9 355.4 60% 253.1 343.8 469.5 794.7
agriulture &
irrigation
110.2 84.4 77% 96.27 373.4 238.6
1992 - 2011 (31 De.)
water Supply 832.63 603.95 73% 599.20 233.43 706.5 876.90
waste water 688.34 402.85 59% 302.91 385.43 675.5 764.4
agriulture and
irrigation
114.73 87.08 76% 96.27 18.46 241.3
1992 - 2012 (31 De.)
water supply 881.9 616.2 70% 636.4 262.6 862.1 1,070.5
waste water 709.4 407.1 57% 345.2 364.0 770.6 832.7
Agriulture &
irrigation
469.17 275.8 59% 96.3 373.4 2.5 239.3
Total 2,060.5 1,299.2 63% 1,077.9 1,000.0 1,635.2 2,142.5
Total ws & ww 1,591.3 1,023.4 64% 981.6 626.6 1,632.7 1,903.2
Soure: CDR progress reports 1993-2013 (units in millions of US$)
* for the following years foreign funding in irrigation ould not be separated from foreign
funding in agriulture (the share of CDR investment in agriulture is about US$ 20 million).
The projets that are planned or in the proess of preparation depend to an inreasing degree
on foreign naning as is indiated by the large amounts of funding that are agreed, ratied and/or
signed. The dierene between the foreign funding share of ontrats awarded and the foreign
funding available (or agreed upon) is about US$ 450 million for the water supply setor and US$
430 million in the waste water setor.
16
The data show that at least 70 perent of new water supply investment is funded by the IDC.
In the waste water setor the share of foreign funding inreased from 18 perent by the end of
1997 to 54 perent by the end of 2007 and to a still inreasing share after that. A larger share
16
The 2012 progress report also suggest that in agriulture more foreign funding is awarded than has atually
been signed. This points to the diulties and unertainties related to foreign funding and to the unertainty of the
data presented by the CDR. It is not lear whether the olumn labelled foreign funding assigns the whole ontrat
value one a projet is started, or whether it lists only the disbursed amount. The analysis points to inongruities
in the aounting of ontrats and projets in progress that are resolved when projets are ompleted.
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of new ontrats awarded is naned by the IDC generally and points to its growing importane.
This almost omplete reliane on foreign funding prompts the World Bank to make the following
assessment:
The CDR is highly dependent on donor funding for the naning of its investment,
and annot therefore fully ontrol its expenditure patterns. The lumpiness of the
expenditure patterns an be partially explained by the unertainty surrounding donor
funding (World Bank, 2010d, p. 38).
The report refers to the investment pattern of the CDR in the water setor. Years of high volumes
of investments are followed by years of very low volumes. Roland Riahi (2013) makes the same
observations for the years until 2010 but analyses all water setor expenditures. He assigns the
full ontrat value to the years the projets have been signed (see Figure 3.6). This shows how
irregularly funding agreements are reahed.
Figure 3.6: Value of ontrats signed by year
Investments in million US$.
Soure: Riahi (2013), p.221.
The funding peaks follow the major donor onferenes: the Friends of Lebanon onferene at
the end of 1996; the Paris I and II onferenes in 2001 and 2002; the Paris III onferene in 2007.
Funding for projets beomes available with a delay. After being pledged by a donor ountry
the bilateral agenies start identifying and negotiating projets. Depending on the projets this
may take more or less time. The proess an entail a number of expert missions and preliminary
assessments until donor requirements regarding impat, feasibility, and eonomi and eologial
sustainability are met. When a projet is identied, funding negotiations take plae, usually with
the CDR. As was explained in the last hapter, foreign funding requires approval from parliament
and/or the Counil of Ministers and is as suh exposed to the vagaries of the Lebanese politial
proess.
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The delay in investment after Paris III was longer. It was due to the politial stalemate that
was resolved only by mid-2008. Even if projets were identied earlier, a new government needed to
be formed before parliament ould proess loan agreements. The lulls in investment have dierent
reasons. After 2006 both the war and immediate reonstrution neessities, logistial obstales
suh as impeded transportation aused by the destrution of bridges during the war, as well as the
aforementioned politial deadlok, slowed down CDR investment.
It is not only loal or speially Lebanese irumstanes, politial impasses or wars that ause
these periods of minimal investment. IDC poliy or interests, as well as operating proedures and
standards, were also responsible for anelled and delayed projets. Between 1998 and 2000 it was
the failure to pass the reforms that prompted the World Bank to anel a loan agreement for the
waste water setor with a value of about US$ 50 million. Following the World Bank lead other
agenies also withdrew from the larger framework projet or delayed their projets.
The distribution of foreign funding by setor is shown in Figure 3.8. European donors provided
37.7 perent of funding to the water setor, Arab donors 34.4 perent, the World Bank 19.2,
and Japan's part is 6.5 perent. These desriptions beome more interesting when analysing the
distribution of funds by donor and sub-setors. The following setions show that even though there
is a resaling of the water governane proess at work this resaling does not follow a unied logi
and annot be attributed solely to the neoliberalisation proess desribed above. The dierent
IDC ators have dierent interests for their involvement. The desriptions below show that their
involvement in the Lebanese water setor and by extension their inuene on the watersape is also
the result of a variety of ontingent agenies. It is these dierent motivations that I will unpak
now.
Figure 3.7: Ratied, signed and approved Foreign Funding in the Water Setor
Soure: Compiled from CDR 1994 - 2013
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Figure 3.8: Share of funding by IDC ator
Soure: Compiled from CDR 2013
The World Bank
The largest single donor by end of 2012 in the water setor was the World Bank with a total of
US$ 412 million umulative support of whih only about US$ 10 million was a grant. More than
80 perent of these funds were dediated to the water supply setor making the World Bank also
the largest donor in this sub-setor.
It has naned the early national emergeny reonstrution programme whih foused rst
on repairing war-damaged infrastruture at a ost of about US$ 90 million. It naned a water
supply and waste water projet in the Bekaa (US $ 43 million), and in 2010 after the projet had
been shelved for a deade it made available US$ 200 million for parts of the Greater Beirut Water
Supply Projet (GBWSP). It also has provided the most important funding to irrigation systems
rehabilitation (US$ 57 million).
With these projets the Bank suessfully introdued itself into the entre of the restruturing
of the water resoure management proess after the ivil war. The emergeny reonstrution pro-
gramme and the later-anelled oastal pollution projet were entral to kik o the administrative
reform projet (see Chapter 4). To further arm its entral position it hose to support one of
the two most high prole water projets launhed sine the early 1990s: the Greater Beirut Water
Supply Projet. In all ases the hoie of projet is explained with the high soial and eonomi
impat of the projets. The higher level objetives to whih the projet ontributes are presented
as follows:
The Greater Beirut Water Supply Projet is onsistent with the overall GoL's obje-
tive to reonile eonomi development with environmental and soial sustainability,
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through better publi servies for all, espeially the poor. The projet is also aligned
with the Bank's Country Partnership Strategy pillar for eonomi infrastruture, whih
onentrates on energy, water and urban transport. Finally, the projet is onsistent
with the World Bank Water Strategy's pillars of urban water aess and reform.
(Author's highlight, World Bank, 2010, p. 3.)
The World Bank's ations are onsistent with its self-image to redue poverty and promoting
shared prosperity by working for development in ooperation with the development ommunity.
Seen from a more ritial point of view then the World Bank aims to inuene the development
proess and shape it aording to neoliberal paradigms. Bakker (2013) and Goldman (2005) have
shown how the World Bank has shaped global knowledge about water resoure management. This
knowledge is then reintrodued in the ountries it is ative in. It is able to do so most eiently
when it beomes indispensable, as it is today in Lebanese development eorts. From this position
it produed a number of piees of analytial work and just-in-time poliy notes that have shaped
poliy debates and provided poliy advie and analytial underpinning for reform (World Bank,
2010a, p. 15) in Lebanon. Its preeminent voie in terms of poliy advie, the water setor reform,
and water resoure management thinking/knowledge rests on a strong nanial foundation, but is
given legitimay by its ability to shape poliy debates (see Chapter 4 for a disussion of its role in
the administrative reform).
JICA and its Predeessor
Japanese involvement in Lebanon and speially in the water setor dates from the mid 1990s
and happened in the framework of the Oslo peae proess. A loan for the water setor of about
US$ 110 million was signed by the vie president of the CDR in Tokyo in Marh of 1997. Japan
is interested in investing in Lebanon beause its eonomi revival an help build stability in the
Middle East. We believe there will not be true peae in the region without stability, the Japanese
ommerial attahé is quoted by the Daily Star (Daouk, 1997a). On this oasion Hariri stated:
We have brought with us projets worth $350 million. We don't know how many of
them will be approved. We know that the Japanese will study eah one of them, and
will examine their eonomi viability. (Daouk, 1997b)
But diplomati relations between the two ountries deteriorated over failed negotiations to extradite
ve Japanese Red Army members who were inarerated in Lebanon in the same year. Rak
Hariri's trip to Japan in this ontext in late 1997 did not produe the desired results. Hariri's hope
for further Japanese aid did not materialise. After 2003 when a study of Lebanese water resoures
produed by a Japanese onsultant for JICA's predeessor aused diplomati frition, JICA involve-
ment in Lebanon was almost entirely stopped (Interview Catafago 2010). The original projets
were ontinued but with the ompletion of the Keserwan Water Supply Projet in 2012 (more than
a deade after the signature of the loan agreement) Japanese diret development involvement ame
to an end (with exeption of smaller projets through UNRWA in the Palestinian amps). This
annot be attributed to an overarhing dynami related to development or neoliberalism, but has
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to be seen as historially ontingent event and illustrates how kle the Lebanese relationships to
development organisations an be.
The European Union
European Union funding surpasses World Bank funding as a total but is distributed over several
agenies or EU programmes. Most of it  about US$ 380 million  was hannelled through the
EIB and about US$ 50 million was hannelled through other EU mehanism.
EU interventions in Lebanon are exeuted almost exlusively within the framework of the
Union's Mediterranean poliy. The ways in whih EU foreign poliy is formulated have hanged
over the last two deades and even more sine before the ivil war when only the weakest outlines
of what would be the EU existed. The Barelona Convention of 1976 ratied by the Lebanese
state in 1977 is an early expression of shared European foreign poliy. With the evolution of the
EU into a more distinguishable foreign poliy ator its interest beame equally more dened, and
is now enshrined in the European Neighbourhood Poliy (ENP). The EU delegation in Lebanon
states:
In 2004 the EU launhed a new poliy as the framework for ooperation with its
neighbours - the European Neighbourhood Poliy. The objetive of the poliy was to
avoid the emergene of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours
and instead to strengthen the prosperity, stability and seurity of all onerned. The
ENP is based on the values of demoray, rule of law and respet of human rights.
(EU, 2013)
As signatory of the Barelona delaration and the Euro-Med partnership, Lebanon beame the
beneiary of inreasing aid alloations from the EU (EU, 2002, p. 13). Mainly foused on
eonomi aspets of Euro-Med interation, espeially the reation of a Euro-Med free-trade-zone,
the delaration inluded a reognition that:
water supply together with suitable management and development of resoures are
priority issues for all Mediterranean partners and that ooperation should be developed
in these areas. (EU-MED_CON, 1995,p.6).
Moreover, it highlighted the importane of pollution ontrol of the Mediterranean, reiterating the
original goal of the Barelona Convention (1976). The EU-Lebanon Assoiation Agreement (Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement) signed by Lebanon in 2002 and ratied by EU member states in 2006
makes these provisions binding.
17
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Reinforing the notion that the agreement and the early delaration were foused on eonomi ooperation is
the fat that An Interim Agreement entailing the immediate enforement of the eonomi and trade provisions of
the Assoiation Agreement entered into fore 1 Marh 2003 (EU, 2013) three years before the atual assoiation
agreement was ratied.
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These EU poliies would be further enshrined in the evolution of the Barelona proess and
eventually the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) whih was reated in 2008. The UfM is not
exatly an extension of the European Neighbourhood Poliy (ENP) and its orresponding funding
vehile the ENP Instrument, but rather a parallel EU foreign poliy vehile.
EU funding to Mediterranean partners was hannelled through the MEDA programme The
MEDA-water programme that emerged from this initiative spent ¿ 40 million aross the Mediter-
ranean region between 20022008 on apaity strengthening, training, information and know-
how exhanges to further regional ooperation. Further grants were hannelled through the EU
Delegation in Lebanon.
But more importantly as a result of the EU's de-pollution of the Mediterranean poliy most
of its funding went to the waste water setor. Of the total of US$ 434 million of water setor
funding that was implemented through the CDR, US$ 321 million was earmarked for the waste
water setor and the rest for the water supply setor.
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As will be seen in Chapter 5 this had
important ramiations for waste water management in Lebanon beause it foused investment
on the oast rather than on soures of pollution that ontaminate aquifers used for water supply.
The point is that poliy priorities of the EU are linked to its funding ativities and so inuene
Lebanese waste water investments. The Euro-Lebanon Assoiation Agreement thus supersedes
loal poliy denition beause it is so intimately linked to the funding that is provided by the EU
and its member states.
The EU Member States
Frane, Italy, and Germany as bilateral donors have about the same weight as the EIB and have
provided umulative funding of US$ 182 million, US$ 107 million, and US$ 83 million respetively.
Italy spent a majority of its investment on the waste water setor (US$ 82 million) and US$ 25
million on the water supply setor. Germany's ontribution to the water setor (through the CDR)
inreased from US$ 12 million to US$ 39 million by the end of 2006, and to US$ 83 million by
the end of 2012. US$ 38 million were allotted to the water supply setor and US$ 45 million to
the waste water setor and no ontribution was made to the irrigation setor. Of the total US$ 54
million were grants of whih about a third was funding for tehnial assistane projets. Frane has
provided US$ 85 million to the water setor and US$ 94 million to the waste water setor. Added
to these loans are US$ 3 million as a grant for tehnial assistane in the water supply setor.
Frenh and German funding is almost balaned in terms of setor distribution, with a small
bias towards the waste water setor. Taken together the European funders provided (inluding
the EU) US$ 800 million of whih about two thirds went to the waste water setor. The fous on
de-polluting the Mediterranean produed results bordering on the absurd. The Tripoli treatment
plant ompleted in 2010, after a two years delay, remained nonoperational until 2012. The same is
true for the plants in Chekka nished in 2006, and in Batroun and Jbeil in 2010 (see Chapter 5).
The various bilateral development agenies put forward the same disourse about development,
poverty redution, and demoray promotion as the EU or the World Bank, but they also have
their own agendas whih dier from ountry to ountry. Yet a few ursory observations appliable
to Lebanon an made. Two of the largest multinational utilities orporations (MNCs) are Frenh:
18
EU funding for irrigation and agriulture projets started only reently and is minimal.
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Veolia (formerly Vivendi) and SUEZ Environment with its range of subsidiaries. Aording to
Goldman (2005) they ontrolled 70 perent of the global private water markets in 20022003.
The SUEZ group has been very ative in the Lebanese water setor through its subsidiaries.
Ondeo Liban implemented the Tripoli delegated water management ontrat, Safege implemented
a tehnial assistane projet with the ministry. Lyonnaise des Eaux implemented tehnial
assistane ontrats in the early 1990s. Finanially more beneial than the tehnial assistane
ontrats, Degremont provides the high valueadded mehanial omponents on a number of waste
water treatment plants (Tripoli, Chekka, Batroun, and probably Keserwan in the future). Veolia
provided onsultany servies on the Chabrouh Dam.
The fat that the Lebanese GDP-per-apita ratio is higher than in Sub-Saharan ountries, for
example, opens the real possibility for prots in the water setor making Lebanon a potentially
lurative destination for these two MNCs. It is thus probably not surprising that the bulk of AFD
funding in Lebanon goes to the water setor, and often enough, ultimately to Frenh ompanies.
This also situates Frenh involvement more diretly in the ongoing neoliberalisation proess.
German involvement has dierent agenda. German projet funding in Lebanon inreased
onsiderably after the 2006 Israeli attak on the ountry. It an be read as part of a hearts
and minds operation to oset German naval deployment o the Lebanese oast. The aim of
this mission was to ompensate for refusing to send the army in the framework of a peaekeeping
fore along the Israeli border. The navy took over patrol duties along the oast line to guard
against weapons deliveries to Hezbollah. German support of Israel and German Chanellor Angela
Merkel's ommitment to be unyielding in our [German℄ defene of Israel's right to exist (Benoit,
2006), was also not well reeived in Lebanon.
19
Naval deployment and ivilian aid oered a good
way to avoid putting German troops on the border with Israel, be seen to full UN responsibilities,
and avoid a publi diplomati row with the Lebanese government. The same Finanial Times
artile goes to explain that Merkel:
said Germany would rather onentrate on ivilian forms of assistane, for instane
by helping Lebanon train its polie and army and repair its infrastruture. (Author's
highlight, Benoit, 2006, 2007)
German involvement in Lebanon was rekindled with the war, but is oming to an end with the
projets still in proess in 2014 beause of a reorientation of the German government's development
aid poliy (Interview Sheu 2013). Unlike Frenh involvement the basis of German involvement
was of geopolitial nature, its planned termination is due to domesti politial reasons.
Arab States Related Organisations
The total European ontribution ompares to Arab donor support. KFAED, AFESD and the
IDBG provided grants and loans amounting to US$ 307 million, US$ 220 million, and US$ 153
million respetively. Together they provided about US$ 730 million of whih just under half were
allotted to the water supply setor. The waste water setor was allotted US$ 200 million and about
US$ 180 million were earmarked for irrigation (see Figures 3.8 and 3.7). The projets that the
KFAED, AFESD, and IDBG nane are generally smaller in sale and value. They are also often
19
See The Daily Star (2006): Beirut tries to ease tensions, limit impliations of 1701 : Conerning Merkel's
omment, Fneish said Beirut 'should take a stand ... beause they ... violate [UN resolution℄ 1701. See also
Haaretz (2006): UN fore only protets Israel: top Shi'ite leri.
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tehnially less demanding than the large projets that the European funders and the World Bank
nane. Projets below US$ 10 million are the majority of projets and those with higher values
often ombine many smaller works in multiple loations. The projets are also generally more on
the periphery rather than in the densely populate areas where soio-eonomi impat per dollar
spent is more important beause of the eonomies of sale involved (more inhabitants/users servied
per dollar spent).
20
Many of the projets funded by Arab donors ould be onsidered seond hoie
in terms of the standard soio-eonomi impat assessments and in terms of visibility, beause the
populations in the areas are small.
The mehanisms through whih the Arab donors get involved and their interest are opaque.
With exeption of the KFAED they have no oes in Beirut and no sta is based in the ountry.
Very little is published about their ativities and even the non-Arab donors remain uninformed
about the AFESD's and IDGB's funding poliy (Interview Sheu 2011).
Arab funding seems to be more a funtion of the patronage networks at an international sale,
speially in relation to Saudi Arabia as leader of the Gulf Cooperation Counil (GCC) ountries.
Saudi Arabia is the largest shareholder of the IDBG with 23.6 perent of shares. Combined with
the GCC ountries it holds about 43.83 perent of IDBG shares (IDB 2013). The situation is
similar for AFESD. The funding provided through these hannels and for investment in the setor
serves to buy allegiane from the loal zu'ama to strengthen Arab elites' inuene on the Lebanese
politial sene.
This assertion an be illustrated by the example of KFAED. The Fund gives priority to the water
setor beause water is overwhelmingly an essential element for eonomi development (Interview
Saadiqi 2010). Its riteria for projet funding are eonomi feasibility and the availability of up-
to-date studies/preliminary designs, and other riteria that other development agenies study.
The more important riteria for KFAED is the priority of the projet in the CDR's development
programme. The Fund will initiate a projet appraisal mission upon CDR (i.e. government)
request. Part of the appraisal is the CDR's onrmation of the developmental priority of the
projet (Interview Saadiqi 2010). Given the ad-ho nature of the implementation of master plans
this is not very meaningful and suggest that there is onsiderable leeway in the interpretation of
the notion of priority. One projet manager at the fund observed what is a priority today might
not be priority tomorrow in order to explain why the Kuwait Fund attempts to minimise the time
period from CDR request to ratiation of a loan agreement (Interview Saadiqi 2010). Indeed the
average four to six months the proess takes is very brief when ompared to the time it takes with
most other donors. It is probably also the reason why about a quarter of the naning it provides
ame in the form of grants and so was not held up in parliament.
The pereption that Arab funding is linked to the ability of the politial leaders to mobilise
their Arab allies in order to redistribute among their lientele was expressed during interviews.
An engineer who was involved in water resoure management eorts in Keserwan  a majority
Christian area  onsidered that the lak of the development in the setor in the post war era
(until the late 1990s) was due to the loal (Christian) leaders inability to mobilise these networks
(Interview Gaby Abdelnour 2012).
Another example that illustrates this is the South Lebanon Irrigation Projet whih KFAED
and AFESD have agreed to provided initial funding of US$ 180 million (of total estimated ost of
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The projets with higher numbers make for better reading in end of year reports of the large bilateral agenies
aountable to European parliaments, in need of justiation of large budgets, and vying for government budgetary
appropriations.
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about US$ 300330 million) in form of loans. The projet, one ompleted, will irrigate 14,500 ha
of farm land in south Lebanon. The projet is said to have sueeded beause of the good relations
the Lebanese Speaker of Parliament (Nabih Berri) had with the now deeased former Speaker of
the Kuwaiti National Assembly Nasser al-Khara and billionaire owner of the MAK group (See
KUNA, 2006, 2011, Interview Anonymous 2012). The family business, the MAK Group, is one of
the Middle East's largest holding ompanies aording to Forbes magazine (2012) and is also one
of the ontrating ompanies on the projet.
There are valid questions to be asked about whether the expeted benets of the projets for
the loal population will materialise in their full and projeted extent. This seems unlikely. It
seems more likely that it will lead to a onentration of land in the hands of the loal agriultural
industry hannelling the benets to only a few rather than the broader loal population.
21
It
seems more ertain that the projet will guarantee the ontinuation of loal agriultural exports
at dumping pries to the Gulf (see Chapter 5). Given the export dependeny of the Lebanese
agriultural setor on GCC markets this projet resembles the land aquisition strategies of Arab
monarhies in east Afrian states (Bush, Bujra & Littlejohn, 2011; Bush, Martiniello & Merer,
2011; Olanya, 2012). This food seurity strategy an be read as the equivalent of the exploitation
of a virtual water soure and labour at a bargain prie.
This setion illustrated that despite the ommon development disourse and approah to water
setor management, individual interests also govern the hoie of projets of the dierent IDC
ators. The CDR's lak of ontrol over its expenditure pattern (World Bank, 2010d, p.38) is a
funtion of Lebanese donor dependene, as the World Bank rightly points out (quote on p.104),
and importantly the individual ators' interests. The Lebanese government (through the CDR)
did not have full ontrol over the expenditure of nearly US$1.3 billion.
As was mentioned earlier, planning is mostly ad-ho, the CDR mathes projets to donors
but this proess is a funtion of donor interest rather than dened by investment priorities set
by the CDR. Either the CDR shops around for donors with a spei projet in mind and the
projet remains on hold until funds are seured, or a donor with funds available searhes for a
projet that fulls its soio-environmental impat requirements and poliy priorities. This entails
a loss of sovereignty and represents a resaling of governane and poliy making as exemplied by
the ombination of the Barelona Delaration and the EU-Lebanon Assoiation Agreement. All
this is partial and inomplete, but the ombination of Lebanese dependene on foreign funding, its
endorsement of the Barelona delaration and the assoiation agreement at to override Lebanese
poliy preferene (or rather what some Lebanese experts think it should be and have expressed in
interviews; Interview Abou Assali 2012, Abelnour 2012, see also Chapter 5).
This dynami annot be attributed solely to the neoliberalisation proess. While the presene
of the IDC nds its reason in the high debt that result from the spei variety of Lebanese
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To name just two reasons this projet is questionable, the Canal 800 Projet is in diret ompetition for
water resoures with the Greater Beirut Water Supply Projet as both draw from Lake Qaraoun. Halabi (2011)
proposes that the total water volume of the reservoir is not enough to supply both projets and guarantee eologial
requirements of the Litani river. The UNCWI dedues that the Awali Projet [the main omponent of the GBWSP℄
is feasible from a quantitative perspetive only if the Canal 800 Irrigation Projet will not begin to withdraw water
until 2021 and will not reah maximum value until about a deade later. . . its feasibility an only be determined in
the ontext of a broader analysis of Lebanon's total water resoure availability. (Halabi 2011)
A water resoure management professional (Interview Hawa 2012) onsidered the possibility that Halabi might be
wrong but suggested that there will not be enough water to also supply the unnished Canal 900 Irrigation Projet
that also draws from the lake.
Halabi further points to the elevated levels of heavy metals pollution of the lake to question the suitability of the
water. He interrogates only the waters suitability for domesti onsumption but given the type of pollution even its
suitability for irrigation remains questionable - at least in its projeted volumes (Halabi 2011).
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neoliberalism, its shape and form is a funtion of various other dynamis, some of whih have been
desribed above.
Table 3.4: Terms and onditions of existing debt nane in 2002
Soure: Tari Report Appendix I Existing debt serviing Obligations (Jaobs Gibb, 2002)
Foreign funding of the water setor has another eet worth mentioning. Table 3.4 gives an
overview of the terms of the loans until 2002. The onditions for these loans tend to be very lenient
and interest rates highly subsidised. In 2011 a CDR employee expressed it aordingly:
The water setor and espeially the waste water setor get very good onditions for
funding beause they are part of the soial and environmental setors. It is about
reduing the pollution in the Mediterranean. There is virtually no loan above 3 perent
for the water setor. They get very good onditions ranging from 3 perent over 20
years with a ve year grae period or 2.5 perent, 15 years, and a ve year grae period.
(Interview Charfeddine 2011)
This US$ 1.3 billion is a small amount seen by itself and ompared to a government debt reahing
US$ 64 billion in 2013. Yet these preferential loan onditions not only make the apital for
water projets relatively heap but also redue the average interest rates for the total Lebanese
government debt by a not insigniant amount.
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These low interest rates ontribute to the
stabilisation of the aumulation regime desribed in the rst part of this hapter, and with that
the politial eonomi strutures of the ountry.
3.3.1.2 Projet Implementation
Beyond the inuene on planning and the hoie of projets to fund, the IDC also has inuene
over the projet implementation proess. It diers depending on the type of projet. Three types
of projets an be distinguished: 1) the infrastruture projets managed via the CDR, 2) tehnial
and administrative assistane projets implemented by agenies diretly or sub-ontrated to on-
sultany rms whih are either speialised development onsultany rms or ordinary private setor
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It stood at about 6.5 perent in 2014 but signiantly higher for most of the time sine the end of the war (see
Setion 3.1.4).
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rms, and 3) diretly implemented projets with material omponents whih an be infrastruture,
other equipment, or of a soio-eonomi nature, or a ombination of all of these.
Infrastruture Projets with CDR Involvement
The loan agreements for infrastruture projets onsist of two douments, a nanial dou-
ment and a tehnial doument. The nanial doument lays out the loan onditions and the
disbursement modalities. In many projets the payment of ontrators is exeuted by the CDR,
but the Kuwait Fund for example pays ontrators diretly. In both ases approval by the donor
is required. In the earlier years of the reonstrution the supervision of projets by donor agenies
seems to have been less stringent. With the IDC's inreasing involvement and the mixed results of
earlier projets donor oversight has beome more stringent. KFW, for example, had one German
engineer from a German rm posted in Lebanon to oversee work on the waste water trunk olletor
it naned in the north of Tripoli. For the Greater Beirut Water Supply Projet of the World Bank,
a Projet Management Unit (PMU) was inluded in the projet design, as has been World Bank
pratie for all its projets.
In general all hanges to projets in progress require donor approval. These range from simple
hoies of material to the redesign of parts of the projet. Prie hanges for onstrution material
or urreny utuations an ause shortfalls in onstrution budgets and alterations to projet
designs to exlude ertain omponents. In the ase of waste water or supply networks this an mean
the exlusion of ertain areas initially inluded in the projet design, often with highly politial
onsequenes. Corruption produes similar results but usually generates less donor ooperation
and diminishes the hanes for omplementary funding agreements.
Donor inuene on infrastruture projets often starts even earlier in the design phase. The
hoie of loation for KFW funded WWT plants in the Keserwan area beneted from the presene
and involvement of the hydrologist leading a BGR projet. He has been atively involved in the
identiation of potential loations. In this ase the projet beneted from the synergies of two
German agenies working together. The planned EIBAFD waste water plant for the area was
initially studied by Lebanese onsultany Libanonsult in 1996-1998. The feasibility study for
the new projet in 2010 was also produed by Libanonsult but under the oversight of the Frenh
ompany Hydrate, a fat that was noted with a ertain amount of dismay by the Lebanese engineer
working on the study (Interview Abou Assali, Faysal 2012).
The Greater Beirut Water Supply Projet was rst planned in 2000 as a BOT projet by the
CDR and the World Bank. The projet was shelved for a number of years and then renegotiated.
When it was relaunhed, the World Bank was entral to the whole proess. A group of onerned
itizens tried to hallenge the proposed design by suggesting alternative dam emplaements (based
on former hydro-geologial studies). They laimed that building a dam in Damour was a less ostly
alternative to the Bisri Dam that was suggested in the projet design. It was also laimed that
the alternative would produe leaner water beause it would not draw from the highly polluted
Qaraoun Lake. A petition was led to the World Bank to halt the GBWSP but it was deemed
ineligible (WB 2010). Nonetheless the World Bank did ommission a new feasibility study for
the original projet design. No updated feasibility study was done for the alternative projet
proposed by those opposed to the Bisri Dam. Halabi (2011b) quotes Randa Nimer, advisor to
the minister, explaining the reason for the Bank's and ministry's going forward with the projet
despite opposition and:
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despite what potential other options suh as Damour might hold, the GBWSP is the
only projet for Beirut that is ready to go; the potential alternatives don't have a
nal design or funding lined up. For Damour, the World Bank wanted a sophistiated
environmental assessment, and it was not ready and would take at least a year. (Halabi,
2011b)
The projet was implemented in this form beause of a ombination of reasons. The rst was the
minister's eorts to appear proative and prole himself for politial gains (see Chapter 2). It
is only one, but probably the most prominent, of a number of large projets he launhed during
his term. The seond reason was the limitations and requirements of the donor ageny oupled
with the potential threat of loosing the funding opportunity. If in the ase of the KFW projet in
Keserwan the involvement of the German expert was beneial as regards the redued eologial
risks, the World Bank's involvement in the ase of the GBWSP is more ambiguous.
Many more suh examples for donor inuene during the design and implementation phase
ould be found. As these three small examples illustrate the inuene exists along the whole
infrastruture prodution proess. It diers from ase to ase and produes positive as well as
negative eets, but further illustrates the loss of sovereignty, rooted in the nanial dependeny,
in both the planning and implementation stages of the prodution yle.
Tehnial Administrative Assistane
With the end of the war the need for strengthening the water setor administration was
reognised immediately. As part of the National Emergeny Reonstrution Programme Setor
Implementation Units (SIU) onsisting of private setor onsultants working for the respetive
ministries were reated. This happened in onsultation with the World Bank and UNDP who
naned a number of these positions (see setion 3.2.2). In the early to mid 1990s a number of
assessments of the state of the water oes were made; one by the World Bank and another by
the Frenh Lyonnaise des Eaux. A study to draw up a road map for administrative reform was
ommissioned from a private onsultany rm. With the initiation of the reform in 2000 even more
tehnial assistane projets were launhed. In a large number of ases these were funded through
grants. These types of projets are not usually managed through the CDR. They are based on
ooperation agreements with the institution onerned. Table 2.2 lists a number of these projets.
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Tehnial assistane projets were reated not only by the ore ators but also in the framework
of a deentralised ooperation mainly (if not only) between Frenh muniipalities and adminis-
trative bodies suh as the Region Ille de Frane or the Grand Lyon. These projets nane expert
missions that provide onsultany servies to muniipalities or water authorities but are usually
less signiant nanially and in terms of duration.
These tehnial assistane projets are all entral elements in the neoliberalisation proess.
They aim to improve water setor administrative management, either by trying to improve man-
agement praties or by supporting master planning. The GIZ and USAID projets are and have
been the longest lasting projets of this type. For example:
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The Lebanon Water Poliy Program (LWPP), funded by USAID, is an ambitious
programme working on sensitive poliy and nanial issues related to publi private
partnerships, water utility management, and tari priing at the national and loal
levels.
LWPP worked at both the national and regional levels with the Ministry of Energy
and Water (MEW) and Lebanese water establishments to provide assistane in the
following four areas: 1) tehnial assistane; 2) institutional strengthening; 3) poliy
making and; 4) apaity building. (DAI, 2007, p.1)
The objetives of the programme were among others:
Assist the GoL in reating a onsensus for the most suitable approahes for private
setor partiipation and related water setor reform; (DAI, 2007, p.1)
They inlude many omponents and remain very targeted attempts to help the Regional Water
Establishments transform into well funtioning publi utilities ompanies. The overarhing goal of
IDC setor reform has been the privatisation of publi servies sine the early 1990s (see Chapter
4). The water setor reform was originally designed to allow for and enourage private setor
partiipation. The tehnial assistane projet insribe themselves in this proess. The World
Bank expenditure review from 1998 spells this out:
The Government of Lebanon is not yet ready to onsider signiant private setor
partiipation in the WWEs in the short term due to politial and legal onstraints. For
this reason fousing on the orporatisation and ommerialisation of WWEs is the next
best way of improving overall management of servies while preparing the ground for
inreased private setor partiipation. (World Bank, 1998, p.16)
These projets aim to produe utilities that operate aording to ommerial priniples. In
tehnial terms this means the provision of water 24/7 and the installation of private onsumption
water meters throughout the ountry. In operational and nanial terms this means full ost
reovery. The intermediate goal is for the RWEs to over operation and maintenane of supply
and waste water management, inluding the ability to expand its work fore, espeially the skilled
and eduated positions. The long term goal is to reate utilities in a position apable of naning
their own investment.
The tools to ahieve this are listed as follows:
 A strategi business plan for eah WWE is needed, together with systemati introdution of
demand analysis to guide development of eah WWE's ommerial operations.
 Aounting praties similar to those used by private ommerial enterprises should be
developed and implemented in eah WWE.
 Billing and olletion systems should be strengthened.
 Private setor partiipation should be onsidered in the form of performane management
ontrats, leases or onessions.
 Tari reform needs to be part of the orporatisation programme and is essential to attrat
private partiipation and investment. (World Bank, 1998, p.1617)
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The tehnial assistane programmes funded by the EU, the US, German, and Frenh agenies
all work towards these goals. One outome is the reation of onsensus on the best ourse of
ation by key stakeholders (USAID LWPP 2007, p.7). The basi tenets of this approah are
naturalised in the oial and publi disourse, and ativities onentrate on tehnial aspets and
the introdution of best praties.
Business Plans
The ore of these ativities is the prodution of multi-year business plans with all that this entails:
1) data gathering and organisation, for example the valuation of assets, 2) the development of a
benhmarking system to measure progress, 3) the standardisation of operating proedures, and 4)
the introdution of management tools suh as GIS software or aounting software that ombines
all ost and apital, namely: inventories, asset, wages, inomes, energy and the various other
assoiated aounting neessities. Coupled to these ativities are ountless trainings and workshops
to expand sta apaity.
One example of this, and the diulties that an be enountered in the proess, is the introdu-
tion of aounting/management software. The software programmes are omplex. Aording to
one onsultant a software alled X7 introdued by Frenh ompanies (Safege and Ondeo) required
about 40 people to run it eiently (Interview Yazbek 2011). In Tripoli where Ondeo Liban was
ommissioned under a delegated management ontrat for a period of four years X7 was introdued.
This in turn requires formation of sta whih in itself is not an easy task. At least in the Bekaa
Water Establishment this proved to be diult and produed little in terms of produtivity gains:
Employees are relatively old and set in their ways, often have jobs on the side, are
not very motivated to go beyond what they have been doing for ages. So the training
eorts produe at best mediore results if any. Aordingly the software is not very
helpful as nothing more is done with it than to input data. Employees do not are and
know how to take more out of the data, no analysis. (Interview Yazbek 2011)
USAID funded projets introdued Mirosoft Windowsbased software for the same purpose a
ouple of years later. I am not aware if one software replaed the other. Whether it did or did
not matters little, in the rst ase the eorts of previous interventions would have been nullied
and in the seond ase it leaves the Regional Water Establishments with inompatible aounting
systems. While this is not a major aw, it is ertainly unneessary and highly ineient, but it
ertainly illustrates the absene of a Lebanese poliy and the independene with whih the IDC
ators work in this realm.
Master Plans
As part of these tehnial assistane programmes a number of planning eorts have been naned.
The EU naned the Management Support Consultant  Investment Planning Programme soon
after the reform law was passed. Six years later with muh of the IPP goals and reommendations
still not implemented, GIZ supported the reation of the National Water Setor Strategy in the
framework of whih it naned the salary of one of the minister's advisers. In parallel, and even
though the NWSS inluded a waste water omponent, a separate National Strategy for the Waste
Water Setor (NSWWS) was produed. The head of the German team observed:
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If ooperation in the ministry would have been better then this waste water strategy
would not have been neessary. But it was about egos. One advisor wanted to do the
same as the other advisor and the World Bank also wanted to partiipate somewhere
with something. Support for the waste water part of the national water strategy ould
have been better. (Interview Sheu 2012)
The assertions that World Bank involvement is more due to a need to be pereived as proative
rather than strategi in terms of its involvement in the setor is supported by the fat that most
of its projets target the water supply setor and not the waste water setor. The nal doument
for the waste water strategy was produed after the World Bank involvement with support from
Veolia.
All the newer plans don't move far from the earlier master plans in terms of infrastrutural
provisions. The NWSS in general reprodues older plans in all setors. The waste water strategy
also reiterates the infrastrutural requirements of earlier plans with only small alterations.
23
What
all these plans have in ommon is their insistene on the priniple of full ost reovery through
taris, waste water harges, and irrigation harges. It shows that within the administration the
market environmentalist disourse is aepted.
All of the projets listed have the same vision for the operation of the water supply and waste
water setor. At this point it sues to show that these eorts are substantial and though the
projets do not always merge seamlessly and eiently there is agreement among the ators as
to the general aim. As was the ase with their involvement in infrastruture prodution, these
interventions are also baked by substantial amounts of money. Most of the tehnial assistane
projets listed above are funded through grants and add up to an approximate US$ 100 million.
This inludes all the ost assoiated with the onsultany but also inludes funds for maintenane,
repairs and equipment. The onsiderable investment this represents is used in an attempt to make
the IDC's vision of water resoure management a reality.
What is more important here, is the fat that the notion of full ost reovery has over the
years been established as the ultimate goal in all setors and is not questioned. Bakker (Bakker,
2003, 2005) disusses the theoretial and pratial problems with the ommodiation of water as a
resoure that aording to neo-lassial theory requires full-ost-priing on the example of England
and Wales. The ommerialisation proess is but one step in the ommodiation proess, they
are not interhangeable onepts.
She denes ommerialisation as:
Commerialisation entails hanges in resoure management praties that introdue
ommerial priniples (suh as eieny), methods (suh as ost-benet assessment),
and objetives (suh as prot-maximisation). (Bakker, 2005, p. 544)
The IDC ators (GIZ, USAID through DAI and IRG, as well as the EUWI-MED) and projets,
atively promote, support, and to the best of their abilities work on the ommerialisation of
the regional water establishments. But unlike the ase of England and Wales where the utilities
already had highly developed management systems, the Lebanese water authorities do not have
suh systems in plae. They lak information about the infrastruture they manage; they have only
estimates about the water volumes they produe as well as how muh of this is lost in onveyane
23
It is worth noting here that the waste water strategy lists the 58 USAID funded in-land treatment plants. None
of the plants worked satisfatorily (MEW 2004) a study of the 43 plants built between 1999 - 2004 onludes, showing
that this study was more a desktop exerise (see next setion).
CHAPTER 3. THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPLEX 120
or eventually onsumed. The Bekaa Water Establishment for example is inapable of managing
tenders for onstrution and repair ontrats so that DAI (funded by USAID) fully manages the
proess, from produing the douments to verifying and assessing the oers (Interviews Zammar
2012, Giantris 2013).
These programmes almost run as a parallel administration (at least in the ase of the Bekaa and
to a degree in the south) in oordination with the water establishments. In the ases where more
self-generated funding is available and espeially in the BMTLWE (and to a degree in the north)
the ooperation with and interest in the ativities of the IDC is muted bordering on disinterest
(Interviews Chemali 2010, Giantris 2013).
The tools they introdue have the potential to provide muh needed inreases in management
apaity if they prove to be sustainable. Yet as was shown in the last hapter the lak of apaity of
the RWEs is rooted in the politial strutures of the ountry; the resulting inability of the diretors
to hire appropriate personnel when they get government approval to employ; the related hiring
freeze imposed by the governments sine early in the reonstrution; as well as the general lak of
funds.
That skilled professionals exist in the ountry is evidened by the sta that the dierent IDC
programmes employ; inidentally inreasing the ompetition for the administration that annot
oer omparable salaries. They provide manpower, diretly through the experts they hire, and
by ontrating onsultany and engineering rms for works and assessments. The manpower so
provided is onsiderable. A quik and by no means omprehensive estimation puts the sta for
the programmes listed above in 2011 at anywhere between 3040 experts (Lebanese and expatriate
long-term and resident and short-term expert missions) along with young professionals, as well as
a support sta of about 1020 (if not more).
The lak of funds is also why the notion of full-ost reovery, related ommerialisation, and
the drive for privatisation and private setor partiipation nds almost universal aeptane. The
private setor is viewed as the only solution to the apital needs of the setor with very few and
marginal exeptions. The onept of full-ost priing is similarly seen as the only solution to the
woes of the administration and to make the regional water oes nanially viable. That it is
at the same time another strategy that will allow the reprodution of the aumulation regime
desribed above is not mentioned, if at all onsidered.
This is a dierent notion from the one proposed by Bakker (2010) with regard to ommodi-
ation and by other ritial geographers (see Harvey, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2003, 2005) with regard
to privatisation. While it does represent a move towards the enlosure of the ommons  the
promised prots are notied by the Lebanese elites as expressed in the Blue Gold projet 
and an be seen as another attempt of aumulation by dispossession justied via the attempted
imposition of a market environmentalism and the promise of better servies. But it also serves to
free the government of its obligations to the setor and its operation and shifts the burden onto the
itizen. It frees funds for the perpetuation of the debt-interest sponsored aumulation mehanism,
whih is a dierent hannel for apital ows to the elites.
Self-Implemented Projets
A muh smaller fration of projets in the water setor are implemented by the agenies
themselves. One suh projet is the BGR projet for the Protetion of the Jeita Spring. It is
a small projet in terms of nanial ommitment and does not produe infrastruture. There is
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very little in terms of material results. The goal of the projet was the demaration of a water
resoure protetion area for the Jeita Spring (see Chapter 5).
The Jeita Spring is loated in the Keserwan area north of Beirut and is the main soure of
the water supply for Beirut. The dense population and the lak of waste water infrastruture in
the athment auses substantial pollution to the waters of the spring. The projet was designed
to study the hydro-geology of the area to understand the limits of the groundwater athment
of the spring. Initially the projet did not reeive muh attention from the water establishment
or the ministry. Lebanese experts, suh as the diretor general of hydrauli and eletrial water
resoures (Fadi Comair), assumed that the projet would not generate any value added beause the
athment was already known.
24
Beause the BGR refused to assoiate with a university researh
entre
25
of whih Comair is the diretor he further lost interest.
26
In the ourse of the investigations of the German hydrogeologists it was found that the surfae
and groundwater athment do not overlap (see Chapter 5). Rather the German experts suspeted
that the adjaent watershed (the basin of the Nahr Ibrahim; Nahr: Arabi for river) also on-
tributed about 3035 perent of the ows of the spring. These ndings had politial impliations.
The inltration area for these ows was assumed to be within the reservoir area of a dam projet
(the Jannah Dam) on the Nahr Ibrahim. The results of the German work put into question the
eonomi feasibility of the dam projet. It suggested that high inltration rates would undermine
the dam's intended purpose to store water and that attempts to seal o the inltration area would
aet the Jeita Spring (Margane, 2012).
The general diretor of hydrauli and eletrial resoures, who has been at odds with the
minister sine the latter was appointed, found a renewed interest in the BGR projet and asked
the German expert to review the plans and speially the hydrogeologial studies for the dam.
27
The German report on the dam projetstudy questioned its analysis and showed that the area
under question towards the upper end of the reservoir was not suiently studied in the projet
proposal (Margane, 2012).
28
Unsatised with the outome of the German review the ministry
ommissioned a seond study from the Frenh ompany Safege, whih supported the view that
further study was needed. In addition a Lebanese ompany was tasked to ondut a traer test.
The one test that was done ould not onrm an interonnetion, but given the omplex hydro-
geology of the area (see Chapter 5) one inltration well would not have been enough to rule out
a onnetion, and aordingly the test report did not rule out the possibility (ELARD, 2013).
29
It was the onsultany rm that had originally produed the dam study that laimed that no
interonnetion between the Jeita Spring and Nahr Ibrahim existed basing itself on the results of
this one test (Khatib and Alami, 2013).
24
The German expert explains how he did not reeive support from the CDR or other agenies to release equipment
from the Lebanese ustoms who held it for more than two months beause nobody onsidered themselves responsible.
25
The entre was established with funds from the Italian Development Cooperation and is assoiated with the
Lebanese Notre Dame University whih has its main ampus in the area.
26
The head of the BGR projet onsiously hose to remain independent of the diretor general (Interview Margane
2010).
27
Comair also had to provide the study by the engineering onsultany rm (Khatib el Alame) beause the Beirut
Mount Lebanon Water Establishment had refused to do so earlier.
28
This was onrmed in an interview with a Lebanese engineer who had onsulted for Khatib el Alame on the
projet (Interview Abdelnour 2012).
29
Aording to the German expert the Lebanese author of the report resisted requests by the minister's advisor
and Khatib el Alame to rule out the interonnetion (Interview Margane 2014).
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The German expert suggested that an investment of less than US$ 200,000 would have been
suient to larify the situation (Interview Margane 2014).
30
It is telling that the ministry did
not ommission an in-depth study of the area onsidering that the dam projet inluding the
eletro-mehanial equipment of an assoiated hydro-power plant is to ost about US$ 250300
million.
In any ase, the arguments of the BGR report and the Safege report provided the base for
politial opponents of the minister to attak him publily and question his ompetene. Mohammad
Qabbani, president of the parliamentary ommittee for water and energy, published an open letter
to the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament reommending that the projet
be anelled (The Daily Star, 2013b, Interview Qabbani 2012).
On the other hand the minister and his advisor supported by the reports of their onsultant,
reated by disrediting the BGR study (Interview Zakhrour 2012). The projet was important
for the minister beause it was based in his home distrit, one of the few areas that is ontested
during eletion time. In answer to the questions regarding the dam the minister's advisor erely
rejeted the projet's onlusions, ndings and overall methodology, and went on to state publily
that:
Mr. Margane has no proof on what he is proposing, ... All the tests we are doing right
now show the water is not going to Jeita ... The impliation at the end of the day is if
he is totally wrong in his theory, sine he didn't wait to see the result of the test, if we
nd that he is wrong, and everything is wrong [then℄ we an say thanks and goodbye
and BGR an go out. (Dokery, 2013)
This smaller ase study showed that projets are instrumentalised by the Lebanese deision makers;
the diretor general at the ministry disovered his interest in the projet only when it beame
politial serving to further fuel his onit with the minister. Conversely, an MP from Keserwan
(Farid el Khazen)
31
that has advoated and promoted waste water projets for the area and this
spei German projet as well, turned against the German team when it started questioning the
projet of the minister, his politial boss.
32
The ndings of the projet were ignored by the parties
with a politial interest to do so, while they were promoted by those with an opposed politial
interest. Eventually, the dam projet was launhed and onstrution started, simultaneously
opposition to the projet went dormant. As was mentioned earlier and is onrmed by this ase,
the fate of development projets in the setor is strongly orrelated with the politial and material
interest of the Lebanese elites or the administrations involved.
30
The drilling of three or four inltration wells ould have overed an area suiently large to give a more
sientially robust result. He also saw the possibility to build a small earth dam just below the suspeted inltration
area and diretly measure if any inltration atually happens (Interview Margane 2014).
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The el Khazen family is a notable family in the Christian areas of el Metn and Keserwan. As a family it rosses
politial divides. The Farid el Khazen mentioned here is allied to Aoun's Free Patrioti Movement and is member
of the Marh 8 alliane. His ousin, also named Farid el Khazen, is member of the Marh 14 blo and also an MP
representing Keserwan.
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He attempted to ensor the presentation of the German experts before a onferene his development assoiation
organised. Representatives from the CDR, the German embassy, as well as the Italian and Frenh development
agenies partiipated. The onferene was targeted at an audiene from the Keserwan area, inluding members of
NGOs and numerous muniipal ounils in order to promote the work of the minister and the CDR. It attempted to
promote the waste water management plans and espeially the treatment failities to be built to loal onstituenies.
Khazen expliitly requested that Nahr Ibrahim not be mentioned at all. Yet beause the German team presented
their ndings whih showed the extent of the athment, to Khazen's intense displeasure, followed by the threat
that he withdraw his blessings for the BGR projet.
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3.3.2 Observation on the Networked Nature of the Expanded IDC:
Networking, Knowledge Prodution and Hegemony
The setion above highlighted the varied interests that shape the ators' involvement in the
Lebanese water setor and the nanial means that are mobilised to materialise a relatively spei
view of how the setor should funtion. While disussing the individual ators, they were always
treated as part of a blo, the International Development Complex. The following setions will now
reinfore this notion and illustrate the networked nature of the IDC further. It highlights that
eorts to shape the Lebanese water setor aording to the market driven disourse are onerted
and that tremendous eort goes into the reprodution and adaptation of this disourse beyond
the projets that aim to hange the administration diretly. This setion will show that the IDC's
inreasing dominane of the WRM proess is not based only on its nanial means, but also on the
eorts that go into the establishment and maintenane of the hegemony of the justifying disourse.
3.3.2.1 The Water Setor Coordination Meeting
In the two deades after the war the oordination between water setor ators inreased. It did so
in response to the muted suess and often ambiguous outomes of projets and the still worrying
state of water resoures in 2014. Many of the infrastruture projets went over shedule, did
not produe the expeted results, or stood idle for long periods of time (see Chapter 5). The
administrative and legal reform proess, pushed by the IDC, similarly did not produe the desired
outome (see Chapter 4).
In 2008 the EU instituted setor working groups that brought together the European donors in
the dierent setors to oordinate their eorts. This approah followed earlier attempts, suh as
the IPP that attempted to lay out setor and investment strategies, and aimed to improve setor
administrative apaity with the goal to move from projet support to setor budgetary support.
This onern is not new for the EC. It has been for many years at the forefront of eorts
to make aid more eetive by harmonising its eorts with other donors, and by aligning
aid with partner-ountry strategies and systems. It is EC poliy to use general and
Setor Budget Support as the favoured nanial modality for its assistane whenever
onditions are favourable. This is part of a broader ommitment to the priniples
of Programme Based Approahes (PBAs): one of the Paris Delaration targets is to
inrease the proportion of all aid delivered as PBAs to 66 perent by 2010 (EC, 2007,
p.7).
Within the framework of this diretive the EU Coordination Group for the Water Setor in
Lebanon was reated. Its initial intent was to oordinate EU member states' donor aid in the
water setor. The sope was dened as inluding the water supply setor and the waste water setor
but was extended to inlude water resoure management (GTZ/GIZ, 2008a). The rst meeting
inluded only two representatives from the EU Delegation in Lebanon: one from AFD, two from
the Italian Development Cooperation, the head of the GTZ mission, and a representative from the
German embassy (GTZ/GIZ, 2008a). The partiipant and guest list was soon expanded to inlude
representatives from the World Bank, EIB, USAID, UNICEF, and later the Kuwait Fund as the
only representative of the Arab state donors.
Inlusion and partiipation of the Lebanese water setor administration was disussed early on
but the rst time representatives of the Lebanese water setor were present was a year later in
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the framework of a disussion about the state of the waste water setor (GTZ/GIZ, 2009). The
expansion of the oordination group to fully inlude Lebanese authorities had to wait for a EC
diretive. Eventually in 2010 the meetings were moved from the premises of the EU delegation to
the Ministry of Energy and Water. Initially this forum served to share information about projet
progress and plans with the goal to oordinate aid eorts:
Priorities are to (1) develop ommon setor strategies of EU states (2) involve non EU
agenies in oordination groups and (3) involve Lebanese setor institutions (GTZ/GIZ,
2008b).
A review of the minutes of meetings suggests that a fruitful exhange of information ourred
and that development eorts in the setor proted from the improved oordination. A number
of initiatives and/or issues were addressed, setor analysis was exhanged, and the pereption
and understanding of setor problems harmonised, at least to a degree. Altogether this seems to
have served to unify the voie of development agenies. At the very least the disussions show
that all the individual partiipants have the same disourse with regard to the requirements for
an improvement of the water setor. For example, one onern that was repeatedly brought up
was the issue of the sustainability of waste water treatment projets in the absene of waste water
harges to guarantee that ontinued operations and maintenane funding is available . The guiding
logi suggested that beause the state an't pay for it the itizens shall. This issue was repeatedly
impressed upon Lebanese stakeholders (GTZ/GIZ, 2008b, 2008).
The setor oordination meeting an be interpreted as the loalised foal point of IDC in
Lebanon. It brings together the most important ators and serves to strengthen its presene in
Lebanon. It is one site of prodution of a unied disourse for a small audiene of Lebanese
tehnorats.
3.3.2.2 The Lobbying and Disourse Reinforing Network: the Expanded IDC in the
Water Setor
Another site in whih the mainstream disourse is reprodued, and the work of assuring its
hegemony takes plae is the global network of water poliy expertise. Goldman (2005) shows how
the World Bank's professional training ativities were entral to the dissemination of development
knowledge. One result was the emergene of a transnational poliy network on water. Among
them he identies the World Commission on Water, the World Water Counil, the Global Water
Partnership whih emerged from a ooperation of inuential politiians, the World Bank, UN
agenies, and/or multinational orporations (MNC). It is also from these institutions that a large
part if not the majority of the board members of these bodies originate. Goldman groups with these
the World Business Counil for Sustainable Development, whih is a grouping of the worlds largest
MNCs ative in the energy water and waste management setor, and global NGOs suh WaterAid.
He shows how this network has been instrumental to the proliferation of water expertise that treats
water as an eonomi good and advoates private setor operation of water supply. (Goldman,
2005, p. 221247)
A subset of this network exists entred on the Mediterranean Basin.
33
A large number of or-
ganisations onerned with some aspets of water resoure management around the Mediterranean
33
Another network, younger than the one desribed above, was formed with the reation of the Arab Countries
Water Utilities Assoiation (ACWUA). It is the result of a joint GIZ (GTZ)ESCWA projet. It was rst initiated
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 ranging from agriulture and irrigation, wetlands management, urban water management, and
development on a more general level  are networked to exhange and publiise expertise. Figure
3.4 shows only a seletion of those ators ative in Lebanon, their interonnetion and how they
relate to the Lebanese WRM proess.
In many ases these assoiations are linked to the Euro-Mediterranean projet, the Barelona
Proess, and the UfM. The main funtion of this network, seen from a loal perspetive  that
is from Lebanon  is the reprodution of the IWRM disourse oupled with the mainstream
disourses about sarity and limate hange. It also serves as a site for the networking of experts
and the lobbying of business interest. This sub-network will be disussed here with its links to
Lebanon and speially Fadi Comair, the General Diretor of Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures
at the MEW. His prominent position in the water resoure management proess makes him the
appropriate example. He is among the most proli publi speakers and is often ited in loal
newspapers. Others with a less prominent publi prole exist but the soiologial researh to
expand this analysis was outside of the sope of this thesis.
The network in question nds its origins in the Euro-Mediterranean proess and by extension
the European Union. In a publiation by the Institut de Prospetive Eonomique du Monde
Mediterraneen (IPEMED),
34
Comair and three experts with lose professional relations to him,
make the ase for a Mediterranean water ageny. In their artile they desribe some of the ators
of this network and its origins:
Water has been at the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean ooperation's onerns sine
the Barelona Convention in 1976. Integrated water resoure management is one of
the priorities of the Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable Development reated
in 1996. Several international onventions regulate this ooperation, overing for ex-
ample, operating aquifers in North Afria (Sahara Sahel Observatory), the ommon
strategi debate on the Nile basin (Nile Basin Initiative), and the protetion of the
Danube, et. A number of tools have suessively been put in plae to further the
ooperation's operational side: EMWIS, Plan Bleu, Unep-Map, International Oe for
Water, Mediterranean Water Institute, GWP-Med, the Mediterranean omponent of
the European Water Initiative, Euro-Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations,
et. They are urrently small and sattered, and have produed few tangible results.
(Comair, Donzier, Lainé & Mino, 2010, p.2)
Most of these ators have also implemented small projets in Lebanon. Plan Bleu ommissioned
studies onerning the water and environmental setor. The International Oe for Water (OIeau)
has provided training and onsultany servies at a small sale. GWPMed runs the EUWI-Med
intervention in Lebanon whih has a ooperation agreement with the ministry and speially works
with Comair's department. This does not our by aident, but stems from his involvement in
the water expert group of the Barelona proess and later the Union for the Mediterranean. Plan
Bleu, IME, and the Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations (MENBO) of whih Comair
was president, are members of GWPMed administrative ounil.
Representatives from these organisations, and often the same persons are networked through
onferenes and projets. The earliest referene found in the ontext of this researh is the
in 2006 and eventually launhed in 2009. It organises the Arab Water Week whih brings together tehnorats and
private setor ators from aross the Arabi speaking region.
34
It formulates its goals thus: IPEMED aims to bring the two sides of the Mediterranean loser together using
eonomis, and to make a onrete ontribution to building an integrated, sustainable and soially responsible
Euro-Mediterranean area. (IPEMED 2009)
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attendane list of the Conferene of Water Diretors of the Euro-Mediterranean and southeastern
European Countries in Athens in November 2006. The list inludes Jean F. Donzier, diretor of
OIeau, Walter Mazitti, president of the steering ommittee of EMWIS, treasurer of the Mediter-
ranean Water Institute (IME), and European negotiator during the Wazzani inident in 2002,
35
and a number of other names. These speakers and experts, or at least a ore group of them (of
whih the above named are ertainly part) meet regularly at the numerous onferenes taking plae
around the Mediterranean.
The two transnational orporations dominating the water setor in the region, Veolia and SUEZ
Environment are also present in this network. SUEZ Environment is member of IME and partner
of GWP. SUEZ and its subsidiary Safege and Ondeo, as well as Veolia, have representatives in the
board and the administrative ommittee of OIeau (OIEAU, 2012).
AFD also baks a number of these Mediterranean institutions, for example it has a representa-
tive on the board of OIEAU and is a member of the Plan Bleu. IPEMED, whih is onerned more
with eonomi integration, is purely a lobbying group of the private setor. Yet, water governane
issues are on its agenda. For example, it supported eorts to reate a Mediterranean Water
Knowledge Hub and was involved in disussions to this end sine at least 2008. The projet was
aimed at the reation of a Knowledge Hub olleting and disseminating expertise, as well as form
professionals (OIEAU, 2008). IPEMED has onsiderable politial lout. The founding members
inlude Blom Bank, Byblos Bank, and other Lebanese businesses alongside SUEZ Environment, Air
Frane, AFD and other ompanies and organisations. The CEOs of Blom Bank, SUEZ, Rothshild
Bank, and the President of Partenariat Français pour l'Eau (Frenh Partnership for Water) are
on the board of diretors. Its politial sponsorship ommittee ontains politial heavyweights suh
as Xavier Solana (former NATO seretary general and EU Minister of Foreign Aairs), Romano
Prodi (former Head of the EU), Alain Juppe (former President of Frane) and Jean Pierre Raarin
(former Prime Minister of Frane), while the Lebanese representative is former Minister of Finane
Georges Corm (IPEMED, 2012).
In Lebanon the main venue for these ators is the Beirut Water Week, organised through the
ministry by Comair. The EUWIMed projet through GWPMed provides tehnial assistane to
his diretorate and takes some of the organisational and nanial burden (Interview Thomassini
2011). The representatives of the member organisations listed above of the Mediterranean poliy
network are usually present at the Beirut Water Week, as are private setor ators suh as SUEZ.
But other onferenes in Lebanon invite many of the same faes. Lebanese and international
aademis also partiipate. The topis of these onferenes are very similar. They promote
and reprodue the mantra of private setor partiipation, full-ost priing (in domesti as well
as irrigation water supply), IWRM, limate hange and the related sarity risis, as well as
hydrodiplomay (BWW 2010, BWW 2012).
It is thus not only the ore of the IDC in Lebanon that works on the prodution and reprodution
of the dominant disourse but it is supported by transnational poliy networks as the one just
desribed; itself baked by a onsiderable amount of resoures, as well as politial and knowledge
apital. Tremendous eort is expended in an attempt to make the market environmentalist
disourse hegemoni in Lebanon. This work happens in dierent sites, the water setor oor-
dination meetings, through the tehnial assistane projet (though their work goes further and is
35
In 2002 Israel threatened to go to war over Lebanese plans to build a small pumping station on the Wazzani
Spring. The Wazzani Spring feeds the Hasbani river and is part of the Upper Jordan river that runs south into
Oupied Palestine. The issue was resolved through US and EU mediation and Lebanon went on to build the
pumping station (Zeitoun et al., 2012a).
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onerned with the implementation of these governane tehniques), as well as in the work of the
Mediterranean poliy network. These eorts are targeted at the Lebanese water setor tehnorats,
and an audiene of aademis, NGO professionals and also to the publi via these onferenes.
3.3.2.3 The IDC as Site for the Reprodution of a Transnational Poliy Expertise
This reprodution of expertise does not stop with the dissemination of the disourse but is extended
to the reprodution of the transnational poliy experts. To ontinue the example of Comair,
apart from the EUWIMed projet that gives Comair's department tehnial assistane, for him
this network serves as a means to inrease his politial prole. His position as president of the
Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations (MENBO), vie president of EMWIS,
36
and his
membership of the Water Expert Group of the UfM also serve this purpose.
It is also through his onnetions to SUEZ Environment and speially its vie president of
Corporate Seurity Frank Galland that he was nominated to and reeived into the Frenh National
Order of Merit with the rank of knight.
The eremony was held at the Frenh Embassy in Beirut in November 2010. This exerpt from
the Frenh ambassador's speeh gives an indiation of the reasons for the award:
Dear Fadi, you entertain exellent relations with the oes of the Frenh Embassy,
partiularly with the Beirut regional eonomi oe and the Frenh Development
Ageny. You ollaborate with both in support of Frenh ompanies, whih allows
the latter to realise more projets in Lebanon in the framework of private publi
partnerships for delegated management of water in the ity of Tripoli, in assoiating
with the Lyonnaise des Eaux, that lead to the rehabilitation of the water supply network
in the Jezzine region. With SUEZ Environment and Veolia, you equally partiipated
in the reation of waste water treatment plants. (Comair, 2010a)
The piture that is painted is that of an oial working with the ommerial mission and a
development ageny in support of the private setor. It is only one faet of his funtions, but this
haraterisation shows resemblane to one of ategories of Leslie Sklair's (Sklair, 2005) denition
of the transnational apitalist lass (TCC). For the purpose of this study only the state and the
tehnial fation are of interest. The state fation made up of the globalising politiians and
bureaurats and the tehnial fation onsisting of globalising professionals and experts. These
globalising politiians and bureaurats are the ones who atually deide what gets built where,
and how hanges to the built environment are regulated. The globalising professionals inlude
the leading tehniians entrally involved in the strutural features of the systems that are built
(Sklair, 2005).
37
In this denition the TCC not only ontrols money apital but other forms of
apital, referring to Pierre Bourdieu he lists politial, organisational, ultural and knowledge
apital (Sklair, 2002, p.17). Instead of following Sklair's argument I propose a ategory of
transnational poliy experts as agents of the neoliberalisation of water governane.
This ategorisation an be extend to the IDC experts working in Lebanon. For example,
two of the water experts working for DAI have extensive experiene with the privatisation of
36
Euro-Mediterranean Information System on know-how in the Water setor founded in the framework of the
Euromed proess.
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He goes on to inlude those responsible for the eduation of students and the publi in arhiteture in the
tehnial fration. This also resonates with observations from Lebanon, whereby the same university professors are
also invited to the loal onferenes, and promote the same IWRM and PSP disourse. As was mentioned earlier
Comair also heads a researh entre at a loal university.
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utilities around the world. The head of the programme explains that he was involved in the rst
privatisation of water utilities in the US in the early 1980s (Interview Coxon 2012). One EU
Delegation expert explains that he sold his ompany, a venture apitalist rm, and doesn't need to
work anymore but wants to use his experiene for another purpose (Interview Christiaens 2011).
The team leader of the USAID sponsored IRG projet at the LRA, has worked in development for
most of his areer. He has worked on design and implementation of development projets for the
World Bank, EU, AFD, but also has experiene in the private setor (Interview Viala 2011).
The work expended by the numerous agenies and aordingly by the experts that represent
them has eets beyond the mere reprodution of the dominant disourse with regards to water
resoure management. In Comair's ase it is his politial and organisational apital that is enrihed
through his partiipation and membership of the dierent organisations and his being knighted.
Comair's evolution from a loal state tehnorat into a transnational poliy expert illustrates a
reprodution of this ategory of ators. The Mediterranean expert network formed with the support
of European foreign poliy was instrumental for this transformation. There are other examples,
none are as important in their inuene on the setor and as proli abroad as Comair but more
researh would be needed to understand how the IDC reprodues loally and how this aets the
Lebanese administration and water setor.
But the example of Comair allows to onnet the work done by the IDC and the Mediterranean
poliy network to reprodue the dominant disourse among Lebanese experts to the Blue Gold
projet. He has emerged as a voal and publi advoate of the projet, supported by the politial
and organisational apital he gained. This loses the irle between the marketing ampaign to
promote the projet with its radial market environmentalist disourse, the elites that stand behind
the projet, and the IDC.
This hapter started by explaining the evolution of neoliberalism in Lebanon. It detailed the
Lebanese desent into eonomi risis and the related dramati rise in publi debt. At the root of
this debt is the main pillar of the Lebanese aumulation regime, a wealth transfer mehanism that
shifts government revenues to Lebanese banks and by extension to the elites. With the inreasing
debt burden the IDC was progressively integrated into all aspets of Lebanese development politis.
In the water setor the IDC has beome a strutural feature of whih the Lebanese state and
its water setor administration have beome dependent. I have shown that without IDC funds the
development of the setor ould not happen, and given the sal situation of the state will not
happen for the foreseeable future. The apital that is provided and transformed into infrastruture
underpins the IDC inuene on the setor. It is inreasingly involved in all aspets of water resoure
management. Planning, infrastruture prodution, and operation and maintenane are all heavily
inuened by the IDC. This reets a loss of sovereignty by the Lebanese state and administration.
The infrastruture and tehnial assistane projets often produe ambiguous results, while IDC
intervention always supports the reprodution of the eonomi base of the Lebanese elites.
In parallel and related, the IDC in Lebanon (what I have alled the Core) and the support
network of assoiations and NGOs work tirelessly to reinfore the hegemony of the market en-
vironmentalist disourse that guides IDC intervention. The imposition and reprodution of the
disourse was and still is neessary beause, as will be shown in the next hapter, the administrative
reform eorts have not generated the promised improvements.
Chapter 4
Water Setor Reform
This hapter disusses the transformations of the water setor administration in the post-war era.
The entral aspet of this hapter is the reform proess that was initiated with the reonstrution
and that has been ongoing sine. The reform proess was driven by a neoliberal ideology and
its best pratie template for the water setor as desribed by Bakker (2003; 2005; 2010). The
main ingredients of whih are the ommerialisation of the administration, full ost reovery, and
user-pays priniples, all leading to the privatisation of the water setor utilities. The IDC, with
the World Bank in the lead, was the driver of this reform and pressured the Lebanese state
into the proess. These early eorts ulminated in Law 221 of May 2000 that restrutured the
21 water oes and some 200 water ommissions into four regional water establishments. The
hapter shows how the oniting interests of Lebanese elites and the IDC have aeted the reform
proess and therein reprodued the entral strutural features preventing it from operating and
improving water resoures eetively. This will be shown in three examples, the administrative
reform proess, the attempted reform of the legal framework governing water resoure use and
management, and tehnial assistane projet aimed at ommerialisation. In these example the
hapter shows how the reform proess is onstantly subverted by the elites to assure their hannels
of power into and through the administration, and while the distribution of power among the
elites an hange in the proess, the prinipal patron-lient mehanisms remain intat. As a result
the ommerialisation and the opening of the setor to private setor partiipation and PPPs are
remoulded and disrupted.
This proess extends to the salar politis involved in the reform. The last setion analyses
how the new geographial boundaries of Regional Water Establishments took form, taking aount
of the politial dynamis as well as the geographial features and the historial proesses that
ontribute.
In this hapter I show the limits of the power of the IDC to impose its poliy preferenes and
ideology and at the same time point to a ontradition internal to this ideology. The depolitiised
reading of the shortomings of the Lebanese administration makes an engagement with the stru-
tural features governing its operation virtually impossible. The exlusion of the politis from the
analysis of the setor does not make the division of power mehanisms disappear, but rather makes
interventions blind to them. The proposed solutions annot but fail to hange these dynamis,
allowing them to reprodue, and thus the ineienies of the setor and the water management
proess to ontinue.
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4.1 Water Setor Transformation after the Civil War
The seond half of the 19th entury an be viewed as the origins of urrent water resoure
management strutures. The earliest odiation of water law stems from the 1870s publiation of
the Ottoman legal ode known as the Medjelle. It enshrines water use and property laws based
on ustomary laws, the Sharia, and the Napoleoni ode (Mallat, 2003, p. 228). At around the
same time the rst onession to supply potable water to Beirut from Nahr el Kalb was granted
by the Ottoman rulers to a Frenh engineer, other onessions would follow.
After the First World War the Frenh administration introdued wide ranging legal reforms
during the time of the mandate starting in 1920. Laws regulating water resoures were among
the priorities aording to Hyam Mallat (2003). The most important are the deree 144 from 10
June 1925 whih denes the publi domain, and in a subsetion, the waters inluded therein; and
deree 320 from 26 May 1926 whih regulates the protetion and use of publi water. With some
amendments these laws are still in eet and artiles from the Medjelle remain appliable to issues
of irrigation, groundwater use, and usu-frut water rights (Mallat, 2003, p. 228; see also Ghiotti
& Riahi, 2013).
Water supply management was left largely unregulated and in the hands of private entities by
way of the numerous onessions for exploitation of water resoures. It was only after independene,
in the 1950s, that publi administrative bodies harged with aspets of water resoure management
were reated. The Beirut Water Oe was the rst to be reated when the private onession ran
out in 1951. Other onessions were bought up by the government and loal water oes were
reated in the following years (Mallat, 2003, p.229; Catafago, 2005, p. 76).
In 1954 the Litani River Authority was founded to take harge of the development of the Litani
basin and of the development of water resoures in the whole ountry (Catafago, 2005, p.86).
This followed the plans of Albert Naahe and Ibrahim Abd el Al who both promoted modern
infrastruture entred visions of resoure development and water development speially (AFIAL,
n.d.; Gemayel, 1951; Naahe, 1936).
The Oe of Hydrology, under the authority of the Frenh High Commissioner, beame the
General Diretion of Hydrauli and Eletrial Aairs in the Ministry of Publi Works after inde-
pendene, but it was not until 1966 (based on a deree from 1959) that the Ministry of Hydrauli
and Eletrial Resoures was legally and eetively instituted. An attempt at reforming the water
oes and the water setor administration was undertaken in 1972. Its aim was the onsolidation
of the already numerous and disjointed water oes into ve regional water establishments. This
was not to be, but artiles regarding the management of the water establishments from this law
projet would be passed six month later. These would govern the funtioning of the loal water
oes until the reform of 2000.
4.1.1 Post-War Reonstrution of the Water Setor
The development of the water setor administration was still in its early stages when the war
started in 1975. In the phases when the war ebbed and governments and parliament were ative
new laws were passed, so that a few water oes reeived legal derees and were integrated into the
water administration. The same ourred with loal water ommittees and water user assoiations.
No law projet of substane regarding water use and regulation was implemented during the war
(Mallat, 1997, 238275). At the dawn of the war the water administration was in a shambles,
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neither the ministry nor the water oes were fully operational, quite the ontrary. Adding to
the onsiderable physial destrution and damages, the lak of administrative apabilities was a
further obstale to reonstrution, operation and maintenane.
4.1.1.1 Assessments without Data
Numerous assessments of the state of the post-war water setor were exeuted. The rst assessment
and reonstrution plan, the Emergeny Reovery Program (ERP) was produed for the CDR by
Rak Hariri's Oger International. It would later feed in the Horizon 2000 plan of the government
and the National Emergeny Reonstrution Program (NERP) support by the World Bank. The
World Bank published the results of its and the government's assessments in a report from 1993.
Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez (LED)  (whih would later beome SUEZ)  in the framework of a
tehnial assistane ontrat with the Lebanese government funded through the Frenh eonomi
ooperation protool, produed an assessment report in 1994. It analyses the water oes and
their apaities, the water ommittees, and the infrastruture under the responsibility of either.
These three reports pointed to the diulties obtaining aurate data. Regarding the infras-
truture the Oger report had the following to say:
 The onsultants faed great diulties nding plan, maps, and tehnial studies in the
arhives of the dierent servies (Water oe, Ministry...[si℄).
 Only a few douments are updated regarding exeuted works and maintenane. No as-built
drawings and ompletion reports are arhived.
 Standard Pratie Douments, onerning hoie and quality of material, neessary for all
installations, do not exist. A study must be ommissioned in order to establish the tehnial
speiation valid on the national sale with the goal to unify installations and failitate
maintenane management. (Author's translation, Oger International, 1992, p.3)
The same situation was found in relation to administrative and operational aspets of water
resoure management. Only limited data regarding the users and onnetions existed, aounting
was also noted to be rudimentary and pathy. Some oes ould only estimate the number of
onnetions they served (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p.3).
Based on the information provided by the water oes the three assessments presented dierent
numbers: Oger at 5.3 million and LED at 7.1 million inhabitants. Both these reports aknowledge
that these numbers were grossly exaggerated. But even three to four years later a World Bank
funded assessment obtained a total of 5.7 million inhabitants based on the numbers provided
by the water oes. This needs to be ontrasted with the numbers produed by the Central
Administration of Statistis that estimates that the ountry had about 3.7 million inhabitants in
2007 not ounting about 250,000 Palestinian refugees.
The ERP was not a damage assessment per se, its aim was the immediate start of rehabili-
tation works of all existing installations (Oger International, 1992, p.2). Networks inluding all
prodution, treatment, and storage infrastruture had suered not only diret damages but also
from lak of maintenane. The NERP was planned over three years from 19931996 and projeted
investments of US$ 187 million in the water supply setor and US$ 111 million in the waste water
setor (Oger International, 1992; Van Eeghan, 1993a p. 31).
Of this US$ 130 million was provided through the Emergeny Reonstrution and Rehabilitation
projet (ERRP) led by the World Bank to support the NERP. This projet was expanded with a
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US$ 50 million loan from the Bank in 1996 after the Israeli attaks in the spring of the same year.
It was ompleted in 2002 (WB 2002, p.1)  six years later than initially planned. With regards
to the ERRP the World Bank writes:
the suessful implementation is tarnished by the long implementation proess whih
an be attributed to the inauraies in the original damage assessment estimates and
fresh damages aused from external hostilities during implementation; this was quite
unantiipated. Some of the repairs were from damages inurred as late as in 2000,
indiating the ontinued relevane of emergeny rehabilitation in Lebanon. (Author's
highlight, World Bank, 2002, p.6)
The damages were larger than the originally estimated US $ 300 million proposed in the ERP from
1992. However, the assessment of required investments is as muh a funtion of the destrution as
of the expetations and normative visions of the planners. These are expressed in the denition
of rehabilitation needs, as well as the levels of quality and tehnial standards. This vision is
neessarily rooted in planners' outlook for the future. The ERP and the NERP were designed to
kik-start eonomi growth as soon as possible, and aording to the general neoliberal vision for
the ountry (see Chapters 3 and 5). This happened at the expense of more thorough assessments
of the atual investments needed and/or possible.
The eets of this underestimation of damages was amplied by the misreading of the geopo-
litial situation as was mentioned earlier. The idealised (and unrealisti) expetations of future
growth and development did not allow for other-than-peae senarios in a similar manner as the
market driven templates depolitiised the analysis of the setor.
4.1.1.2 The State of Water Infrastruture after the Civil War
The water setor was in a state of dilapidation. A 1990 assessment of water quality showed that
80% of olleted water samples were ontaminated. Four years later the LED assessment found
that all the samples taken were ontaminated. Water towers were destroyed and damaged, as
were pumping stations and publi wells. Networks suered from inltration beause of the lak of
pressure as well as regular servie interruptions. The larger part of the prodution equipment were
in a ritial state. Coneived mostly in the 1960s no automation systems were present (Lyonnaise
des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p.13). All treatment plants were damaged and were thus operating
at redued levels. Out of 120 hlorinators, only 12 were still in operation (Van Eeghan, 1993a,
p.26). The waste water infrastruture fared the same. Damaged networks ould only operate below
apaity and aused inreased health hazards through overowing and ponding of raw sewage in
residential and ommerial areas (Van Eeghan, 1993a, p.27). This report desribes the state of
the few waste water treatment projets as follows:
The two existing treatment plants (in Hammana and Marjayoun) were hit by shelling;
raw sewage has been diverted for irrigation use. Two other plants Bikfaya and Ghadir
were never ompleted; equipment for Ghadir has been delivered but never installed.
(Van Eeghan, 1993a, p.27)
The important power requirements for pumping and other eletro-mehanial equipment ould not
be met due to the state of disrepair of the power setor, with power outages ourring regularly and
often throughout the ountry. Only a minority of prodution wells were equipped with bak-up
generators by end of 1993 (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p. 13).
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Water quantities were insuient beause of high losses in the network. Unaounted-for-
water was estimated to exeed 40 perent but ould not be measured due to the lak of metering
throughout the network. Neither the produed quantities nor the losses through leakage ould
be asertained, even more so beause reords of subsriptions were faulty and no numbers for
unregistered onnetions ould be produed.
4.1.1.3 The State of the Water Setor Administration after the Civil War
The water setor administration and organisations as a whole had not developed muh beyond
their state at the beginning of the war. While new water oes, ommittees and assoiations were
formed during the war the hierarhy of the setor remained unhanged. The water oes and
the Ministry of Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures (MHER) had suered from the eets of the
war. Suessive periods of hyperination and a legally binding limit on the pries of water supply
put them in a dreadful nanial state. The ost of 1 m³/day annual subsription was xed at LL
60,000 by the ministry for soial reasons and by 1993 LL 100,000 for 1 m³/day in Beirut, but a
study had shown the prie of prodution to be about US$ 100 ( LL 150,000 in 1997). In most
ases operating expenses and revenues did not balane, and none of the oes had muh surplus
for investments or repairs. But even where a positive balane existed operation was hampered by
the need for approval from the ministry.
The limits set on expenses that did not need approval from the ministry varied between LL
150,000 and LL 1,000,000 depending on the oes (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994). In dollar
terms this would amount to between US$ 75 and US$ 500 in 1993 and US$ 100 and US$ 660 in
1997 when the Lebanese Lira was oupled to the dollar at LL 1,500 per US$ 1. These sums were
not enough to implement the smallest repairs on the network or proure the most basi materials.
The LED report omments on the Zahleh water oe illustrate the problem this made for works:
The diretor does not wish to renew his mandate beause the inertia of the adminis-
tration disourages him. Example: It takes seven months to obtain the approval from
the tutelage bodies to buy hlorine... The diretor takes the initiative to resolve the
problem in an illegal manner. (Author's translation, Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez,
1994b, p. 4)
The muniipalities who were responsible for waste water olletion and networks similarly had only
minimal funds and were in any ase severely handiapped by the lak of planning and tehnial
personnel.
The water oes and ommissions had no oherent or updated organigram or management
struture. In many ases responsibilities were not learly dened. Management ommittees were
staed more aording to loal soial and politial onsiderations and not based on skills and
expertise aording to Lyonnaise des Eaux (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p.10). The oes
and the ministry were both overstaed and understaed, sometimes both, laking engineering,
tehnial, aounting, and other neessary expertise that ould not be made up for by the large
number of labourers and administrative assistants who swelled the work pool of the least trained.
Aording to the LED assessment 18 water oes had a ombined 22 engineers (ve to six of whom
were in Beirut) and eight aountants (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p.18).
One ause was the ompliated employment proess for publi servants that is under the tutelage
of the Publi Reruitment Counil, the Ministry of Finane and the MHER, who all have a say
in the number of new employments, the ontrat details, and even on the hoie of andidate
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(Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p.17). Another ause was the salary level that was very low
ranging form LL 130,000 to LL 300,000 in 1994 (between US$ 60 and US$ 150200). As a result
severe shortages of qualied personnel ould not be made up by the large numbers of ontratual
and/or daily labour that were not publi servants.
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the state of the water oes in 1993 based on the LED report as
well as the investments projeted per water oe based on the ERP. A ouple of observations are
worth making regarding this table. The reservations regarding the data mentioned above apply.
The table nevertheless serves to show the regional dierenes.
All the major ities and the areas of Mount Lebanon have a very high onnetion density,
whereas the Bekaa has on average the lowest. In most ases a subsription is made for 1m³ xed
volume per day. Water use was never metered but provided by way of a xed diameter gauge
that limits the ow. In nine ases the water oes did not produe enough to provide the 1m³
equivalent to the subsription, the Kesrwan-Ftouh and Zahleh water oes had the lowest ratios,
with about 0.40m³ per subsription. The others ould have been able to provide 1m³/subsription
aording to this data, but experiene had shown this to be wrong in Beirut and varyingly aross
the regions (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a). In part this was due to the damages and leaks
estimated at more than 50 perent as for example in the Barouk area, and in part it was due
to the unertainty regarding the number of onnetions, illegal onnetions, and tampering with
the gauges. Yet the report onsiders that for ratios larger then one it should not be a priority to
inrease prodution volumes, but improve delivery eieny.
The budgets listed in Table 4.1 do not reet ost aurately beause they do not aount for
eletriity onsumption whih was subsidised entirely by the ministry. The aounts the oe
presented also did not inlude amortisation and replaement ost (with exeption of the Beirut
water oe.) In general the aounting methods were found to be unadapted to needs and onsisted
in most ases of revenues versus expenses aounting, with investments and other unexpeted
expenses led under extra-budgetary items. No analyti or management aounting systems were
in plae suggesting that planning was almost wholly absent. The salaries absorbed a onsiderable
portion of the expenses in most areas and took ridiulous proportions in the Bekaa area. Measured
on a per employee basis these were highest in Beirut with LL 5.7 million per employee (about US$
3,200 / year in 1994), followed by Tripoli and Tyre at around LL 4.5 million. On the lower end
Qobbayat water oe in the far north and Chamsine water oe in the south east Bekaa had the
lowest expenses per employee.
In 1994 the Frenh ompany found that:
the ills from whih the oes suer are not new and the events only aelerated a
degradation proess whih observers had already noted in the beginning of the 1970s.
The Charfeddine report from 1971 noted that the oes manifest a deit of 15 perent
and the level of leakage osillated between 45 perent and 65 perent and that the salary
expenditures were exessive. (Author's highlight, Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994,
p.34)
The oes were not only dependent on the ministry for employment but also for investments.
What was oneived as posterior budget ontrol in the legal text had progressively evolved into
a situation where all spending had to be preapproved by the general department of exploitation.

































































8,700 156 110,000 550,000 644,000 52 0.00 56 5,815,650
Tripoli 46,000 373 500,000 2,253,517 1,792,000 66 58,000 1.26 106 13 123 12,414,850
Nabaa el
Ghar
10,000 198 200,000 29 6,500 0.65 50 6,518,200
Qobbayat 2,500 295 500,000 215,347 110,102 55 3,350 1.34 176 8 8 8,771,400
Nabaa el
Kadi
3,500 122 25,000 123,500 79,500 11 5,600 1.60 60 39 29 4,030,550
Jbeil
BMTLWE
18,000 418 70,000 1,800,000 2,000,000 84 10,000 0.56 493 17 43 4,230,950
Keserwan
Ftouh
38,200 387 500,000 1,900,000 2,000,000 117 15,400 0.40 338 13 99 5,356,500
Metn
35,000 225 175,000 1,069,000 2,019,000 56 24,000 0.69 122 17 156 3,091,400
Braouk 52,000 778 750,000 985,000 1,082,000 200 60,000 1.15 45 49 67 24,291,000
Beirut 150,000 60 1,250,000 5,532,000 10,000,000 493 200,000 1.33 76 51 2,500 25,306,000
Ain el
Delbe
70,000 91 700,000 954,311 894,473 136 42,500 0.61 62 34 769 11,070,000
Saida
SLWE
17,000 13 400,000 509,000 1,086,000 52 25,000 1.47 56 26 1,307 1,695,500
Nabaa el
Tasse
42,000 873 500,000 1,230,000 1,715,000 127 60,000 1.43 56 22 48 22,379,450
Tyre 12,200 450 200,000 471,000 498,000 56 19,000 1.56 68 51 27 14,536,340
Jabal
Amel




23,000 1,898 550,000 1,250,000 400,000 255 18,000 0.78 190 72 12 11,912,560
Chamsine 18,000 1,320 250,000 33,481 295,869 82 15,000 0.83 61 65 14 3,026,000
Zahleh 35,000 480 200,000 459,000 918,000 90 14,000 0.40 90 56 73 7,327,000
Total 601,100 8,662 7,130,000 20,220,156 26,317,944 2,035 590,350 1.02 181,671,000
Average 33,394 481 396,111 1,189,421 1,548,114 113 34,726 1.04 132 69
Reprodued from:Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a; Oger International, 1992
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was seen to be of partiular importane with regard to infrastruture projets and medium and
long term planning. To quote from the LED report one last time:
Nobody has a medium term vision of the projets to be realised in one oe. It is
indispensable to determine investment guidelines for the oming year and starting from
this master plan all ators at following the same objetives. (Lyonnaise des Eaux
Dumez, 1994, p. 31)
4.2 The Water Setor Reform
After the event whih ravaged Lebanon, it appeared neessary to reorganise the water
setor and update the laws and regulations that governed it ... the government was not
able to ontinue subsidising the neessary investments in equipment.
This oinided with the objetives of the World Bank and other donors who were
onerned that failities and equipment they funded be managed and maintained in a
manner assuring their reliability and sustainability. This is why a restruturing of the
setor was neessary and the publiation of law 221 happened in this framework. It
dened the new tasks of the ministry and regrouped the 21 oes and some 200 water
ommittees in four publi water establishments overing all the Lebanese territories.
(Catafago & Jaber, 2001a, p.26; Author's translation)
4.2.1 The Vision Driving the Reform
The theory and ideology behind the reform eorts in Lebanon onformed to the globally hegemoni
disourse at the time. The ERP mentions the need for reorganisation of the administration more in
passing, other reports, by government onsultants and members of the IDC, point learly towards
the need for private setor involvement (see Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a; Van Eeghan, 1993a,
1993b; World Bank, 1991). The private setor potential was to be taken into full aount. The
argument for this was based on the eonomi and soial importane of the water setor and the
failure of the administration.
Present setor organisations annot ope with the present situation and annot satisfa-
torily be made responsive to future needs. A setor reorganisation, with partiipation
from the private setor, is urgently required to ensure sustainable operation and main-
tenane of rehabilitated assets.
Any sustainable development will be ontingent upon satisfatory ost reovery. The
dependeny on budget alloations annot be ontinued. Taris will have to be raised
in pae with improved servies to ensure adequate internal ash generation.
(Van Eeghan, 1993a, p. 23)
Private setor involvement and privatisation were presented as the logial solution. The World
Bank suggested that onsolidation of oes into regional entities and ombining operational
responsibility over water supply and sanitation was needed. Coupled with the ommerialisation
of these oes and the adoption of ost reovery priniples, reforms would bring rehabilitation.
1
1
What is meant here is ost reovery from users  not through taxes  whih ost are or need to be reovered
and how muh apital needs to be set aside for new investment, salary sales and other ost related issues, are not
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The onsolidation of oes was to enable speialisation and ensure lose attahments to the
loal level.
Moreover the regional establishments should be given a signiant degree of autonomy and be
required to operate on a ommerial basis. Management ontrats was one aspet of private setor
partiipation and while privatisation is not expliitly mentioned in the 1993 World Bank report the
poliy approah on setor development was to gauge the sope for privatisation (World Bank,
1991). These poliy presriptions orresponded with global and hegemoni neoliberal ideology of
whih the World Bank was and still is a main promoter. Espeially during the 1990s the full
privatisation (transfer of assets) of the setor was still a goal. The Lebanese experts and oials
would eho this disourse.
2
Very little eort, in fat virtually none, was expended in the various reports to explain why the
poliy presriptions were atually suited for the spei ontext. Rather these were appended onto
a hain of arguments about development and publi health standards without ausal or logial
links made.
The hain of argument started with the inlusion of the water setor into the ERP beause the
reation of satisfatory sanitary onditions are prerequisites for promoting eonomi development
and for maintaining an aeptable publi health standard, (World Bank, 1991, p. 26). In the
post war situation, with water related servies being deient, the poor would suer most. As
suh they would also benet form proposed developments (World Bank, 1991, p. 26). The
root of this deieny were overlapping responsibilities of the dierent agenies, the fragmentation
of responsibilities for dierent aspets of water and waste water management, lak of funds and
expertise, and other issues related to the dysfuntional state of the water administration and
institutions (see Chapter 2). This argument posited the reforms geared towards privatisation as
being beneial for eonomi development and for the poor. The state's inapability was the
soure of the sorry state of the setor, but why the answer to these problems was to be found in
the outsouring of servie provision was never explained. The symptoms are aurately identied
but no onvining diagnosis and even less an argument and ausal link for a solution was presented.
Neoliberal ideology is substituted for more empirial and rational analysis. Simply writing that
more private setor involvement will be beneial for eonomi development, for the poor, and
for publi health, does not make it so. What is presented as a logial argumentative sequene is
essentially an ideologial slight of hand.
As was shown earlier, what was missing from these aounts was an analysis of the reasons for
the failure of the administration beyond the listing of ineienies. Why the administration and
present setor organisation ould not satisfatorily be made responsive to future needs (World
Bank 1991) was not elaborated. In the same vein, no possible alternative approahes to water
resoure management were onsidered or even thought possible. As suh there was no alternative
(or rather seemed not to be).
addressed yet these are essential aspets of the ost and operating apabilities of the oes. The soial impat of
suh an approah was simply assumed to be beneial, but not assessed until 2002 in an unpublished report and in
2009 in a World Bank study (see Chapter 5).
2
A 1998 onferene at the University of Kaslik brought together a number of Lebanese experts among them one
of the authors of the rst reform proposal (Hyam Mallat), Diretor General of the Exploitation Department (Bassam
Jaber), the diretor of the Litani River Authority at the time (Fadi Comair) and the Minister (Elie Hobeika). All
endorsed the approah (see USEK, 1998).
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4.2.2 Water Setor Administrative Reform
The need for reform was seen by all the major poliy setting ators alike. The situation  where
purportedly no olletive and oherent management of water supply, waste water disposal, and
even irrigation was possible  was untenable. Administrative reform that would allow the market
to drive water resoure management was seen as the only way to x the water setor, ertainly for
the World Bank. The Lebanese ators were more interested in the rehabilitation of infrastruture.
This was true for the reonstrution in general and also in the water setor.
4.2.2.1 The Beginnings of the Reform
A series of derees was passed in the years 19931994 to regularise the ministry's relationship to
water ommittees and the ommissions that formed during the war. The water ommissions of the
north reeived derees making them water oes and thus binding them to the ministry's oversight.
The water oes for Akkar and Koura were dereed and replaed the ommissions that had been
under the tutelage of the Tripoli water oe. The ommissions responsible for Batroun, Bharre,
and Zgharta were also made water oes (see Figure 4.1). In eet, this was an unontested
onsolidation of state power and as suh a resaling of water governane beause these had now to
abide by the ministry's budgetary ontrol.
The groundwork for setor restruturing was laid with the ERRP whih initiated reforms in
almost all the setors through studies. These have resulted in enatment of appropriate laws in the
respetive setors (World Bank, 2002, p.5). The more substantial reform aimed at restruturing
the whole administration was initiated in 1994 when the CDR, with funds from the World Bank,
ommissioned a Lebanese onsultant to prepare a water management master plan. The outome
of this projet would be a proposal for a reform of the setor administration. As Catafago and
Jaber (2001b) desribe in the quote above, the reform was the result of the interation between
the Lebanese and international development ators led by the World Bank. The reform proess
and negotiations leading to the law had started early on and inluded a number of failed attempts
and onsequent rewritings of the law proposal. The setor struture that was to be framed by the
new law had to be redesigned to nd the approval of the Lebanese parliament and the elites it
represents.
4.2.2.2 Administrative Reform Imposed
All interviewees asked about the subjet agreed unequivoally that the World Bank was driving the
reform. The World Bank's threat to withdraw its support and the assoiated loan for the Coastal
Pollution Control and Water Supply Projet served to pressure parliament into the ratiation
of the proposed reforms. When the law enountered opposition in parliament and ratiation was
delayed the World Bank eventually withdrew its loan oer. As a onsequene the related EIB
loan was anelled and assoiated Japanese-funded projet delayed. Of the total projet volume
only the Japanese omponent survived, overall about US$ 180 million of projet naning was
withdrawn beause of the failure of parliament to approve the law.
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Figure 4.1: Water Oes
The World Bank's ations had the support of the aid and development ators. The Daily
Star points to one EU oial as saying the reform of the bureauray was a prerequisite for the
various donor banks to hand out the money. The same oial is on the reord as pointing out
the importane of the World Bank: Proeeding without the World Bank is not viable: one annot
build half treatment works. Other organisations follow the lead of the World Bank. If the bank is
happy, they're happy (The Daily Star, 1998a).
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The onditions were in onordane with the wishes and onditions proposed by the other
donors, write Catafago and Jaber (Catafago & Jaber, 2001a). They follow up with a list that
groups and exemplies the weight of the most important donors in the water setor, and name
those that were lassied as being part of the ore of the IDC. Like so many of the experts
interviewed, Catafago and Jaber express their understanding and justiation for the ations and
proedures of the international development ators. This is understandable, they write, as all
the donors wish that the equipment (infrastruture) they would nane be well maintained and
managed to assure their sustainability (Catafago & Jaber, 2001a, p. 42).
Minister of State for Finanes, Fouad Saniora, expressed the government's view about the issue,
quoted in the Daily Star (The Daily Star, 1998a): We an reapply for the loan but it will take a lot
of time. We've already ompromised our redibility. Like Catafago and Jaber (2001a) he expresses
an aeptane of the ations, preonditions and proedures of the international development
ators and the importane to remain redible by meeting their requirements. This aeptane
of onditionalities, proedures and oversight ditated by the IDC shows that the pressure applied
by the World Bank did show a onsiderable measure of suess. It is also a ruial element in
the onstrution of the hegemony of the market environmentalist disourse. As for the Lebanese,
eventually it was felt that there was no alternative but to give in to the Bank's demands.
The World Bank disiplined the Lebanese government and parliament by withdrawing its loan
and, with that, its support for the oastal pollution projet in an attempt to impose reform after
the rst reform draft was not approved by parliament in time. Under the oerive pressure of the
rapidly rising debt the new government relaunhed reform eorts. The World Bank had made
lear that reform was not irumventable if Bank support was to be maintained. As I argue
below, the result was that the draft reform law was redued to the lowest ommon denominator
that the dierent ators ould agree on. This in turn shows the limits of the World Bank's and
development ommunity's oerive power: The reform was not implemented as envisioned and
advoated. Instead it was born out of the ross-breeding of neoliberal poliy templates and loal
politial onsiderations.
4.2.2.3 A Chronology of the Reform
In 1996 reform eorts began to beome more onrete. In Marh of this year the Ministry
of Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures and the Oe of Administrative Reform had agreed on
the major lines of the reform during onsultations whih inluded the World Bank and other
international donors (Catafago & Jaber, 2001b). It was agreed that administrative reform was more
important than legal reform. This would give the tools to manage the setor (Interview Mallat
2012) as only then would it be useful to worry about the legal reform. The Israeli aggression in April
and May 1996 and subsequent parliamentary eletions delayed the proess until Deember 1996
when derees 96269631 were passed legally reating ve regional water authorities and reduing
the role of the Litani River Authority.
In early 1997 plans for a large international donorfunded projet started taking shape. The
World Bank negotiated a loan agreement for the Lebanese Coastal Pollution Control and Water
Supply projet with the Lebanese government. The World Bank loan of about US$ 53 million
omplemented loans by the European Investment Bank (about US$ 62 million), the European
Union (US$ 17 million) and the largest share from Japan (US$ 123 million). The Lebanese
government was set to ontribute US$ 53 million or about 17 perent of a total of US$ 308 million.
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The projet ontained a number of omponents, the most ost intensive was waste water and
water supply infrastruture. Less ost intensive but seen as equally important were the tehnial
assistane, management, and tehnial training, as well as the setor reform omponents, even
though these were less tangible. The loan by the World Bank and with that the whole projet was
onditioned on the presentation of the draft law for the setor reform to parliament (World Bank
2001).
The draft was approved by the Counil of Ministers in the summer of 1998 (Catafago and
Jaber 2001a) but it was not presented to parliament for ratiation. As a result the World Bank
 followed by the EIB  made good on its threat and withdrew its loan due to the delays. With
the eletion of a new president the government hanged, interrupting the law-making proess.
Subsequently this rst law proposal was opposed within the parliamentary ommittees to delay it
even further. It took the new government of Salim el Hoss until Otober 1999 to forward a new
proposal to parliament.
Law 221 was passed in May of 2000 and would form the beginning of the reform. It was
amended in August of the same year reduing the number of regional water establishments from
originally ve to four (Law 241/2000). Law 247 integrated the Ministry of Hydrauli and Eletrial
Resoures (MHER) with the Ministry for Petroleum into the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW)
and restrutured its internal organisation. One year later Law 377 delegated the responsibility for
waste water management to the ministry and the regional water establishments. With this the
administrative reform was onluded in terms of legislation and needed to be instituted.
The regional water establishment started up their operations, from the merger of the water
oes in the years that followed. The integration of the water oes was made eetive by late
2001/early 2002. Interim diretors were nominated for three of four water establishments by 2002
but it wasn't until 2005 that the four Establishments reeived their oial by-laws, dereed by the
Counil of Ministers in 2005. The position of diretor of the Bekaa Water Establishment (BWE)
hanged often beause of politial wrangling over the nomination. Of those appointed none were
in oe for very long until 2011 when the position was lled after a long vaany.
With the by-laws ratied by the government, reform eorts foused on the ommerialisation
of the utilities. The Israeli attak in 2006 delayed these eorts anew. The priorities and energies of
the politial establishment shifted to the politial fallout from the war and the damages inurred.
Damages to water infrastruture alone were in the range of US$ 100 million (see Zeitoun et al.
2012a). Espeially the South Lebanon Water Establishment (SLWE) had to deal with extensive
damages to its infrastruture, some 50 water towers were destroyed or damaged, transmission lines
were broken and eletriity was laking due to the extensive damages to transformers and the
transmission network (SLWE 2007). The SLWE personnel and its diretor would operate in risis
mode for the remainder of the year and into 2007 (Interview Nizzam 2011).
The war did not only aet the SLWE but also the other establishments. Muh of the southern
suburbs of Beirut were destroyed. Throughout the ountry transportation infrastruture was
destroyed and eletriity blakouts were ommon. But the war also inaugurated a new period in
the reform proess. Donor onferenes subsequent to the war brought an inrease in international
donor and development agenies involvement in the water setor. GTZ and USAID, but also the
European Union through various organisations funded tehnial assistane projets that aimed
at improving management strutures in the ministry and the regional water establishments (see
Chapter 3).
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4.2.3 Water Setor Legal Reform: a new Water Law?
The legal reform was launhed almost a deade after the administrative reform eorts began, when
AFD funded a trial publi private partnership projet for the (assisted) management of the Tripoli
water oe (not the regional water establishment of the north). In 2003 Ondeo-Liban, a subsidiary
of Ondeo who in turn is part of the SUEZ Environment Group was ommissioned to operate and
reform/ommerialise the Tripoli water authority and improve water supply servies in the ity.
Two narratives exist about this rst trial at larger-sale private-setor involvement in water supply
servies. The Lebanese oials tend to laud it as a resounding suess (see Comair, 2010b) while
the private ompany Ondeo and the Frenh development ageny AFD have a more qualied and
negative outlook on the ontrat outome. Ondeo was ned for delays that aording to the CEO
of the ompany were due to the Lebanese administration's ineienies and bureaurati red tape
(Interview Yabroudi 2010). Whatever the ase, an option to renew the ontrat and extend the
area of operation was delined by the private ompany (Yous, 2011, p.223-240). The problems
with this ooperation showed early on and beame glaringly obvious by the end of the ontrat
period in 2007. For all involved in the water setor, but espeially the international donors, it
highlighted the need for suessful legal reform, speially with the view to regulate the various
forms of private and publi partnerships.
This aspet of the reform projet foused on legal issues and laws regulating surfae and
groundwater use and protetion, water rights, and related issues. It was important to the IDC
beause its goal was the regularisation of private setor involvement. With the suessful passage
of Law 221 and the promise of improvements in the administration AFD pushed the legal reform
and funded a projet to that end whih brought together Lebanese and Frenh experts.
A rst draft of the Code de l'eau was produed in 2005, but like the administrative reform
proess, it got bogged down by the events that followed. The war and the subsequent politial
onfrontation delayed the legislative proess in general, thus, like so many other law projets, the
Code de l'eau projet remained dormant until late 2011. AFD reinvigorated the projet when
it onditioned a loan (of US$ 70 million oupled to a EIB loan of about the same amount) for
the Keserwan waste water projet to the presentation of a draft legal reform law to the Counil
of Ministers and later the parliament. It borders on irony that the Keserwan waste water projet
was now used again as a lever to implement the wishes of international development organisations.
AFD in this ase deployed the same disiplining tatis that were used to make the administrative
reform happen.
As a result a revised version of this law was presented to the COM in early 2013. The proposal
was rejeted without muh fanfare. The proess was kept quiet on purpose; the proposed law
was kept seret and irulated only among a few experts (Interview Freiha 2012). Nothing was
mentioned in the media. With the resignation of the prime minister and the dissolution of his
abinet in May of 2013 (ating in an interim funtion in the time that followed until the formation
of a new government), and the politial deadlok over the formation of a new government, the
law projet was put on hold again. The legal ode governing the water setor and water use thus
remains based on the framework laid with the Medjelle, the Frenh mandate, and the laws passed
before the war, with only minor amendments during the post-war period.
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4.2.4 The Reform between the IDC and the Lebanese State : a Juxta-
position of an early Draft and Law 221
The reform did not bring the results desired by the World Bank. What started as an attempt
to deentralise the water resoure management proess and to promote the entry of the private
setor into the proess ended up hanging very little in terms of deision making strutures. It
redued the number of water oes to ve and then four establishments whih de-fato remain
virtually as dependent on the ministry and the government as the water oes were before them.
The politial elite used the politial proess to hange the proposed law draft so that the deision-
making mehanisms and the related hannels of power remained nearly unhanged, the reform
was largely neutralised before the law was passed. Its implementation as noted by the authors
of the NWSS (see setion below) was still inomplete in 2012 and it failed to bring the desired
improvements to the water setor. This is not to say that if fully implemented the reform ould
have sueeded, muh rather the failure to fully take into onsideration Lebanese politis and
modes of power division in the design of the reform is at the ore of its failure.
The reform proess and the struture it produed an be understood by examining an earlier
draft law and how it was hanged and negotiated to result in Law 221 and its later amendments
(Law 221 and the draft law from 1998 are presented in Annex 2 and 3). This analysis reveals the
dierent logis aording to whih the various ators operate. On the one hand the neoliberal logi
is propagated by international development ators and versions of it are repeated by Lebanese
experts. On the other hand, the elites and their representatives in the administrations take a
pragmati approah, in part with a view to transboundary issues with the Israeli state and more
importantly to onserve their power, whih in this ase translates in the ontrol or inuene over
the diverse parts/omponents of the water setor.
4.2.4.1 Global Best Praties and Good Governane versus the Conentration of
Deision-making
One of the major goals of the law was the administrative deentralisation of the water setor at
least for the international development agenies. It was initially designed, as one interviewee alled
it, to be a three-pillar system. But that never happened here (Interview Giantris 2013). The
three-pillar system the onsultant refers to is the separation of oversight and regulation, legislation,
and operation. Instead they play a game here where everything is run through the Counil of
Ministers making it instead a one pillar system (Interview Giantris 2013).
The rst drafts of the reform law were modelled on global best praties. The Lebanese
onsultant realls how his team read all the water laws in the world, travelled to the US, to
Germany, and to England to learn about the restruturing of the water setor (Interview Majdelani
2012). In the rst iteration of the law proposal, the onsultant had inluded an oversight body
inspired by the British Oe of Water Servies. Referred to as the wathdog, the water servies
regulation authority was reated in 1989 when the water and sewerage industry in England and
Wales was privatised (OFWAT, 2010). This body was to be independent of both government
and the water establishments. Its role was the auditing, regulation and ontrol of the autonomous
water establishments that were to be reated. The water establishments would submit business
plans for review and approval. Within these parameters they would be free to set taris and dene
their own personnel poliy, meaning they would be free to hire and re as they saw t. They would
also be required to do the neessary studies and take up planning responsibilities with regards to
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the extension of infrastruture within the framework of the national water resoure management
poliy set by the ministry.
The aim of this oversight body was to ut the politial relations, the inuene of the politiians
on the water setor (Interview Majdelani 2012) or as Kunigk (1999) quotes the same onsultant
15 years earlier, the point of the reform is to get politis out of the system (p.19). The oversight
body was one important aspet of this attempt at urtailing politial inuene over the water
authorities. But the proposal was already altered in an early draft from 1998 (World Bank, 1998);
in this version the oversight board was integrated into the ministry. It was subjet to the ministry's
ontrol and supervision and thus robbed of its independent harater. The onsultant attributed
this to the interferene of politiians and their parliamentary representatives that feared the loss
of inuene in the water administration (Interview Majdelani 2012).
Law 221 disusses the responsibilities of the MHER in the seond artile diretly, these are
summed up in 14 paragraphs ompared to 27 in the earlier law proposal (World Bank, 1998).
The new law ombines some of the paragraphs of the 1998 draft regarding management of water
resoures and it omits all mention of ood protetion. It expliitly mentions that investment
heavy large water installations suh as dams, tunnels and even water networks shall be designed,
studied, implemented and, very importantly, operated by the MHER. Like the elimination of the
three-pillar system, this hange is an attempt to retain power at the ministry. It seures (or at
least attempts to seure) ontrol over large projets and assoiated funds for the ministry, and
with that the minister and general diretors at the ministry. Dams for example always require
ostly maintenane, and onvey a ertain amount of prestige. Dams are named after politiians for
a reason, as the dam in Keserwan is named after and was inaugurated by former president Emile
Lahoud.
4.2.4.2 The Waste Water Setor and Loal Politis
The juxtaposition of this earlier draft and Law 221 from the year 2000 shows other important
alterations. After the formation of the new government in late 1998 the law projet was reexamined
and approved by the Counil of Ministers in Otober 1999 and submitted to parliament. One major
alteration introdued by the government of Salim el Hoss was the deletion of the proposed transfer
of waste water management responsibilities from the muniipalities to the new regional water
establishments (Catafago & Jaber, 2001a; Interview Karam 2012). This was in line with the new
government's attempt to strengthen muniipalities; loal government, it was hoped, would render
the politial proess more aountable. The government whih was formed of numerous politiians
that had disagreed and opposed Rak Hariri's vision of the primay of eonomi reonstrution
were eager to strengthen state strutures at the base. The muniipalities, whih had in 1998 seen
their rst eletions in over 30 years, seemed to be promising andidates to begin the reonstrution
of the state administration. The muniipalities would not keep this responsibility for very long. As
they ontinued to suer from a lak of funds and expertise the situation was redressed in 2001 by
the new Hariri government and waste water management was made the purview of the ministry
and the RWEs with Law 377.
3
3
A later onsultation by the Ministry of Justie (2003) laries the ownership over existing olletor networks,
aordingly these remain the muniipalities ownership but are operated by the RWEs.
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4.2.4.3 Delaying Deisions as Strategy
Disussions and negotiations in the parliamentary ommittees brought numerous other hanges to
the projet. One of these hanges would have long-lasting eets. Unlike in the draft law from
1998 in law 221 the RWEs were not subjeted to ommerial law but were harged to dene their
own by-laws that would later be approved by the COM (Catafago & Jaber, 2001a). At the time
this served to delay nal deision on the organisation and management of the RWEs and the water
oes that were to be inorporated. The questions about the relationships between old oes and
the RWEs were not answered. It was relatively lear that these would beome subsidiary oes but
the new positions of the employees, managers, and diretors of the water oes in the hierarhy
of the RWEs and other onsiderations dening atual operations and management on the ground
remained open for further negotiations. The diretors of the RWEs were appointed almost two
years after the law was passed and only as interim diretors.
Inseurity regrading hanges in employment strutures among the sta remained high. On
numerous oasions water servies were interrupted for short periods, or employees of the water
oes went on strike. In part the reason was the arrears on salaries and the bad working onditions
but the planned restruturing of the setor and privatisation plans also reated inseurity among
the workers. Fears of mass layos, espeially of ontrated sta (the majority of the sta in most
oes) who had no job seurity beyond the guarantees of their loal Zu'ama was ertainly one
aspet fuelling the reurring strikes of the water oes' employees in 1999. The strikes were not
surprisingly lead by the Bekaa water workers union whih was the oe with the highest number
of employees (see Honeine, 2000; L'Orient le Jour, 2001a, 2001b; The Daily Star, 1999a, 1999b,
1999, 2000b, 2001, 2002). Delaying suh ruial deisions for a later date redued opposition to
the reform on all levels and bought time for negotiations. Desribing the dynamis before the
implementation of the reform, one onsultant explained how the work fore inreased rapidly in
some water ommittees in the Bekaa and the Bekaa-Hermel water oe only a short time before
the integration of the oes and water ommittees into the BWE in 20012002 (Interview Yazbek
2011).
4.2.4.4 The Private Setor Expelled
The notion of privatisation and private setor partiipation, one of the driving motives of the
reform, would be watered down drastially in Law 221. All referenes to the private setor were
erased (Catafago & Jaber, 2001a). For example, the seond artile of the 1998 draft dening the
general water resoure management priniples guiding this law was omitted. The artile ontained
two paragraphs framing the eonomi nature of the law:
 Artile 2 paragraph 2 of the 1998 draft read: Stressing the onept of eonomi return relative
to the protetion, development, alloation, and distribution of water resoures in aordane
with the needs of soiety and eonomi ativity.
 Artile 2 paragraph 4 of the 1998 draft read: Strengthening and enouraging private setor
partiipation in the provision of servies.
Of seven (short) paragraphs only two were diretly onerned with eonomi aspets of man-
agement, related to the eonomi value of water and private setor partiipation, the other ve
established eologial onerns, quality of servie and institutional hange. Other artiles dening
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the role of the new water establishments and emphasising the potential involvement of the private
setor in there operations were also deleted (see Annex 2 and 3).
There were two reasons for these deletions. One was that a law governing issues and proedures
regarding privatisation was being prepared in parallel to the water reform law. Privatisation was
envisioned for numerous setors so that it made sense to produe a framework law for privatisation.
Suh a law, Law 228, was signed only two days after Law 221 on May 31, 2000. Rendering the issue
of privatisation more abstrat and generi was a onvenient way to displae the issue of privatisation
in the water setor speially and avoid publi disussion of it for this setor. But even the
privatisation law saw notable resistane. It was unsuessfully hallenged in the onstitutional
ounil (The Daily Star, 2000a). Aording to Verdeil (2006) writing on the eletriity setor
the disputes about privatisation did not follow the lines of politial divisions, but were more
omplex and related to the interest of the individual Zu'ama and what they had to lose in this
reorganisation. Notwithstanding, the nal form of the law, privatisation and ommerialisation
remained the primary objetive of the reform under Hoss's government.
The minister at the time, Sleiman Traboulsi, stated the importane of privatisation and private
setor partiipation in a presentation at a Lebanese engineering faulty onferene, as did a number
of Lebanese water experts from the administration and from the private setor (USJ, 2000). The
same was true for the new government after the eletion of 2000. This is onrmed by the fat
that a joint venture inluding one of the ountry's largest banks, the Soiété Générale de Banque
au Liban (SGBL) was harged to study the potential for privatisation in the setor in 2001.
4.2.4.5 Transboundary Water Seurity and the Changes to the Law
The seond reason being forwarded against privatisation was related to seurity and transboundary
issues. One of the onsultants puts privatisation in the ontext of Israeli designs for south Lebanon:
There is this apprehension that if the private setor is to be integrated feroious ontrols
would be needed to avoid foreign ompanies oming and slowly taking over ontrol of
the water setor in Lebanon. Given all that happens in the Middle East and given
that water is a strategi resoures in this battle, it is to prevent a foreign appropriation
of water resoures by way of these ompanies. One has to reognise that one of the
essential points of the negotiations in the Middle East is the question of water. It needs
to be addressed by Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Israel. If no solution to
this question is found it ould be said that the negotiations are not likely to sueed.
(Interview Mallat 2012)
The transboundary issue with Israel remains important and was very present at the time of the
negotiations regarding the reform. Israel still oupied the south and the Hasbani from its soure.
The Litani and Israel designs for it, past and present, as well as fears and rumours of Israeli theft
of Lebanese water appeared in the newspapers regularly (see Al Mashnouk, 1995; Andraos, 1998;
Annahar, 1996, 2002; Assar, 2002; Ayyash, 1996; Haddad, 1995 for some examples). Though the
theft narrative was often onfused, and as onerns the Litani baseless, Israel had indeed aptured
all of the ows from the Hasbani sine 1978 (Zeitoun et al. 2012a). Water was and remains linked
to seurity and beomes a topi that holds politial signiane. The World Bank was part of the
ontroversy. It was seen as olluding with Israel beause it enouraged ideas that Lebanon should
sell water to its neighbours inluding Israel (Ayyash, 1996).
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A World Bank soure unovered details of the position taken by the manager of the
Middle East agriulture and water resoure management unit, John Hayward, where he
alled on Lebanon to sell its wasted waters to its neighbours inluding Israel. In the
details was the fat that this was advised by the World Bank's CEO James Wolfenson.
(Author's translation, Ayyash, 1996)
At the very least the artile shows how the issue was pereived in Lebanon. Kunigk (1999)
lays this ontroversy out with a little more detail. She writes that former minister Elie Hobeika
believed that the World Bank would require international sharing of water as a ondition for
naning dams. The World Bank on the other hand denied any suh onditionalities were linked
to the Greater Beirut Water Supply Projet.
4
One the issue of Israeli designs for water was linked
to the question of privatisation it ertainly beame a topi that politiians would rather not be
assoiated with. Any other poliy would prove to be politial suiide, Kunigk assesses, perhaps
a little too unritially (1999, p.25).
The transboundary issue remains a politially sensitive topi and the question of water in the
south is often linked to seurity issues. Despite the importane that is given to transboundary
water issues very little strategi eorts have been deployed by suessive governments and the
water setor administration to address the unfair and highly unequal use of the waters of the
Upper Jordan.
5
An important indiator of the priorities of suessive governments is the failure
to produe robust hydrogeologial data in general and speially regarding transboundary ows
to the south. And though this would have proven to be diult before the Israeli retreat in 2000,
the fat that at least two projet proposals that ould have helped the government produe some
data were rejeted (Interview Salame 2011), and that the government itself has made no eort in
this regard, indiates that the issue was not onsidered espeially important.
This in turn suggests that under the mantle of transboundary seurity onerns the hanges to
the law also served other onsiderations. As was suggested above, the opposition to privatisation
was not a reetion of the politial amps and the reservations voied under the mantle of
transboundary water seurity, though earnest (at least by some of the advoates) this argument also
served as opportunity to voie opposition without putting too muh strain on politial allianes.
Furthermore, the transboundary issue an (with the benet of hindsight) also be looked at as a
onvenient way to shroud the water setor (or at least aspets of it) in serey. An important and
obvious hange that was introdued in Law 221 as ompared to the earlier proposal was the omission
of the requirement to publish hydrogeologial and hydrometri data (See Annex 2 and 3). Where
three paragraphs were onerned with the publiation of data and the provision of information
4
The projet was already under disussion sine the mid 1990s. Plans existed from before the war, but it took
another 15 years for one version of the projet to be launhed in 2011. Earlier versions were experimenting with
Build-Operate-Transfer designs in the hope that the private setor ould arry the ost of the projet, but the risks
assoiated with the projet and the water setor seem to have detrated investors from bidding.
5
The 2002 Wazzani inident that had Israel threaten to go to war over Lebanese plans to build a pumping
station and withdraw water from the liberated Wazzani Springs does not run ounter to this argument. It in
fat reinfores it. While the inident showed the importane of the transboundary water issue with Israel and it
did evoke a diplomati response from the Lebanese government, whih built the pumping station, no eorts were
made to determine and eventually seure its reasonable and equitable share aording to International water law:
1) Ation never went beyond the reports produed in this ontext, the government or the administration never
attempted to put in plae a more broad based strategy, that involves a legal strategy, a publi relations strategy,
and a diplomati strategy based on robust hydrogeologial investigations to hallenge Israeli hegemony in the basin;
2) the Lebanese were not prepared for an Israeli reation when the projet was initiated; 3. Israeli threats were
aimed less at preventing the building of the pumping station but served to establish limits to Lebanese ation and
espeially unilateral Lebanese development of these waters. (See Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, Dajani & Talhami, 2012b
and Maternowski, 2006 for a more detailed argument) 4) The Wazzani pumping station still operates at redued
apaity sine and its potential was never fully used.
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regarding projets and laws by the ministry in the draft of 1998, the new law redued this to one
paragraph regarding publi relations and the provision of neessary information onerning water
resoures and adequate orientation toward rational usage (Law 221 Annex 2) and information
remains very diult to obtain.
As with the issue of privatisation, the resistane to give aess to information and hydrogeolog-
ial and hydrometri data is often explained with referene to the transboundary problems and the
danger of Israeli designs on Lebanese water resoures. Yet the spuriousness of these arguments are
glaring beause the quality of Israeli information on water resoures along the Jordan valley are
by far superior than the available Lebanese data (see Zeitoun et al., 2012a). It is not diult to
imagine that the extensive Israeli intelligene network in Lebanon would have been able to obtain
data from the administration.
6
Thus another interpretation is that aess and ontrol over data
was seen as a resoure from whih to draw power, and if that was not intentional, the omission of
any duty to publish data in the nal law ertainly made it a power resoure. Power not neessarily
in relation to the RWEs but to the publi and other bodies of the Lebanese state's administration.
Aess to data and reports from the ministry and the RWEs in 2013 remains diult as they
are treated as valued ommodity.
7
The Jannah Dam ontroversy desribed earlier (see Setion
3.3.1.2) is a good example, the only information available was put online by the BGR while the
reports it produed for distribution by the CDR gather dust in an oe (Interview Margane 2014).
Similarly, the ministry has not published any of its ndings or reports regarding the issue, even
as (or beause) it aunts their superiority in publi (see p. 122). Transboundary seurity issues
turn out to be only one reason why this serey is maintained, internal politial issues also play an
important role.
4.2.5 Legal Reform Attempts
It has been established that the nal administrative reform law turned out dierent than expeted
by the international development ators. A number of the desired outomes were not ahieved,
aountability remained elusive, as did transpareny. Considerations regarding the ompetition
over power, ontrol, and aess to the water oes and establishments were important in produing
the nal administrative reform law. A similar onsideration an be observed when omparing the
dierent versions of the drafts of the ode de l'eau.
A rst draft was produed in Frenh and brings together best praties and Lebanese spei-
ities. The lead was taken by a Frenh team whih onsisted of legal experts with international
experiene produing water laws. Lebanese representatives inluded a law professor, a lawyer
6
Reports that were supposedly treated as seret and not aessible to the publi were still obtained by some
aademis (Alles (2007); K. Makdisi (2007); Zeitoun et al. (2012a)) and ould be found at the library of a researh
institute, but requests for information to the Oe of the Prime Minister were denied on the basis of the supposed
sensitivity of the data. Data regarding the ow of the Hasbani (the river rossing into Israel) were diult to obtain
and then ontained only a data set for six years of measurement, whereas data olleted by the Hydrologial Survey
of Israel regarding Hasbani ows after the border that is 22 km after it soure data bak to the 1940s and are
ontinuous sine.
Regarding Israeli intelligene apaity, between 2009 and 2013 some 200 inhabitants of Lebanon ating as Israeli
agents providing intelligene to Israeli seurity servies were unovered by Lebanese internal seurity servies. It is
also known that Israel had an extensive information network during the war that enabled it to assassinate politial
and military targets.
7
In his PhD thesis modelling the ows of the Hasbani basin the son of Fadi Comair the General Diretor of the
Department for Hydrauli and Eletrial Resoures omments on the diulties of obtaining data from the Litani
River Authority (Comair 2012, p. 155156). This is from a person that ould not be muh better onneted in
terms of the water setor administration in Lebanon.
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and former diretor of the Beirut water oe, as well as other oials from the administration
(Interview Mahmoud Baroud 2013).
The Frenh draft was the basis for a next draft in Arabi. This draft saw numerous smaller
hanges but was strutured exatly as the rst Frenh draft. The authors also inluded oials
from the Lebanese administration, some of them the same as before  still under guidane from
Frenh experts and still naned by AFD.
The last draft whih was forwarded to the COM in early 2013 departed more substantially from
the earlier Frenh and the Arabi drafts in ontent and struture. Its author was ontrated by the
ministry, on behalf of the minister himself, and reets the vision of the minister who ommissioned
it (Gebran Bassil), while the other drafts reet a more anodyne expert approah and vision.
The water law resusitates the idea of a National Water Counil (NWC), though with a dierent
funtion than originally envisioned for the administrative reform, depending on the draft the
responsibilities of this body would vary. Two important hanges related to the NWC in the
various drafts illustrate the same struggle for aess to and ontrol over administrative resoures
and thus power. These relate to the omposition of the ounil and its responsibilities. Regarding
the hanges in the law proposed in 2013 one informed observer points to the power dynamis
and ommented that minister Bassil wants to have the ministry for himself forever (Interview
Abd el Al 2013). The omment was made in referene to the draft law the minister submitted
to the Counil of Ministers in reation to Frenh onditions attahed to loan for the Keserwan
waste water management projet. It reets the minister's intentions behind the hanges that
were introdued and the fat that the ministry has beome a oveted administrative assets with
gas reserves onrmed o the oast and promising substantial revenues.
Table 4.2 presents the artiles regarding the NWC in the dierent drafts. With regard to the
law this onentration of power beomes visible in the rst paragraph of Artile 2.1.1 in the Frenh
version as ompared to Artile 16 in the Arabi version and Artile 1517 in the last version. In
both the Frenh and the Arabi the NWC is to be presided by the President of the COM (the Prime
Minister). It is made up of the ministers onerned by matters of water resoures, the diretors of
the water establishments, and qualied persons, muniipality representatives, professionals, NGO
representatives, and ivil soiety representatives. Spei deision making mehanisms were not
suggested and would need to be agreed and ratied by deree of the COM. The logi behind this
artile is to make water poliy a national issue and broaden it beyond the ministry and its experts.
In the last draft the ounil is presided over by the Minister of Water and Energy; the Prime
Minister is nowhere mentioned. The ounil is made up only of members that are lower in rank
than the minister. Half ome from the water setor, the others are general diretors from dierent
ministries. Eetively the ounil beomes a tool of the ministry and the minister. Artiles 17 and
18 dene deision making funtions in the ounil and stipulate that deisions are made by vote
with an absolute majority suient for deisions to be taken. With half of the ounil members
being subordinates of the minister, power beomes onentrated in the person of the minister.
8
It
is reasonable to further assume that any outside expert would be vetted by the ministry in order
to potentially ement the minister's power in the ounil.
8
Even where general diretors are loyal to politial leaders opposed to the minister's fation, defying the minister
would in all likelihood produe a politial risis. The balane of power at the larger politial level would have to be
strongly against the minister for suh a senario to take plae.
Suh a dynami was observed when Interior Minister Ziad Baroud saw his requests to the General of the ISF
denied on numerous oasions. This was possible beause said seurity oial had the unwavering support of the
Marh 14 fations while the Interior Minister was part of the fation of the President, who did not have the power
to bak his minister.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Water Law Drafts
Frenh Draft of 10/12/2005 Arabi Draft (funded by
AFD)
Draft proposed in 2013
Setion 2.1.1
The National Water Counil
Artile 13
The National Water Counil
Artile 15
The National Water Counil
A National Water Counil is
reated attahed to the
Presideny of the Counil of
Ministers.
A National Water Counil is
reated attahed to the
Presideny of the Counil of
Ministers.
a) this law stipulates the reation of a
body named the National Water
Counil it has the status of a moral
person and onsists of:
The NWC is presided by the
President of the Counil of
Ministers and is omposed by
the ministers onerned by
water, the general diretors of
the Publi Water
Establishments, qualied
persons and representatives of





The NWC is presided by the
President of the Counil of
Ministers and is omposed by
the ministers onerned by
water, the general diretors of
the Publi Water
Establishments, qualied
persons and representatives of





The Minister of Energy and Water 
president
General Diretor of Energy and Hydrauli
Resoures from the MEW member
General Diretors/Presidents of the
boards of the Publi Water
Establishments  members
President of the board of the LRA 
member
General Diretor of the Ministry of
Agriulture  member
General Diretor form the MOF 
member
General Diretor of the MPH  member
The NWC ontributes to the
denitions of the general
objetives and orientations of
national water poliy. It is
onsulted namely on:
The NWC ontributes to the
denitions of the general
objetives and orientations of
national water poliy. It is
onsulted namely on:
General Diretor of the MOE  member
General Diretor of Urban Planning of
the MPW  member
b) The NWC shall hoose from among its
members a vie president and a seretary.
The priorities for the
objetives and implement the
guidelines following:
The general master plan for
water and basin master plans;
planning and water division
and re-partition projets of
national or regional
importane;
The priorities for the
objetives and implement the
guidelines following:
The general master plan for
water and basin master plans;
planning and water division
and re-partition projets of
national or regional
importane;
) It an selet representatives from ivil
soiety that deal with hydrauli tasks on
the basis of expertise and ompetene and
eieny in this area and are appointed
under a deree issued by the ounil of
ministers.
d) Non governmental representatives
serve a two year term that an be
renewed one.
the orientations and prinipal
deision related to the publi
servies of water supply and
waste water treatment;
the issues mentioned in artile
63 of the present law;
Artile 16
The National Water Counil partiipates
in the following subjets:
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Water Law Drafts
Frenh Draft of 10/12/2005 Arabi Draft (funded by
AFD)
Draft proposed in 2013
taris for water supply and
distribution tax projets and
ontributions of any kind
related to water resoure
management or potentially
having a diret impat on this
management;
law and regulation projets
related to water resoure
management;
the issues mentioned in artile
5.7.2 of the present law;
the strategies and measures
envisioned by the publi
authorities







infrastruture, when they are
likely to aet water resoure
management;
1. Setting a omprehensive plan to
benet/use water resoures in all
Lebanese regions.
2. Deide on a poliy to develop and use
the water resoures in all dierent usages.
3. Deide on plan and programs aiming
to regulate the use of water and prohibit
its waste and minimise onsumption.
4. Projets regulating the distribution of
water of national or regional importane.
The strategies and measures
envisioned by the publi








infrastruture, when they are
likely to aet water resoure
management;
All question onerning water
that the President of the
Counil of Ministers or the
minister harged with water
deem useful and submit to the
NWC, this not being the ase
on the demand of another
minister;
On the request of the
President of the Counil of
Ministers or the Minister of
Energy and Water the NWC
may formulate proposals
relating to researh,
5. Making sure that the state is apable
of naning the plans and projets and
setting the naning program and
dening the soures from the treasury or
from outside.
6. Orientations and deisions that are
hosen by the publi authorities in the
ourse of environmental protetion,
tourism, industry, energy, management of
forestry, and agriultural ativities,
pastoral, shery, urban planning, and
roads when those aet the management
of water resoures.
7. Dene the priorities of projets and
their regional distribution.
all question onerning water
that the President of the
Counil of Ministers or the
minister harged with water
deem useful and submit to the
NWC, this not being the ase
on the demand of another
minister.
On the request of the
President of the Counil of
Ministers or the Minister of
Energy and Water the NWC
may formulate proposals
teahing, training and
information in the eld of
water and, in a general
manner, all proposals that
may improve or failitate the
management of this resoure.
A deree taken by the ounil
of ministers upon the request
of the President of the NWC
will dene the modalities, the
omposition, the organisation
and the funtioning of the
national water ounil.
8. All subjets onerning water and the
minster of energy and water onsiders
beneial to suggest to the ounil will be
addressed.
9. Regulating periodial reports on the
ativities of the ounil and the progress
of work therein. Upon the request of the
minister of energy and water the NWC
may prepare suggestions relating
researh, eduation, training, information
in the eld of water and in general all
suggestion that may improve or failitate
the management of this resoure.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Water Law Drafts
Frenh Draft of 10/12/2005 Arabi Draft (funded by
AFD)
Draft proposed in 2013
relating to researh, teahing,
training and information in
the eld of water and, in a
general manner, all
suggestions/proposals that
may improve or failitate the
management of this resoure.
10. The modalities for running regulating
ativities of the national water ounil by
a deree taken in the ounil of ministers
upon the suggestion of the Minister of
Energy and Water.
A deree taken by the Counil
of Ministers upon the request
of the President of the NWC
will dene the modalities, the
omposition, the organisation
and the funtioning of the
NWC.
Artile 17
The NWC meets upon an invitation of its
president, one every six month at least
and it is possible to organise urgent
meetings when neessary upon the
request of the president of the ounil,
the president presides the session or his
deputy in his absene.
Artile 18
For the meeting of the ounil to be
regular and aepted it is onditional of
the presene of 2/3 of its members
inluding the president or his deputy. The
deision of the ounil are issued by the
majority of the present members in ase
of equality the vote of the president
breaks the tie.
Depending on the draft the same artile denes the responsibilities of the NWC. These dier in
all three drafts. In the Frenh version it needs to be onsulted on tax projets and ontributions of
any nature related to water management or suseptible to have a diret eet on its management
(AFD-ROL 2005). The aim here is to assure oherene in poliy and its implementation. Sine
the ounil is reated attahed to the Counil of Ministers deision making an theoretially be
harmonised with the budgetary proess.
In the Arabi draft all mention of monetary issues are deleted. Its input on tariation is
deleted beause it is regulated in Law 221. The other aspets are omitted beause they are seen to
be part of the normal budgetary proess. The hanges reet the expert approah to the reation of
the draft. As water and legal experts the authors are preoupied with a logially oherent proess
and loal onsiderations of power are not in the foreground (Interview Baroud 2013). They do
not work on the law on behest of one politiian or politial fation with spei interest but in
the framework of the AFD projet that promotes good governane. The expert approah to this
is exemplied by the desription of one oial that was involved: They sent us to Frane on
workshops. They taught us how to write laws orretly (Interview Baroud 2013). In both the
Frenh and the Arabi draft it is not loal power politis that inuene the writing and deisions
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about what to inlude or not, but rather more abstrat visions of ideal state funtioning foused
on private setor partiipation.
The 2013 draft hanges the intended funtion of the NWC. The minister's powers are enhaned
through the ounil as it gains ompetenes to assure funding through the treasury and foreign
soures. These powers are not learly dened in relation to the budgetary proess or the proess
to negotiate foreign loans. Pratially and legally it is the CDR that is tasked with negotiations
onerning projets and assoiated loans. With the mandate to assure funding the NWC would
ompete with the CDR in this realm. The ommentary on the minister's intentions quoted above
point to these dynamis. The law drafting projet beame an opportunity to onentrate his hold
on power and was used as suh by the minister. The opportunity to pass a law to his advantage
emerged from AFD's onditioning of naning for the Keserwan waste water projet (about US$
70 million oupled to a loan of about the same size from the EIB) to the presentation of the law to
the COM. The last draft attempted to expand the ompetenies of the minister by putting him in
a position to bypass the budgetary proess. The ounil was oneived as having the ability and
responsibility to seure funds for planned projets and plans. In this ase the minister's gamble
was unsuessful but had no onsequenes, beause the onditions for the loan onerning the
Keserwan waste water projet were met. The diretor of AFD is well aware of the slow and often
interrupted parliamentary proess (Interview Cassat 2012) and it is thus very possible that the
onditions were designed not to make the projet fail.
The 2013 draft was rejeted by the COM when it was presented in early in the year  even
afterwards the draft was analysed in detail and ritiised to uphold this opposition. The hanges
show very learly how the distribution of power among the deision makers is a point of intense
ontention. This also supports the observations made in the disussion of the administrative reform
eorts, where intentions of the donors and development agenies are subverted in an attempt to
use the projets for the extension or preservation of politial inuene and power. It also shows
that IDC's power to inuene the reform proess is limited. The neoliberalisation proess is in this
ase resisted by the elites in the defene of the setarian patron-lient soial relations.
4.2.6 Reforming Utilities: Tehnial Assistane and Private Setor
Management
Setion 3.3.1.2 of the last hapter elaborated on the tehnial assistane programmes that support
the dierent administrative bodies. Considerable eort is expended with the goal to ommerialise
the RWEs and the setor as a whole. This proess suers from the same onit of interest and is
hampered by the ompeting logis of the IDC and the Lebanese elites. Chapter 2 gave an example
of hiring praties in the Bekaa Water Establishment and how the Lebanese elites interfered in
the employment proess. As a result, the workfore and salary expenses of the establishment
swell without produing an equivalent improvement in produtivity and thus water servies. On
the ontrary it reates a nanial burden on the establishment. Attempts at ommerialising the
water establishment are largely nullied by this employment dynami. The World Bank-funded
Baalbek Water Supply and Waste Water Projet provides other examples from the BWE. The
projet, approved in 2002 and launhed in 2003, aimed at:
1) Strengthening the apaity of the BWE whih merged the Baalbek Hermel Water
(BHWIA) and Irrigation Water Authority, Zahleh Water Authority and Chamsine
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Water Authority; 2) improving aess of BHWIA ustomers to satisfatory water supply
and waste water servies through house onnetions and extension of network; and
3) improving eieny by involving the private setor in operation and maintenane
(O&M) through a Servie Contrat. (World Bank, 2012a, p.3)
Like most World Bank projets it ombined both an infrastruture omponent with a tehnial
assistane and apaity building omponent. The physial work of the projet was ompleted early.
The projet lasted from 2003 to 2012. It was extended a number of times from its original planned
ompletion date in 2006 in an attempted to ahieve the objetives of the projet. The infrastruture
omponent and the apaity building omponents were onneted in so far as the implementation
of a water metering strategy (the physial installation of meters) and the introdution of taris was
to eventually help the BWE improve its nanial situation. Aording to the projet ompletion
report it did not ahieve its goals. Not even half of the expeted number of meters were installed.
But even those that were are not read by the BWE beause no tari law was passed by the
government, ontrary to what was expeted at the time the projet was oneived. Of the 73,640
individuals reeiving water through the projet (i.e. 14,728 households), the BWE estimates that
only 9,793 households are legally subsribed with the remainder illegally onneted or beneting
from the improved network without paying (World Bank, 2012a, p. v). In the report the operation
of the BWE was estimated to be equally dependent on subsidies from the entral government or
other external soures as before. The reasons for this are well aptured in the report itself and
illustrate the dynamis disussed above:
The appraisal team may have avoided mention of the politial dynamis of the region for
ountry relationship reasons. While understandable, they underestimated the inuene
that loal politis might play in delaying loal development plans and in inuening
household deision making. This beame partiularly evident in two ways: rst, a
stando at the Iaat Treatment Plant as a result of farmers opposed to the redireting
of untreated waste water from their elds to the treatment plant and seond, the lag in
subsriptions where households beneting from the water but not paying found politial
protetion against non-payment penalties. (World Bank, 2012a, p. 12)
Other omponents were judged equally unsuessful. The institutional development omponent
whih relied on the reation of a omprehensive ve year business plan to provide the guidane and
planning to improve the establishment fell short of boosting the institutional apaity of the BWE
given the delay in appointing permanent leadership and the weakness of enabling environment
(World Bank, 2012a, p. 16). As a onsultant on the projet ommented: The business plan is
not the problem, people know what needs to be done. It is the implementation that is muh more
problemati. The politial will is missing (Interview Yazbek 2011).
The projet shows how the interferene of politial patrons in order to maintain their ties to
their onstitueny prevented the BWE from inreasing its revenue. The dynami desribed here
is one where the politial patron guarantees subsidies from the government to his lient base. The
projet design threatened these dynamis. It ultimately failed to transform the establishment into
a ommerially operating utility beause it did not take these dynamis into aount and was not
able to sever the links between lient and patron.
Christel Alles makes a similar argument in her analysis of the eets of the private management
ontrat for the Tripoli water oe (2012). She shows how the existing lientelist networks showed
a remarkable resiliene and that the attempted ommerialisation of the oe did not displae the
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inuene of the patrons. The lientelist networks were reshaped in part beause leadership in the
ity was being ontested at the time and in part beause the private ompany (Ondeo) introdued
new management tehniques that required adaption from the politial leaders. She writes that
one aim of the private rm was to establish a new relationship between the water authority and
the ustomers. Indeed, some of the ations of the private rm ould be understood as an attempt
to turn the lients of a patron into the ustomers of a rm (Alles, 2012, p. 401). The politial
impliations are the same as in the ase of the World Bank projet in the Bekaa. These eorts
did not remain unontested. The ompany was not always able to resist overtures by the varying
patrons who attempted to inuene its hiring praties and attempted to provide protetion for
non-paying users. The eorts of Ondeo were also met by resistane from within the water oe
who drew on its ontratual rights and subjeted the ompany to a lengthy internal audit in an
attempt to establish its position vis-a-vis the ompany (Alles, 2012). The unertainty in the legal
framework for publi/private partnerships did not protet it from the inuene of politial powers
nor the slow politial proess that it viewed as the soure of its problems. Thus after losses and
ontratual penalties of about US$ 600,000 or about 5 perent of the ontrat value the ompany
deided not to renew the ontrat (Interview Yabroudi 2010).
4.3 The State of the Water Setor after 20 Years of Reforms
The goal of the reform proesses desribed above was the improvement of the water resoure
management proesses. The reform did not turn out as hoped for by the IDC. A look at the
state of the water setor after 20 years of reform will further indiate how suessful or not these
were. The extraordinary irumstanes of the immediate post-war period set the baseline very low
with whih to ompare the eorts of the last 20 years. Improvements were virtually inevitable,
but the pae of physial improvement of infrastruture systems and the resiliene of the strutural
problems of the setor suggest that the results of twenty years of reform are rather poor.
Water supply has improved over the period of study, areas in Keserwan that suered from severe
shortages for example now have regular and more dependable water after the onstrution of the
Chabrouh Dam and the distribution network. In Tripoli water supply improved as well and during
the operations of Ondeo even reahed a point where many areas reeived water ontinuously by
the end of the ontrat period. Quality of servie though deteriorated slightly afterwards. Saida
also saw improvements and many parts of the ity have a onstant water supply. Waste water
management also saw improvements though at a muh slower rate. In 2011 waste water treatment
eieny in Lebanon was estimated at below 8 perent (MEW, 2010a). The national water setor
strategy published in 2010 nds following issues with the infrastruture:
 Ineient and poorly maintained systems and networks, leading to high losses and supply
interruptions, with a limited fous on demand management.
 Low overage of waste water networks and severe shortage in treatment eieny.
Infrastruture rehabilitation, network extension, and improvements started very early but projets
experiened delays almost immediately. To this day, infrastruture projets fall prey to the politial
wrangling of ompeting elites and as a result tend to experiene serious delays, ost overruns, and
other problems.
The administrative situation ontributes to diulties with the prodution of infrastruture.
Quality and maintenane are important aspets of this but ontratual issues ome into play as
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well. In general the RWEs suer from very similar problems as the 21 water oes before them.
None of the water establishments are in a position to full their mission; they operate water supply
servies, but do not have the apaities to manage irrigation, nor to manage waste water operations.
They do not have enough qualied sta and usually have very high numbers of unqualied sta.
The MEW has a vaany rate of 87 perent for qualied sta suh as engineers and aountants,
aording to one of the authors of the NWSS (Interview Tayar 2012). It also fouses more on
operation and maintenane of infrastruture than strategi planning as it should aording to Law
221.
The improvements that an be named are at the level of aounting (at least for most RWE)
where modern aounting methods were introdued with the neessary IT infrastruture and
software. Similarly, inventories of existing infrastruture were updated and digitised using GIS
systems. In both ases a lot of the sta responsible for these operation is naned via ontrating
ompanies. Nevertheless full-time employment levels in all RWEs have improved. In the SLWE for
example employment levels of permanent full-time sta had reahed 218 in 2008 ompared to 681
total sta raising the ratio to 32 perent from a disturbingly low level of 12 perent in 2005. It was
set to reah a level of 41 perent or 327 employees by 2011 and maintain these work fore levels. The
SLWE also outsoured Finane/Aounting, as well as the Billing and Colletion funtions (DAI
- Development Alternatives, In., 2008, p. 20). These improvements are not to be overlooked and
represent important inreases in operational and management apaity  even with all the aveats
about the qualiations of employees and the lient-patron nature of the employment proess. In
this sense the eorts of GIZ and DAI-USAID and the ommerialisation they push forward need to
be understood as a suess and even as a positive outome of the neoliberalisation proess. There
is learly an urgent need for the utilities to operate more eiently, whether then full-ost reovery
priniples need to be implemented and what kind of subsidisation an mediate the impat on more
vulnerable parts of soiety is a dierent question. The involvement of the IDC helps prevent a
more drasti deterioration of water resoure management.
Of the water establishments only the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment fully overs
its maintenane and operations ost. The northern establishment is also reasonably balaned
regarding its operation and maintenane ost. The southern and the espeially the Bekaa estab-
lishments are in worse shape nanially. None of the oes are apable of naning their own
investments. UfW averages around 50 perent, and is at the same levels as at the end of the war.
Not all the water is lost in the network, this is also importantly related to the low user-fee-olletion
rates that range from 18 perent in the Bekaa to 62 perent in the BMTLWE (MEW, 2010b, p.
10). A signiant part of the water produed is not aounted for beause nobody pays for it.
One of the more glaring failures of the last two deades is the failure to reate a ontinuously
up-to-date database regarding water resoures. The extensive network of weather stations that was
built before the war was virtually non-existent by its end. A very few stations were still measuring
preipitation, Kunigk writes that Lebanon does not have a large number of rainfall stations and
of its 140 stations only seven have data sets that over the last 30 years (Kunigk, 1999, p.13) By
the end of the 1990s no more than 12 aross the ountry were in plae and by 2013 the number
had risen to a maximum of 24 (see Shaban, 2009). Of 89 disharge measuring station on rivers




Observations on the ground though suggest that even at least some of those that were onsidered operational
were only suient to measure an order of magnitude. Untrained and uninterested personnel are another fator of
unertainty regarding the measurements available (Interview Renk 2011).
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with support from USAID installed a number on the Litani and the Hasbani.
It is only with the funding of the Italian government through the UNDP that a projet for the
assessment of groundwater and a water database was launhed in 2011. This projet is limited
due to the lak of funds, no monitoring wells were drilled and installed but rather testing and
measuring (with little renovation) of publi wells substituted for a more extensive and in-depth
program (Interview Khayat 2012). Most experts agree that the quality of the available data is
poor. The models that are produed are at best questionable beause they use data of dubious
quality. Given the US$ 2 billion estimated apital investment by the state in the setor it seems
bordering on the absurd that no funds were diverted for up-to-date hydrogeologial studies, a
network of limnigraphs and weather stations, and other neessary investigations to produe reliable
and reasonably aurate data onerning water resoures. The prie tag of suh an operation is
variable and depends on the level of auray and the volume and the up-to-dateness of the data
points. But it is lear that reasonably robust data and a monitoring system ould have been
produed at a minusule fration of the money spent and wasted in the setor.
At least this would have improved the negotiating positions with regard to transboundary water
ourses, in the north the rivers shared with Syria and Turkey and in the south the Hasbani owing
into what is urrently Israel, and more importantly groundwater owing south. It would ertainly
have ontributed to an improvement in infrastruture planning and had the potential to avoid the
risks assoiated with investments suh as the Jannah Dam.
Setor performane has improved, but upon deeper analysis this statement proves to be vauous
beause of the very low baseline from whih setor redevelopment/rehabilitation started. The
strutural problems with the administration and with the management of water resoures in general
remain. To quote the NWSS again:
 The implementation of the reform law has been initiated but not fully onluded;
 The transfer of funtions to the four WEs has been subjet to several delays;
 The WEs are not yet empowered to at with full administrative and nanial autonomy;
 The legal text to organise the work of MEW, has not been developed yet;
 MEW's eorts are still dediated to apital projets and operation and maintenane;
 WEs suer from a shortage of funds and tehnial sta.
(MEW, 2010b, p.15)
The list reads similar to the listings from the assessments of the early 1990s. As I have shown in
the two previous hapters it was both earlier rounds of neoliberalisation and the Lebanese soio-
politial power strutures that are at the root of this state of aairs. The reform did not bring
about the promised improvement, and the reason, as it was 20 years ago, is the lak of private
setor partiipation and enouragement aording to the authors of the NWSS and the IDC. The
same ideology is mobilised as solutions to solve the problems that were in no small part reated
by its earlier appliation.
4.4 Geographial Reonguration
Yet the reform did produe hanges. The most obvious result of Law 221 was the geographial
re-organisation of the setor. This resaling of governane in itself is a substantial hange. It also
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represents an important alteration of the division of power in the setor, even if the RWEs territorial
ontrol is not omplete. In all four a number of water ommittees keep operating outside of the
ontrol of the RWEs. Fnaydeq, a little village in the north (Alles and Puig 2011), and Arsal, a town
(Riahi, 2013) in the eastern Bekaa, are two suh examples. Interviewees have reported similar
inidenes in all four regions and RWEs. The reform law deentralised the water setor on paper.
Theoretially and legally the RWEs are autonomous from the MEW, subjet only to budgetary
oversight. This was supposed to represent a resaling from the entral ontrol that the MEW had
over the 21 water oes. But the mehanisms of aess to and ontrol over the administration,
as a power resoure, were maintained despite the reform. While legally water management has
been deentralised the new geographial division of the administrative boundaries represents a
onentration of that power in fewer politial leaders.
4.4.1 Topography and History: Boundary dening elements
The spei geographial division of the RWEs originates not solely from politial onsiderations
but reets the shape of the early water oes and their servie areas (see Figures 4.3 and 4.2).
It is related to administrative boundaries and the topographial, even hydrogeologial properties
of the landsape. The Lyonnaise des Eaux report of 1994 attempts a ategorisation of the water
oes' servie areas. It divides the territories of the oes into those that result from histori
irumstanes suh as the purhase of older onessions and existing supply systems, those that
result form the superposition with administrative boundaries of azas and mohafazaat (Arabi:
governorates), and some that are a produt of the two. Administrative boundaries are equally
the result of the interation of soial fores (history), but in the report the dierene is made
between infrastruture projets linked to spei onessions, and purely administrative boundaries
(Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p. 33).
Table 4.3: Summary of Typology of Oes
Administrative Atypial Hydrologial
Bharre Qobbayat Nabaa el Kadi
Batroun Saida Nabaa el Tasseh
Nabaa el Ghar Zahleh Chamsine
Jbeil Tripoli






Soure: Reprodued from Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994, p. 33.
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Figure 4.2: Watershed, Administrative boundaries and Rivers
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The report ontinues its desription of the oes and their areas of responsibilities with
examples of what it alls inoherenes that neessitate the readjustments of the perimeters.
For example, the water oes of Beirut and Ain el Delbe were supplying the same streets on the
border of their perimeters, so did the oes in Saida and Nabaa el Tasseh. The Zahleh oe was
singled out for its partiularly atypial geographial extension. The report noted that its baroque
form renders its management arobati (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a, p.33). The area
was onsidered large, but its limit did not orrespond to either the boundaries of the aza or the
watershed, it followed the muniipal boundaries. The Chamsine water oe also did not follow
either aza or watershed boundaries. The boundary shared with the Zahleh water oe runs along
the Litani river for the most part, but deviates to the east and the west oasionally (see Figure
4.2).
The report does not spend muh time on the analysis of the geographi extension of the
oes, and misses the overlap between administrative boundaries and rivers. Muniipal boundaries
generally, with few exeptions, run along rivers. The administrative boundaries divide watersheds
into left and right banks. Conversely, in a majority of ases muniipal boundaries do not follow
watershed limits but rather inorporate them, with exeption of the larger east-west divide along
the peaks of the Mount Lebanon range where administrative boundaries are largely ongruent with
the mountain rest. These divisions translate to larger sale administrative boundaries and the
limits of the azas and mohafazaat often follow rivers. Figure 4.2 shows that with the exeption
of the upper Litani and the northern Bekaa, as well as the boundary between the azas Saida and
Nabatieh, this holds true for the whole territorial administrative division.
The histori dynamis are alluded to by Kaufman (2006). Analysing the Chebaa Farms border
dispute
10
he explains that the Frenh olonial experts who delineated the border to Syria were
trained to view watersheds as natural boundaries. Thus in delineating the border in the south
they disregarded loal ownership laims, farming praties, and related water use patterns. The
border was delineated along the ridge instead of along the stream further south in the valley.
While he is onerned with the border region only, the loal praties he desribes seem to apply
throughout the ountry. The delineation of ommunal lands aording to suh a logi allowed
aess to streams and rivers to left and right riparian ommunities.
A look at the topography supports the argument. Most of the Lebanese waterways, espeially
the oastal rivers, run in deep ravines with extremely steep slopes that are the result of the erosion
of karsti rok formations. In many ases villages are built on or just under the ridges with
onsiderable vertial distane to the rivers. But even in the Bekaa where the land is relatively at,
very little is built immediately on any river and usually also at a safe elevation away from it.
4.4.2 New Administrative Boundaries
The topography and the historial formation of the administrative boundaries thus determined the
exat ourse of the boundaries of the 21 water oes. Law 221 would regroup these 21 oes into
rst ve and then four Regional Water Establishments. This proess was governed by two fators.
The rst was the territorial politis of the ountry, related to the setarian and lientelist power
onsiderations that are so entral to the Lebanese politial eonomy. The seond was the searh for
10
The Chebaa Farms is still oupied by Israel. The Israeli government laims that the area is Syrian and thus it
does not need to be returned to Lebanon. Based on this view it onsiders that it has returned all Lebanese lands
formerly under oupation. The Lebanese and Syrian governments present a dierent view. Transboundary water
issues are part of this dispute. For an in-depth disussion of the water issues between Israel and Lebanon (see
Zeitoun et al., 2012a).
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eieny gains through eonomies of sale with a view towards planed privatisation. The RWEs
thus also needed a large enough user base to oer the possibility to generate suient revenues
and by extension prots.
A law from 1972 reated ve RWEs  Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North, South, and the Bekaa
 along the administrative boundaries of the mohafazaat. The law was never enated, in all
likelihood beause of the onset of the war. When the post-war reform projet was launhed the
rst laws restruturing the setor  ratied in 1996 but never instituted  produed a dierent
ve-fold division of the water establishments. Beirut was integrated with Mount Lebanon, the
Bekaa was divided into North Bekaa and South Bekaa, and the North and South RWEs remained
as proposed in the 1972 law. Ghiotti (Ghiotti, 2004) mentions disussions about divisions into two
larger territories in the period between 1998 and 1999 but these ame to nothing.
11
Law 221/2000
initially inherited the ve fold division but was in the same year amended to regroup the two
establishments of the Bekaa into one (see Annex 2).
4.4.2.1 The Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment
That the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment would have the highest population density
was inevitable. To separate Beirut from its immediate surroundings would have been tehnially
impratial onsidering that the Beirut water oe (WO) (see Figure 4.3) with about 1,250,000
inhabitants had about 181,000 subsriptions, and drew water from the surrounding mountains as
far away as Keserwan in the north, Damour in the south, and the Metn in the east (Fayad, Mallat,
Freiha & Khoury, 1996). It also provided water to parts of the suburbs that were legally under
the purview of the Ain el Delbe water oe. The BMTLWE was thus at least partially welded
together by the existing infrastruture (in this sense the infrastruture ertainly had some ageny).
To this arrangement of four water oes the Jbeil Water Oe and Barouk Water Commission
were added.
The Barouk WO was large in surfae area and ompared to the other oes (exept Beirut) also
rather populous, with around 55,000 - 57,000 onnetions (and up to 400,000500,000 inhabitants).
It was also, with Beirut, one of the very few nanially viable operations. The Barouk WO serves
the azas Aley and the Shouf two areas that are the Druze heartland and it ertainly had this
setarian aliation. Its integration into the BMTLWE is also the reason why Walid Joumblat,
as the most prominent Druze leader, was opposed to and questioned the neessity of the reform
(Kunigk, 1999). He did not have anything to gain and ertainly lost inuene,
12
as other leaders
were more likely to be able to plae their lieutenants in a leadership position in this establishment.
Aording to a number of interviewees the diretor and president of the board is an ally to Mihel
Murr, long time Minister of the Interior and an important Maronite Christian Za'im in the Metn
area.
11
One version was a division into east and west with the water divide along the Mount Lebanon range being the
limit and another option was north and south divided. He does not provide a referene for this, and though he
provides a disussion of the reason these proposal failed  essentially the impossibility to even give a semblane of
regional balane  it seems unlikely that these were ever more than negotiation strategies (Ghiotti, 2004).
12
Though politial fores still manage to have water intended for domesti use in Zahleh (in the Bekaa) soured
in the Barouk be deviated in substantial amounts for use in irrigation along the way (Interview Majdelani 2012).
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Figure 4.3: Administrative boundaries of the water setor before and after 2000
The Ain el Delbe WO was the seond largest oe in terms of subsriptions and population
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served (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994a). The area with a majority Shi`a population was
politially dominated by Hezbollah and the Amal party. Its integration was politially balaned
by appointing its diretor to the same position in the South LebanonWater Establishment (SLWE).
4.4.2.2 The South Lebanon Water Establishment
The SLWE inludes the Mohafazaat Saida, Nabatieh, and Sour. It oversees a strategi area for
Hezbollah and its ally Amal.
13
The Shi`a set also forms the largest setarian group in this area.
Its largest ity and the seat of the SLWE's main oe is a majority Sunni area whih was at the
time politially dominated by the Hariri family (Sunni). Nevertheless, in order to maintain the
setarian balane the SLWE was put under the politial ontrol of Nabih Berri, Shi`a and leader
of the Amal party. With the Counil of the South and the Litani River Authority the SLWE
omplemented the administrative inuene whih the speaker of parliament yields over the south
of Lebanon.
The example of the SLWE allows to show what is (or an be) at stake in these politial divisions.
The war of 2006 was onentrated on the south. The destrution in general and to the water
infrastruture was onsiderable; many villages were without water or had a very limited supply at
the end of the war. The situation was made worse by the very limited power supply that redued
pumping apabilities.
14
Basi rehabilitation and reonstrution had a ertain urgeny, but the
diretor's request for reonstrution funds was rebued by the Marh 14 ontrolled government.
In an attempt to shift the politial burden of the war onto Hezbollah and Amal by delaying
the reonstrution the government hannelled funds through other administrative bodies. The
SLWE had to rely on the Counil of the South, itself without large funds but better staed than
the establishment, as well as on the humanitarian agenies and international donors in order to
rehabilitate servie in the area (see Alles, 2010; Zeitoun et al., 2012a, 2014, Interview Ahmad
Nizzam 2011).
4.4.2.3 The Bekaa Water Establishment
The ombination of what was to be the north and south Bekaa establishments brought together
the water oes of Baalbek-Hermel, Zahleh, and Chamsine. In the original ve-fold onguration
of Law 221/2000, the water oe of Baalbek-Hermel  whih manages a majority Shi`a area
with a strong presene of Hezbollah, as well as a strong inuene by the loal lans and families 
would have been transformed into a standalone establishment. Its situation was already very bad
before the reform and it would have remained the most dysfuntional operation, tehnially and
eonomially. In order to make it viable (or more viable), nanially and in terms of expertise,
it was joined to the Zahleh and Chamsine water oes, both of whih generated revenues above
expenses (Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez 1994a). The main oe is situated in the regional apital
Zahleh and the diretor is said to be allied to Elias Ska, loal Christian Melkite Za'im, and
owner of the largest agriultural land holdings in the Bekaa (more than 3,000 ha aording to one
agriultural engineer (Interview Ghadban 2011). This politial division of the area also goes a long
way in explaining why the diretor's position was only oupied by 2010.
The fat that the number of employees of the water ommissions in the Bekaa rose drastially
between 2000 and 2005  ommissions with 12 employees all of a sudden had 30 (interview Yazbek
13
The formerly oupied south is an area in whih Hezbollah has a strong armed presene and network of hidden
military bases.
14
(see Zeitoun et al., 2012b, 2014 for a more detailed desription of the damages to water systems)
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2011), in turn an be interpreted as the indemniation to parties that lost some of their inuene
in this reorganisation.
4.4.2.4 The North Lebanon Water Establishment
The North Lebanon Water Establishment regrouped eight water oes. Of these three were
responsible for Christian dominated areas (Bharre, Batroun, and Zgharta) the other ve and
the apital of the north Tripoli are majority Sunni areas. Aordingly, it remained under the
inuene of Sunni notables from Tripoli. With that the required setarian balane aross the four
RWEs was established, the largest Christian and Muslim sets eah retained one establishment.
In Tripoli the reation of the water establishment oinided with the waning of the inuene of
the Karami politial dynasty. In this ase it allowed the replaement of the old diretor with one
allied to a dierent patron (Alles 2012). The restruturing of the water setor opened the door for
a reonguration of territorial inuene at a loal level.
The restruturing of the water setor thus did produe hanges in the distribution of power.
With the ontrol over the oes omes the ability to prioritise repair and to a muh more limited
degree invest in projets, as well as to grant favours. The establishments also provide a pool
of job opportunities in ertain areas that an be distributed aording to the Zu'ama's needs
when the opportunity arises. But ontrol over the establishments is not total and varies with the
politial strength of the respetive politial leaders, suh as in the Bekaa for example. Some water
ommission are still operating and not integrated into the water establishment and these ollet
fees while the establishment does all the infrastruture and exploitation work (Interview Yazbek
2011). Alles (2012) points to similar dynamis in the ase of Tripoli where the hanging politial
landsape at the national level gives the dierent politial elites also some modium of inuene.
In general the negotiations are often more dynami and our aross setors. A ommunity with
politial protetion an limit an establishment's power to at without neessarily having inroads
into the establishment, as was the ase with the Baalbek Water and Waste Water Projet where
farmers repeatedly broke the waste water olletor to ontinue irrigation of their elds.
Finally, in a similar manner to the legal and administrative aspets of the reform, the spei
geographial reorganisation of the setor reets the Lebanese onsideration of setarian balane
and related power struggles. Only two of the RWEs reated ould potentially attrat investors,
whereas the BWE and the SLWE do not oer the neessary opportunities for prot. The SGBL
study to assess the possibility for private setor involvement, ommissioned by the High Counil
of Privatisation and published in 2003, proposed a strategy that divided the ountry into one
or two zones. The onsultant reommended the former, but proposed as a seond strategy for
spatial organisation a division in a northern and a southern zone that would see the division of
the BMTLWE to make eah zone nanially viable (Freiha, 2009, p.13). There is tehnially no
reason why a territory the size of Lebanon ould not be managed by one single administrative
unit responsible for the whole territory exept for the politial onsiderations of the elite. The
division of the water setor administration into four utilities is a ompromise between the logi
of privatisation and the neessary eonomis of sale related to improvements in eieny, and
the Lebanese logi of division of power. But as suggested by the results of the SGBL study, this
ompromise of Lebanese politial requirements undermined the pro-privatisation designs of the
reform eorts.
Chapter 5
A Politial Eologial of the
Reonstrution of the Water Setor
In this nal hapter I omplete the analysis of the Lebanese hydrosoial yle. I elaborate on the
interation of bio-physial proesses with soio-eonomi and infrastruture development proesses.
The analysis will show how atually existing neoliberalism shaped the eonomy, foused it on
the tertiary setor  servies, trade, banking and real estate  and strutured it against the
produtive setors, speially agriulture. Spatially this manifested as a perpetuation of an uneven
geographial development that was already a feature of the pre-war era. Spatially development
entred on urban areas and espeially Beirut while rural eras remained negleted.
I will desribe how these dynamis aeted water use patterns in the domesti and agriultural
water setor to the advantage of the wealthier lasses, while on average and depending on the
loation the more underprivileged setions of the populations struggle to seure water for domesti
use and are less likely to have aess to irrigation. The proess that emerged produed severe
eologial degradation and is soially unjust. With this in mind I will demonstrate that the
IDC-naned infrastruture projets did not manage to mitigate the ontinued pollution and over-
abstration of the resoure.
5.1 Uneven Development
The physial entre-piee of Hariri's reonstrution strategy was the Beirut Central Distrit projet
Solidere. Ideas and dreams of a new downtown, an anient ity for the future, were not new;
Hariri already had drawn up plans and models of his vision for Beirut in the early 1980s (Baumann,
2012; Verdeil, 2002). The ontinuation of the war put these plans on hold. But when in the early
1990s peae was nally ahieved, the projet was to be the jewel in the rown of the tax haven
that Lebanon was to beome. It would be the spae where the global elites would manage apital
ows to the Arab world and wealthy tourists would ome to spend their summers and their money;
at least in theory and in terms of marketing. As a projet it meant expropriating owners, against
often meagre ompensation, by transferring ownership rights to a private ompany (Summer, 2005).
This ompany managed the development of the Beirut Central Distrit. This type of development
was not unique, muh rather is was fully in line with neoliberal praties of ity building. Sholars
(Brenner & Theodore, 2005; Smyth, 2013) have desribed how proesses of neoliberalisation have
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seen the mushrooming of urban agship projets around the globe, advertised by loal and national
governments with the prolaimed aim to prot from global nanial ows.
In Lebanon this projet served two purposes. On the one hand it produed large rents for
Hariri and parts of the governing elite  as a prime example of aumulation by dispossession (see
Baumann, 2012; Leenders, 2004a; S. Makdisi, 1997). On the other hand it ated as a prism to fous
reonstrution eorts. As a projet it was part of the larger vision for Lebanon aording to whih,
and as a priority, the ountry and the apital had to be brought bak onto the map as a destination.
While the projet did fae some loal opposition, it arried the torh of hope for a return to
wealth and fame. In fat, it symbolises the whole reonstrution: run by a former ontrator,
geographially entred on Beirut and eonomially embraing the real estate and banking setors.
It beame the island of high-end development and onsumption, and its soial exlusiveness reets
the lass harater of the reonstrution proess.
5.1.1 The Lebanese Eonomy
This vision guiding reonstrution was inspired by a neoliberal ideology of open markets and free
apital ows. How the nanial setor was revitalised and what this meant for government nanes
was explained in Chapter 3. This setion will analyse how this development strategy translated
and shaped the other setors of the eonomy.
One of the entral aspets of the aumulation regime and of the eonomi development strategy
was the exhange ratebased stability mehanism to attrat apital inows from abroad. This had
eets on the struture of the eonomy. Charbel Nahas (2009) writes that:
Lebanon shows, with some partiular modalities, a sever ase of what eonomists all
the Duth disease. This generi name applies to a situation where massive inows
of funds, generally but not neessarily related to very large exports of raw materials,




In Lebanon it is ontinuous emigration that has produed a sizeable expatriate population whih
generates large amounts of apital ows from abroad. Foreign aid and FDI omplement remittanes
and the repatriation of prots from Lebanese abroad to balane the urrent aount deit. This
deit is also a strutural feature of the Lebanese eonomy and is related to the import of onsumer
goods. As a perentage of GDP the urrent aount deit was estimated at 33 perent in 1997,
it dropped to 18.8 perent in 2002 but rose again and has been in the range of 25 perent to 30
perent in the years from 20072010 (Kasparian, 2011, p. 71).
The high interest rates that were to entie apital to nd its way to Lebanon also direted
investment away from produtive setors into banking, real estate, and trade. The eonomy was
strutured with the tertiary setor at the entre.
This is reeted in the break-down of the national aounts and represented in GDP numbers
(See Table 5.1). Over the last deade the role of the tertiary setor has inreased its ontribution
to GDP, rising from 60 perent in the mid 1990s to 66.55 perent by 2010. The importane of the
real estate setor needs to be highlighted, it is driven by mostly speulative dynamis.
An indiation is given by the relative ontribution of onstrution to GDP whih inreased
from 8.8 in 1997 perent to 15 perent in 2010 (see table 5.1). It did so with every revival of the
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Table 5.1: Setoral Contribution to GDP in US$ billion
Setor 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agriulture and Livestok 1.08 1.06 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.08 1.10 1.16 1.37 1.37 1.56 1.76 1.77 1.76
Energy and Water Supply 0.15 0.26 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.02 -0.17 -0.26 -0.34 -0.89 -0.58 -0.98
Industry 2.02 2.16 2.06 1.97 2.00 2.07 2.16 2.34 2.33 2.18 2.37 2.35 2.64 2.66
Constrution 1.42 1.69 1.40 1.35 1.43 1.43 1.45 1.64 1.76 1.94 2.69 4.04 4.66 5.65
Transportation 0.87 0.99 1.24 1.37 1.39 1.60 1.67 1.87 1.94 1.91 2.07 2.24 2.27 2.05
Market Servies 5.38 5.77 5.94 6.06 6.11 6.55 6.97 7.36 7.57 8.02 8.65 9.94 11.00 12.42
Trade 3.41 3.54 3.51 3.35 3.44 4.16 4.54 5.24 5.07 5.03 5.70 7.82 9.73 10.22
Government 1.77 1.87 1.94 1.96 2.07 2.11 2.13 2.18 2.21 2.24 2.36 2.83 3.17 3.36
Total GDP 16.09 17.35 17.40 17.27 17.66 19.16 20.09 21.80 21.87 22.45 25.06 30.09 34.66 37.14
GDP real growth perent 4 3.6 -0.5 1.3 4 3.4 3.2 7.5 1 0.6 7.5 9.3 8.5 7
Agriulture perent of GDP 6.71 6.09 6.20 6.24 5.86 5.66 5.49 5.30 5.25 6.12 6.22 5.84 5.09 4.74
Constrution perent of GDP 8.82 9.74 8.06 7.81 8.10 7.44 7.23 7.50 8.05 8.65 10.73 13.43 13.44 15.21
Tertiary Setor perent of GDP 60.04 59.42 61.45 62.44 61.96 64.21 65.62 66.38 66.68 66.68 65.50 66.46 66.36 66.47
Soure: (Eonomi Aounts Mission, 2010; Kasparian, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011)
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eonomy, after the slump of late 1990s, buoyed by Arab apital redireted after September 11,
2001 for fear of seizure in western eonomies, and more so after the Iraq war in 2003. The post
2006 war destrution and reonstrution also helped to raise real estate pries. Finally the global
nanial risis of 20072008 also redireted Gulf apital towards Lebanon in searh of lost prot
margins (see Fig. 5.8). When onstrution projets with a umulative worth of many hundreds of
billions of dollars were anelled in the Gulf Arab ountries (Ahar, 2013, p.61) FDI to Lebanon
almost doubled between 2006 and 2009 from US$ 2.6 billion to US$ 4.8 billion (ESCWA, 2009).
The market servies setor, whih inludes the real estate setor, has grown ontinuously, even
in the years when tourists stayed away beause of internal onits and instability or war. In all
likelihood this reets the growing debt servie, the substantial rises in property pries, and the
prots that derive from these. Its share of GDP varies with the ups and downs of the eonomy
but remains around 33 perent. Trade is the next largest setor and has inreased its share of
GDP from just under 20 perent to about 28 perent in the period from 19972000. This is related
to the demand reated by the inow of remittanes, as well as to the monopolies and oligopolies
proteted by the elite.
The produtive setors in turn were not the fous of eonomi development strategy. The
industrial setor relative ontribution to GDP has dereased sine 1997, and it has been muh
more exposed to the vagaries of the politial and seurity limate. An exeption to this rule is the
onrete market where three Lebanese produers enjoy state protetion shielding the produers
from imports (see also The Daily Star, 2013a).
More important for this disussion of water resoure management is the agriultural setor.
While it has also grown in terms of value, its share of GDP has onstantly dereased. The neglet of
the setor has been observed by many and as a former minister puts it: nobody ares (Interview
Cortas 2011). This in itself represents a water resoure management hoie, as related to the
neoliberal projet, and to the wealth transfer proess and the rent reation mehanisms disussed
earlier (see Setion 3.1.2).
5.2 Infrastruture and Development Planning
Before turning to the geographial and eologial analysis of the eets of the eonomi development
strategy a brief analysis of infrastruture development and prodution is in order. The Horizon
2000 plan was the doument that framed and laid out the tehnial details of the vision for the
future of Lebanon. The reonstrution and development plan laid out in this doument was to:
serve as a atalyst for the reovery proess, providing through the Horizon 2000 pro-
gramme essential publi servies and failities, and supporting an eonomi and soial
environment in whih the private setor, and all Lebanese, may grasp reovery and
development opportunities. (CDR, 1993, in Najem, 2000, p. 59)
The rst reonstrution eorts were launhed under the National Emergeny Reonstrution
Programme. This projet or plan was the result of a ollaboration of the World Bank, UNDP,
and the CDR based on an early and rapid assessment of war damages arried out by Hariri's
onstrution ompany Oger. The Horizon 2000 plan inorporated this work and presented a ten-
year reonstrution and development strategy and master plan.
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As a plan it took into onsideration balaned regional development, whih was onstitutionally
required after Taef. Investment plans did projet a regionally relatively balaned expenditure
plan; real investment, however, entred on Beirut and foused on basi physial infrastruture.
This maroephaly was further enouraged by the government's support to the private setor
and eetively entred development in and around Beirut (Najem, 2000).
At the time total ost of the programme was estimated at US$ 11.672 billion  onstant
1992 dollar  out of whih US$ 10.2 billion was earmarked for physial investment, US$ 270
million was alloated to non-physial investment onerned with programme management and
administrative support, and US$ 1.19 billion was planned as grant and redit support to the
private setor (CDR, 1993, p.9). The plan was projeted to be implemented between 19942004,
while atual osts onsidering ination was estimated at US$ 14.4 billion in addition to US$ 4.1
billion related to budget deits and debt repayment.
The engineers of the plan very optimistially expeted more than half of this to be soured from
budget surpluses that were to materialise starting in 1996 based on estimated average growth rates
of around 9 perent. Dibeh (Dibeh, 2005) makes an argument that these estimations were sensible
beause they were based on the planned investments in infrastruture and the ontributions to GDP
these should generate. But these preditions should rather be read as utopian dreams of growth,
beause the assumptions very learly did not take into onsideration the geopolitial dynamis of
the region. They were overly optimisti given that the south was still oupied by Israel, that the
rest of the ountry was oupied by Syria, and the situation in Palestine remained unertain and
this notwithstanding the Arab-Israeli peae proess.
As seen earlier, the expeted growth did not materialise. The onsiderable dierene between
reality and predition suggests that the primary funtion of the plan was to restore ondene
in the ountry and its government. It ran into trouble early on when the parliament refused
to inorporate the spending bill for Horizon 2000 into the 1995 budget (Stewart, 1996, p.496)
in 1994 but wanted it reviewed as a separate item. Nevertheless, it gives a good indiation of
the government's intentions and priorities for the ountry. Aording to the plan, water setor
development would be alloated 11 perent of total planned expenditures, whereby the distribution
of investment was about 30 perent towards water supply and 54 perent towards the waste water
setor. Water supply rehabilitation and extension was to produe 150 litres per apita per day
(ld)by 1997 and 160 ld by 2002. Aording to the plan:
Approximately two-thirds of the total waste water investments are sheduled for im-
plementation during the latter half of the Horizon period. ... In parallel with these
priority physial ations it will be neessary to undertake non-physial investments in
order to establish an appropriate basis for the heavy subsequent investments proposed
for the olletion, treatment and disposal of waste water  inluding institutional
developments to ensure appropriate management of the setor nanial sustainability,
and proper ost reovery mehanisms. The setor programme targets to onnet 50
perent of the population to waste olletion and disposal systems by 1997, and 98
perent of the urban population and 70 perent of the rural population by 2002.
(CDR, 1993, p.56-57)
As was already shown in Chapter 3 and as will be shown below these targets were not met. The
plan as a whole was eetively laid to rest in 19961997 with the attempts to rein in the publi
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deit. But it guided investment afterwards, even if on an ad-ho basis, and deoupled from a
time shedule it provided a pool of projets for implementation from whih to hoose.
From 2002 until 2004 the Investment Planning Programme funded by the EU readjusted the
investment programme and goals and identied new priority projets. But the dependeny on
foreign funding, politial instability, and the debt-indued austerity politis derailed its sheduling
and phasing. In 2005 the National Physial Master Plan for the Lebanese Territories (NPMPLT)
formed a rst attempt at omprehensive spatial planning for the ountry as a whole. It formulated
priniples for spatial development of land and resoure use, as well as setoral development
strategies. For example, water resoure protetion priniples and related protetion zones that
regulated and, where neessary, prohibited polluting ativities suh as quarrying. It was supposed
to beome a binding doument to guide master planning at the loal sale. For the rst time a
balaned vision of development was artiulated and published. The plan expliitly stated that
balane was to be understood as providing equal publi servies for all regions (Dar al Handasah
(Shaer and Partners)  IAURIF, 2005, p. III-3). By this it meant to move away from the logi that
misunderstands an equal distribution of projets and funds to all regions as balaned development,
but spending that would attempt to equalise the existing uneven development.
The global vision of the plan and the relative detail whih it artiulated represents a radial
break from the modus operandi of government operation. The plan was never ratied and so has
no legal or binding impliations on planning. But it is still published and aessible on the website
of the CDR and an be used to represent a more sovereign and even progressive vision of Lebanese
development.
2
Its formulation of the priorities of waste water management show the diverging
interest of the IDC and this vision. Like the plans before, the objetive was total overage by
networked systems or individual solutions with adequate treatment before disharge. To reah this
goal, while aknowledging the high ost, it was prioritised:
In the short term, the priority should be given to two ategories of loalities:
1) On one hand, mountainous regions loated in areas of extreme vulnerability of water
table, tapped by downstream villages and ities for domesti supply: For these regions,
the works should enompass olletion of sewage water as well as treatment;
2) On the other hand, in large agglomerations, where rehabilitation and extension
of networks is needed, treatment should be of seond priority, exept for interior
agglomerations (Baalbek, Zahleh-Chtaura and Nabatieh), where they must onstitute
a priority.
(Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners)  IAURIF, 2005, p. IV- 82)
While in a seond and third phase smaller isolated towns were to be progressively equipped. The
priorities expressed here are the opposite of those of the IDC, or at least its European fation.
The depollution of the Mediterranean in this plan was of low priority. A USAID US$ 24 million
projet that naned small sale water treatment plants for villages was also not a priority. Of
high priority were soures of pollution that aet downstream users  in the mountains and inland
where sewage pollutes aquifers that are soures for water supply.
2
The study was produed as a joint venture of the Lebanese ompany Dar el-Handasa and the Frenh IAURIF.
The projet team inluded a number of progressive professionals suh as Charbel Nahas, Kamal Hamdan, Habib
Debs and a number of other gures that have at dierent times hallenged the government's vision of development.
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The availability of external funding should not be the determining riterion for identi-
fying projets: On one hand, the external funding an onern projets of less priority
than others, and on the other hand, it an disappear if the problems of loal expropri-
ation or aeptane by the population are not resolved.
(Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners)  IAURIF, 2005, p.IV- 82)
It ritiised the pratie of aepting loans that are oupled to spei projets and points to the
neessity to prioritise aording to need and government funding apaity. Unlike the praties of
the post-war years it advoated against investment driven by the loans made available by the IDC
and oupled to spei projets of lower priority. Aordingly the plan did not produe a long
term investment plan. A follow-up study identied a more modest detailed investment horizon of
four years (20062009) and denes 27 dierent possible poliy and ontext senarios, and based
on these priority projets (Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners) CNBureau s.a.r.l. - IAURIF
(2006)). But like the master plan this study seems to have been disregarded as evidened by the
history of investment patterns that are still strongly inuened by IDC priorities.
Water setor plans experiened the same fate as the suessive master-plans. A rst plan
produed by Lyonnaise des Eaux in the mid 1990s seems to have been shelved immediately
(Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1995). In 1999 the government presented the Ten-Year plan for
the water setor. The plan emphasised the need for dams and aimed at produing 18 dams until
2010, as well as a total of 27 storage projets (Comair, 2010b, p. 155). Of these only one dam has
been build beause of the lak of interest by foreign donors. A projet on the Assi river owing
into Syria was in the early stages of work in 2006, but after it was bombed, the Chinese ompany
building it withdrew from the projet.
The Ten-Year plan was revived in the NWSS that projets expenditures on infrastruture on
the sale of US $ 7.74 billion in the period from 2011 to 2020. The priorities for dams in this plan
(MEW, 2010b, p. 90) are almost the opposite of those proposed in the NPMPLT (Dar al Handasah
(Shaer and Partners)  IAURIF, 2005, p. IV-74) as an be seen from Table 5.2. The latter had
four riteria for dam seletion: 1) a graded sale measured in volume/apita of RWEs representing
prodution apaities where the least produtive were assigned high priority; 2) irrigation riteria
in order of importane: improvement of existing infrastruture, non-irrigated agriultural zone,
additional supply to existing networks where it generates improvements, and nally where new
networks needed building; 3) other benets that an be derived from suh a projet suh as ood
protetion or as regards to tourism; and 4) the availability of existing studies and designs.
The two plans dier in their approah to planning. The authors of the NWSS built the demand
senario and produed a plan that in theory would meet this demand, as well as omplete the
transfer of the burden of the full ost of water resoure management onto the itizenry. The result
was an investment plan and the denition of apital requirements. How the funding needs would
be met above the projeted revenues of US$ 2.72 billion for the time period between 20112020 is
not explained. The plan is driven by the same wishful thinking as earlier plans.
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Table 5.2: Priority of Dam Projets in NWSS and NPMPLT
Dam Capaity & Use NPMPLT NWSS start / ompletion
Noura et-Tahta 35- 50 Irrig. High before 2020
Bared 37-90 WS High 2011 -2015
Iaal 12-18 WS - Irrig. High start (2016 - 2020)
Younine 5.8 WS High 2011 - 2014
Chabrouh 8-12 WS High exeuted
Massa 8 Irrig. - WS High 2013 - 2015
Ibl Saqi 50 Irrig.- WS High 2014 - (2016 -2020)
Assi 63 +15 irrig. Medium 2011 -2015
Janneh 30-90 WS - Irrig. Medium 2012 - (2016 -2020)
Boqaata 6-12 WS Medium 2011 -2014
Azzounieh 4.1 -5.0 WS Medium 2011 -2014
Damour 42 -106 WS-Irrig. Medium dropped
Bisri 120 WS Medium 2016 - 2020
Khardali 120 Irrig. -WS Medium after 2020
Qarqaf 20-25 Low 2012
Dar Beashtar 55 Irrig. - WS Low dropped
Qalaat el_Mseilha 6-12 WS - Irrig. Low 2011
Kfarsir 15 Irrig. - WS Low dropped
Yammouneh (HL) 1.5 Irrig. High in progress
Qammouaa (HL) 1.2 Irrig. Medium dropped
Qartlab / atolbe(HL) 0.7 WS Medium start (2016-2020)
Kouashra (HL) 0.35 Irrig. Medium 2011 (rehab.)
Sbat (HL) 0.6 Medium 2014 - 2015
Jriban (HL) n/a Medium dropped
Azzibe (HL) 0.6 Irrig. Medium dropped
Masser Chouf (HL) 2.2 WS Medium 2011 - 2014
Brissa (HL) 0.8 Irrig Low 2011
Balaa (HL) 1.2 -2.2 WS Low 2011 - 2013
Laqlouq (HL) 0.5 Low 2013 - 2014
el-Hasbash / Manzoul(HL) 0.4 Low 2013 - 2014
Qaissamani (HL) 1.0 WS Low 2011- 2012
Rashaya (HL) / ain arab 8.0 Low 2014 -2015
Lebaa (HL) 0.8 Irrig. Low dropped
Soure: National Water Setor Strategy 2010; National Priority Master Plan for the Lebanese Territory 2004.
The fat that work has started on only four dams (Jannah, Boqaata, Msaileh, and Qaysamanieh)
sine the ineption of the strategy shows that the priorities presented in the strategy and atual
implementation already diverged by the end of 2013. The Qaysamanieh dam projet is implement
by the Kuwait Fund. The three other dams are loated in areas where the onstituenies of the
minister reside and the only areas where real eletoral ompetition atually takes plae. Their
prioritisation is a reetion of the minister's eorts to prole himself politially. The loal master
plans published by the minister follow the same pattern, they are for the azas of Keserwan, Metn
and Aley, as well as the azas of Jbeil and Batroun. The Bisri dam is part of the Greater Beirut
Water Supply Projet funded by the World Bank (see Chapter 3), and work on the projet is very
likely to start within a few years of publiation of this study. This seletive and politially motivated
reprioritisation by the minister who ommissioned the study shows the disonnet between planning
and implementation.
In ontrast the NPMPLT highlighted the nanial diulties of the state and stated that
reduing system losses should be given more importane, espeially beause these represent an
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equivalent loss of investment (Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners)  IAURIF, 2005, p. IV-70).
The National Master Plan's point of departure is the nanial situation of the state whih explains
why it does not provide an investment horizon. Instead it denes priorities so loosely as to make
them adaptable to the nanial apaities of the state. Unlike the NWSS it does not rely on
debt funded mirales but aims to minimise the debt, taking into aount its eets on eonomi
growth as the development plan for 20062009 explains (Dar al Handasah (Shaer and Partners)
CNBureau s.a.r.l. - IAURIF (2006)).
Given the experiene of past apital expenditure in the water setor and on infrastruture in
general, as well as the problems that dam projets enounter (see Chapter 3 and setion 5.2.3
in this hapter) the NWSS is unlikely to ahieve its goals. The NWSS produes very optimisti
senarios and is planned without taking into aount the Lebanese politial ontext nor the funding
abilities of the state, like earlier plans before it. It shows how disonneted the planning proess
has been and still is. In the light of this, the NWSS seems to be targeted more at the IDC to attrat
funds and projets beause one of the main problems remains the sal situation. It resembles a
bargaining situation where an exessively high demand is initially made to obtain a good oer, or
in this ase more funds for projets. The 2011 World Bank Water Setor Assistane Strategy
desribes the problem as follows:
The NWSS ontains a `strategi road-map' for implementation, and this is now being
broken out into a phased implementation programme. The implementation program
should take aount of the soial, politial and institutional onstraints, prioritising
measures and investments aording to impats, adopting proposals to overome or by-
pass onstraints, and setting out a plan to ensure the needed support of hampions, key
politial ators, stakeholders and naniers. Taking a step by step approah, tailoring
reforms to loal realities, and testing out reforms on a small sale ould also help. ...
Development partners have been assoiated with the NWSS from the start and have
ontributed to its elaboration. As planning for implementation goes ahead, it will be
important to keep the development partners aligned behind the NWSS, with naning of
the priority infrastruture investment and institutional development plans of eah WE
oordinated. (World Bank, 2012b, p. 2324)
5.2.1 Infrastruture Development
An analysis of expenditures on infrastruture in general and water infrastruture speially has to
take into onsideration severe data limitations. In a World Bank water setor report from 1998 that
was never published, the authors note that it was impossible to gather suient expenditure data
(World Bank, 1998) to assess government expenditures at the time. Data regarding expenditure
on infrastruture remains pathy. Two main soures will be used here, the various CDR progress
reports, a number of World Bank reports, but mainly the 2010 water setor expenditure review
and the 2005 publi expenditure review. But even in the 2010 report the authors point to data
limitations. As the 2010 report omments :
The budget in Lebanon has not been approved by the Parliament sine 2004. Budget
alloations to ministries sine 2005 onward are based on approved 2004 values and
signiantly depart from atual expenditure gures. This severely weakens the ability
to monitor budgetary outomes by omparing alloated versus atual expenditure in
the setor and link spending to setor priorities. (World Bank 2010, p.5)
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Aording to the World Bank 2005 Publi Expenditure Report publi investment expenditure
averaged about 3 perent of GDP or 15 perent of primary expenditures. US$ 8.5 billion were
disbursed between 1992 and 2003 (World Bank, 2005). Gaspard estimates expenditures between
1993 and 2002 at US$ 9.2 billion and 6 perent of GDP on average annually. 16 perent of overall
government spending inluding debt servie (debt servie = 38 perent of expenditure) went into
investment ativities during this time period.
Between 1992 and 2003 the CDR awarded ontrats worth $7.1 billion of whih US$ 5 billion
were disbursed. By 2008 this sum amounted to US$ 8.95 billion and US$ 6.5 billion respetively,
by end of 2011 US$ 10.66 billion and US$ 7.40 billion of ompleted work ontrats. These sums
inlude operation and maintenane as well as management ontrats that have no bearing on
apital investments; the World Bank estimates these at an annual US$ 100 million.
The emphasis on the eletriity, teleommuniations, and transportation setors reets the
government priorities aimed at produing a servie and nanial industry hub for the region.
Table 5.3 shows that the water setor, exluding irrigation but inluding waste water disposal and
treatment, was earmarked to reeive 12.6 perent of CDR expenditures in 2003 and 13.9 perent
in 2008. Yet progress in the setor lagged behind other setors as an be seen from the perentage
of ompleted projets. Investment in agriulture and irrigation infrastruture was extremely low
and reets suessive governments' attitude towards the setor.
Table 5.3: CDR perent expenditure by setor 2003 and 2008
Setor 2003 2008
Awarded % total % ompleted Awarded % total % ompleted
Eletriity 19.7 94.7 15.7 92.9
Transportation 25.8 68.2 23.5 67.6
Teleommuniations & Post 10.9 99.9 9.1 100
Water Supply 7.2 61.2 8.2 61.3
Waste Water 5.4 51.3 5.7 69.4
Agriulture & Irrigation 1.5 63.9 1.2 84.0
Solid Waste 12.1 29.0 14.2 40.6
Publi Health 3.6 81.9 3.5 93.6
Eduation (2003 with Sport & Culture) 8.4 53.4 10.8 77.4
Other Setors 8.4 8.1
Soure: CDR 2004, 2009;
Figure 2.7 on page 60 showed an average annual apital expenditure in the water setor of US$
142 million (adjusted for 2008 pries) most of whih was spent by the CDR. The Counil of the
South and the Central Fund for the Displaed also spent onsiderable amounts on water supply
infrastruture. In both ases a lot of the expenditure was foused on drilling wells and the renewal
and extension of water supply networks. In terms of size the projets remained relatively small
(and ertainly had even higher degrees of waste than CDR managed projets).
All waste water related expenditures were naned by the CDR. By 2008 the CDR had disbursed
US$ 694 million with US$ 472 million worth of ontrats in progress.
3
The Ministry of Energy and
Water's ontribution to apital investment and apital formation in infrastruture during the time
period from 1992 - 2008 was aording to these numbers just above 6.3 perent. This shows that
the waste water setor was of seondary importane. So too were eologial onerns in general
3
In 2012 these numbers were US$ 900 million and US$ 610 million.
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whih is onrmed by the level of investment in the solid waste setor (see Table 5.3), where only
40.6 perent of awarded ontrat sums were disbursed.
The numbers regarding apital expenditure do not adequately desribe eorts in the setor.
The World Bank writes that the publi investment in the water and waste water setor has been
inadequate to meet setor development needs. Investment on a sale of 0.40.5 perent of GDP is
below the optimal level of investment
4
and about half the MENA average. The US$ 128 million
annual average (exluding agriulture) is judged insuient by the World Bank. But, aording
to the report, it explains why private alternatives or omplementing publi provision has grown
to the point that revenues arued to private operators exeed revenues raised by the four RWAs
(World Bank, 2010d, p.35).
5.2.2 Eieny of Publi Expenditure: a Study of the Waste Water
Setor
It was mentioned earlier (see Setion 3.1.4) that estimates regarding the sale of waste and
orruption go as far as 20 perent, but this is only one aspet of the high ineienies in publi
expenditure. The waste water setor provides many examples.
Figure 5.1 illustrates these ineienies. The map shows the waste water projets that are
ompleted, in progress and under preparation by the CDR as of 2012. The green areas show the
projets under preparation. Blue areas and ions denote ompleted projets. Red areas denote the
networks under onstrution. The most striking aspet of this map is how many ompleted waste
water treatment plants are not onneted to a network or where the network is under onstrution.
The NSWWS (MEW, 2010a) lists the treatments plants planned and onstruted. A waste
water treatment plant was built for a total ost of US$ 120 million in Tripoli, the projet was
naned through an EIB loan. Constrution started in 2004 and was ompleted with a delay
in 20092010, yet the plant did not start operating before 2011 beause the waste water volumes
reahing the plant were insuient to allow for eient operation. A trunk onnetor and seondary
network olleting waste water from the north of the ity was built with German naning to
remedy the problem. This projet did not start until 2010 and was not ompleted until 2013. The
onveyane network to the plant required an additional US$ 90 million for extension works, but
this funding was not seured in 2011. Three smaller plants in Chekka, Batroun and Jbeil were
onstruted from Frenh funds but are not operational. They were ompleted in 2006, 2010, and
2010 respetively. Combined US$ 57 million for the onstrution of networks to these plants was
not available and US$ 74 million worth of works were ompleted or under onstrution.
The Ras Nabi Younes plant between Beirut and Saida was also listed as omplete but not
operational and required an additional US$ 22 million for network extension. The Saida plant
was ompleted and operational but provided only pre-treatment. Work on the Sour (Arabi:
Tyre) plant was underway. Inland plants too were listed as being operational, in Baalbek and
Yammouneh, and two were under onstrution in Zahleh and the West Bekaa. The same study lists
the plants produed by USAID but more than half of these are not operational anymore (MEW,
2010a).
4
I do not intend to endorse the World Bank's denition of optimal investment. The methodologies it employs
to dene what an optimal level of investment is are mathematial and dened for an average of ountries. Here the
quote serves only to illustrate that even the World Bank viewed eorts as insuient.
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Figure 5.1: CDR Waste Water Works Progress in 2012
Soure: CDR (2013)
In the Bekaa, the World Banknaned Baalbek Water and Waste Water Projet is another
example of the delays and problems these projets suer from. Constrution works were ompleted
in late 20072008, but farmers broke the main waste water onveyor oming from Baalbek to the
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plant in order to use the water for irrigation, as they had prior to the projet. These issues were
eventually resolved by the installation of wells providing groundwater for the farmers (see World
Bank, 2012a, Interview Yazbek 2011).
The low eieny of these projets is only in part aused by the Lebanese administration.
The availability of funds or rather the lak thereof is an important omponent in the ompletion
of funtioning waste water infrastruture. The fous on treatment of waste water bound for the
Mediterranean was responsible for the funnelling of funds towards treatment plants along the oast.
The networks were not a priority of the donors, and with no funding soure other than the IDC
these were not built. The result was that investments stood idle for onsiderable periods of time
and in 2013 the plants that did funtion only did so below apaity.
5.2.3 Infrastruture and the Hydrosoial Cyle in Keserwan: a Case
Study
In ontrast to desriptions of the waste water setor at the national sale above, it is the loal
aspet of infrastruture prodution that is the subjet of this setion. The analysis is extended to
produe an understanding of the material aspets of the hydrosoial yle. The aim is to show 1)
that there is a variety of fators that inuene water resoure management and the infrastruture
prodution proess at this sale, 2) how these fators inuene water resoure management with
a fous on infrastruture prodution and planning, and 3) how the hydrosoial yle is shaped
loally.
In order to produe a desription of the hydrosoial yle and understand the infrastruture
prodution proess at a loal sale, one watershed was hosen. The area seleted is the Nahr el
Kalb drainage area in the KeserwanMetn region, about 20 km north of the apital. The watershed
served only as a starting point, hydrogeologial and soiopolitial fators redrew the limits of the
area of analysis. Figure 5.2 skethes this evolution.
The Nahr el Kalb watershed falls within the administrative boundaries of the azas Keserwan
and Metn, with the river forming the border between the two. Before the reform of the water
setor administration, the north ank of the watershed was administered by the Keserwan-Ftouh
water oe and the southern slope by the Metn water oe (as was shown earlier, the limits of
the aza largely oinide with the limits of the water oes). After the reform the water oes
were integrated into the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMTLWE).
The Jeita Spring at the bottom of the watershed is the prinipal soure of water for large
parts of Beirut and the northern suburbs as well as part of the lower Metn (see g5.2). In 2012
a German hydrogeologist delineated the groundwater athment area for the Jeita Spring in the
framework of a German funded development projet, the aim of whih was the denition of a ground
water protetion area for the Jeita Spring. He found that the groundwater athment extended
beyond the watershed into the adjaent Nahr Ibrahim watershed and the mountain plateau over
the watersheds (Margane & Shuler, 2013). The Chabrouh Dam projet and the related water
supply network supplies water to all the upper Keserwan as well as parts of the oastal area that
do not lie in the surfae watershed. The water supply there is supplemented by the Keserwan
oastal water supply projet that draws from the Moudiq Spring on the slopes of Nahr Ibrahim.
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Figure 5.2: Keserwan problemshed
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5.2.3.1 Soioeonomi Features of the Study Area
The azas Keserwan and Metn are the wealthiest areas in the ountry after Beirut. They form
the extension of the Beirut metropolitan area whih is the entral eonomi pole of the ountry.
Population in these area varies with the seasons. Generally the summer month see a ux towards
the mountains and the villages. In addition to regional and international tourism to these areas,
people living along the oast and in Beirut move to the mountains during the summer months.
Figure 5.3: Urban sprawl in the Nahr el Kalb watershed
Soure: The Study of the Nahr el Kalb watershed (Yazigi and Abi Fadel 2009, p. 95)
One study estimated that only about 45 perent of the registered population is present in the
winter in the villages of the Keserwan, whereas in the summer months this rises to 80 perent of
the registered population (NDU, Harb, Yazigi, Abi Fadel & Zind, 2009). In the highest villages
the ski season produes the opposite eet.
5
Philip Shuler desribes the proess in relation to the
hydrauli yle with the goal to model the water balane of Jeita Spring athment (JSC):
In mountainous villages, like Faqra or Faraya, number of population in winter exeeds
number of population in summer. Thus, JSC is exposed to additional pressure by
people spending only a limited amount of time within the athment. In turn to this,
in agriulture-dominated villages, like Lassa or Ouate El Jaouz, approximately 80-90
perent of the total population leaves during winter. This seasonal variation leads to
hanging demand for drinking water and, in turn, seasonal variation of disharged waste
water.
(Shuler, 2011, p. 70)
The area has experiened onsiderable urban sprawl. Urban planner Serve Yazigi points out that
urban areas in the Nahr el Kalb surfae watershed inreased by 22 km², from 17 km² to 39 km²
between 1963 and 2005 (see Figure 5.3) (NDU et al., 2009, p. 95). This represents an inrease from
5
These utuations are reeted on the national sale. International tourism peaks in the summer months to
amplify demand in the months when it is already highest beause of the heat.
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6.8 perent to 15.6 perent of the area of the watershed. Urbanisation dereases with inreasing
altitude.
Eonomi Ativities and Pollution
In the Keserwan area agriulture is not a very important ativity. Aording to the agriultural
ensus (MOA 1999) published in the Atlas Agriole (2004) there were 2,320 ha of agriultural land
of whih 70 perent was irrigated. In the Metn, 3,300 ha exist of whih 45.5 perent are irrigated.
Shuler (2013) mentions irrigation gures for Kfardebian, the largest muniipality in Keserwan,
situated at an altitude of 1,500 m above sea level (asl), that range between 86 perent to 96 perent
of used agriultural land under irrigation. These are the result of the rehabilitation of the irrigation
network naned through a World Bank loan in the framework of a larger irrigation rehabilitation
projet (World Bank, 2004).
Aording to the Nahr el Kalb watershed report (NDU et al., 2009) agriultural areas dereased
sine before the war and ontinued to do so until 2005. This study onsiders that from 19982005
used agriultural area dereased from 3,720 ha to 3,500 ha (in the watershed). The author suggests
that the driving fator is urban sprawl displaing agriultural uses of the land. He observes that
while overall areas dereased, fruit tree orhards, apples in partiular, expanded. In a sample
survey of 24 farmers and their exploitation he found that all irrigated with dierent means. He
also onrms that fertiliser as well as pestiides and fungiides were used in exess of requirements
and form a soure of potential pollution.
The German funded and implemented projet identied groundwater hazards in the upper
Keserwan. The projet mapped the groundwater athment for the Jeita Spring whih provides
up to 75 perent of Beirut water supply. In the proess it delineated potential protetion zones and
identied the spei inltration threats within the area. The list of hazards inludes: Gas stations
and ar workshops, dump-sites
6
, quarries, agriulture, restaurants, hospitals and dispensaries.
Figure 5.4 shows the pollution soures on the map with the identied vulnerability zones. Within
the area the gas stations were identied as partiular threat, 86 gas stations were ounted on a
groundwater athment of 409 km².
7
5.2.3.2 Infrastruture and Hydrogeology
This setion will now explain the water ows through the ase study area and disuss some of
the ways in whih quantity and quality are aeted. One aspet is the hydrogeology of the
terrain. Bakalowiz (2009) observes that the separation of surfae and groundwater is of little
use in Lebanon beause of the karsti nature of the two main aquifers. Karst denotes geologial
formations shaped by the dissolution of rok layers. In Lebanon the main aquifers onsist of
limestone, a arbonate rok that is dissolved by mildly aidi rain or water.
8
Over long periods of
time, in geologial terms, the rok weathers, and anal systems and aves, as well as nely porous
diuse ow matries form in the geologial layer. These formations govern the groundwater ow
patterns. The ow veloities for large frations of the groundwater are omparably rapid, while the
diuse ow matrix holds a onsiderably smaller part of the groundwater. The porous and fratured
6
Espeially during the war, waste disposal was organised by dumping into the steep valleys. This pratie an
still be observed today even though not as frequently as before.
7
Of about 3,600 gas station about 1,800 are not liensed by the MEW (Interview Cohrane 2012). In the
watershed numerous gas station use only single shelled underground tanks instead of doubly reinfored storage
tanks posing an even greater risk of inltration into groundwater (Interview Margane 2013).
8








































Figure 5.4: Groundwater hazard map
Soure: modied from BGR Groundwater Hazard Map 2012.
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nature of karst also makes it highly vulnerable to inltration and perolation of pollutants and
waste water.
In Lebanon the snowpak over forms the prinipal water reservoir. The snow melts and water
perolates into the limestone through sinkholes or dolines and reharges the aquifers. The water
ows through the aquifer and resurfaes as spring water where the aquifer (the permeable geologial
layer) meets an impermeable layer (an aquitard). The water will remain at the surfae as long
as the riverbed is impermeable but will partially re-inltrate when it ows over karsti bedrok.
Understanding and identifying the groundwater ows through karsti aquifers in Lebanon is further
ompliated by the history of tetoni ativity and related deformations of the geology that have
shaped the topography of the ountry.
9
Bakalowiz states that almost the totality of water volumes
originate from the these aquifers even though surfae water run-o is disharged through rivers
and all the perennial rivers are sustained by the disharge from these aquifers (Bakalowiz, 2009,
p.8).
5.2.3.3 Keserwan Problemshed
For the purpose of the analysis of infrastruture prodution I will fous only on the Keserwan area.
This is justied by the topography and the related layout of the supply system. The river runs in
a very steep valley often hundreds of meters below the inhabited areas. The inhabited areas are
situated on the gentler slopes between the rivers, in the ase of Keserwan this is the Nahr Ibrahim
and the Nahr el Kalb. The domesti supply network for both areas, Metn and Keserwan, rely on
wells that withdraw water from the underlying aquifer and from mountain springs. The Keserwan
water network is isolated from the Metn. It does not reeive water from it, but one water main
originating from the Chabrouh dam supplies water to a reservoir and pumping station in the
Metn.
The researh of the German projet on the JSC started out with the previously held assumption
that the spring water originated from the watershed, but very quikly delimited the Jeita athment
to the northern half of the Nahr el Kalb watershed. With the progression of its exploration
of the geology and hydrology of the area the German hydrologist and geologist showed that the
groundwater athment extends into the higher altitudes of the northern adjaent surfae watershed
of Nahr Ibrahim, inluding its two prinipal springs (see Margane, 2013a, 2013b; Figure 5.5 shows
the surfae and ground water athment).
As Figure 5.5 shows, in this ase the hydrogeology of the area gives the groundwater athment
equal if not more importane than the surfae watershed with regards to resoure management.
Very little water is abstrated from Nahr el Kalb for use. The water supply soure is in fat the
aquifer that reeives the snowmelt water (the shaded areas on the map). The urbanised area along
the oast is not part of either of the surfae watersheds of Nahr Ibrahim or Nahr el Kalb. It lies
in a separate surfae watershed.
As already mentioned in Chapter 3 in the ontext of the politial outfall of the German ndings,
the theory that the upper Nahr Ibrahim and its springs are part of the JSC is ontested by the
engineering onsultany ompany Khatib and Alami whih is responsible for the design and the
supervision of work on the Jannah dam projet on the Nahr Ibrahim. The dam reservoir as planned
9
Lebanon is situated on the Dead Sea transformation fault system, whih is still ative today. It results from the
relative movement of the Afrian Plate and the Arabian Plate and extends from the Red Sea into Turkey where it
meets the East Anatolian fault. The Yammouneh fault whih runs parallel to Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon is
a main fault in this system.
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Figure 5.5: Nahr El Kalb and Jeita Spring Cathment from BGR projet
and under exeution sine mid 2012 would extend into the inltration zone along Nahr Ibrahim
reduing the dam apaity onsiderably. Aording to the German hydrologist a loss up to 60
perent is possible (Margane, 2012) while others estimate the potential loss in retention apaity
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at only 10 to 20 perent (Interview Gabi Abdelnour 2012), but still aeting the projet's eonomi
feasibility.
The debate onerning the existene of a hydrologial interonnetion between the two ath-
ments  JSC and Nahr Ibrahim  was not the only reation to the publiation of these ndings.
Other reations pointed to the tehnial possibilities to manage the onnetion. One Lebanese
engineer suggested to the ministry that the inltration areas that would overlap with the dam
retention area ould be sealed o by tehnial means. Depending on the rate of inltration of the
ows of Nahr Ibrahim in the area, the ontribution to the disharge of the Jeita Spring ould be
onsiderable. In a worst ase (but not improbable) senario this tehnial intervention ould have
drasti reperussions on the water supply of Beirut beause the Jeita Spring is the apitals main
soure of water.
The engineer onsidered that the extra ost (estimated at roughly US$ 10 million), and even the
potential redution in disharge from the Jeita Spring is outweighed by the benets the inrease to
the domesti water supply would represent (Interview Abdelnour 2012). It is estimated that the
projet ould provide up to 200,000 m³ per day (Khatib and Alami 2008) to the northern Beirut
oastal area during the whole year, almost double of what Beirut reeives during the summer
aording to the same soure and thus substitute for potential losses.
Whih hydrogeologial interpretation will prevail depends also on the politial developments
in Lebanon probably as muh as on the sienti orretness of the analysis. In Deember 2013
onstrution work on the dam was stopped beause avities in the bedrok were disovered on the
onstrution site or its viinity (Interview Margane 2014). Whether this onrms the ndings of
the German researh and whether it will move deision makers to rethink the projet remains to
be seen.
This example reinfores the argument made by Mollinga et al. (2007) and Turton (2009)
questioning the river-basin (or watershed) as the appropriate unit for water resoure management
and analysis. The hydrogeology of the ase study area shows that at least in karstied areas
it is unsuitable as both a management and an analytial unit. Furthermore, the extent and
intensity of hydrologial interonnetion is unertain and omplex and does not t preset templates
(Mollinga et al., 2007, p. 703). In this ase the physial reality of the hydrogeologial system, or
at least its sienti representation, extended the problemshed beyond the watershed: physially
and permanently if orret; disursively and only temporarily if not.
5.2.3.4 Water Supply Infrastruture
The Keserwan and its aquifers are the prinipal reservoirs for the Beirut water supply. Between
60,000 m³/d350,000 m³/d are onveyed to Beirut from the Jeita Spring depending on the season.
But while sitting atop a wealth of water, the area itself was poorly served during the 1990s and
well into the following deade. In some of the villages water tankering was the norm and in the
summer publi water supply ran for up to six hours/day, but often only in intervals of a week
or longer. In the absene of publi water supply private wells were dug. A 2004 building ensus
ounts 508 buildings with private wells in the aza Keserwan (CAS, 2004).
A study from 1993 estimates that of 38,200 subsriptions or 44,873 m³/day only reeived
about 15,400 m³/day, or about 40 perent of a nominal 46,500 m³/day available in the dry period
(Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez, 1994b). The rest was lost in leakage from an old and war-battered
network. A later assessment (WB 1996) shows that no new soures were added by 1995 and
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summer prodution was still at the same level. This assessment shows that subsriptions had
inreased from 38,600 in 1990 to 43,498 by 1995.
The rst damage assessment after the war (the ERP) alloated about US$ 5 million for
emergeny repairs to the area (see Table 4.1 on page 135 ). This was equivalent to a rate of about
US$ 120 per subsription. Only the Metn and Saida had lower rates of investment per subsriber.
The water supply situation improved only marginally if it all in the 1990s and repairs seem not to
have kept pae with the inrease of subsriptions. Infrastruture prodution until 20042005 was
no more than pathwork, and supply was augmented pieemeal. An engineer working with the
KeserwanFtouh water oe desribes the repair ativities:
There was no water so we xed things here, dug a well there. Got 1,000 m³ (/day)
here 2,000 m³(/day) there. The last projet was the waters from Jeita whih gave us
10,000 m³ to Baloune. (Interview Abdelnour 2012)
A review of the plans of the networks onrms that only very targeted replaements of old setions
of the transmission network were replaed in the 1990s some of whih was naned through the
World Bank in the framework of the NERP (Oger International, 1992; Massaad, 1997). Most of
the work done desribed by the engineer was naned through the ministry. Overall 13 wells pump
groundwater, about 16,000 m³/d in 2013, drawing from the Jeita Spring Cathment. The Jeita
Projet installed pumps and transmission mains to onvey water from the spring at an altitude of
about 50m asl to the reservoirs in Baloune at 785 m asl. With the work of rehabilitating the Ain el
Delbe system with funding from the Kuwait Fund total prodution must have reahed 60,000 m³/d
to 70,000 m³/d in 2003. Given the omparably meagre repair investments water losses should not
have been better than 2010 estimated averages of about 50 perent UfW (MEW, 2010b, p. 10)
so that the really supplied volumes were likely to range between 30,000 m³/d and 45,000 m³/d.
Subsriptions an be expeted to have grown in the range 812 perent or about 4,0005,000 if not
more to about 48,00050,000 and an equivalent inrease in demand (in the absene of data about
subsriptions in the year the building ensus reords from 1996 and 2004 are ompared see Table
5.4). Thus even after ten years of augmenting the supply the situation was hardly better than at
the end of the war.
Table 5.4: Growth of building stok in Keserwan between 1996 and 2004
1996 2004 Growth
Buildings 23 389 24 876 6.34 %
Units 81 520 88705 8.81 %
Soure: Central Administration of Statistis,
Census of Buildings Dwellings and Establishments 2004;
The situation improved only after two large infrastruture projets were ompleted, namely the
Chabrouh Dam and distribution network and the Keserwan Coastal Water Supply Projet. They
provided water for the whole area from the oast upward and providing 4,000 m³/d to the Metn
area (Figure 5.6 shows the oastal water supply projet). Combined these inreased the water
supply to about 140,000 m³/d.
Both projets were already oneived in the 1990s. The oastal water supply projet was
designed in the mid 1990s, tenders were expeted by the end of 1997 and the projet was expeted
to be ompleted by 1999 (Massaad 1997). Funding was seured through the Japanese development
ageny OECF (now JICA) in 1997, within the framework of a oastal pollution protetion projet
lead by the World Bank. When the programme ollapsed implementation was delayed and had
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to wait until 2001 for work to start. The projet experiened severe delays for various reasons,
politial events in Lebanon, as well as tehnial diulties and ost overruns (ost inreased from
estimates US$ 58 million (CDR, 2009) to US$ 76 million (CDR, 2013). The projet was not
ompleted until 2012, when testing began (Interview Abdelnour 2012). Despite the higher ost
the projet was not implemented in its entirety. Initially, the work inluded 22 reservoirs and 13
pumping stations in addition to networks and a onveyor tunnel (Massaad 1997). Of those only
six pumping stations and 14 reservoirs were built and numerous others  as well as parts of the
network  were exluded from the sope of work in negotiations between the ontrator and the
CDR as implementing ageny (see Figure 5.6). Litigation between the two were still on going in
2012 (Interview Karam 2012).
The Chabrouh dam projet idea stems from the 1970s and has been onsidered important for
the region ever sine. Towards the end of the 1990s planning for the projet began, but the projet
had to fae opposition from dierent politial fations, mostly related to the regional distribution
of projets and the ost of the dam. No foreign funding ould be mobilised and the projet had
to be naned from the government budget. Calls for tenders were not launhed until 2000. The
Minister of Energy and Water at the time then attempted to stop the tender proess beause
he onsidered the ost too high (Interview Abou Assali 2012). Eventually by end of 2001 the
order to ommene work was given. The projet was to be ompleted in 2006 but the Israeli
attak on Lebanon in the summer of 2006 delayed the dams ompletion until late 2007 (Comair,
2010b). Work on the transmission and distribution network was only started after the ompletion
of the dam, even though eorts had been made to mobilise the CDR's support years earlier.
One engineer ommented that the CDR or the relevant foreign donors were simply not interested
(Interview Abdelnour 2012). Eventually it was the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment
whih ompleted the transmission network. The dam alone was an investment of between US$
4565 million depending on the soures (NDU et al., 2009, MEW 2002, Interview Faysal 2012).
The dam projet reeived a lot of ritiism and has a reputation for the orrupt dealings that
supposedly made it possible (see Chapter 2). Important in the ontext of this disussion of the
physial aspets of water resoure management are the disussions about leakage of the reservoir
due to the karsti nature of the bedrok. Bou Jaoude et al. (2010) modelled the leak and estimated
leakage of about 200 L/s. Shuler (2013) in turn alulates that the total annual leakages is about
3.6 MCM or about 24 perent of inow as leakage ours only when the water level reahes a
ertain height.
Figure 5.6: Coastal Water Supply Projet
Consult Map inserted in bak pouh
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The existene of leakages related to the karst topography repeatedly puts the dam strategy of
the government into question. In the ase of Chabrouh the proponents argue that 1) the water
is not lost beause it inreases the ows of springs north (Qana Spring) of the reservoir and 2)
beause the dynami apaity of the dam is higher than initially alulated during the design phase
the eonomy of the dam is not aeted (Interview Faysal 2012, Abdelnour 2012). These arguments
however overlook the fat that the reservoir is almost empty at the end of the dry season with less
than 0.2 MCM remaining even in average rainfall years.
In any ase, the disussions highlight the diulties of dam onstrution, and with that the
ministry's strategy. The Chabrouh Dam oially named Emile Lahoud Dam after the president
who's politial support enabled the projet  was the rst dam projet of the post-ivil war era.
Constrution on the Boqaata Dam started in 2012 in the Nahr el Kalb basin on the border of the
Metn and the Keserwan. It is designed to supply water to areas of the Metn. It is also situated
on karsti rok and the risk of inltration exists. The same an be said of a majority of these
projets, and judging from the experiene of Chabrouh and Jannah they an also be expeted to
experiene ost overruns.
5.2.3.5 Waste Water Infrastruture
Unlike the water supply situation the state of waste water management in the area has not improved
sine the war. No waste water is treated. The building ensus of 2004 (CAS, 2004) shows that
only 5,772 buildings are onneted to waste water networks and 18,312 are not. A majority of
the buildings onneted are situated in the oastal area. Waste water is disharged through a sea
outfall, whih is damaged and the shoreline is polluted as a result. Most of the buildings at higher
altitude sitting on the JSC are not onneted to a waste water network and dispose of their waste
water in esspits. Shuler (2011) desribes the situation as follows:
Aording to unpublished data, within the athment of Jeita Spring, only a negligi-
ble share of households empties their esspits; due to the high potential for leakage,
emptying is not neessary. Therefore, waste water, no matter if previously olleted
through a entral network or not, may onentrate towards streams, inltrate into the
unsaturated zone, and/or perolate into the saturated zone. The onsequene of this is
partial groundwater reharge by untreated waste water. Return-ow from households
towards aquifers is one omponent of the regional water balane. (Shuler, 2011, p. 10)
Water quality tests onrm this. In the framework of the JSC protetion projet an analysis
of miropollutant loads of water at dierent loations throughout the surfae water athment
was onduted. As one would expet, water at the exit of Jeita Spring showed higher loads and
more variety of miropollutants than water at higher altitudes. Even the two highest springs in
the athment, the Laban and Assal Springs, showed traes of pollution indiating inltration of
domesti waste water from the few villages at higher altitudes than the two springs (see Figure
5.5) (Doummar, Noedler, Geyer & Sauter, 2012). A water sampling ampaign in the Nahr el
Kalb watershed showed pollution with oliform bateria in almost half of the samples and high
onentrations of nitrate and nitrite in all tested water samples (NDU et al., 2009, p. 5457).
The rst attempt to begin managing waste water in Keserwan was along the oast (see Figure
5.7). A loan agreement with the European Investment Bank dating from 1995 seured funding








































Figure 5.7: Waste water treatment plan for Keserwan
Soure: BGR 2013.
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on the oast in Tabarja (see Figure 5.7). It experiened initial delays when the muniipality of
Tabarja did not give its agreement for the use of the proposed loation (Interview Karam 2011).
10
The projet was inluded in the same framework programme as the Japanese loan for the oastal
water supply projet, work was also planned to be tendered in 1997 and the projet ompleted in
2000 (Massaad 1997). Unlike the Japanese-funded water supply projet, it was not only delayed but
the loan agreement was nullied by the EIB when the World Bank deided to stop its partiipation
in this spei program in 1998. The CDR has aimed to relaunh the projet ever sine 2004 by
attempting to mobilise foreign funds but it was not until 2012 that funding for the whole projet
was seured. The new projet is expeted to launh in 2013 when updating of tender douments
by the CDR is ompleted (CDR, 2013).
The rst waste water treatment projet to be onsidered in the higher parts of Keserwan was an
Italian funded projet in Hrajel (see Figure 5.7). A progress report published by the CDR in 2001
listed June 2001 as the expeted start date for the projet. The projet was repeatedly delayed. In
the later half of the 2000s a loation was onsidered but would have displaed a restaurant. This
proposal was rejeted by the muniipality as a result of dynamis similar to those in the earlier
failure to nd a site in Tabarja, ausing further delays (Interview Karam 2012). In 2013 the CDR
report of the year listed Deember 2013 as starting date for the projet and an expeted ompletion
date by Deember 2014, still with Italian funding (CDR, 2013, p. 135).
In 2008, the German KFW in the framework of its post-2006 war involvement in Lebanon and
in ooperation with the CDR deided to nane a projet for the protetion of the Beirut water
supply. An initial amount of ¿ 6 million was promised as grant but eventually made available as
loan only. A year later an additional amount of ¿ 7 million was negotiated to fund up to three
small-sized waste water treatment plants. But the loan agreement was passed in parliament only
in 2010 (Interview Neuwirth 2010).
The BGR projet for the protetion of the JSC started in 2009 funded by a ¿ 1.7 million grant
from Germany. One goal of the projet was to provide advie to the partner institutions and KfW
Entwiklungsbank onerning the onept and environmental impat assessment for waste water
failities to be built in the projet area (BGR 2012). The investigations of the German team lead
to alterations in the initial KfW plans and neessitated adjustments in the regional sewage plan.
The original loations of one of the proposed plants was judged to be potentially hazardous to the
Jeita Spring waters and it was reommended to redesign the projet. By mid 2012 a new loation
was found in the village Jeita, in spite of initial opposition by the muniipality (Interview Karam
2012, Margane 2012). By 2014 the onsultant still had to answer to reservations of the Ministry
of the Environment before a nal approval ould be given (Interview Margane 2014).
Twenty years after the reonstrution an be said to have begun in earnest the water supply
reservoir of Beirut was still subjet to onsiderable pollution loads. The experiene in Keserwan
and the quality of the water in Beirut are not an exeption, muh rather they are reetive of the
situation in the whole ountry.
This brief history of infrastruture prodution in the Keserwan area illustrates the varied
fators that inuene the proess. Dierent hydro-geologial irumstanes and varied soio-
eonomi ontexts, that is to say human and non-human agenies, always in the framework of the
10
The land whih was designated for the plant, aording to rumours, belonged to a powerful politial dynasty
(the Edde family) whih was not willing to be expropriated and sell. In order to avoid a onfrontation with the state
that has the legal right to expropriate the land, the family mobilised its inuene with the muniipality to oppose
the projet (Interview Majdelani 2012, Interview Karam 2011).
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larger politial eonomy, will produe distint, ontingent, and often interrelated infrastruture
development dynamis for eah projet.
A wealth of delayed and anelled projets has already been introdued, there are only few
projets that were implemented without delay and to their planned extent. This situation is not
only a result of the haphazard approah to planning and the weakness of the administration but
also of the development strategy of the suessive governments.
5.3 Politial Eology and Uneven Development
The development strategy of the government produed a highly uneven development, geographi-
ally and in terms of eonomi setors. The eonomy's fous on nane and real estate and its bias
against agriulture (and industry) has already been disussed above. This eonomi struture is
part result, part ause of a development strategy relying on the private setor that had the apital
Beirut as entre of gravity.
The Beirut Central Distrit projet was planned to be the gurehead of the new Lebanon vying
for international apital. As suh it had to be anked with a range of image building measures
that projeted a sense of modernity, advanement, and ulture. The business opportunities and
espeially the prots from government apital expenditure promised ertainly gave the theory more
appeal. To give an idea, almost half a billion dollars was spent to build an over-sized airport
11
,
super-sized highways with even larger prie tags, as well as a number of stadiums to host the
Asian Cup. In Beirut a sports omplex worth US$ 250 million was planned - eventually downsized
to a meagre US$ 150 million or so  to host the Asian Games. These measures reeted the
same wishful thinking that governed growth predition and are a reprodution of plae and ity
marketing praties driven by global best praties and as suh by neoliberalisation proesses (see
Leitner, Pek & Sheppard, 2007; Pek et al., 2009; Smyth, 2013). The diret link from airport to
the BCD was not only to make travel for the international business elites more omfortable but
also works to justify the highest property pries in the ountry. Inidentally it bypasses and hides
from view the poorest quarters of the ity.
The government via the CDR launhed a number of infrastruture projets targeting the basi
servies setor, yet the bulk of the reonstrution was ahieved through the private setor and rested
largely on real estate development. The Greater Beirut Area saw an estimated 6,500 new buildings
ereted between 1991 and 1995. Constrution after the war went well beyond the replaement of
destroyed or damaged buildings (see Verdeil, 2002, p.133). The post-war onstrution boom ehoed
the pre-war dynamis; onstrution and real-estate were an important pillar of the eonomy already
in the pre-war era and remained so sine the end of the war (see table 5.5).
An important part of the produts that were brought on the market were high-end and luxury
developments, be they gated ommunities outside of Beirut or luxury towers, equally gated, in
the apital. These were aimed at the Lebanese upper lasses, expatriate Lebanese and foreigners,
mainly from the Arab Gulf, a dynami whih remains true until today. Prie ranges for the rst
half of the 1990s for these types of developments were between US$ 800/m² and US$ 3,500/m²
for apartments ranging from 700 m² to 3500 m² for the top Beirut properties (Verdeil, 2002, p.
134). In 20052006 at the apex of the prie pyramid, downtown Beirut apartments would reah
11
It was designed with a apaity 6 million passengers a year to be reahed by the year 2000 and the seond phase
was to allow for almost double that by 2010. This seond phase was never implemented and in 2012 the airport has
still not reahed full apaity.
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US$ 7,000/m² and by 2010 US$ 11,000  US$ 15,000/m² (and higher) for the agship properties
in Solidere.
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Beirut 593¹ 397¹ 1228 1662 690
Metn 1814 318 2786 5366 2809
Aley 1385 2806 2205 3394 2777
Baabda 4405 1947 3831 9385 2796
Shouf 4578 1947 2631 5601 2971
Soure: Verdeil 2004 p.132, based on CAS building survey 1996,
and Oger International damage assessment (1992).
¹ without ounting the destrution in the BCD
These dynamis were and are highly speulative. Verdeil (2002) points to the fat that growth
in housing inventory did not orrespond to an equivalent demographi growth and was not aimed
at the setion of the population where demand was greatest. Aording to him, 180,000 housing
units remained empty in 1996 throughout the ountry and about 60,000 in the Greater Beirut Area.
Today the real estate bubble is literally visible in the number of empty and under-onstrution
buildings mushrooming in Beirut. The prie dynamis are related to the Duth disease dynamis
desribed previously. Aording to ESCWA (ESCWA, 2009) 56 perent of FDI was owing into
the real estate setor and 20 perent into the banking setor in 2007 (see g 5.8). Arab ountries
were the soure of these apital ows, non-Arab share of these ows was negligible in 2007, but
has inreased espeially after the beginning of the Syrian revolution. In 2009 the share of FDI to
GDP was 14.3 perent and total FDI was US$ 4.8 billion (ESCWA, 2009, 2011).
Figure 5.8: FDI in Lebanon by Origin (only Arab ountries) and Setor 2007
Soure: ESCWA 2009
12
A 2014 artile in al-Akhbar newspaper ites a report by a loal development rm that estimates the average
prie for new apartments in muniipal Beirut at just below US$ 1 million (Wehbe, 2014).
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Figure 5.9: Areas overed by master plans
Soure: Atlas du Liban (Verdeil et al 2007)
This dynami was and is enouraged by the politial establishment; numerous laws and hanges
in regulation have made properties progressively more exploitable, for example through indiret
inreases in oor-area-ratios, that as a onsequene allow the onstrution of more oors, and are
a diret subsidy to real estate developers.
13
Relaxation of ownership requirements and limits for
13
For example: In order to promote the onstrution of re esapes and wider stairs these were exempted from
the alulations of the built-up area so as to allow for the onstrution of more oors than before, with the same
build up area requirements.
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foreigners, as well as tax inentives given through the Investment and Development Authority of
Lebanon were also part of the ative promotion of this setor of the eonomy that inuened not
only Beirut but the whole ountry. (See Annex 4 for a list of measures taken to liberalise and
revitalise the real estate setor).
Urbanisation was already intense in the 1960s, after the war Lebanon emerged as one of the
most urbanised ountries in the region, with an estimated 87 perent of the population living in
what are onsidered urban environments (see MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011; UNHabitat, 2011).
This intense urbanisation proess was further supported by the fat that only 16.3 perent of
the ountry's land is subjet to zoning/urban master plans. Of these 6.3 perent were awaiting
to be dereed  and so not legally binding  by the government in 2004. The remaining land is
buildable as soon as it is aessible by a road (tarred or onrete) (see Figure 5.9). But even where
master plans exist usually resoure protetion is not onsidered, also beause the national master
plan is not legally binding.
The proliferation of gated ommunities around Beirut and Mount Lebanon mostly, but also
in other parts of the ountry, was ertainly enouraged by this state of aairs.
14
The booming
real estate market pushed up pries throughout the ountry, not only in the urban entres but
also for agriultural lands. Espeially in rural areas land pries have multiplied  quadrupled in
some areas  in the last deade. This also made infrastruture development onsiderably more
expensive with the ost of expropriation of land rising in tune.
The rate of urbanisation has also put pressure on agriulturally usable land. Roland Riahi
writes that 20,000 ha of agriultural land have disappeared (7 perent of the total agriulture area
and 15 perent of the irrigated area) due to the urban sprawl dynamis aused by the reonstrution
and real estate speulation (Riahi, 2013, p.263). There is no evidene that this trend will reverse.
Urban sprawl also has diret eets on the water resoures, at least loally. Built-up areas onstitute
a barrier and water is prevented from inltrating. Where run-o inltrates it arries pollutants
amassed over the dry period. This normally happens but when urban sprawl remains unheked
and drainage networks badly maintained the eets are worse.
Another development related to the intensity of onstrution and urbanisation is the prolifera-
tion of quarries to provide input as aggregate and for ement. Quarrying ativity is legally regulated
but often politially proteted, neither the legal nor illegal quarrying abides by environmental
standards. Apart from destroying the landsape these are also soures of water pollution (see
Figure 5.10 for an idea of quarrying ativity). Using remote sensing tools researhers from the
Lebanese National Centre for Sienti Researh (T. Darwish et al., 2011; T. M. Darwish et al.,
2010) established that:
Between 1996 and 2005, the number of quarries inreased by 55.6 perent (from 711
to 1,278 ha). During the same time, the quarried land area inreased by 54.4 perent
(from 2,875 to 5,283 ha). (T. M. Darwish et al., 2010, p. 338)
Hamadeh, Haider, and Zurayk (2006) point to areas around Arsal in the north where quarrying has
replaed the growing of apriots and herries as the most important eonomi ativity beause of
the higher short-term prots. The onstrution boom was a result of the neoliberalisation proess,
real estate development and speulation was also one of the rent reation mehanisms identied
by Baumann (2012), and its eets were felt beyond the urban areas aeting agriulture and the
environment. Amery points to the eet of quarries on the Litani and writes:
14
Again, these are not new proesses. Georg Glaze (2000) desribes how these dynamis started in the 1960s.
But the post-war saw a drasti inrease of suh developments onentrated in the areas lose to the apital mostly.
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The Litani watershed has 96 quarries; a mere 19 of them have government lienses
(Srour and Sleiman 1998). Their ativities inrease soil erosion and water turbidity
and harm the quality of water, thus adversely aeting aquati life and the purity of
the river water. (Amery, 2002, p. 120)
Figure 5.10: Major quarrying operations aross the Lebanese Territory
Soure: MOE/UNDP/ECODIT (2011) State and trends of the Lebanese Environment.
5.3.1 Uneven Development of Domesti/Urban Water Infrastruture
Infrastruture development was not regionally balaned. Investment in water infrastruture was
foused on Beirut and the surrounding areas. CDR investments were highly foused in the areas
of what later beame the BMTLWE and NLWE. Respetively they reeived 29 perent and 23
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perent of investment. The Bekaa on the other hand reeived only 6 perent of CDR apital
expenditures (see Figure 5.11). The fration marked general in Figure 5.11 from the World Bank
water expenditure report hides even further imbalanes. Infrastruture is produed loally, it is
neessarily sunk in or xed on the terrain. As suh apital expenditures annot fall in a general
ategory, they are always geographially distributed. It is inoneivable that over 27 perent of
apital expenditure on water and waste water annot be attributed to one of four areas.
Beirut and Mount Lebanon are home to over 60 perent of the population while only 13 perent
of the population of the ountry live in the Bekaa. Thus even if the gures given by the World Bank
and the CDR are taken at fae value per-apita expenditures are marginally lower in the Bekaa. Yet
to deliver servie of similar quality in the peripheral mohafazaat would require larger investments,
espeially in an area like the Bekaa that overs 40 perent of the Lebanese territory beause it does
not benet from the same eonomies of sale. In the water-supply setor the inequalities are muh
more pronouned: the Bekaa reeived only 2 perent of investment. Investment patterns are not
only skewed in relative terms but even more so when ompared to the relative needs.
The 9 perent in the waste water setor inludes investments through the Baalbek waste
water projet. It is not an expression of the investments in the Bekaa but rather of the lak of
investment in other areas until 2008. As was detailed earlier the waste water investments along
the oast started only in the mid 2000s.
Figure 5.11: Expenditure by RWE and Setor (1992 -2006)
Soure: Lebanon - Water setor expenditure review (World Bank, 2010d).
Figures 5.12 and Table 5.6
15
show the onnetion rates to the water supply system. Figure
5.6 shows the onnetion rate per building from the 2004 Central Administration of Statistis
ensus of buildings and Figure 5.12 shows onnetion rates per household, as well as estimates
of the population from the 2010 World Bank report. Both show that the investment patterns
only partially translate. Beirut is unsurprisingly the area where the largest perentage of the
population is onneted to a network: 93 perent of households were onneted in 2003 and 88
perent of buildings. In the north, where 35 perent of overall apital expenditure were direted, the
onnetion rate per household is the lowest: 65 perent of households and 56 perent of buildings
15
It needs to be noted that the Census of Buildings, Dwellings, Establishments from 2004 omits the aza Shouf
and Aley in the BML area, most likely beause of the issue of the internally displaed during the war in these areas.
(These areas were the site of intense ChristianDruze onfrontations and foreful displaement of the population).
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in the area are onneted. In the Bekaa the situation is reversed. The World Bank report shows
that only 68 perent of households and 88 perent of buildings are onneted. One explanation for
this state of aairs is the high number of illegal or o the books onnetions that exist in the area
and that prot from politial protetion. They are thus not inluded in the World Bank report
that draws its data from an older CDR report.
Figure 5.12: Household Connetion Rate (%) and Conneted Population (in 1,000s)
Soure: Lebanon - Water setor expenditure review (World Bank, 2010d, p. 15).
Household onnetion to the water network is related to inome. A greater perentage of low-
inome households are not onneted. Measured by household inome 38 perent of households
in the lowest inome quintile are not onneted to the network ompared to 14 perent in the
highest inome quintile. This is less related to the aordability of onnetion and rates but to the
regional extension of networks. In most ases households are not onneted beause no network
exists. This situation mirrors the investment patterns of the administration and their geographial
distribution: the poor whih are more onentrated in the periphery and in rural areas have less
aess to network onnetion (World Bank 2009, p. 35).
The data about onnetion and population served does not inlude the about 260,000 Pales-
tinian refugees living in United Nations Ageny for Refugees in Western Asia (UNRWA) admin-
istered amps. In the amps basi servies are under the auspies of UNRWA and vary greatly
from amp to amp and in terms of volume and quality of supply. The informal gatherings of
Palestinian refugees outside of the amp perimeters do not always get infrastruture servies from
UNRWA but depend on the Lebanese state. For this reason water supply and quality is generally
of relatively bad quality. UNRWA operates and builds wells. If no wells are built then supply
depends on agreements with the Regional Water authorities and infrastruture is produed by
either international NGOS or popular ommittees (UNDP/UNHabitat, 2010). From eld visits
though, it is safe to say that supply and quality are worse on average in the amps than in the rest
of the ountry.
16
The data about onnetions is only one aspet, the dierenes in hours of water supply and
quality of supplied water aross regions is a dierent matter. Figure 5.13 shows estimates of water
supply availability in hours in the dierent areas of Lebanon.
16
UNRWA does not have the best reputation in the amps, it is viewed as orrupt and ineient. This is very
well exemplied in this quote form an artile in al-Akhbar about water provision in al Jalil amp in Baalbek: The
well, adjaent to the UNRWA building, is now well-sealed. Dead: the vitim of the orrupt and bribable UNRWA
maa, reads the grati on the adjaent wall. Expressions of sorrow, anguish... and ontaminated water, and








































Table 5.6: Building Equipment - Wells, Water Network and Sewage System onnetion by Caza
Soure: Central Administration of Statistis Census of Buildings, Dwellings and Establishment (2004).
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Figure 5.13: Network Water Availability
Soure: Lebanon - Water setor expenditure review (World Bank, 2010d, p. 13)
With the highest onnetion rate the BML and espeially Beirut and the Greater Beirut area
have the lowest water availability per household. In the summer in some areas of Beirut households
reeive water for 3 hours a day every other day, and even less the further summer has progressed
and the higher the building oor oupied. In the Bekaa the BWE interrupts servie to save on
energy osts (World Bank, 2012a, p. 13). Eletriity osts provided through the state ompany is
subsidised fully by the ministry. Yet, supply is rationed and areas outside of Beirut reeive only
616 hours-worth and the establishments have to operate generators at high ost.
Intermittent supply does not mean that households remain without water between intervals.
Water is supplied through a xed gauge at the household onnetion and then stored in a roof
or ground tank, so that a buer reservoir exists. But intermittent supply does aet metering
strategies beause pressure hanges are likely to redue the life span of many water meter types
and models, as well as aet measurement auray. More importantly, many if not most water
meters will reord air ows as well as water ows and so are likely to over-register onsumed
volumes.
17
The quality of the water is also substandard and is generally not trusted, on average only 53
perent of onneted households use the publi water supply for drinking (World Bank, 2009, p.35).
As with supply, quality depends also on the geography. Pollution stems from two soures, the rst
is related to pollution in the water athments as desribed previously in the ase study of the
Keserwan, pollution of ground and surfae water soures. Treatment is, where it exists, not able
to ontrol the quality suiently and extrat all ontaminants.
The seond soure of pollution is found in the quality of the networks and the pressure variations
therein, the age of duts and pipes is one indiation of this (see Figure 5.14). Some of the most
important transmission lines supplying Beirut are more than half a entury old. More than 50
perent of transmission and distribution networks are judged to be beyond their useful life (MEW,
2010b, p.9).
18
With reeding pressure leakage into the supply network ours. Where sewage
and supply networks are in lose proximity sewage an enter and ontaminate the domesti water
17
Judging from the interviews with the various experts and preliminary researh there seems to be a strong
orrelation between the wish to install water meters for eonomi reasons and the requirement of 24hr onstant
water supply. I suspet that water metering an only work properly under onditions where a minimum of onstant
pressure exists throughout the system. This would require more researh, but if onrmed it would mean that water
metering strategies require/ are prediated on an elevated tehnial level of servie.
18
That network duts reah an elevated age is nothing unusual around the world (see Bakker 2012) but in the
Lebanese ase they have been subjeted to a prolonged war.
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supply after treatment. In rural areas this is less prevalent but in mountainous areas espeially,
pollution from septi tanks ontaminates water supply soures for lower lying villages as was shown
in the ase of Keserwan.
Figure 5.14: Age of Water Supply Network
Soure: National Water Setor Strategy 2010
As has beome evident related to the issue of pollution and the quality of the water supply
is the lak of waste water treatment and the onnetion rate to sewage networks. Aording to
the NWSS waste water network overage is around 60 perent. The CBDE has it at about 50
perent but more importantly treatment is minimal. Only 8 perent of total water onsumed is
treated. Along the oast water is simply disposed via sea outfalls, some of whih are very lose to
the shore. In the Bekaa the Litani reeived and still reeives substantial volumes of raw sewage
ausing serious pollution.
19
Industries along rivers are also soures of heavy pollution as attested
by newspaper artiles desribing the Beirut river as having turned blood red or the Litani waters
running white (Hamieh, 2011; Meguerdithian, 2012). In some plaes, espeially in the Bekaa,
sewage is pumped into wells that have run dry and so eventually seeps into the groundwater. One
study (Houri & El Jeblawi, 2007) investigated pollution of eight perennial oastal rivers during
the dry season and found that these arried heavy pollutant loads with among others feal e.oli
ontamination, mostly due to raw-sewage disposal.
20
A muh earlier study (Jurdy 1992 ited in
Khair, Aker, Haddad, Jurdi & Hahah, 1994) found that 5075 perent of all water soures did
not full WHO standards for baterial ontamination. Later studies onrm that the situation has
not hanged sine (see S. Korfali & Jurdi, 2011; S. I. Korfali & Jurdi, 2010)  a situation that is
reeted in high frequeny of water born diseases (S. I. Korfali & Jurdi, 2007, 2009).
5.3.2 Private Water Supply and Soial Justie
Compensating for the shortomings of the publi water servies, parallel loal and private servie
provision enterprises have sprung up. Generators provide eletriity in times of power outages of
the publi supply, and private wells, water tankering, and bottled water make up for the shortages
in the publi water supply. This is also true for areas onneted to publi networks. Seventy
ve perent of revenues in the water supply setor are made by private providers or 75 perent
of household expenditures are spent on alternatives to publi servies for all households, and 65
19
To the point where restaurant owners along the river omplain that the smell drives away their ustomers.
20
Aording to them pollution levels along the oast are so high that one study found that most beahes are not
suitable for swimming, bearing potential osts to the tourism industry.
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perent by households onneted to the network (World Bank, 2009, 2010d). In this sense the water
setor is already largely privatised and water partially ommodied, not aording to IDC designs
and not to the benet of the elites or transnational orporations. The World Bank's onern with
this situation is that:
Despite the relatively low budget shares, the setor raises serious onsumer welfare
onerns given the (1) lak of onsumer power; and (2) the over-reliane on un-regulated
and highly pried o-network private water providers. In partiular, the over-reliane
over non regulated o network providers further exposes low inome households to water
arried diseases or opportunisti behaviours from these private providers. (World Bank,
2009, p. 32)
In some rural areas, and in low-inome and informal neighbourhoods, illegalities in the built
environment are prevalent. As a result publi water servies are either ompletely absent, or only
partially available, and loal ommittees organise their own servies and rely on the provision of
water through politial parties or other patrons. The lientelist networks are ongured aording
to very loal politial dynamis and reet the soio-politial history of the spei areas and
remain ruial for the eorts of the loal ommittees (See al Khayat (2008) for an example in
a Beirut suburb, and Riahi (2013) desribes dynamis in Arsal, see also Makhoul and Harrison
(2002)). There are numerous ases throughout the ountry. Even after the water reforms of 2001
that onentrated 21 water oe into four regional water establishments, some water ommittees
and muniipalities still operate their own supply networks, building them and produing water
from wells or springs.
An important aspet of the failure of publi servies to ll the demand even marginally is
the proliferation of private wells. Aording to the NWSS (MEW, 2010b) the number of private
wells is about 43,000 produing some 440 MCM/year, yet this number is presented with a aveat
that states: Numbers and volumes of private wells are feared to be signiantly higher (MEW,
2010b, p.8). Numbers as high as 70,000 were suggested by interviewees ative in the setor. For
omparison some 620 publi wells provide 267 MCM/year. The bulk of the private wells are small
wells to satisfy domesti demand and supply one building or in the rarer ases a luster of buildings.
The CBDE ounts 33,410 buildings with wells in 2004 (see Table 5.6). An unknown number of
wells produes water for irrigation.
The giganti number of wells, both for domesti use and irrigation, has led to an over-abstration
of groundwater along the seashore and in inland areas. Constrution during the war is one
important omponent of this development, with water servies interrupted on numerous oasions,
wells were an integral part of building planning and onstrution and remain a wide spread pratie
in Beirut and outside of the apital.
Along the oast this over-abstration has led to saltwater intrusion. Groundwater levels are
so redued that the ows from the mountains annot replenish the aquifers and sea water ows
in instead. Salt deposits aumulate in the karsti underground. These dynamis are aentuated
by the high urban density that prevents inltration in the area. Mark Saadeh (2008) writes that
this has been on-going for at least three deades and ontinues to do so. It has progressed so far
that even during the winter when groundwater ows and volumes are highest, well water in many
areas of Beirut and some other plaes along the oast suh as Tripoli, Saida and Jounieh, remains
brakish. Saadeh judges this situation to be irreversible (Interview Saadeh 2012). Aording to him
the neessary surpluses of freshwater are not available, at least not for the time period required
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to wash out salt deposits and remedy the urrent state of aairs with ground water reharge
tehniques.
Private water businesses have stepped in to ll the water supply gap. Drinking water is available
in bottles and larger sized gallons of 5, 10 and 20 litres, the more expensive suppliers espeially in
bottled drinking water produe from mountain springs, and, unsurprisingly, Nestle has the largest
market share in this setor (Interview Cohrane 2012). The market for gallons is more ompetitive
as numerous small and loal businesses produe from wells even in urban areas. The quality of this
water is more variable. A study from 2002 showed that 24 perent of 403 samples of bottled water
were miro-biologially ontaminated (El-Fadel, Maroun, Semerjian & Harajli, 2003). As with the
wells the state's supervisory and regulatory apaities are not developed and are at the root of the
related publi health risks. In 2011 the Minister of Health estimated that 85 perent of drinking
water produing businesses were unliensed by his ministry (The Daily Star, 2012).
21
The quality
of the water delivered via tankers is equally not subjet to ontrols.
Together gure 5.15 and gure 5.16 shows the water expenditures of households aording to
household budget. They show that households without onnetion to the network spend relatively
more on average and as mentioned above are more likely to be poor. The 20 perent of households
with the highest budget spend relatively less on water than the remaining 80 perent of households.
They do this for muh better quality water.
22
Figure 5.15: Perentage Water Expenditures in Household Budget
Soure: Lebanon - Water setor expenditure review (World Bank, 2009, p. 38).
Figure 5.16: Expenditure of Conneted Households
Soure: Lebanon - Water setor expenditure review (World Bank, 2009, p. 39).
This privileged aess to water is related to real estate dynamis. The luxury developments that
house the upper lass provide in-house or in-ommunity servies  for water this means reverse
osmosis plants that an purify the brakish water oming from wells  again illustrating the lass
21
Some ompanies operate ompletely without lienses others with a liense only from the Ministry of Trade.
Given the prevalene of petty orruption in the administration, even a liense from the Ministry of Health is not a
100 perent guarantee for the quality of the water. In 2002 it was estimated that 10 out of 800 ompanies had a
liense from the Ministry of Health (El-Fadel et al., 2003).
22
The drop between the top quintiles is explained by the steep wealth disparities.
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harater of Lebanese politial eonomi and developmental dynamis. It is not by aident that
suh luxury housing is advertised by emphasising the availability of water and eletriity around
the lok. Improved servies were aording to Glasze among the most important reasons for
inhabitants to hose to live in gate ommunities even after the war (Glasze, 2003, p.183).
23
The IDC logi to move towards private setor partiipation and privatisation is partially based
on the fat that the domesti water setor produes revenues of US$ 411 million of whih only US$
104 million are aptured by the publi water setor (World Bank, 2010d, p.30). The remaining
US$ 300 million are revenues to the private setor of whih a onsiderable fration is expeted to
be shifted to the water utilities. It is also the basis for expetations that the potential for prots
exists and ould attrat private setor ators.
Based on its soial impat analysis the World Bank estimates that the ombined water expen-
ditures on all water soures are in line with aordability norms (World Bank, 2009, p.38) set by
the bank itself to 3 to 5 perent of household budget.
24
An earlier study assessing opportunities
for and obstales to privatisation estimates the expenditures threshold at 8 perent for water and
waste water servies (Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p. 6). This 2002 report makes a tari level analysis for
a privatisation strategy, it shows that a xed tari struture would exeed the eight perent of
household inome threshold and proposes a unit based tari struture that allows a degree of ross
subsidisation. Aording to the report:
The analysis shows that at a threshold of a maximum ost of water and waste water
servies of 8 perent of household inome that the LRAC
25
is generally below the
threshold ost. The only exeption is in the Bekaa regional oe, the ost of water
supply and waste water servies to the lowest inome households makes up around
10 perent of household inome. The ost of water supply for households [in all of
Lebanon℄ is equivalent to between 56 perent of household inome. Sine waste water
servies are only made available to 70 perent of the population, it ould be argued
that it is unlikely that the lowest inome households would be onneted.
Despite the improvement in the aordability of servies, aordability would be an issue
for the lowest quintile (20 perent) of the population where an annual ost reovery
tari is implemented. The ost of water and waste water servies would exeed the
aordability threshold to the year 2010. (Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p. 32)
This 2002 report exluded large sale water resoure development projets from the ost alu-
lations. These were assumed to remain the government's responsibility (Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p. 10)
and would inlude the major (if not all) dam projets suh as the Jannah Dam and others desribed
earlier. The report goes on to explain that the proposed taris would further not inlude debt
serviing obligations for existing debts in the water and waste water servies. Their inlusion
23
Another example of the unequal aess to infrastruture and the prots made from its onstrution an be found
in downtown Beirut. The real estate ompany Solidere struk a deal with the government to build the infrastruture
of the BCD and turn it over to the state in return for the right to relaim land along the oast and sell it for a
prot. The ost of nished onstrution was estimated at some US$ 400 million and the land at about US $ 1 billion
by 2003 and has ertainly inreased sine (see Leenders 2004). Designed for a fully oupied area sewers had to
be regularly ushed with large amounts of water to maintain it and prevent orrosion. But more importantly elite
spae was produed with the highest level of servies.
24
The norm is alulated inluding waste water harges but these are not olleted by RWEs. With the
introdution of polluter pays priniples and the harging for waste water it is reasonable to expet that aordability
norms set by the World Bank will be exeeded.
25
The standard approah to deriving a full ost reovery tari is the use of long run average ost (LRAC) priing
tehniques. A tari set at the LRAC would reover apital and operating osts over the projet life and inorporates
allowanes for returns on apital employed (Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p. 2).
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would inrease proposed taris by about 20 perent. Aordingly the 8 perent threshold would
be exeeded in all areas but the BMTLWE area. It goes on to state that:
The ost of servies would also reate some aordability problems for the seond lowest
household inome quintile in South Lebanon. Despite the redution in the ost of water
and waste water servies under the unit harge tari struture, the reovery of debt
serviing obligations on existing debt would be diult.(Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p. 32)
The initial assumption of the analysis is that water and sanitation servies would be provided by
joint (private/publi) venture under a long term onession ontrat (Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p. 2).
Taris were established using a target rate of return of 15 perent (Jaobs Gibb, 2002, p.24) that
would have to be shared between the partners.
The results of this 2002 report suggest that the nanial burden on the poorest 20 perent of
households would not be relieved with a privatisation strategy. The euphemistially named equity
onsiderations of the World Bank would not be met. The soially unjust distribution of water
for domesti use would in all likelihood be reprodued and the ost of large sale infrastruture
prodution would still be arried by the state  even in the ase where the regulatory and
management apaity of the state was drastially improved, as the report assumes (and needs to).
Thus a privatisation strategy seems to produe only limited benets but onsiderable disadvantages.
5.4 Agriulture in Lebanon
In the agriultural setor distribution of water resoures and water use patterns show the same
trend as in the domesti water setor. The disproportionate fous on Beirut and on the tertiary
eonomy is reeted in the lak of investment in infrastruture in the rural areas. The poverty
in the rural areas is also related to the dilapidated state of the agriultural setor. Contrary to
the GDP data the agriultural setor is important for a onsiderable part of the population. That
just about 5 perent of GDP is linked to the livelihoods of 2025 perent of the population (World
Bank, 2010b) and possibly more, who rely on agriulture as primary or seondary soure of inome
(and that does not inlude those that farm solely for their own onsumption) sheds light onto the
high levels of rural poverty. Aording to a study by the Ministry of Soial Aairs the agriultural
setor employs 7.5 perent of the labour fore (aged 15 years and above) on average in Lebanon.
In the main agriultural regions, the mohafazaat of Northern Lebanon, the Bekaa and Nabatieh,
this share rises to 12.3 perent, 20.2 perent, and 20.7 perent respetively (MOSA 2006). Roland
Riahi shows that 67.5 perent of agriultural households are poor  double the national average
(Riahi, 2013, 274).
26
Despite being important for the livelihoods of large setions of the population it is usually
depited very negatively in terms of water management. Its depition as a relatively unimportant
setor of the eonomy sustains statements like the following from the Ministry of Environment's
State and Trends of the Environment Report:
Although the perent ontribution of the agriultural setor to total GDP appears to be
dropping the setor ontinues to be the largest water onsumer in the ountry  about
60 perent of total freshwater goes for agriulture. (MOE/UNDP/ECODIT, 2011, p.
53).
26
The alulations are based on average and median monthly revenues, US$ 288 and US$ 300 respetively.
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Figure 5.17: Rehabilitated, planned, and not rehabilitated irrigation networks
Soure: National Physial Master Plan of the Lebanese Territory 2004.
This demonising of agriulture as ineient omes in tune with the government's agriultural
CHAPTER 5. A POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 205
poliy of neglet during the last 20 years and misrepresents the importane of the setor. But
it is reeted in the infrastruture prodution eorts of the state and the IDC. Sine the end
of the war investments in irrigation were negligible and only one projet, funded by the World
Bank with a loan of US$ 57 million foused investment in the setor.
27
The projet aimed at
rehabilitating 27,000 ha of whih 17,000 ha in ve large irrigation shemes and 10,000 ha in smaller
sized shemes. Aording to the World Bank projet ompletion report (World Bank, 2004) 24,300
ha were suessfully rehabilitated. As was mentioned earlier the MEW has a department to support
rehabilitation and extension of existing shemes but does not have the manpower nor the nanial
apaity to do so in a substantial manner (see Chapter 2). In 2012 the Canal 800 projet was
launhed to irrigate about 14,000 ha in the south (see Figure 5.17).
5.4.1 The Struture of the Agriultural Setor
The GDP alulations presented in table 5.1 are based on farm-gate pries and related down and
upstream ativities are not inluded. Aording to the national aounts study for 2009 agro-food
output was about 30 perent of overall industrial output (Kasparian, 2010). Transportation of
produe and whole and resale trade, as well as ommere in agriultural inputs are not inluded
in the alulations of the ontribution of agriulture to GDP, but depend on it. Molle (2011, p.
116), based on Alberto Valdes and William Foster (2010), suggests that agriulture's ontribution
to growth is about twie its value added to GDP (measured at farm-gate) based on an analysis
of the eonomi ativities it produes in the downstream supply hain (in developing ountries).
But even suh a alulation would underestimate the value added that is produed on farms large
and small, as well as by agriultural labour in the Lebanese ontext. Following an argument made
by John Smith (2012) for GDP alulations on a global sale the importane of the agriultural
setor beomes even learer. Smith distinguishes between value added not represented in GDP
of produing nations and value aptured from the same prodution proess by orporations and
showing up as GDP of the eonomially most powerful nations. In the ase of Lebanon a similar
argument an be made for value added in the agriultural setor but aptured and represented in
other setors ontribution to GDP. An indiation of value aptured downstream of the supply hain
is given by Riahi (2010) who produes a relatively onservative estimate, exluding land rents and
using the higher of the available pries for agriultural rops as listed by the MOA. Table 5.7 shows
that the farmers' share of nal retail prie is relatively low on average. It is generally lower for
vegetables, and on average higher for fruit trees produed generally on larger farms. Olives and
almonds are the exeptional rops from whih farmers earn more than 50 perent of the nal retail
prie. But these numbers still do not take into aount the better market positions of large farms
and so overestimate the prots of small sized farms and produers.
With these aveats, they do provide an image of who aptures the value added in the metaboli
proess that ombines water with land and inputs as the result of farm labour inluding the small
and family sized farmer who do a lot of the work themselves.
5.4.1.1 Agriultural Markets
Like all other setors of the eonomy the agriultural setor is highly onentrated. The distribution
of agriultural land is highly uneven. Aording to the agriultural ensus of 1999 1 perent of
27
The Hassad Projet funded by IFAD and implemented through the Green Plan provides loans and subsidies
to the agriultural setor at the farm level. Parts of these US$ 12 million are spent on improvements of on-farm
irrigation tehniques, reservoirs, and rehabilitating terraes.
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Table 5.7: Pries of Agriultural Produe along Supply Chain
Crop Cost LL (Share) Pries LL (Share)
Farm-gate Wholesale Retail
Fruits
Orange 160 (0.12) 570 (0.32) 967 (0.31) 1284 (0.25)
Clementine 196 (0.12) 700 (0.30) 1239 (0.32) 1685 (0.26)
Lemon 160 (0.15) 650 (0.46) 713 (0.06) 1069 (0.33)
Grapefruit 160 (0.16) 480 (0.32) 641 (0.16) 999 (0.36)
Apple 211 (0.10) 1000 (0.39) 1539 (0.27) 2027 (0.24)
Pear 222 (0.09) 1000 (0.32) 1869 (0.36) 2445 (0.24)
Medlar 577 (0.14) 2000 (0.34) 3365 (0.33) 4197 (0.20)
Apriot 152 (0.08) 850 (0.35) 1433 (0.29) 1986 (0.28)
Cherry 445 (0.16) 1200 (0.27) 2188 (0.35) 2828 (0.23)
Peah 152 (0.07) 1000 (0.42) 1547 (0.27) 2034 (0.24)
Plum 152 (0.06) 1100 (0.39) 1911 (0.33) 2433 (0.21)
Almond 270 (0.15) 1250 (0.54) 1377 (0.07) 1826 (0.25)
Grape 228 (0.09) 775 (0.22) 1943 (0.47) 2466 (0.21)
Strawberry 1015 (0.24) 2100 (0.26) 3393 (0.31) 4207 (0.19)
Banana 326 (0.18) 800 (0.27) 1359 (0.32) 1765 (0.23)
Pomegranate 258 (0.14) 900 (0.34) 1721 (0.43) 1894 (0.09)
Melon 183 (0.09) 800 (0.31) 1453 (0.32) 2015 (0.28)
Water melon 111 (0.10) 450 (0.29) 668 (0.19) 1152 (0.42)
Olive 404 (0.16) 1900 (0.58) 2018 (0.05) 2591 (0.22)
Vegetables
Potato 195 (0.20) 570 (0.39) 711 (0.15) 963 (0.26)
Onion 105 (0.09) 500 (0.36) 760 (0.23) 1109 (0.31)
Garli 560 (0.24) 1100 (0.23) 1850 (0.32) 2347 (0.21)
Green peas 524 (0.22) 1250 (0.31) 1847 (0.25) 2366 (0.22)
Green beans 697 (0.32) 1000 (0.14) 1732 (0.33) 2211 (0.22)
Broad Beans 387 (0.20) 900 (0.26) 1488 (0.30) 1969 (0.24)
Cauliower 344 (0.39) 600 (0.29) 610 (0.01) 874 (0.30)
Cabbage 223 (0.33) 350 (0.19) 411 (0.09) 686 (0.40)
Lettue 163 (0.18) 370 (0.22) 619 (0.27) 929 (0.33)
Spinah 271 (0.15) 750 (0.27) 1294 (0.31) 1770 (0.27)
Cuumber 230 (0.16) 650 (0.30) 721 (0.05) 1403 (0.49)
Eggplant 396 (0.30) 700 (0.23) 917 (0.17) 1312 (0.30)
Veth 549 (0.35) 800 (0.16) 1133 (0.21) 1551 (0.27)
Squash 440 (0.30) 650 (0.14) 1060 (0.28) 1473 (0.28)
Gombos 473 (0.14) 1950 (0.43) 2800 (0.25) 3430 (0.18)
Tomato 235 (0.19) 670 (0.35) 878 (0.16) 1260 (0.30)
Soure: Riahi and Chaaban (2010), p. 17.
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landowners and farmers own 25 perent of the land and 20 perent own 72 perent of the land
while 10 perent of small farmers own only 0.4 perent of agriultural land and the 75 perent of all
farmers own 22 perent (see Figure 5.11).
28
Unsurprisingly this piture is reprodued in total area
exploited with the largest rops: potatoes (see table 5.8) and ereals (see Table 5.9). The potato
market for example is dominated by large landowners who have immense market power supported
by better storage apaities, transportation, on-farm infrastruture and aess to information.
29
















< 1 4,728 879 6.2% 66.7 %
1 - 5 1,660 3,412 24.2% 23.4%
5 - 20 576 5,220 37.3% 8.1%
> 20 121 4,543 33.3% 1.7%
total 7,085 14,054 100% 99.9%
Soure: Agriultural ensus 1999 (MOA)
The supply hain is held in rather fewer hands. Aording to a paper by World Bank sta
(Dessus, Ghaleb & Malouhe, 2006 ) rents aruing from monopolisti positions represent more
than 16 perent of GDP in Lebanon. To illustrate, an earlier report (CRI, 2003) analysing
ompetition shows that the market in pestiides and other agro-hemial produts is dominated by
one ompany that has 59 perent of market share, and ve ompanies dividing the market among
themselves.
30
To go bak to the example of potato farmers, seed import is also highly onentrated,
four ompanies, three of whih arry the same family name, import about 62 perent of seeds
(Abou Zeid, 2005). Input supplier monopolies or oligopolies are mathed by equally prevalent
market power downstream, where loal wholesale markets and powerful traders ontrol the supply
hain. As Roland Riahi and Jad Chaaban write, farmers are in a weak position ompared to
suh monopolies. The inability to gather in ooperatives to fae wholesalers is mainly due to their
small sized exploitations. They also lak adequate tehnology and storage strutures (Riahi &
Chaaban, 2010, p.16).
The onentration of land reets the lass hierarhies. The struture of the setor is the
result of government poliy, or rather its absene, and the lak of interest in agriulture by the
nanial and ommerial bourgeoisie. Aordingly, government budget alloations to the Ministry
of Agriulture (MOA) were always low, they never exeeded 1 perent of the budget and usually
were held at around 0.5 perent. In omparison the Ministry of Youth and Sports had a budget
of 0.25 perent when the the MOA was reeiving 0.47 perent of the budget in 2001 (Sanyu
Consultants In. & Yahiyo Engineering Co. Ltd., 2003)  again, this is for a setor that provides
28
The Lebanese Observatory of Agriultural Development started a new ensus in 2010 but it still has not been
published. Unoially beause of problems with the methodology and the data. But aording to a onsultant on
the study the onentration of land into fewer hands has ontinued.
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Anedotal evidene suggest that this power is deployed via importation of potatoes during the harvesting season
so pushing loal pries down and buying up small produers' harvests, as they do not have aess to adequate storage
apaity. After storing the harvest greater o-season margins are made when imports are down and loal pries rise
again.
30
Exlusive dealerships for imported produts are legally proteted in Lebanon. Importers have monopolies on a
whole range of produts. Attempts to resind these exlusive rights made it to the stage of draft law in 2002 but
were eventually thwarted by the ommerial bourgeoisie.
CHAPTER 5. A POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 208
a livelihood for 2025 perent and possibly more of the population. In itself this is a stark expression
of loal lass politis.
5.4.1.2 Finaning the Agriultural setor
This lak of funds from whih the ministry suers is one ause of the poor state of extension
servies, as well as other support mehanisms and infrastruture that ould prot small-sale
farms and farmers.
31
The other ause is the weakness of the administration of the setor: the
MOA like all ministries is understaed in key positions.
Subsidies to the agriultural setor originate from dierent organisations, and bypass the MOA.
Tobao, wheat, and until rather reently sugar beet reeived diret subsidies from the government
through the monopoly of the National Board for Tobao and Tomba under the auspies of the
MOF, the Ministry of Trade and Commere via the General Diretorate for Cereals and Sugar
Beet.
32
The tobao subsidies served Hezbollah's and Amal's lientele and were instituted as an
inentive for the rural population in the south to remain on their land during and after the Israeli
oupation.
33
This US$ 51.1 million (in 2008) is distributed as prie support to farmers, most of
them poor and onstitutes an important portion of their inome. Aording to a survey from 1999
mentioned by Zurayk (Zurayk, 2011, p.38) it ranges from 2585 perent of a tobao farmer's total
inome.
With this exeption the major subsidies do not target the poor. Lebanon imports 75 perent
of all its wheat and the 25 perent whih is soured from loal prodution is subsidised. Wheat
subsidies have inreased dramatially in the last deade from US$ 8 million in 20012002 to US$
93.5 million in 2008 when they were abolished but reinstated in 2010 (Riahi & Chaaban, 2010;
World Bank, 2010b). This inrease, reeting global food prie rises linked to the nanialisation
and speulation of ommodities, highlights the vulnerabilities that ome with this kind of import
dependeny and the potential importane of a poliy of food sovereignty. Unlike the tobao
subsidies that benet small farmers
34
ereal prodution is dominated by large farms (see Table
5.9) who prot from eonomies of sale. About 24 perent, or 12,429 ha in 1999, of ereal prodution
is irrigated. The perentage of irrigated parel inreases with the size of the exploitation, more
than half (6,529 ha) were parels larger 5 ha (Choueiri, 2002a). In 2002 irrigated wheat-growing
areas equalled 16,905 ha and were three to four times more produtive than non-irrigated wheat
elds (Choueiri, 2002a, p.27). Thus the subsidies favour the owners of larger land who irrigate.
The Export Plus programme naned by IDAL is also usually named as a subsidy to the
agriultural setor. These US$ 33 million, oming in the form of a subsidy for transportation for
export, has repeatedly been ritiised for beneting traders and large sale export-oriented farmers,
following the pattern of neglet of small-sale farming.
Finaning for farmers is not readily available, at least for the large majority. Not one operational
agriultural development bank exists in the ountry even though three institutions existed in the
past and still do legally and on paper. The Credit Bank for Agriulture, Industry and Real
31
Zurayk (2010 p.25 & p.33), for example, points out that quality ontrol and inspetion of imported goods and
their labelling as suh and a poliy to promote loal produe ould benet loal farmers. Other possibilities are
linked to the regulation of the supply hains and wholesale markets to redue farmers vulnerabilities. The extension
servie would remain ruial in the improvement of farmers aess to eduation and skills, and input management.
32
Subsidies to the tune of US$ 4 million were also paid for pestiides by the MOA in the early 2000s, though it
is not lear how far this beneted the smaller farmers. Most likely these ended up being indiret or even diret
subsidies to importers.
33
Zurayk points to the 2006 war and the rugged resistane fought by Hezbollah and the people of the south to
undersore the importane of these subsidies.
34
Half of tobao farmers have plots under or around 4 dunums or 0.4 ha.
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Estate was eetively laid to rest in 1968 when the government withdrew its support (despite
being protable). The National Union for Cooperative Credit did exist but lost it assets in the
suessive bouts of hyper-ination during the war and after. The National Bank for Agriultural
Development was reated in 1994 on the basis of a 1977 law but never saw the light of day.
Disputes over ommerial bank partiipation, a hange of the law in this regard, disagreements
between dierent ministries as to its eetive role, and a refusal to diretly support the agriultural
setor left the projet stillborn (Choueiri, 2002, p.34 -35).














10,941 7.7 5791 11.9 3,394
0.3
1 - 4 ha 13,245 31.6 26,831 34.2 14,229
1.1
4 - 20 ha
4,516 46.7 34,250 47.7 19,035
4.2
> 20 ha
633 54.8 28,845 58.7 15,184
24.0
Total
29,515 15.1 95,717 38.6 51,842
1.8
Soure: Ministry of Agriulture (Choueiri, 2002a).
In general small farmers' aess to naning is very limited. A number of smaller projets funded
by international organisations and loal NGOs exist but their reah and means are extremely
limited. Finaning support through the government tends to ow towards larger operations
(Choueiri, 2002) with the exeption of the Green Plan whose mission is to support agriulturalist
with small loans and grants not exeeding US$ 10,000 but on average half of this.
35
Bank loans to the private setor have always been marginal ompared to overall redit volumes.
The agriultural setor reeives a dereasingly small share of not even 1.5 perent of bank redits
and loans. Of these the majority are held by the larger land owners and farmers. The private banks
have little interest in agriulture, onsidered as a high-risk ativity with elevated operation osts
(Choueiri, 2002, p. 35). Real estate and treasury bonds oer higher prot margins. Coupled
with the dollarisation of the eonomy and the ompetitive returns on LLTBs these have had a
rowding-out eet on industrial and agriultural aess to redit and naning (see Kubursi,
1999; S. A. Makdisi, 2004). Aordingly the barriers for small farmers are nearly insurmountable.
Physial aess to banks in rural areas is diult, as only very few branhes operate outside the
major population entres. Collateral requirements are very stringent, eetively exluding small
farmers from aess to redit. Both these obstales are also related to the urban fous of the
banking setor.
The agriultural setor reets the general lass politial orientation of the ountry and su-
essive governments. It is strutured in favour of the land and apital owning lasses and severely
biased against small landholders and tenants: the majority of farmers. The larger eonomi
orientation of the ountry towards the tertiary setor is expressed in the negligible budgets alloated
to the MOA, the lak of apital ows towards agriulture, and a redued export ompetitiveness due
to the overvalued Lebanese lira pegged to the dollar (see Kubursi, 1999; Nahas, 2009). This general
35
Minimum plot requirement are 1500 m2 or 1.5 dunum (0.15 ha). I did not investigate the distribution of loans
and grants relative to exploitation size. Anedotal evidene suggests that there is a tendeny to favour larger
exploitations (going towards 2 ha).
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eonomi orientation and bias against agriulture is reeted in water use and abuse patterns in
the setor.
5.4.2 Agriulture and Water Resoures
That agriulture is the largest water user is true for most developing ountries, ertainly for
ountries in similar limati zones, and is in the nature of the ativity. Looking at Lebanese
water use by setor reveals that in Lebanon the share of water used by agriulture is signiantly
less than in most other ountries of the Arab region and the Mediterranean (see Table 5.10).
Dierent soures produe dierent numbers the 61 perent are MEW estimates while the World
Bank estimates irrigation water use at 64 perent (World Bank, 2003, 2010b).
Table 5.10: Comparison of water use by setor in the Region
Soure: FAO-Aquastat.
5.4.2.1 Assessing the Data
Numbers regarding agriultural water use are diult to assess. Data regarding the distribution of
irrigated versus non-irrigated agriultural land is equally ambiguous. A World Bank report from
2003 estimates the total equipped area at 90,000 ha. The Bank report goes on to estimate the
eetively irrigated area at about 81,030 ha (World Bank, 2003). These numbers show a large
variation to those of the MOA ensus of 1999 aording to whih 104,009 ha, or about 42 perent,
of a total of 247,940 ha agriultural land were irrigated. The 90,000 ha originates from a report
that was produed by JICA but never published beause of dierenes that emerged between the
onsultants, the ageny, and Lebanese experts.
36
The 90,000 ha estimate was based on a 1993
FAO and the 1999 ensus (Sanyu Consultants In. & Yahiyo Engineering Co. Ltd., 2003). It
onstitutes an extrapolation that deduts plots of a quarter of a dunum inluded in the ensus and
laims to aount for the lak of expansion of shemed irrigated area by the state. What is more,
this same number is reprodued by the MEW in the NWSS in 2010. Nonetheless irrigated area
36
The JICA report on whih these numbers are based was never published and was rejeted by the Lebanese
government (or MEW) beause it was onsidered inaurate or so it was laimed (Interview Catafago 2010).
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has inreased sine the writing of the Japanese report. The FAO onsultant in harge of the new
agriultural ensus projet of 2010 estimated it at about 112,000 ha (Interview Choueiri 2011).
37
The prodution surveys of the MOA estimate that 139,000 ha and 130,000 ha of farmed
agriultural areas were irrigated in 2006 and 2009 respetively (MOA, 2010). This sum inludes
irrigated area for eah rop and so ounts the elds that are used for multiple rops repeatedly.
Field observation onrms that irrigation, at least irrigation from groundwater, has inreased
importantly in some areas, as observed in this ase in the Hasbani basin in the south of the
ountry.
38
The following analysis of agriulture is based on the 1999 ensus and the agriultural prodution
surveys based upon it and published by the MOA. These numbers annot be taken at fae value;
the margins of error are in all likelihood too substantial, and the data is 15 years old. The numbers
are inaurate and as in the ase of irrigated area an have a variane of 15 perent. Use of this
data though is justied. It is the only oherent and omparable data set on the topi. The errors in
all likelihood are systemati and onsistent throughout. The trends that emerge from the following
analysis were onrmed through interviews with aademis, agronomists, ministry oial, and IDC
professionals.
5.4.2.2 Irrigation and Irrigated lands
The distribution of land and the use of water is highly uneven. Irrigated agriultural land is even
more onentrated than agriultural land, a omparison of the two is presented in Table 5.11. 72.68
perent of farmers own land holdings smaller than 1 ha, whih represents only 19.62 perent of all
agriultural land and 14.52 perent of irrigated land. Holdings of a size between 1 and 10 ha make
up 50 perent of the agriultural land and 42 perent of irrigated land. These are owned by 25.7
perent of farmers. Holdings larger than 10 ha make up 30.4 perent of all land but 43 perent
of irrigated land and are held by only 1.6 perent of landowners and farmers. The perentage
of irrigated land to total land held inreases with the size of the exploitation (see Table 5.11).
Aordingly water in agriulture is even more unequally distributed than land.
Table 5.11: Distribution of land aording to size of farm
Exploitation
Size






< 1 ha 72.68 19.62 14.52
< 2 ha 86.76 34.83 25.36
> 1 ha <
10 ha
25.71 49.96 42.14
> 10 ha 1.61 30.41 43.35
Soure: Agriultural ensus 1999 (MOA)
104,000 ha of used agriultural land is irrigated whih amounts to 42 perent of the 248,000
ha of total used farmland. Of those 64 perent were irrigated by gravity (ooding), 28 perent by
sprinklers, and 8 perent via drip irrigation tehnology (Choueiri, 2002b).
39
Water for irrigation is
37
This latest ensus was never published beause the data that was produed was onsidered to have major aws
(Interview Ghadban 2012).
38
A fat that raises questions as to the usefulness of numbers presented by both the WB and the MEW.
39
Aording to the NWSS these numbers are 70.4 perent gravity, 23.4 perent sprinklers, and 6.2 perent drip
irrigation in 2010.
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soured to 52 perent from groundwater and 48 perent from surfae water. Table 5.12 shows the
distribution of modes of irrigation and their reliane on the respetive soures of water. Pressurised
systems rely disproportionally on groundwater, 85 perent of sprinkler irrigation and 74 perent of
drip irrigation respetively are soured from groundwater. Channel or ood irrigation in ontrast
relies up to 65 perent on surfae water. The ost of irrigation varies widely, those that irrigate
with surfae water tend to pay less, where groundwater is used pries are higher (Choueiri, 2002b).
In both ases where irrigation networks are operated olletively, loal politial dynamis an
play a role, usually to the advantage of the better politially onneted (Interview Nassif 2012).
Those with no aess to a network pay tankers with mobile pumps and aordingly pay the most
(Interview Ghadban 2012).
Table 5.12: Area irrigated by type and soure
Soure Irrigated area (ha) Gravity Sprinkler Drip
Surfae water 49,939 48 % 43,093 86 % 4,477 9 % 2,369 5 %
Ground water 54,070 52 % 23,035 43 % 24,565 45 % 6,469 12 %
Total 104,009 100 % 66,128 64 % 29,043 28 % 8,838 8 %
Soure: Choueiri, 2002b
The ause for this state of aairs is to be found in government poliy and its neglet of
agriulture and the failure to invest in irrigation infrastruture, as well as a lak of poliy and
enforement of regulations by the MEW who ould theoretially limit well onstrution but laks
the apaity and the will to do so. As Amery writes:
Rehabilitating the agriultural setor and rebuilding of the irrigation system were not
high priorities of the Lebanese government during the early years following its ivil war.
As a result, individual farmers relied more on groundwater, and thus between 1992 and
1995, they added 2,000 wells to the existing stok of more than 10,000 wells to augment
the farmers' water supply. (Amery, 2002).
It is a proess that has been going on sine. It is unlear how many exist, and aordingly how
muh groundwater is really pumped. Table 5.13 below shows that the average plot size of land
irrigated from surfae water is slightly less than one third that of plots irrigated from groundwater.
Depending on the type of irrigation the dierenes vary, plots irrigated by sprinkler and soured
from groundwater are on average almost three times as large as their equivalent soured from
surfae water. This average is even higher in the area of Baalbek were average plot size irrigated
by sprinkler reahes 5.7 ha (Choueiri, 2002b). Larger plots irrigate from groundwater and the
larger the exploitation the more likely it is to use pressurised systems.
Table 5.14 serves to onrm that the mehanisation of the farm and apaity to irrigate via pres-
surised system is related to exploitation size. It shows that the perentage of exploitations equipped
with motor-pumps inreases with the size of the exploitation, with 45 perent of exploitations larger
than 10 ha being equipped on average with two pumps. The author of the irrigation strategy of
the MOA (Choueiri, 2002b) sees the ause in the weak nanial apaities of small farmers and
remarks that an appropriate naning system would allow small farmers to implement more modern
irrigation systems. It is not only the one-time investment in a new tehnology and system that
stands in the way of small farmers irrigating with pressure and from groundwater but also the
inreasing depth from whih pumping ours. It inreased from an average depth of 50 m to 100
m, 150 m and even up to 500 m, partiularly during the last deade (Dar al Handasah (Shaer and
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Partners) CNBureau s.a.r.l. - IAURIF, 2006, p.9). The ost assoiated with pumping is expressed
by one interviewee at the MOA: In Lebanon we irrigate with mazout (Arabi: diesel) (Interview
Roukos 2011). Seen from a dierent perspetive this means that responsibility for rapidly falling
ground water levels is aused muh more by large land owners and farmers.
Table 5.13: Irrigated Area by Size of Exploitation
Irrigation system Surfae water Groundwater Total
Gravity
Plots 115,080 28,248 143,328
irrig. area (ha) 43,093 23,035 66,128
irrig. a. / plot 0.37 0.82 0.46
Sprinkler
Plots 3,459 6,641 10,100
irrig. area (ha) 4,477 24,565 29,043
irrig. a. / plot 1.29 3.69 2.87
Drip
Plots 4,374 5,572 9,946
irrig. area (ha) 2,369 6,469 8,838
irrig. a. / plot 0.54 1.16 0.89
Total
Plots 122 913 40,461 163,374
irrig. area (ha) 49,939 54,070 104,009
irrig. a. / plot 0.41 1.34 0.63
Soure: reprodued from Ministry of Agriulture (Choueiri, 2002b) based on agriultural ensus 1999.
Table 5.14: Size of Exploitation in Relation to Pump Ownership
Size exploitation (ha) # of expl. # of expl. with pump perent expl. pump # of pumps pump / expl
< 0.5 103,600 8,269 8.0% 8,505 1
0.5 - 1 37,994 3,771 10.0% 3,987 1.1
1 - 2 27,434 3,407 12.4% 3,754 1.1
2 - 4 14,977 2,477 16.5% 2,853 1.2
4 - 10 7,686 1,929 25.0% 2,520 1.3
> 10 3,138 1,390 44.3% 3,007 2.16
Total 194,829 21,243 11.0% 24,632 1.2
Soure: reprodued from Ministry of Agriulture (Choueiri, 2002b) based on agriultural ensus 1999.
5.4.3 Prodution, Irrigation and Export
This nal setion will show the relationship between groundwater extration and high value added
rops destined for export. The prinipal agriultural areas are the plains of the Bekaa, the Akkar
and areas in the south. Aording to the annual agriultural prodution report of 2009, 39 perent
of agriultural areas are loated in the Bekaa, 29 perent in the north, 20 perent in the south,
and only 12 perent in Mount Lebanon (MOA, 2010). Aording to the agriultural ensus the
largest exploitations are found in the Bekaa. Around Zahleh average size of exploitation is about
9 ha and varies between 45 ha in the rest of the Bekaa and some ares of the north. Figure 5.18
shows the perentage of exploitation larger than 4 ha and shows the prinipal agriultural areas.
Table 5.15 lists irrigated agriultural area by type of irrigation and by aza. It shows that in the
entral Bekaa and the West Bekaa, where the size of exploitation is largest, the share of irrigated
agriultural areas reahes 80 perent and more.
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Figure 5.18: Exploitations larger than 4 ha
Soure: Atlas du Liban, CNRS and IFPO 2007.
The table also demonstrates that the share of groundwater exploited is generally highest in
the areas where the perentage of irrigated area to total agriultural area is highest. In the aza
Zahleh 80 perent of agriultural lands are irrigated; of these almost 72 perent are irrigated from
groundwater. In the West Bekaa the situation is similar and almost 75 perent are irrigated from
groundwater. Only in the mountainous areas where little agriultural land exists are the rates of
irrigation higher than in the Bekaa. In Baalbek, further north, 64 perent of irrigated areas draw
from groundwater, where the groundwater table is already muh deeper and an reah 100 m  200
m and more (Interview Nehme 2011). Similar dynamis an be observed in the azas Saida and
Sour, where the perentages of irrigated area are 55 perent and almost 38 perent respetively. Of
these, 65.5 perent and 85.5 perent are irrigated from groundwater in Saida and Sour respetively.
Beause the ensus is from 1999 the data for areas in the azas Marjayoun and Hasbaya an
not be onsidered representative. Agriulture still suered from the stiing poliies of the Israeli
oupation (see El Ezzi, 1990). The lower plains of the Hasbani basin are today well-irrigated
(personal observation) and the total ultivated areas have inreased. The hanges in land use are
explained by one man from Wazzani who is ited in a study about poverty in Lebanon (Das and
Davidson 2011):
In the 1970s and 1980s there were no big farmers here so we ould rent land from the
hurh to take the ows to graze. But sine 2000, big farmers from Beirut and Bekaa
rented the land. We just have the land where our house is. We have no other land. We
used to rent land for $2030 but the big renters ame and oered $100 for longer term
leases. So of ourse the hurh preferred them. (Das & Davidson, 2011, p.146)
Agriultural area by rops is distributed as follows: fruit trees were ultivated on about 30 perent








































Table 5.15: Irrigation by aza
Soure: Agriultural Atlas of Lebanon, Ministry of Agriulture 2005.
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by potatoes, fruit vegetables, legumes, and leafy vegetables. Riahi shows that these distributions
represent the results of a transformation proess in agriulture that saw a shift towards fruit tree
ultivation and away from ereal prodution. His analysis shows that in the 1960s 39 perent of
agriultural area was used for ereal prodution and only 23 perent for trees. He further points
out that this transformation was enouraged by government poliy (Riahi, 2013, p.271). After
the war it was equally enouraged by the World Bank and other IDC ators whih reommend an
orientation towards high value added rops for export (World Bank, 2003, 2010b).
The largest rops are potatoes followed by the dierent fruit tree varieties. The priniple fruit
tree rops are itrus, apples, and bananas. Table 5.7 shows that only very few rops give revenue
ertainty to the farmers. Market vegetables in general allow for very low revenue streams for
farmers and the largest share of prot is aptured downstream in the distribution network. Citrus
and banana prodution also provide a onsiderable share of the revenues to farmers. But these
produts tend to benet large landowners who prot from a vertial integration of the prodution
hain.
With the exeption of ereals and olives, large parts of these main rops are destined for the
export market to Arab states. Export is dominated by the large produers, they produe, sell and
ontrol the loal and export market (Riahi, 2013, p.278). They depend on the export market
beause the major rops are produed in quantities so large that they ould not be absorbed by
the Lebanese market. The export dependeny ratio dened by Riahi (2013) illustrates this well.
He explains it as the ratio of prodution over loal onsumption.
40
For example, half of the
orange prodution is exported and import volume is only 0.15 perent of total orange prodution.
The export dependeny ratio aordingly is 103 perent, beause volume of exports equals volume
of internal onsumption. A similar situation is found regarding bananas, apples, pears, lemons and
lettue. Riahi alulates export dependeny ratios that are 95 perent, 76 perent, 43 perent, 32
perent and 185 perent respetively (Riahi, 2013, p. 286). These rops are exported at dumping
pries beneting from transportation (maritime and by land) oered through the Export Plus
Programme.
In terms of water use this means that the over-exploitation of groundwater sustains exports at
dumping pries to the Arab ountries. This over-exploitation is largely due to large produers and
landowners in the prinipal rop produing areas who are also the exporters.
It is also in this ontext that the South Lebanon Irrigation Projet needs to be understood.
In the absene of a strutural reform of the agriultural setor it all but guarantees the ontinued
ow of virtual water, embedded in these rops, to the Gulf at bargain pries. A substantial
hange of agriultural poliy is highly unlikely, thus the high-value rop prodution for export
poliy promoted by the IDC is similarly likely to reprodue this situation. It will ontribute to a
ontinued over-extration of the resoure to the advantage of the large landowners and produers.
This hapter elaborated on the soio-physial eets of water resoure management poliy
and the water infrastruture development proess in partiular. The uneven and soially unjust
distribution of water resoures, as well as their eologial degradation are a result of suessive
governments' development poliy. Uneven setoral and geographial development are the outomes
of a reonstrution strategy that supported the real estate and nanial setors to the detriment
of produtive setors. The proess of extending water and waste water networks, as well as the
failure to do so in many areas, is the produt of the interation between Lebanese administration
40
It is the ratio of total exports over the dierene between export and the sum of loal prodution and imports,
or exports over total volumes onsumed loally.
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and IDC. This was espeially apparent in the waste water setor but was shown also for the ase
of Keserwan in the water supply setor.
The variations in availability of potable water from the publi network in the dierent regions
are a reetion of these proesses. The pollution of water resoures is due to the failure to extend
waste water networks, open dumping, and polluting eonomi ativities, as well as the government's
inability and unwillingness to enfore environmental laws. A partiular vulnerability to pollution
of water resoures is also due to the harateristis of the terrain that allows pollutants to inltrate
very rapidly.
Rapid and dense urbanisation also ontributes to pollution and overextration of resoures.
Quarrying is a polluting ativity that is diretly linked to the rapid rate of urbanisation. The
over-abstration and related saltwater intrusion of water resoures in urban entres along the oast
is aused by the immense number of private wells that make up for the lak of publi water supply
from the network. The deits of the publi water supply are also a ause for the nanial burden
water provision imposes on the poorest segments of the population. Those with the nanial
means are not aeted but an guarantee onstant supply of better quality water on average. In
this ontext it was also shown that ommerialisation and privatisation strategies are not likely to
hange this situation. The 2002 privatisation study showed that water provision would remain a
nanial burden on the poorest segment (20 perent and more) of the population.
Finally, the analysis of the irrigation setor showed that this situation is reprodued in agriul-
ture where large landowners prot disproportionately from the ability to mobilise water resoures.
The government's laissez-faire attitude towards the agriultural setor and the related failure to
extend irrigation networks is also responsible for the unequal aess to water resoures for irrigation.
As a whole the unequal distribution of water that is a produt of the water resoure management
proess reinfores the dependenies, in form of the patron-lient networks, that produe them.
Conlusion
In this thesis I investigated the inuene of the International Development Complex on the
hydrosoial yle as oneptualised by ritial geographers (Bakker, 2003; Linton & Budds, 2013;
Swyngedouw, 2004b) in order to understand how the IDC interventions and its interation with
the Lebanese water setor aet Lebanese power relations. Through this theoretial lens I foused
on the soial onstrution of water and the water resoure management proess. This allowed the
inlusion of a variety of agenies, human and non-human, into the analysis of the watersape. The
water ows, their quality and distribution, are the result of a historially and geographially spei
and ontingent proess (N. Smith, 1984) shaped by: the IDC, neoliberal ideology and assoiated
governane templates; Lebanese soial, politial and eonomi dynamis, the onomitant institu-
tional framework; physial infrastruture and the related planning proess; Lebanese topography,
as well as hydrogeology and limate patterns. This also allows an analysis of the neoliberalisation
proess oneptualised by ritial urban theorists suh as Brenner, Pek, and Theodore (Brenner
et al., 2010a, 2010b; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; ?) as always inomplete, path-dependent and
uneven by identifying whih elements ontribute to it, how they do so, as well as their eets.
Noel Castree (2010b) provides a useful map to make sense of nature's neoliberalisation. Based
on a synthesis of the work by Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi, and James O'Connor he produes two
ideal type senarios that an be used as a diagnosti guide to assess the neoliberalisation of
nature. The rst he alls Neoliberalism triumphant on one end of the spetrum of outomes
whereby in this ase neoliberalism is able to suessfully manage the eologial and soial on-
traditions that emerge from its ontinued geographial expansion and related ommodiation of
nature. The seond is on the other end of the spetrum and termed Neoliberalism on the bak
foot; in this senario the proess of neoliberalisation reverses, as it is not able to manage both
ontraditions and opposition rises in reation to the soial and eologial injustie that has been
perpetrated. Depending on the reations of opposition movements and the various ators invested
in neoliberalisation this leads to strong reform at a minimum, or something even more radial
and threatening to the neoliberal order (Castree, 2010b,p 1744). He summarises six elements
for eah senario, four of whih are relevant here. Neoliberalism Triumphant: 1) ontinued
expansion of neoliberalism; 2) ommodiation of the biophysial world ombining preservation
and exploitation; 3) depolitiisation of issues being mediated by markets; 4) anking mehanisms
from ivil soiety suessfully mitigate negative soial and environmental eets. The seond
senario: 1) geographial ontration of neoliberalism; 2) inreased environmental problems from
exploitation whereby markets are not able to internalise externalities; 3) politiisation of soio-
eologial issues whih `the market' auses and is unable to resolve; 4) anking mehanisms are




Four broad and interrelated ategories presented in the introdution of this thesis serve to
disentangle these soio-natural assemblages: 1) the International Development Complex and how
it links to 2) the Lebanese water administration and the politial eonomi proesses in whih it
is embedded; 3) the water resoure management proess as produt of the interation of the IDC
and the Lebanese water setor administration; 4) the biophysial proesses that are the material
aspets of the hydrosoial yle and how these are aeted and shape the proess. Very broadly
this ategorisation also reets how I strutured this thesis. The water resoure management
proess and the interation between the two sets of ators was followed throughout the thesis with
a spei emphasis on the water setor reform proess in Chapter 4.
I situated the emergene of the IDC in the speially Lebanese neoliberalisation proess.
The latter was presented as a hybrid of largely setarian lient-patron networks enshrined in
the onstitution and a market friendly neoliberal eonomi infrastruture that proteted highly
onentrated markets and sustained a wealth transfer mehanism from state oers to the elites.
The resulting publi debt led to an inreasing inability to invest in soial servies infrastruture
and lak of funds in the servie ministries: the Ministry of Energy and Water and the Ministry
of Agriulture are examples entral to the management of water resoures. Rooted in its ability
to substitute for the state's sal onstraints the IDC took on a dual role. On the one hand it
resembles what Castree terms a anking mehanism to replae state-support in the soial and
environmental domains (Castree, 2010a, p.1728) usually assoiated to ivil soiety. On the other
hand its funding support inreased its ability to at as an agent of the deepening neoliberalisation
and push forward the ommerialisation of the water setor with a view to institute full ost
reovery and inrease private setor partiipation.
However, this proess is riddled with ontraditions. One ontradition emerges from the
analysis of the setor produed by Lebanese and IDC water setor expertise (see Setion 2.2.1). In
it the water setor and its administration are disembedded from their soiopolitial ontext. In this
depolitiised representation of the setor the analysis deprives itself of the possibility to understand
the more fundamental power relations that shape the water resoure management proess. This is
inherent to the ideology; if the problems were posed in politial terms and represented as issues of
power the market ould not be the solution. Thus the problem is posed in terms of good governane.
Eonomi/produtive eieny or the lak thereof, fragmentation of responsibilities, orruption,
as well as the general funding problems of the state are not understood as being the result of the
mehanis of power division among the elites, but as tehnial and managerial problems that an
be solved with the appliation of generi neoliberal templates.
The de- and re-regulation of the setor and the marketisation of water servies (or rather the
attempt) puts the neoliberalisation of the setor in diret ompetition with the setarian patron-
lient networks that form one important pillar of the power of the Lebanese elites. It in fat
represents nothing other than an attempted fundamental restruturing of an important subset of
Lebanese soial relations. The substitution of patron-lient relations with onsumer relations, the
substitution of patron-proteted employment with market-driven labour relations, and the loss of
other ways to generate rents through the water administration works against the interests of the
elites and the spei patrons. The neoliberalisation of the water setor poses the real danger of
destabilising the power base of the elites. This is not a uniform proess as dierent patrons have
varying levels of inuene in the setor and the administration. Thus deepening neoliberalisation
emerges as a threat to the soial order. From this emerges a seond ontradition. The patron-lient
dominated politial proess emerges as both a barrier to gradual neoliberalisation in some elds,
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as well as the mehanism of power distribution that has allowed the survival of atually existing
neoliberalism in Lebanon. Resistane in this ase does not originate from soial movements as
in the ase of Castree's (2010a) senarios but from elites onerned with the perpetuation of the
existing aumulation regime and their positions as patrons of the system and their ability to
dispense favours.
I have further shown that as a result the reform was rst opposed and later the draft law
was altered to exlude or water down elements that had the potential to ause onit over the
distribution of inuene, speially the proposal to reate an oversight body and make the regional
water authorities largely independent was underut. Setarian politial dynamis were also a
entral aspet in the resaling of the water setor administration and water governane. The need
to divide administrative units aording to setarian quotas undermined geographial subdivisions
more favourable to the privatisation of the setor whereby the nal form of the subdivision is a result
of the interplay of historial administrative boundaries, topographial properties and setarian
politis (see Setion 4.4). Moreover, aspets of the ommerialisation of the setor were (and still
are) undermined when they threatened loal patronage networks. One of the reasons why Ondeo
did not renew its ontrat was its inability to operate aording to ommerial priniples and was
repeatedly faed with politial opposition (see Setion 4.2.6).
This leads me to the third ontradition whih is related to the environmental degradation
assoiated with the almost absent management of waste water as well as the quality and quantity
of water supply. In its urrent form, inompletely deregularised and only partially ommerialised,
the water administration does not have the nanial nor the tehnial apaities to operate and
maintain the infrastruture as needed, even less are they in a position to develop it. As I have
illustrated, this is not the result of the neoliberalisation proess but rather of its hybridised
adaptation, whereby the patron-lient dynamis are predominantly responsible for the extremely
low management apaity. The view prevails among IDC and Lebanese experts that the ontinued
ommerialisation of the regional water establishments will improve water servies. The argument
is not without merit with a view of the improvement that tehnial assistane projets by the IDC
have been able to produe. The water establishments have for example updated and digitalised
their infrastruture inventories, introdued management aounting systems and software, updated
subsription data bases and improved their management apabilities in general. Furthermore, the
dire sal situation of the state, whih in turn is also a result of prior rounds of neoliberalisation
in Lebanon, and the related dearth of funds from whih the regional water establishment suer,
are the most important reasons for the hopes plaed in the further ommerialisation and the
implementation of full-ost reovery via user fees. But this would also require parliamentary ation
to pass the required law, however, as the World Bank-funded Baalbek Water Supply and Waste
Water Projet already experiened (see Setion 4.2.6), this is not very high on the agenda and not
a law that politiians are enthusiasti about. If suh a law passes and if the ommerialisation and
introdution of full-ost reovery priniples were to be suessful (or more so), the likelihood for
an improvement of water servies is high. It ould not, or is highly unlikely to produe soially
just outomes, beause the ost inreases would beome a onsiderable burden on the poorest 20
perent of itizens (see Setion 5.3.2).
This speulation aside, in the urrent situation IDC funding and involvement in infrastruture
prodution shores up the water setor, and in this sense it ats as a anking mehanism to the state.
Inreasingly the IDC gets involved at all levels of the water resoure management proess, inluding
the planning, design, and implementation stages of infrastruture it nanes (see Setion 3.3). As
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suh it dampens the eets of the on-going eologial risis. A risis that is on the one hand human
made, the mismanagement of the setor partially rooted in the spiralling publi debt, but also a
funtion of the hydrogeologial harateristis of the terrain aentuated by the limate and the
long rainless summer period. The karsti geologial features that over large areas of the ountry
reate partiular vulnerabilities to pollution, while the long dry period makes larger sale water
storage of some form a neessity (see Setions 5.2 and 5.3.1). The IDC at the same time attempts
to mitigate this soio-natural risis that is also an eet of atually existing neoliberalism while
simultaneously ontributing to its prolonged survival. This dynami forms the third ontradition.
I have shown that the mitigation of the environmental (and assoiated soial risis in terms
of water availability and quality) is not very, or simply not, suessful. Water quality has not
improved (or not muh where it has), worsened in plaes (suh as Lake Qaraoun and the Litani),
and remains a health hazard. Unaounted-for-water remains at the same levels as right after the
war, water supply has improved in some areas (notably Saida and Tripoli) but remains sporadi
in many plaes, while only a few areas benet from lean and suient water, mostly in the
higher mountain areas where springs are not yet polluted. One important aspet of this is the
fous of funds on oastal waste water treatment rather than the more important treatment of
waste water originating from mountainous areas and inland soures of pollution. The IDC for
a long time did not, or not suiently, address issues more entral to improved water quality
and supply. This dynami is not diretly a produt of the neoliberalisation proess but of the
varying interests of the members of the IDC. The bias towards Mediterranean de-pollution stems
from EU Mediterranean poliy, the Lebanese aession to the Euro-Mediterranean proess and
the related EU-Lebanon Assoiation Agreement (see Setion 3.3.1.1). EU donor priorities for
an implementation of oastal projets is probably better read as a weak form of neo-olonialism
rather than onated with neoliberalisation dynamis. There also has not been any interest in
the support of the dam building strategy of the government, while the strategy as expressed in
the NWSS, a stark expression of the Lebanese hydrauli mission, is questionable, the long dry
period provides arguments for investments into storage apaity. Finally, with the exeption of an
early World Bank projet, very little has been done in the irrigation setor. This is reetive of
the government poliy of neglet of the agriultural setor as a whole sine the end of the war.
As a result of the ombination of the absene of a oherent agriultural and irrigation strategy
(that takes into aount the needs of the poorest farmers) and the radial laissez-faire attitude,
enables the ontinued mining of groundwater and the assoiated degradation of the resoure. The
IDC thus only partially mitigates the degradation of water resoures and their uneven distribution
favouring the land owning lass (see Setion 5.4).
The outome of the water resoure management proess of the post-ivil war deades has pro-
dued and reprodued a situation that is not eologially sustainable and in whih the distribution
and use of water resoures is highly unjust, whih in turn has reinfored the dependeny of the
weakest parts of soiety on their politial patrons. In this proess the IDC has emerged as an
important proponent and agent of a highly ontraditory neoliberalisation proess that has been
used by elites to reprodue their soial, politial, and eonomi power. The involvement of the
IDC in the setor annot bring about a more eologially sustainable and simultaneously soially
just water resoure management proess (assuming that the Neoliberalism Triumphant senario
is a real possibility) beause resistane to the deepening of ongoing neoliberalisation has originated
in large parts from the elites, who in turn ontrol the state apparatus and are thus able to subvert
de- and re-regulatory proesses to reprodue the power relationships on whih they depend.
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Finally, the obvious failure of the water setor reform and the drasti degradation of the resoure
has generated a reation by setions of the elite (the ommerial and nanial bourgeoisie) repre-
sented by the Civil Inuene Hub (CIH). The CIH, in a ontext where the market environmentalist
disourse has been heavily promoted by the IDC as a solution to all water problems, has proposed
the Blue Gold Projet. It is the latest and probably most radial attempt to fully neoliberalise
the setor (see Setion 3.3). But to nish on a more positive note, the propaganda ampaign that
has been launhed to promote the projet has re-politiised the issue of water and is generating
inreasingly oordinated resistane by environmental ativist groups and NGOs and also pro-labour
movement groups that have beome more voal and grown stronger sine the start of the Arab
revolutionary proesses in 2011. Opposition to the projet, at least by some of these groups, is
framed in terms of it relationship to the larger politial eonomi system. The neoliberalisation
proess thus remains ontested, not only by the elite, but also by grassroots movements and NGOs
onerned with soial and environmental justie.
With this ritique of IDC intervention in the politial eonomy of water in Lebanon this
thesis addressed a topi that has not been treated in this form before. Speially, an in-depth
understanding of the interation of the IDC with its Lebanese ounterpart, the water setor
administration and the wider water resoure management struture, is new for the ase of Lebanon.
This reading of IDC intervention allowed an analysis of the umulative eets of development
projets at the national sale. In so doing I identied the IDC as having a struturing role in the
artiulation of the relationships between governane, water, and soial networks (Norman et al.,
2012, p. 53) and by extension power. Given the large number of organisations ative in a ountry
as small as Lebanon and their tight interlinkages (as shown in Chapter 3) the researh suggests
that this ould be the ase for a large number of third world ountries and that the IDC needs
to be onsidered an important ator in hydro-politial analyses. This is a dierent notion from
analysing the dynamis of individual development projets but emphasises eets at a larger sale
that are not neessarily apparent when analysing loal dynamis and projets.
I further showed that IDC intervention should not be read as a unilateral imposition of a market
environmental logi of water resoure management but rather that the water resoure management
and the hybridised neoliberalisation of the setor is the result of the interation of the IDC and
the Lebanese administration. The Lebanese elites through their use and manipulation of the
administrative arhiteture have an equally important role.
This is also where the analysis of the proess in terms of the International Development Complex
oers insights that dier from approahes that are framed in Fouauldian terms of the development
apparatus suh as in Ferguson's work (1994), or the dispositif based on Esobar (1995). By not
treating power as a disembodied notion expressed in a dominant disourse inluding the praties
of all ators involved, but by analysing the ators and their ations in a spei ontext, was it
possible to dierentiate their roles and the eets of their interventions and so identify the inherent
ontraditions, rather than treat the reprodution of power geometries only as undesired eets
that only happen to end up oming together into powerful onstellations of ontrol that were never
intended (Ferguson, 1994, 18-19).
I demonstrated that the resulting development and management dynamis in the water setor
in Lebanon do not and annot overome the existing hydrosoial injustie nor an they mitigate the
assoiated eologial deterioration. The ontraditions inherent to IDC involvement in the setor
make this impossible. The most important result of IDC intervention is thus its ontribution to the
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reprodution of loal power strutures whih are at the root of this unjust hydrosoial onstellation
in the rst plae.
Whether or not these results an be generalised would require further study. Comparative
work on the ountries of the region and beyond would allow to test in how far these dynamis
and ontraditions are reprodued in other loations. The results from this study are more likely
to be reprodued in politial eonomi ontexts that show harateristis similar or omparable
to Lebanon. These are 1) deep politial divisions based on set, ethniity, lan or other soial
identities (what the World Bank alls soial polarisation) and related fragile balane of power, and
2) high state debt and dependene on foreign funds, i.e. a prearious sal and eonomi situation.
Iraq, notwithstanding its oil rihness, seems to be a ase in point, but numerous other third world
ountries (for example in Afria or Asia) ome to mind.
Further, and in a more narrow sense fousing on Lebanon, the example of the politial eonomy
of water ould be usefully transferred to studies of other infrastruture setors suh as transporta-
tion, as well as power supply and generation, or even teleommuniations.
This study into the ways in whih the IDC intervenes in and interats with the Lebanese water
setor also opens other interesting avenues for researh. Here two suh avenues deserve to be
mentioned speially. The rst relates to expert interation and the propagation and reation of
water resoure management knowledge and ideology. In Chapter 3 I skethed a transnational poliy
network that is ative throughout the Mediterranean. Detailing these types of networks, their
genesis and how they ontribute to the onstrution of expert knowledge and its reprodution ould
provide interesting insights into the transformation of expertise in third world ountries. Related,
mirosoiologial and anthropologial work on the interation between international development
experts and loal administrators and managers (and the overlap in these ategories) promises
further insights into the power dynamis at the level of the individuals involved. This ould show
how and under what onditions mainstream development knowledge and ideology are propagated,
resisted and hybridised. Throughout my interviews with Lebanese experts a generational shift in
knowledge, expertise and ideology ould be observed, while probably unsurprising and not lear-ut
this does open questions about loal training and university eduation, as well as the intersetion
of the latter with above mentioned transnational poliy networks.
The seond avenue for further researh relates to the politis of tehnologies designed to manage,
distribute, store and treat water and waste water. The emphasis in this work (also beause of spae
restritions) was on the distributional properties of infrastruture i.e. the deision and planning
proesses that loate water infrastruture in one plae and not another and aordingly how this
aets the ows of water and waste water. But researh into the types of tehnologies in use,
their appropriateness (in terms of onstrution and maintenane ost and expertise), as well as
their tehnial design is neessary to understand the politial onsequenes these hoies and
designs might entail. Researh in this diretion might also start to grapple with the dialetial
interplay of soiospatial environments or onstruted nature and the tehnologial properties of the
networks that sustain the ows of water through them. How do soiospatial arrangements limit
tehnologial hoies? How do available tehnologies aet soiospatial development, and what are
the impliation for a soially and eologially just politis?
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The Prinipal Charateristis of Neoliberalism (Castree, 2010a)
 Privatisation (i.e. assigning lear, legally enforeable, private property rights to hitherto
unowned, government owned or ommunally owned aspets of the soial and natural worlds).
 Marketisation (i.e. rendering alienable and exhangeable things that might not previously
have been subjet to a market alulus lubriated by monetary transations within and
between nation states).
 State roll bak or deregulation (i.e. the withdrawal or diminution of government intervention
in ertain areas of soial and environmental life in order to enable rms and onsumers to
exerise `freedom of hoie'; and the reation of new quasi-state or state-santioned ators to
take on funtions that states themselves ould otherwise per- form in theory or pratie).
 Market-friendly reregulation (i.e. a reonguration of state / governmental poliies so as to
extend the frontiers of privatisation and marketisation. Here, then, the state in its various
forms beomes `market manager' or `night wathman', and less of a `provider' to the itizenry
or speial interests therein: it intervenes for the eonomy not, as it were, in it. This entails
sal disipline, a fous on supply side investments, entrepreneur- and onsumer-friendly tax
poliies, rm-friendly labour market poliies, and measures to enable `free' movements of
money apital and also other less `uid' ommodities).
 Use of market proxies in the residual governmental setor (i.e. making remaining state
servies more market-like in their operation through the use of measures like internal markets,
ost-reovery and budget-apping).
 The strong enouragement of `anking mehanisms' in ivil soiety (i.e. state-led measures
to promote the growth of voluntary, haritable, `third setor' and ommunity groups who
are seen as being able to ll the vauum reated by the absene / diminution of diret
state-support in the soial and environmental domains. This is linked to formal state
enouragement, where appropriate, of the so-alled `informal' and `soial' eonomies whose
funtioning relies only partly, or not at all, on monetary transations).
 The reation of `self-suient' individuals and ommunities (i.e. the ultivation of an ethi
among persons and ommunities that emphasises less, and ultimately limited, reliane on
state-provided servies for life's neessities. For neoliberals this ethi is almost a `natural'
good. It enapsulates the individual's right to maximum freedom and their responsibility for
their own aairs).
Soure: reprodued from Neoliberalism and the biophysial environment 1: What `neoliberalism'
is, and what dierene nature makes to it (Castree, 2010a, p. 1728).
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Law N° 221 Organisation of the Water Setor
The parliament approved And the President of the Republi promulgates the following law :
Artile 1:
Are onsidered in the ore of publi interest, the hydrauli natural resoures' protetion and
development within the environment and eosystems protetion
Artile 2: Ministry of Hydrauli and Eletri Resoures (MHER)
In the Water Setor, the MHER assumes the following ompetenies and missions:
1. To ollet, ontrol, meter, establish statistis and study water resoures, to evaluate water
needs and elds of its usage all over the Lebanese territory.
2. To ontrol the surfae and underground water quality and identify standards to be applied.
3. To establish the General Planning projet for hydrauli resoures alloation, repartition
among the drinking and irrigation water usage on the national level, as well as to prepare
the National General Water Master-Plan and update it ontinuously.
4. To design, study and implement the large water installations and works suh as dams,
artiial lakes, tunnels, water ourses retiation, water networks et. . . , and to operate
them.
5. To implement, when needed, artiial reharge of underground water reservoirs and to ontrol
underground water extration.
6. 6- To protet water resoures from losses and pollution by elaborating legal texts and taking
neessary measures and dispositions to avoid water pollution as well as to bring these water
resoures bak to their former natural quality.
7. To give lienses and permits for water prospetion, publi water usage and temporary ou-
pation of publi properties and to nalise all the neessary formalities aording to the laws
and by-laws in fore.
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8. To implement studies, and hydrauli, geologial and hydrologial researhes, to ollet teh-
nial data relative to hydrauli matters, to establish tehnial maps onerning these studies,
researhes and data and to update them regularly
9. To arry out ontrol and tutelage over Publi Establishments and other bodies operating in
the water eld, aording to the present law dispositions, texts and stipulations relative to
eah of the about mentioned establishments and institutions.
10. To ameliorate performanes of the Water Exploitation Publi Establishments (WEPEs) and
to evaluate their performanes on the basis of indiators mentioned in the ation plans, whih
has been approved aording to the legal proedures.
11. To establish standards to be adopted in the studies onduted by WEPEs as well as in their
works implementation. To establish onditions and regulations for surfae and underground
water extration and use and their quality standards and ontrol
12. To prepare and arry out expropriation formalities relative to the MHER and WEPEs
submitted to its tutelage aording to the laws and regulations in fore.
13. To express a tehnial opinion on quarries and mines lienses and permits onerning their
impats on water resoures
14. To provide publi relations with the population and to inform the people of all neessary
information onerning the water matters and to provide adequate orientation toward a
rational usage.
Artile 3: Water Exploitation publi Establishments (WEPEs)
WEPEs will be reated and their names and main oes will be as following:
Beirut-Mount Lebanon water establishment - main oe: Beirut.
North-Lebanon water establishment - main oe: Tripoli
South  Bekaa water establishment - main oe: Zahleh
North-Bekaa water establishment - main oe: Baalbek
South -Lebanon water establishment  main oe: Saida
The about mentioned Establishments have the status of moral person and will operate within
an administrative and nanial autonomy. Their operating perimeter is xed in the map attahed
to the present law.
Artile 4:
1- Duties and ompetenes of Eah Water Establishment within its exploitation perimeter are:
 a) To arry out studies, implementation operation, maintenane and renewing of projets for
drinking and irrigation water distribution within the frame of General Water master-plan or
aording to a Ministry's preallable permit to use publi water resoure.
 b) to propose taris for drinking and irrigation water servies taking into onsideration
general soio-eonomi onditions of the Country .
ANNEX 2 227
 ) to ontrol the quality of the drinking and irrigation distributed water
2- Water Establishments will operate under their own regulations.
The above mentioned Establishments will hire the servies of an audit ompany whih mission
onsist in the preparation of a report on the nanial status and losing aounts as well as on the
internal regulatory system applied in the said Establishment.
Artile 5:
Establishment's management will be undertaken by a Board of Diretors onstituted by a
President and six Members. Members nomination and indemnities will be xed by a deree taken
in the Counil of Ministers on the proposal of Minister of Hydrauli and Eletri resoure. They
should be university graduates with diplomas reognised in Lebanon, in the following speialities:
law- water and environment- mediine  engineering  eonomy and aounting.
The Board of Diretors' mandate time will be xed in their nomination Deree and their servies
ould be ended at any time following the same proedure.
The President of the Board will assume the General exeutive manager's mission. He will be
assisted by an exeutive sta onstituted by employees submitted to his own authority
The Establishment's Board of Diretors will prepare all the regulations needed to run the said
Establishment . These regulations should be approved by derees taken in the Counil of Ministers
on the proposition of both the Minister of Finanes and the Minister of Hydrauli and Eletri
Resoures.
Artile 6:
WEPEs will be submitted to the a posteriori ontrol of the Aount Court aording to
regulations to be disussed and agreed with the said Court; they are also submitted to the Central
inspetion ontrol but not to the Publi Reruitment Counil authority.
Within the MHER, will be reated a Performanes Evaluation Committee (PEC). It will be
nominated by deree taken in the Counil of Minister upon the proposition of the two Ministers
of Finanes and of Hydrauli and Eletri Resoures; this PEC will be onstituted of:
The Minister of Hydrauli and Eletri Resoures as the President and as members:
The General Diretor of the Ministry of Finanes
The General Diretor of Exploitation (operations) in MHER
The General Diretor of Hydrauli and Eletri equipment in the MHER
A Hydrauli Engineer with 6 years experiene
An Eonomy Graduate with 6 years experiene
A law graduate with 6 years experiene
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A seond ategory funtionary (ivil servant) from the General Diretorate of Exploitation, as
rapporteur
The mission of the said Committee and its working proedures will be dened by a ommon
deision taken by the two Ministers: of Finanes and of Hydrauli and Eletri Resoures. It has
the possibility of requiring any expert assistane when needed.
Artile 7:
The Oe National du Litani (ONL), reated by the Law dated on August 16th, 1954, will
not follow the terms and lauses of the present law; it will ontinue, as before, to manage and
operate irrigation water in its perimeter (South Bekaa and South Lebanon), however ONL will be
submitted to Artile 4 - paragraph 2 and to artile 6 of the present law.
Artile 8:
Atual Water Autonomous Authorities and Committees will ontinue to manage drinking and
irrigation water, to aomplish their funtioning works until their merging aording to the artile
3 of the present law in a gradual way. This merging should be ompleted within a period of two
years beginning from this law enatment date.
Artile 9:
Appliation details of this law will be xed by derees taken in the Counil of Ministers upon
the Minister of Hydrauli and Eletri Resoures proposal.
Artile 10:
All legislative texts and by-laws in ontradition with this law's Clauses and stipulations are
onsidered as null and void.
Artile 11:
Enatment of the present law will beome eetive immediately after its publishing in the
Oial Gazette
The President of Counil of Ministers Baabda May 29th ,2000
Signed : Selim El Hoss Signed: Emile Lahoud
Promulgated by the President of the Republi The President of Counil of Ministers
Signed: Selim El Hoss.
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Law N° 241 Material Error orretion in the Artile 3 of the law 221
dated on May 29th, 2000
(Organisation of the Water Setor)
The Parliament approved and the President of the Republi promulgates the following law.
Unique Artile:
Artile 3 of the law N° 221, dated on May 29th, 2000 (Organisation of the Water Setor) is
orreted and its text will be read as following :
Artile 3: Water Exploitation Publi Establishments (WEPEs)
WEPEs will be reated and their names and main oes will be as following:
Beirut - Mount Lebanon Water Establishment  main oe: Beirut
North  Lebanon Water Establishment  main oe: Tripoli
Bekaa Water Establishment  main oe: Zahleh
South- Lebanon Water Establishment  main oe: Saida
These mentioned Establishments will have the status of moral person and operate in an
administrative and nanial autonomy; their operating perimeter is xed in the map attahed
to the present Law.
Enatment of the present Law will beome eetive, immediately after its publishing in the
Oial Gazette.
The President of Counil of Ministers Baabda August 7th , 2000
Signed: Selim El Hoss Signed: Emile Lahoud
Promulgated by the President of the Republi The President of Counil of Ministers
Signed: Selim El Hoss.
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Draft Law Water Setor Reorganisation (November 1998)
Setion 1: General Priniples
Artile 1:
Water onstitutes an important ommon resoure of the Lebanese soiety. Thus the protetion
and the development of this natural resoure is at the heart of the protetion of the environment
and eosystems that benet general interest
Artile 2:
The purpose of this law is to set up water resoures management by providing an adequate
supervision on the basis of the following priniples by:
1. Managing water resoures in a rational and sienti manner;
2. Stressing the onept of eonomi return relative to the protetion, development, alloation
and distribution of water resoures in aordane to the needs of soiety and to the eonomi
ativity;
3. Ensuring prompt, speedy and quality servie to water beneiaries;
4. Strengthening and enouraging private setor partiipation in the provision of servies;
5. Proteting the eologial balane throughout the Lebanese territory and relaiming this
balane in regions that suered degradation;
6. Proteting aquifers and rain water form pollution, and taking appropriate steps to prevent
pollution and to treat polluted waters;
7. Establishing an appropriate institutional framework to implement a national water poliy
Artile 3
Subjet to the responsibilities assigned to the MWRE (in the eletriity area) as dened in artile
1 of the 20/66 law and artile 4 relative to the water setor mentioned there-under:
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Development enterprises for drinking, irrigation, and waste water will be established and will be
entrusted with organising, managing and supervising water investment provided that the national
Authority of the Litani river will be entrusted with the management of the irrigation investment
area (North and South Bekaa)
Setion 2: MWRE Responsibilities
Artile 4: MWRE duties and responsibilities
MWRE duties and responsibilities will be entrusted, but nor restrited to undertake the
following:
1. Assessing aquifers and running water;
2. Assessing residential, drinking, industrial, agriultural, and general water needs;
3. Alloating and distributing water resoures in a rational and pratial way;
4. Setting up and modernising a national diretion plan on a periodi basis;
5. Spelling out onditions for private setor partiipation in the water area;
6. Supervising aquifers and running water quality;
7. Improving water river, soures, wells and aquifers quality on a ontinuous basis;
8. Monitoring and determining minimum relative aeptable water distributed both in terms of
quality and quantity, as well as the maximum waste water level;
9. partiipating in the setting up of water ontrol systems to ensure water quality;
10. Charging polluters, as well as the beneiaries of a leaner environment, a fee;
11. Preparing and issuing property ownership regulations;
12. Paying attention to water rights, oniliation, and partiipation in water disputes resolution
in general;
13. Putting up strategies, objetives, and texts to ensure ost reovery and drinking, waste water,
irrigation, and industrial water taris;
14. Evaluating and approving work programs put out by independent water investment enter-
prises;
15. Evaluating the performane of independent investment water enterprises and making pro-
posals while taking appropriate steps;
16. Enating a water ode and updating it on a periodi basis;
17. Providing adequate protetion from oods whether this aets people or property while
respeting the laws in fore;
18. Providing appropriate bodies to monitor oods and give proper warnings;
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19. Delivering water investment permits and lienses subjet to existing laws;
20. Delivering mines and investment permits and presenting Opinions on stone quarries if there
is an impat on water resoures subjet to existing laws;
21. Spelling out protetion and investment onditions and rules for aquifer and running water;
22. Designing, studying, implementing, and inorporating in investment larger water enterprises
having a ommon interest suh as dams;
23. Supervising existing eletriity onessions subjet to existing provisions;
24. providing neessary information and publi relations eorts to enable the itizens o support
water investment enterprises and management ativities;
25. Colleting and publishing all hydrometri and hydrogeologial data;
26. Informing people of water resoures projets as well as legal organisational texts, among
other things.
Setion 3:Drinking, irrigation, and waste water investment enterprises
Artile 5
Drinking, irrigation and waste water publi enterprises established by virtue of derees no.
9626, 9627, 9628, 9629, 9630 enated on 12/13/1996 will beome investment enterprise. These are:
Northern Lebanon drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprise
Southern Lebanon drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprise
Beirut Mount Lebanon drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprise
Northern Bekaa drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprise
Southern Bekaa drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprise
These enterprises will be governed by ommerial law and the provision ontained in this law.
Upon publiation of this law, these Authorities will merge and their ommittees will be absorbed
by the investment enterprises. The transitory proess should no exeed three years. Above
mentioned Investment water ommittees will endeavour to seek private setor partiipation in
their ativities. In any ase, these ommittees will selet and aounting rm whih will undertake
its ativities in aordane with international reognised aounting priniples.
Artile 6
Northern Lebanon drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprise will, eah within
its area of ompetene be responsible for providing equipment, distribution and treatment of
drinking water, olleting and treating waste water, and managing irrigation water. In the ourse of
its work, investment enterprises an have reourse to the various forms of internationally aeptable
management praties. For example, it will, among other things, partiipate, diret management,
or any ombination of the above.
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Artile 7 : Investment enterprise duties
Northern Lebanon drinking, irrigation and waste water investment enterprises duties inlude
but are limited to the following:
1. Designing, studying, and implementing loal and muniipal (plans) in aordane with MWRE
general national water master plan;
2. Establishing, operating, and ensuring the maintenane of all drinking, irrigation and waste
water infrastruture;
3. Managing user servies falling under it authority;
4. Deiding a tari poliy based upon the work program and proeeds;
5. Developing human resoures and managing user network
6. Resorting to the private setor in some area ativities suh as management, operations, and
maintenane of equipment and investment to name a few;
7. Monitoring drinking, irrigation water quality and drainage;
8. Preparing and keeping updated annual reports and submitting them to MWRE for onsid-
eration and approval;
9. Requesting MWRE approval relative to water exploitation (publily owned), or drainage;
10. Implementing neessary means pertaining to water distribution meters;
11. Designing major irrigation projets in aordane with MWRE national master plan;
12. Studying primary and seondary water implementation networks and major enterprises for
water retention and pumping;
13. Operating and maintaining primary and seondary water irrigation networks;
14. Selling irrigation water among farmers' unions and devising a tari poliy based upon a work
programme and proeeds;
15. Leaving tertiary building and maintenane networks (as a part of water exploitation) to
farmers' unions and investors who would dene water taris upon farms and landowners;
Artile 8: Taris
The board will determine a drinking, irrigation, and waste water tari poliy based upon the ost.
An additional aeptable prot margin will be allowed so as to give inentives to the private setor
partiipation in the ativities of investment enterprises taking into onsideration inhabitants soial
onditions;
The implementation of these tari will be subjet to prior approval of the MWRE nanial struture
ommittee.
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Artile 9: Boards of diretors
The board will be omposed seven (7) members to be appointed by the Counil of Ministers
upon reommendation of MWRE. The board will inlude representatives of the state, onsumers,
muniipalities, and the private setor to be dened in a deree enated by the Counil of Ministers
upon MWRE reommendation, This deree will determine ompetene and qualiation of the
board members.
The board will funtion in aordane with the provisions of ommerial law. If private setor
partiipation is inluded, a deree issues by the Counil of Ministers upon reommendation MWRE
will dene private setor partiipation modalities the enterprise, and the regulations of joint
enterprise.
The mandate of the board is three years that are renewable.
Artile 10: Boards Duties
Water Investment enterprises boards duties are those reognised duties undertaken by any
board operating under ommerial law. This inludes bu is not limited to the following:
1. Proposing and approving regulations
2. Proposing and approving work mehanisms that enable investment enterprise to reah its
objetives;
3. Issuing users' regulations and dening appointment priniples, vaation, and salaries;
4. Making an inventory of assets and appraisal them,. along with property evaluation;
5. Borrowing to further the naning of neessary appropriations of ativities regarding invest-
ment enterprises
Artile 11: Management organisation
The board upon MRWE reommendation puts into plae the internal administrative organisation of
the investment enterprise. Should the private setor partiipation in apital or in the management
of enterprise, the Counil of Ministers sets out the bylaws and approves them. The ounil an
delegate power to the board for enating and amending administrative struture.
Setion 4: Taris ommittee
Artile 12
A taris ommittee will be established within MWRE. The funtion of the ommittee is to
study and agree to drinking, irrigation, and waste water investment enterprises proposed tari to
determine the nanial impat.
The taris ommittee will be omposed of three members: A representative of MWRE, the ministry
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of nane, and a nanial analyst form the private setor with a high level of expertise.
The ommittee will propose and justify the taris to MWRE.
Setion 5: Transitory measures
Artile 13
All laws will be abrogated whenever they ontradit the present law upon entering in fore
exept for provision pertaining to the area of eletriity.
Artile 14
The derees of implementation relative to this law and the details therewith will be enated as
an appropriate time in the Counil of Ministers upon MWRE reommendation.
Artile 15
This law will enter into fore upon ratiation and publiation in the national gazette.
ANNEX 4
Regulations enouraging intensied land-use (Krijnen, 2010).
Type of
Inentive




Deree 2791 Otober 15,
1992
Amendment to implementation deree of the








New building law, most important hanges:
-Inrease in total exploitation area by allowing
for more areas to be deduted: suh as
stairases, elevators, tehnial oors, double
walls, maid's room and parking grounds. -25% of
apartment size in balonies, inreased from 20%,
an be added.
-Inrease of the fator used to alulate the
building envelope (gabarit) from (2*road width
+ setbak) to (2.5* road width + setbak)
-Inrease of same fator for the bak of the
building from (4*road width + setbak) to
5*road width + setbak)




-Inrease of maximum height for tehnial oors
from 1.8 to 1.9m, while not ounting them
towards exploitation.
-Buildings up to 50m an obtain their permit
diretly from the Muniipality, from 40m
previously. -An exavation permit an be issued
for projets waiting for a building permit.
41
The retour de gabarit works as follows: when a building is on a orner and thus on two streets, the
height allowed before a developer needs to reede is smaller on the narrower of the streets. The retour de
gabarit allows a developer to go 30 meters in depth from the wider street and apply to those 30 meters,
whih are on the narrower road, the fator used to alulate the building envelope as 5*road width +










Hotels are allowed to double their Total Area
Exploitation (built-up area). Given by deree
Law 339 August 6,
2001












Foreigners an aquire up to 3000m2 of property
without seeking permission from the Counil of
Ministers. A total of 3% of eah aza and 10% of
Beirut an be owned by foreigners.
-Exemptions an be requested from the Counil
of Ministers.
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-Areas an be aquired in regions previously
o-limits (suh as the Syrian- Lebanese border
region).
-Real estate registration fees are lowered to 5%





2006 Exempts joint-stok ompanies that have a
ontrat with the Investment Development
Authority Lebanon from the requirement of







Exempts holdings from the requirement of
having at least two Lebanese nationals on their
boards.
Holdings an have their apital in foreign
urreny.
A non-resident foreign hairman of a holding
ompany does not need a working permit.
If a holding has more than 20% of the apital in




If a holding has more than 20% of the apital in
a ompany, it annot provide loans, unless it is a
foreign investment.
42
Aording to the Author this information is partly derived from an interview and partly from data
researhed by a researh assistant ( Abir Saksouk).
43
The Counil of Ministers has been more than willing to grant exemptions for foreigners aquiring
property in Lebanon. From a report (BI-ME, 2005, iting numbers by Ramo real estate onsultants):
`Between January 2001 and May 2003 for example, 80 investors from the Gulf aquired 1.8 million square
meters of land, mainly in Mount Lebanon. (...) The top 23 of these investors eah bought an average of
64,467 square meters of land (83% of the total), a size learly indiating the intended use is ommerial
rather than personal.'
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Inentive








Removing the requirements of having two
Lebanese nationals on the board of an o-shore
ompany
-A non-resident hairman of an o-shore
ompany does not need a working permit.
44
IMF-plan 2006 The government signed a plan with the IMF to





June 24, 1983 Holding ompanies are exempt from paying
inome taxes and their apital is regressively
taxed:
6% for apital up to 50 million Lebanese lira
(LL), 4% for apital between LL50 and 80
million and 2% if their assets are over LL80
million, with a maximum of LL5 million
New ustoms
law54
April 23, 2001 Hotel equipment is exempt from ustom duties.
New ustoms
law
April 23, 2001 Tourist transportation busses are exempt from
taxes.
50% disount on inome tax for joint-stok and
limited liability ompanies on prots made from
residential real estate development.
45
44
Author's soure: www.mattarlaw.om/oshore-ompanies-lebanon.htm. A full-text version of
the law is available at doumanio.om/le/Law%20No_19%20amendment%20oshore%20regulation.pdf.
Aessed February 15, 2010.
45
Author's soure: From www.idal.om.lb/WhyLebanon.aspx?ID=66, aessed 4 November 2009 and
www.professionalsaa.om/tax/Additional%20Tax%20information%20in%20Lebanon.htm
List of Interviews
Interview with Date Relevant information
Abdallah, Chadi 06.03.2011 National Center for Sienti Researh, Hydrogeologist
Abd el Al, Imane 12.03.2013 Exeutive oer, Assoiation of the Friends of Ibrahim Abd
el Al
Abd el Al, Imane 12.10.2010 Exeutive oer, Assoiation of the Friends of Ibrahim Abd
el Al
Abdelnour, Gaby 25.06.2012 Engineer & Consultant (private setor), Giome
Abdelnour, Nasri 08.12.2010 Engineer & Consultant (private setor), Khatib el Alame
Aboud, Ali 18.06.2012 Diretor of the Litani River Authority
Aboulassali, Naji 04.12.2012 Engineer & Consultant (private setor), Liban Consult
Ayoub, Georges 12.04.2011 Amerian University of Beirut, Water and Waste Water
Engineer
Baroud, Mahmoud 04.03.2013 Interim Diretor of the General Department of Exploitation
Basha, Habib 15.08.2010 Amerian University of Beirut, Hydrologist
Cassat, Denis 16.12.2011 Diretor of AFD Lebanon
Catafago, Selim 22.12.2010 President of the Board of the LRA
Chalak, Ali 12.10.2011 Amerian University of Beirut, Agronomist
Chalak, Fadl 19.10.2011 Former President of the CDR
Chamas, Amal 09.12.2010 GTZ Programme oer
Charafeddine, Waa 11.04.2011 Finanial Aairs Diretor, CDR
Chemaly, Nabil 21.12.2010 GTZ Programme oer
Comair, Fadi 06.01.2011 Diretor of General Department of Hydrauli and Eletrial
Resoures
Chouweiri, Elias 31.10.2011 FAO programme oer
Christiaens, Peter 02.03.2012 Eu delegation oer, responsible of infrastruture projets
Cortas, Adel 18.04.2011 Former Minister of Agriulture
Cohrane, Paul 20.01.2012 Business Journalist
Coxon, Sam 21.01.2013 DAI Head of Mission
Daahe, Danielle 20.10.2012 UNICEF programme oer
Darwish, Ali 06.04.2011 Greenline NGO diretor
el Khazen, Imad 21.12.2010 GTZ Programme oer
Faour, Ghaleb 06.03.2011 National Center for Sienti Researh, GIS speialist
Farajallah, Nadim 15.04.2011 Amerian University of Beirut, Agronomist
Fayal, Samir 04.12.2012 Engineer & Consultant (private setor), Liban Consult
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Interview with Date Relevant information
Freiha, Rizk 21.06.2012 Former Diretor of Beirut Water Oe, onsultant on draft
water ode
Ghadban Elias 09.11.2011 Agronomist
Ghadban Elias 09.10.2013 Agronomist
Giantirs, Phil 29.02.2013 Valuadd, head of mission
Hawa, Hussam 21.06.2012 Water Resoure Management professional, employed by IRG
Jaber Bassam 20.06.2012 Former Diretor of GDE, Consultant for IRG,
MOTGE/Safege
Jaber, Bassam 30.11.2010 Former Diretor of GDE, Consultant for IRG,
MOTGE/Safege
Mr. Jebara 12.12.2011 President of the Muniipality of Jdeideh
Kanj, Wissam 23.12.2011 Diretor of the irrigation department at the MEW
Karam, Youssef 2013 Head of Water and Waste Water Programme CDR
Karam, Youssef 18.12.2011 Head of Water and Waste Water Programme CDR
Khalaf, Fadi 10.12.2011 Diretor of Bourj Hammoud oe of BMTLWE
Khansa, Mohammad 22.12.2011 Adviser to the Minister of Agriulture
Khayyat, Ziad 26.06.2012 UNDP programme oer, LWMPP
Khoury, Raymond 14.12.2011 Green Plan, Head of Hassad programme, agronomist
Klingbeil, Ralf 19.09.2010 ESCWA, water programme oer
Klingbeil, Ralf 15.01.2013 ESCWA, water programme oer
Majdelani, Mihel 15.11.2012 Engineer & Consultant, BTD
Majdelani, Zeina 30.11.2010 Oe of the Prime Minister, Water programme oer
Makki, Ismail 08.10.2010 CDR, Water and Irrigation programme oer, CDR
Mallat, Hyam 13.06.2012 Lawyer and onsultant, Water Reform Law
Mangassarian,
Arpine
24.11.2011 Head of the urban planning department Muniipality Bourj
Hammoud
Margane, Armin 02.10.2010 BGR, Head of Mission, Protetion of Jeita Spring
Margane, Armin 19.06.2012 BGR, Head of Mission, Protetion of Jeita Spring
Margane, Armin 25.02.2014 BGR, Head of Mission, Protetion of Jeita Spring
Maternowski, Eileen 21.10.2010 BGR, ESCWA programme on transboundary waters
Maternowski, Eileen 26.09.2013 Swiss Development Ageny, programme oer
Najem, Wajdi 18.03.2011 University Saint Joseph, hydrologist
Nassif, Marie-Helen 26.06.2012 Programme oer with IRG and UNDP
Neuwirth, Daniel 28.10.2010 KFW representative in Lebanon
Nizzam, Ahmad 05.03.2011 Diretor of the SLWE
Nizzam, Ahmad 17.09.2011 Diretor of the SLWE
Qabbani,
Mohammad
22.06.2012 President of the Parliamentary Committee on Publi Works,
Water and Energy
Qaraa, Kamal 14.12.2010 Head of irrigation department, LRA (retired)
Qaraa, Kamal 20.10.2010 Head of irrigation department, LRA (retired)
Renk, Andreas 21.10.2010 BGR, ESCWA programme on transboundary waters
Rizk, Georges 02.23.2011 Head of infrastruture department at MEW
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Rizkallah, Marwan 21.06.2012 UNDP programme oer
Roukos, Salim 09.12.2011 Head of irrigation department, Ministry of Agriulture
Saadeh, Mark 08.06.2012 Engineer & Consultant, ACE, former onsultant LRA
Saadeqeh, Mohamad 04.11.2010 Head of Mission, Kuwait Fund for Arab Eonomi
Development
Salame Antoine 04.04.2011 Engineer & Consultant, GICOME, Former Employee of LRA
Salame Antoine 15.06.2012 Engineer & Consultant, GICOME, Former Employee of LRA
Salame Antoine 16.10.10 Engineer & Consultant, GICOME, Former Employee of LRA
Salame Antoine 17.02.2011 Engineer & Consultant, GICOME, Former Employee of LRA
Sheu, Manfred 29.09.2010 Head of Mission GTZ/GIZ, Water Setor Support
Programme
Sheu, Manfred 30.01.2013 Head of Mission GTZ/GIZ, Water Setor Support
Programme
Tayar, Abdo 27.10.2011 Advisor to the Minister of Energy and Water, National
Water Setor Strategy
Tayar, Abdo 05.11.2012 Advisor to the Minister of Energy and Water, National
Water Setor Strategy
Thomassini, Barbara 06.12.2011 Head of EUWI-MEd programme in Lebanon, GWP-MED




25.11.2010 Head of mission, Ondeo Liban, MOTGE/Safege
Yazbek, Roy 19.10.2011 Programme management unit, Baalbek Waste Water and
Water Supply Projet CDR/WB
Zakhrour, Ziad 19.11.2012 Advisor to the Minister of Energy and Water, Dams
Zammar, Jimmy 02.20.2013 DAI programme Oer
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t of Global Warming on Water Resoures in the Middle East
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a: The Fifth Environmental Symposium of German Arab S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for Environmental Studies. Organised by German-Arab S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 Forum for Environmental
Studies and Lebanese Amerian University, Byblos, Lebanon.
2. 2010, 22 Otober; Workshop on The Improvement of Water Supply and Waste Water in the
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ipalities. Organised by UNICEF, el Abda, Akkar, Lebanon.
3. 2010, 24-27 Otober; 3rd BEIRUTWATERWEEK. Organised by the Notre Dame University-
Louaize, Ministry of Energy and Water, GWP-Med. Louaize, Lebanon.
4. 2010, 20 Deember, Lebanon's Eonomi Projet: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for
the Future - Presentation by Dr. Mazen Soueid and disussion. Organised by The Lebanese
Eonomi Assoiation  LEA and the Friedrih Naumann Foundation. Beirut Lebanon.
5. 2011, 22 Marh, World Water Day 2011. Organised by ESCWA, BGR, Assoiation of
Friends of Ibrahim Abd el Al, Beirut Lebanon.
6. 2011, 14 Otober, The LebanonWater Resoures: Challenges and Opportunities. Organised
by Amerian University of Beirut, Lebanon.
7. 2011, 28-20 November, Pour une Gestion durable de notre Territoire. Organised by Le
Comité National Libanais du Forum Franophone des Aaires (FFA), l'Eole Supérieure des
Aaires, Beirut, Lebanon.
8. 2012, 9 Otober; Publi Engagement in Water Management Projet (PEWM). Organised
by Assoiation of Friends of Ibrahim Abd el Al, Arab Water Counil, World Bank, Beirut,
Lebanon.
9. 2012, 7 Deember, The Seond Conferene on Waste Water Treatment Plants in Kesrwan
Ftouh . Organised by Friedrih Ebert Stiftung - Lebanon, Mubadarat- Development Initia-
tives. Harissa, Lebanon.
10. 2013, 20-22 February; 4th BEIRUT WATER WEEK Tehnologial Tools and Finaning
Mehanisms for IWRM: Complementing Hydrodiplomay & Climate Change Adaptation
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